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Introduction 
Black Americans seldom have spoken with a single voice. While a consen-
sus has always existed concerning the urgency of freedom and equality, 
blacks have disagreed about how these objectives were to be achieved. During 
the black struggles of the 1950s and 1960s, despite intergroup conflicts, lead-
ers of the major civil rights organizations spoke with rare unanimity about 
their quest for an integrated American society. Although they pursued com-
mon goals, they chose different tactics to attain them. Moreover, each played 
a special leadership role and made unique contributions to the civil rights 
movement. 
These national leaders, the "Big Six," defined the goals of the civil rights 
struggle and encouraged blacks and whites to respond to the call for "Free-
dom Now." James Farmer of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), Martin 
Luther King Jr. of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), and 
John Lewis and James Forman, spokesmen for the Student Nonviolent Co-
ordinating Committee (SNCC), represented activist organizations that used 
marches, freedom rides, sit-ins, and aggressive voter registration as their prin-
cipal tactics. 1 They believed that confrontations with racist institutions and 
protests against odious racial practices, particularly in the South, would re-
sult in progress for blacks. Although not on the frontline of civil rights pro-
test, Dorothy Height headed an important federation of black women's groups, 
the National Council of Negro Women. She lent valuable support to efforts 
to achieve racial equality. Roy Wilkins served as the executive director of the 
oldest and largest civil rights group, the National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People. Although the NAACP often sponsored marches, 
the organization stressed change through the legal and political system, par-
ticularly in the courts and through legislative lobbying. 
Whitney M. Young Jr., the militant but diplomatic head of the Na-
tional Urban League, also belonged to this leadership cadre. Like Farmer, 
King, and Forman, Young possessed impeccable activist credentials. In the 
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early 1950s, while he served as executive director of the Omaha Urban League, 
he planned strategy with the combative De Porres Club, a forerunner of the 
Nebraska affiliate of CORE. Later in the decade, when he was dean of the 
School of Social Work at Atlanta University, he became an officer in the local 
NAACP and an adviser to student protesters who challenged racial segregation 
in downtown Atlanta stores. Young appreciated the importance of activism 
to achieve civil rights, and he supported these efforts throughout his career. 
At the same time, he asserted with equal fervor that the National Urban 
League with its programs for job training and social services was best equipped 
to translate de jure victories into de facto equality for black Americans. 
Young's style of leadership differed significantly from that of King, 
Farmer, Wilkins, and Lewis and Forman. Other black leaders articulated the 
demands of black Americans with urgency and eloquence. Young voiced these 
same grievances, but he tried to reconcile them to the social and economic 
concerns of major white institutions. He interpreted the goals and grievances 
of black Americans to government, business, and foundations. He also sought 
ways to persuade powerful whites within these institutions that their support 
of the civil rights movement was consistent with their interests. He stressed 
that the achievement of political and economic equality would give blacks a 
stake in American society and would create a black middle class of entrepre-
neurs and consumers and a group of professional, technical, and blue-collar 
workers whose skills and productivity would enhance the American economy. 
While he helped government, business, and foundation leaders understand 
black demands, he developed specific programs to involve these officials in 
efforts to allay racial tensions and to ameliorate the black social and eco-
nomic condition. Young was a black ambassador to elite white leaders and 
institutions. He interpreted the grievances and concerns of each group to the 
other. 
Two perspectives have shaped assessments about Young. Tom Buckley, 
a New York Times reporter, in a 1970 article in his newspaper's Sunday maga-
zine posed the provocative question, "Whitney Young: Black Leader or 'Oreo 
Cookie'?" Buckley validated the idea that Young's successful interactions with 
establishment whites signaled compromises that disfavored the black popula-
tion and undermined his own racial militancy. So widespread was this 
misperception that, even before the Buckley article appeared, some militant 
blacks and antiestablishment whites called the League leader "Whitey" Young. 
A second perspective was promulgated by Nancy Weiss in Whitney M Young 
fr. and the Struggle for Civil Rights. Weiss stressed that the essence of Young's 
leadership lay in his cultivation of wealthy and influential whites in business, 
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philanthropy, and government. His emphasis on these constituencies shaped 
the perspectives and programs he inaugurated through the National Urban 
League. 
Missing from both perspectives are acknowledgments of how much the 
integrationism of middle- and working-class blacks influenced Young both as 
a local leader in the Twin Cities, Omaha, and Atlanta and as the executive 
director of the National Urban League. Militant Mediator carefully chronicles 
how Young in his public career drew unprecedented contributions to the civil 
rights movement from powerful and influential whites. At the same time this 
biography argues that Young vigorously sought and received endorsements of 
his leadership from blacks through their numerous churches, fraternities, 
voluntary organizations, and other institutions. "While Young aggressively 
pursued the support of whites in Fortune 500 corporations, major founda-
tions, and the federal government, he made similar efforts to mobilize inte-
grationist blacks whose views became increasingly overshadowed by smaller 
groups of Black Power proponents. Moreover, Young did not concede that 
black nationalists exclusively spoke for black ghetto residents. Through vari-
ous League initiatives he impacted their social and economic conditions and 
devised programs through which inner city blacks articulated their own per-
spectives and aspirations. 
As a leader, Young balanced the interests of middle- and working-class 
blacks with those of powerful and influential whites. His credibility with 
whites relied on his broad support within the black population. Although he 
was never viewed as a grassroots black leader like Martin Luther King Jr., 
Young still had as much tangible black support as his colleague in SCLC. This 
dimension of Young's leadership does not appear in the Buckley/Weiss inter-
pretations.2 
Three influences shaped the leadership of Whitney M. Young Jr. First, 
his parents had a profound impact on him. Loved and encouraged by both, 
he became a confident adult unashamed of his race and unintimidated by 
whites. From his father he learned how to negotiate with influential whites 
and reconcile his objectives with their interests. The elder Young headed Lin-
coln Institute in Lincoln Ridge, Kentucky. This secondary school provided 
high school training to blacks from numerous Kentucky communities with 
limited educational facilities for their minority students. The elder Young 
consciously emulated the pragmatism ofBookerT. Washington and his stress 
upon practical education. Also, like the Tuskegeean, Young successfully courted 
wealthy Kentucky whites and state officials and drew needed support to his 
financially vulnerable institution. By observing his father, Young learned how 
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to negotiate skillfully and effectively with powerful whites. From his mother, 
he learned that in some instances militant confrontation with racial injustices 
was necessary. Whenever her children were slighted or when a white sales 
clerk treated her family discourteously, Laura Ray Young almost never held 
her tongue. She also defended Lincoln Institute students in their encounters 
with local police. She and her husband helped to mold Young into a black 
leader skilled in the art of persuasion but ready to protest when white leaders 
and institutions seemed deaf to black demands. 
The Urban League was the second major influence that shaped Young's 
leadership. He spent nearly two decades as an official in this organization. 
Established in 1911, the National Urban League grew rapidly in the 1920s 
and succeeding decades because it provided a wide range of employment and 
social services to recent black arrivals to the cities. Since individual philan-
thropists, foundations, and corporations traditionally financed the group, 
most League officials knew that effective dealings with wealthy whites were 
required for success. Additionally, negotiations with employers, unions, and 
various government units, especially about jobs for blacks, required diplo-
macy. Although Whitney Young injected greater militancy into the National 
Urban League and involved it in more controversial issues, he expanded cor-
porate, foundation, and government contributions to the organization. His 
skill in presenting urgent racial issues in a nonconfrontational manner won 
him numerous supporters within these important institutions. 
Escalating black militancy during the 1950s and 1960s was the third 
major influence on Young. The Brown decision of 1954, in which the Su-
preme Court outlawed public school segregation, inspired blacks to under-
take greater activism to bring about the total demise of Jim Crow. One histo-
rian has written that the Brown decision was a "second emancipation 
proclamation" and that it "heightened the aspirations and expectations of 
Mro-Americans as nothing ever had before."3 A burgeoning civil rights move-
ment resulted. The Baton Rouge, Montgomery, and Tallahassee bus boycotts 
of the 1950s, the Little Rock crisis of 1957, and the Greensboro sit-ins of 
1960 mobilized blacks and sympathetic whites to demonstrate and protest 
until the federal government moved to end second-class citizenship for the 
nation's largest racial minority. When Young became executive director of the 
National Urban League in 1961, he wanted to revive a conservative organiza-
tion that viewed its role as narrowly oriented toward social service. His desire 
to make this change came mainly from two sources. First, Young had experi-
ence as an activist. Second, the growing militancy of that civil rights struggle 
compelled him to make forthright statements in support of black demands 
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for political and economic equality. With freedom rides, sit-ins, and marches 
occurring throughout the South and some parts of the North, Young wanted 
the National Urban League to get involved directly in the black struggle. He 
wanted blacks unmistakably to identifY him and the National Urban League 
with such activist groups as CORE, SCLC, SNCC, and the NAACP. At the same 
time, Young was able to persuade powerful whites that in the midst of these 
unsettled racial conditions, the National Urban League was the best equipped 
organization to implement programs to achieve actual black equality. As a 
result, funds flowing into the civil rights movement went not only to such 
activist leaders as King, Farmer, and Forman and the groups they represented, 
but also to Whitney M. Young Jr. and the National Urban League. 
Young made a major contribution to the civil rights movement through 
his audacious advocacy of creative programs for racial advancement and as a 
gifted and effective organizer and mediator. He suggested in 1963, for ex-
ample, that the federal government undertake a bold initiative, a "domestic 
Marshall Plan," and spend $145 million over the following decade. to reha-
bilitate black Americas. In 1968 he secured from the Ford Foundation a grant 
of $1,050,000 for the National Urban League to initiate a grassroots pro-
gram relevant to the immediate needs of particular black communities. This 
"New Thrust" effort allowed the National Urban League "to change ... from 
... a bridge between black and white communities to that of an advocate for 
... large, low-income ghetto areas." The League was to become less con-
cerned with interpreting black demands to powerful whites than with devel-
oping the capacity of blacks to define their own objectives and solutions. The 
League would deemphasize its ambassadorial role, assume the position of 
facilitator, and empower ghetto blacks. Young never understated the serious-
ness and depth of racial realities when trying to enlist corporate, government, 
and foundation assistance in attacking these problems. 
Moreover, Young played a key role in organizing black leaders and the 
groups they represented. With substantial backing from Stephen Currier of 
the Taconic Foundation and other contributors, Young helped to form the 
Council for United Civil Rights Leadership (CUCRL). The group consisted of 
the heads of major civil rights organizations, and they divided funds given to 
the coalition by several philanthropists. Young also realized that the National 
Urban League could assist blacks if organizations with similar goals became 
involved in tackling urban problems. Accordingly, he became a founder of 
the National Urban Coalition, a group which attempted in 1966 to forge 
formal alliances between business and government to solve urban ills. Young 
also reached out to Black Power advocates who espoused racial separatism 
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and physical resistance to white racism. In the late 1960s he helped Imamu 
Amiri Baraka in efforts to revive Newark, New Jersey, by deepening black 
participation in the city's political and economic decision making. He en-
dorsed the application of CORE, now a black separatist group, when officials 
sought foundation funding for a special project in Cleveland. Young never 
allowed his rapport with powerful whites to undermine his credibility with 
grassroots black organizations. He wanted blacks who populated the pews of 
black churches and filled the membership rolls of social, fraternal, profes-
sional, and service organizations to ratifY his leadership and endorse the 
interracialism he articulated. 
Each of the "Big Six" brought unique contributions and perspectives to 
the civil rights struggles of the 1950s and 1960s. With his stirring oratory; 
King drew upon the rich religious and cultural heritage of blacks to articulate 
in moral and democratic terms their hopes and aspirations. Wilkins used the 
NAACP'S numerous contacts in the White House and in Congress to get im-
portant civil rights legislation enacted. Farmer, Lewis, and Forman repre-
sented organizations that worked at the grassroots mobilizing blacks to regis-
ter to vote and urging them to challenge unjust racial practices through sit-ins, 
freedom rides, and marches. Height injected an organized female presence in 
a movement largely dependent on women's support, but one in which men 
held the most visible and influential positions. 
Whitney M. Young Jr., alone among these civil rights leaders, drew 
unprecedented financial support, mainly from foundations and corporations, 
to the civil rights movement. Although foundations had been involved in 
racial affairs for several decades, Young persuaded them to give larger amounts 
to the National Urban League and to other civil rights groups. Also, most 
businessmen, except for a notable few, had remained aloof from racial better-
ment organizations. Whitney Young changed that. He persuaded corporate 
leaders to give substantial contributions to his group, and he involved them 
more conspicuously in civil rights and urban affairs. He capitalized on his 
relationships with Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon to influence the 
appointment of blacks to key subcabinet and agency positions within the 
executive branch and to attract federal money to important League projects. 
Young was a pragmatist, an organizer, and a facilitator who built coali-
tions between factions of black integrationist leaders and later reached out to 
include younger and more militant Black Power advocates. At the same time, 
he solidified relationships with corporate leaders and foundation executives 
and involved them in the civil rights movement. He moved the once conser-
vative National Urban League into the thicket of the black struggles of the 
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1960s. Moreover, he changed its focus and direction when rioting in major 
cities and the rise of Black Power convinced him that the League clientele 
required greater input in the creation and implementation of programs aimed 
at assisting them. No longer would the organization confine its role to speak-
ing to powerful whites for poor urban blacks. It would now help inner-city 
residents to design programs and spearhead groups to express their needs and 
aspirations to white-controlled public and private institutions. 
Whitney M. Young Jr. was a mediator between deprived blacks and 
powerful whites, who tried to reconcile their different perspectives and inter-
ests. He also communicated to white Americans the integrationist vision of 
millions of middle- and working-class blacks who wanted an end to social 
and economic barriers based on race. What follows is a critical assessment of 
his leadership and his ambitious attempt to mobilize the resources of govern-
ment, corporations, and foundations to end the poverty, deprivation, and 
discrimination that lay at the core of racial inequality in the United States. 
1 
As the Twig Is Bent 
"\VJhenever Whitney M. Young Jr. mentioned his background in Ken-
W tucky, he identified himself and his native state as southern. He re-
membered that Jim Crow was as deeply entrenched in this border state as 
it was anywhere in the Old Confederacy. Segregated housing, schools, 
restaurants, libraries, and other public facilities were as much a part of 
Kentucky's racial landscape as they were Alabama's or Mississippi's. Yet, 
in some ways, Kentucky was different. Sixty years before Young was born, 
the state's nonslaveholding majority and its indigenous abolitionist move-
ment limited the influence of slaveholders. When the Civil War occurred, 
Kentucky, while retaining its commitment to the "peculiar institution," 
sided with the North and stayed in the Union. 1 Nonetheless, in ways 
that mattered most to blacks, Kentucky was no different from other south-
ern states. 
During Reconstruction most white Kentuckians denounced the Thir-
teenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. As Jim Crow evolved into 
legal form in the South in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
white Kentuckians imposed rigid racial segregation and discrimination on 
blacks. They were segregated as customers on public transportation, as pa-
trons of white businesses, and as clients of health and welfare agencies. Em-
ployment discrimination locked them out of better paying jobs and relegated 
them to menial occupations. Racial violence, like that which plagued Ala-
bama and Mississippi, was also present in Kentucky. Although blacks eventu-
ally secured the franchise, hostility from Democrats and indifference from 
Republicans limited their political influence. Louisville enacted a residential 
segregation ordinance in 1914 to lock in the physical separation of the races. 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the law in 1917 in Buchanan 
v. l%r~ the desire to maintain second-class citizenship for black Kentuck-
ians in no way disappeared. Any effort to promote racial equality and full 
integration met stiff resistance from white Kentuckians who wished their 
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state to observe the doctrine of separate but unequal as tenaciously as any 
Deep South state. Hence, Berea College, an interracial institution, yielded to 
the majority white sentiment, which espoused Jim Crow. The founding and 
fate of this interracial experiment was a part of Kentucky's ambiguous legacy 
to Whitney M. Young Jr.2 
Established in eastern Kentucky in 1855 by two white abolitionists, 
Berea College admitted both black and white students. In 1904, however, 
during the spread oflegalized Jim Crow throughout the South, the Kentucky 
legislature passed the Day Law, which banned integrated education. Berea 
supporters sympathetic to black Kentuckians wanted to build another school 
for them. As a result, Berea trustees raised funds and founded the Lincoln 
Institute near Simpsonville, Kentucky, in 1910. The Eckstein Norton School 
for Girls in Cane Spring, Kentucky, also merged into this new institution. 
Strongly influenced by Booker T. Washington's Tuskegee Institute, Lincoln 
stressed vocational training in agriculture, business, industrial and building 
trades, and steam and maintenance engineering. Women could enroll in home 
economics and pre-nursing courses. In 1912, eighty-five students, including 
Young's father, enrolled in Lincoln Institute. Within the next few years, his 
mother, Laura Ray, also enrolled.3 
Lincoln Institute, a high school, emerged out of Berea College separate 
and unequal. Since Young's parents spent most of their lives at this struggling 
institution as teachers and administrators, he learned firsthand about the re-
alities of race relations and the methods that black leaders used to improve 
the condition of their followers. Created in the image of Tuskegee Institute, 
Lincoln required its black faculty and staff to adopt an accommodationist 
philosophy and to emphasize practical education. To woo white benefactors 
and reassure white Kentuckians, Whitney M. Young Sr. did not present him-
self or Lincoln Institute as threats to the racial status quo. As a teacher at 
Lincoln from 1920 to 1935 and afterwards as president, the elder Young, 
who depended heavily on white contributors, seldom antagonized powerful 
Kentucky whites with strident demands for black equality. In numerous 
speeches and articles he extolled vocational education and promoted hard 
work and religious piety. He emulated the leadership style and educational 
aims espoused by Booker T. Washington. At the same time, Young searched 
for any cracks or openings in Kentucky's Jim Crow system to advance his 
students and other blacks beyond the restraints of racial segregation and sec-
ond-class citizenship. The techniques and strategies he employed to draw 
white support to Lincoln Institute later proved instructive to his son. 
Whitney Moore Young Jr. was born on July 31, 1921, in Lincoln Ridge, 
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Kentucky, a village that embraced the Lincoln Institute campus and the resi-
dences of the school's faculty and staff. He grew up with his two sisters, Arnita 
and Eleanor, born in 1920 and 1922. Their mother, Laura, was born in Leba-
non, Kentucky, in August 1896. Her parents, Richard and Ella Ray, were 
native Kentuckians, both born in 1860, probably as slaves. Married in 1881, 
Richard Ray operated a sulphur well and sold its special water to an interra-
cial clientele to support his wife and ten children. For a time, Laura's older 
siblings worked to supplement the family income. Mary taught school, and 
Abe and George became farm laborers. In spite of these financial struggles, 
the Rays lived in their own mortgage-free home in 1900. Laura met Young at 
Lincoln Institute, and they married in 1914. She continued her education at 
Kentucky State College and taught school. After graduation, the Youngs lived 
in Detroit before returning to Lincoln Institute in 1920. Until her death in 
1962, Laura Ray Young assumed numerous roles in the small Lincoln Ridge 
community.4 
She was a firm disciplinarian who required her children to dress impec-
cably and to conduct themselves in a courteous and respectful manner. Al-
though she was strict with her daughters, her jovial son, Whitney, whom 
everyone called Junior, frequently could get her to smile even when she at-
tempted to teach him a serious lesson in proper behavior. Affectionately known 
as "Mother Dear" by her children and later her grandchildren, Laura Ray 
Young was a gracious and formal woman who wanted her offspring to be 
credits to their family and set positive examples for Lincoln Institute students 
who were sometimes deprived of such parental guidance.5 
Mrs. Young's conscientious rearing of her three children, however, did 
not preclude deep involvement in the lives of Lincoln Institute students. To 
numerous Lincoln youth, her home-cooked meals were far superior to food 
prepared by the campus dietitians. Those audacious enough to knock on her 
door were seldom turned away. Occasionally, she went to nearby Simpsonville 
and Shelbyville to buy clothing for needy students. She also intervened with 
the police whenever Lincoln youth were wrongly accused of misconduct. 
During her husband's teaching and administrative career at Lincoln Insti-
tute, she became a campus matriarch, always ready to correct a pupil's poor 
English or offer advice to a troubled student. Unlike her spouse, Laura Ray 
Young openly defied Jim Crow practices and flouted them whenever she could. 
It was the custom in Simpsonville and Shelbyville stores that blacks were 
prohibited from trying on garments before purchase. Mrs. Young firmly and 
successfully resisted this policy when it involved her children and Lincoln 
Institute students. In 1945, she became the postmistress at Lincoln Ridge, 
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Kentucky. This position provided her with an independent, professional iden-
tity unusual among black women in Kentucky. 6 
Young probably inherited his assertive and outspoken attributes from 
his mother. He learned different lessons, however, from his father. For nearly 
fifty years, the elder Young served Lincoln Institute as a teacher, athletic coach, 
and administrator. Working in a border state riddled with Jim Crow, Young 
was tied to a school that stressed vocational education. Whites believed such 
training would prepare blacks for practical occupations that would not chal-
lenge the racial status quo. Like Booker T. Washington, the elder Young did 
not articulate black aspirations or define black goals in ways inimical to white 
interests. He also worked surreptitiously to limit the influence of white preju-
dices upon black education and to circumvent Jim Crow whenever integra-
tion was an attainable objective. When he wished to introduce electrical en-
gineering into his school's curriculum, for example, he presented the proposal 
to white supporters as a janitorial course. Although his professional standing 
in Kentucky education depended on the existence of segregated institutions, 
Young initially endorsed efforts to integrate schools in his state. A pragmatic, 
resourceful educator skilled in racial diplomacy, he set a compelling example 
for his son, who achieved similar success in his dealings with influential whites 
in government, business, and philanthropy. 
Born in Midway, Kentucky, in November 1895, Whitney M. Young Sr. 
grew up in poorer circumstances than his wife. Taylor Young, his father, was 
born in March 1855, and his mother, Anne Henderson, was born in May 
1864. Taylor worked as a farm laborer, and his wife earned money as a cook. 
In 1900, they did not own the home in which they reared their daughter and 
two sons. Although Whitney knew little about his father's ancestors, he learned 
plenty about his maternal relatives? 
His mother's parents were Harve and Winnie Henderson. Grandfather 
Harve, born a slave near Georgetown, Kentucky, took the surname Henderson 
from the wealthy white family who held him in bondage. He did not remem-
ber his parents because he had been sold away from them while still a small 
boy, "a fact he mentioned with considerable pain." ''A full-blooded Negro," 
Harve Henderson died at the age of eighty-four early in the 1900s while 
married to his fourth wife. Whitney Sr. knew less about his grandmother, 
Winnie Henderson, "a half-blooded Indian." While still in slavery, Winnie's 
physical beauty and "her long wavy black curls ... brought her favour with 
her old master." Whether this meant that she received better treatment than 
other slaves or that she had a personal relationship with her owner is unclear. 
In any case, Harve Henderson fathered all five of their children, one son and 
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four daughters: Harve, Polly, Birtie, Bettie, and Anne. In 1880 Anne married 
Taylor Young, and they became the parents of five children, not all of whom 
survived infancy. Whitney M. Young Sr. was the second oldest. 
Unlike the Rays, the relatives of his future wife, Young's immediate 
family lacked even an elementary education. His father, Taylor Young, was 
literate, but neither his mother nor his brother could read or write. Perhaps 
his brother who worked as a house servant stayed out of school to supple-
ment the family income. Apparently, the Young family encouraged Whitney 
to get an education. He attended elementary school in Frankfort, Kentucky, 
and enrolled at the Chandler Normal School of Lexington, Kentucky, where 
he finished the ninth grade. When he was graduated in 1912, a white teacher 
persuaded him to enter the new Lincoln Institute. Because Taylor Young was 
too poor to offer his son any financial assistance, Whitney found a job at the 
Lincoln Institute dairy farm. 8 
The founders of Lincoln Institute greatly admired Booker T. Washing-
ton and aimed to make Lincoln a "Tuskegee in Kentucky." Two trustees vis-
ited Tuskegee Institute to find ways to mold Lincoln in the image of 
Washington's school. Consequently, when Lincoln Institute opened in 1912, 
it offered industrial and agricultural courses. As a student at Lincoln, Young 
pursued engineering. His training included the repair and maintenance of 
electrical fixtures and boilers, plumbing, and other practical skills. He was 
graduated from Lincoln in 1916, but school officials were so impressed with 
him that they invited him to return the following year to teach mathematics 
and social studies.9 
World War I inaugurated a massive black migration from the agricul-
tural South to the industrial North that lasted from 1916 to 1930. Thou-
sands of blacks went to Chicago, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, and Detroit to take 
advantage of better employment opportunities and a freer social environ-
ment. Whitney and Laura Young joined this migration to the Motor City. 
His training at Lincoln Institute proved attractive to the Detroit United Rail-
way Company, which hired him as an engineer. 
On March 21, 1918, however, the U.S. army drafted him. Mustered in 
at Georgetown, Kentucky, Young received his basic training at Camp Sherman, 
near Chillicothe, Ohio. He served in Company F of the 317th Engineers, 
92d Division. Shipped overseas on June 10, 1918, he saw action in France 
from late August until November 11 when the armistice was signed. He re-
turned to the United States on April 14, 1919, and was honorably discharged 
at Camp Sherman, Ohio, two weeks later. 1o 
Cosmopolitan experiences in France and other parts of Europe trans-
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formed black soldiers, many of whom came from the racially restrictive South. 
Their enlarged perspectives made it difficult for some to return to provincial 
southern towns where their sophistication posed grave threats to the racial 
status quo. Young resumed his job in Detroit. Although he made more money 
there than in Kentucky, Young felt possessed by a mission. Lincoln Institute 
was in his blood. Apparently, he envied the numerous black and white admin-
istrators and teachers who educated the hundreds of underprivileged students 
who matriculated at the school. In any case, after another year in the Motor 
City; Young joined the staff of his alma mater at a sharply reduced salary. 11 
Between 1920 and 1935; Young served Lincoln Institute as an engi-
neering teacher, football coach, and dean of men. Like Booker T. Washing-
ton, he believed that vocational training met the educational and employ-
ment needs of the black population. For Young, education provided a means 
to reduce "friction between the races." He contended that training in the 
trades helped blacks to develop economically and morally: "When the Negro 
shall have become a greater producer rather than a consumer, a lender rather 
than a borrower, an economic asset rather than a liability, he will have a 
proper foundation for building the higher things." He further asserted, ''All 
labor is dignified when done in a dignified manner." Young praised two Lin-
coln Institute alumni who worked as Pullman porters. They advanced to 
porters in charge "due to lessons in reliability and promptness taught them at 
Lincoln." 12 
Young also declared that his field of engineering imparted a wide range 
of employable skills to Lincoln students. He noted that janitors needed a 
knowledge of electricity, plumbing, steam fitting, and steam boiler opera-
tion. Blacks who worked as factory employees, managers and supervisors of 
large office buildings, and power plant operators would find engineering use-
ful in their occupations. Optimistically, he pointed out that blacks had op-
portunities to open plumbing, electrical, and repair shops in cities and that 
"many sympathetic white architects and contractors are not prejudiced and 
will give work to trained, dependable Negro men." Again Young cited a suc-
cessful Lincoln alumnus who wisely chose to study engineering: ''After leav-
ing the Institute he secured work as a chauffeur at the Kentucky Children's 
Home. Seeing a new power plant being erected, he went to the superinten-
dent and asked if he might have the position of running the plant .... He 
told him he had finished a course in it at Lincoln Institute .... Not only did 
this boy make good and is still operating the plant ... but he came back to 
the school and got six more boys when the superintendent told him he could 
use six more like him." Also like theTuskegeean, Young contended that "trade 
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and business men make the middle class of the race .... The middle class is 
the feeder for the professional class and the masses." Hence, "the plight of the 
Negro ... is traceable to this malicious and suicidal neglect."13 
Young worked under four white presidents. These administrators, how-
ever, failed to strengthen the school financially and increase enrollments. Be-
tween 1925 and 1935 the student body decreased from 131 to 81. In 1935 
the trustees decided to close Lincoln Institute, payoff its debts, and use the 
remaining funds to send students to other institutions. Before final action 
was taken, Young and J. Mansir Tydings, the white business manager, pre-
sented a "Faith Plan" to the trustees. Young and Tydings believed that deep 
religious faith would resurrect this moribund institution. Specifically, the plan 
freed the trustees from their fiscal responsibilities to the school. Bills would 
be paid before funds were disbursed for salaries. Since black support was 
crucial, a black, preferably Whitney Young, would assume the presidency. 
Since the trustees had no other options, they endorsed this last-ditch effort to 
keep the school open. 
The confidence of Young and Tydings apparently impressed Lincoln 
teachers and potential benefactors, both black and white. At Young's urging, 
the faculty traveled throughout Kentucky to recruit students. Within two 
weeks 125 applied for admission. Fortuitously, a wealthy black in Lexington, 
Kentucky, died and left $10,000 to Lincoln Institute. Embarrassed white 
trustees and supporters, shamed by such generous black philanthropy, fol-
lowed with their own contributions. Young coaxed free health services from 
black doctors and reorganized the farming operation with greater student 
participation. Within two years, Young had turned Lincoln Institute around. 
Enrollments climbed, salaries rose, financial contributions increased, and even 
the institute farm showed a profit. 14 
Young, the pragmatist, accepted the reality of racial segregation in Ken-
tucky education and used it for Lincoln's maximum benefit. Charles W. Ander-
son Jr., a Louisville lawyer and the state's only black legislator, sponsored a 
bill in 1938 that directly aided Lincoln Institute. Since most Kentucky com-
munities failed to provide high schools for blacks, the new law offered state 
funds to underwrite transportation costs and tuition for students who wished 
to attend Lincoln Institute or some other high school within the state. Young 
corresponded with Anderson, supported his efforts, and later advocated more 
state involvement with Lincoln Institute. By 1944, for example, Lincoln was 
designated a teacher training laboratory high school for Kentucky State Col-
lege for Negroes. Much to Young's pleasure, the state commenced a biennial 
appropriation of $42,000 to support the program. IS 
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As Lincoln deepened its relationship with Kentucky's education de-
partment, the credentials of Young and his faculty came under closer scru-
tiny. In 1938 Young earned his B.A. from Louisville Municipal College after 
several years of night school, summer school, and extension courses. Soon 
the state educational commissioner urged him to pursue a master's degree. 
Segregation forced him to go out of state to the all-black Fisk University in 
Nashville, Tennessee, where in 1944 he received the M.A. Compelled to emu-
late their president, Lincoln faculty in 1952 included ten teachers with cred-
its beyond the master's, five with work above the bachelor's, and three with 
specialized technical training. 16 
Young's visibility as an educator drew him into Kentucky's black leader-
ship class. Although he publicly eschewed partisan politics, he learned to deal 
successfully with Kentucky politicians and gain support for his school. His 
friend Charles H. Parrish Jr., a professor at Louisville Municipal College, 
admired Young's "detailed knowledge of Kentucky" and his "appraisal of the 
political crosscurrents" of their native state. A succession of governors and 
other state officials appointed him to numerous positions and committees. 
From 1935 to 1943 Young served as the state's assistant supervisor for Negro 
education. In 1944 he served on the Governor's Commission on Negro Af-
fairs. The state superintendent of public instruction commended Young in 
1945 as an effective coordinator of the Negro High School Principals Con-
ference. In 1952 the state director of vocational education appointed him to 
evaluate the West Kentucky Vocational Training School for Negroes in 
Paducah. In each of these positions Young approached the separate-but-equal 
doctrine in a serious and, at times, self-serving way. In 1947, for example, as 
a state supervisor for Negro education, he investigated schools in Carroll 
County. He angered whites and blacks in the town of Ghent when he sug-
gested that black students seek their education elsewhere, perhaps at better 
black facilities in Paducah, Louisville, or Lincoln Ridge. He had harshly criti-
cized Ghent for its "antiquated" and "dilapidated" Negro school. Although 
residents wanted to build a new Negro school, Young probably wanted blacks 
to get a Class A education, with state aid, beyond Carroll Country, probably 
at Lincoln Institute. 17 
A succession of state appointments and his presidency of Lincoln Insti-
tute made Young an important spokesman for Kentucky blacks. He became 
president in 1948 of the Negro Section of the Kentucky Education Associa-
tion, after an unsuccessful bid in the 1930s. In 1950 Young joined with Frank 
L. Stanley, publisher of the Louisville Defender, a black weekly, to launch a 
Commission on Negro Affairs. Young wanted to include civil rights groups, 
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churches, and political organizations to "make democracy a reality" and im-
prove "all Negro institutions and living conditions of the masses of our people." 
As a columnist for the Defender, he challenged Stanley and other black Lou-
isville leaders to "extend your influence beyond the city." He noted that there 
was "tremendous ... suffering in every section of the state due to the lack of 
intelligent organized leadership," and he asked, "Why not use some of your 
fine leadership qualities in helping the people in the rural areas?" He soon 
j~ined the Kentucky Division of the Southern Regional Council, an interra-
cial organization devoted to the study and improvement of race relations. 18 
As an educator, Young articulated a conservative philosophy in part to 
attract white support to Lincoln Institute and other black Kentucky schools. 
He advocated the expansion of agricultural and shop courses in secondary 
schools, and he urged a greater emphasis on business, engineering, and sci-
ence. The manager of the Foust O'Bannon School in Louisville, an institu-
tion that trained domestics, seamstresses, stenographers, and shoe repairmen, 
praised Young for his cooperation. Apparently the O'Bannon School had 
accepted students whom Young had recommended. His educational philoso-
phy seemed confirmed when Fred Njilima, a Lincoln Institute classmate, 
built a school in Africa's Nyasaland modeled after their alma mater. 19 
Although Young remained cautious, he desired an immediate end to 
legalized racial segregation. In 1954, he greeted news of the landmark Brown 
decision, which outlawed public school segregation, like a second emancipa-
tion proclamation. The attainment of integration, however, placed some black 
institutions and organizations in jeopardy. Young pragmatically proposed that 
such groups devise plans to demonstrate their importance in a desegregated 
Kentucky. At the time of the Brown decision, Young presided over the Ken-
tucky Negro Education Association (KNEA) and promoted the interests of 
black teachers and students. Nonetheless, he backed a merger between the 
KNEA and its white counterpart, the Kentucky Education Association. De-
spite the failure of this early effort, Young suggested that his organization 
change its name to the Kentucky Teachers Association (KTA) because the in-
clusion of the word Negro in KNEA "delimits" and "prevents others from join-
ing our ranks."20 
Young also envisaged a special role for Lincoln Institute in the desegre-
gation of public facilities in Kentucky. He asserted that his school was well 
positioned among state-supported institutions to offer vocational education 
in engineering, agriculture, construction, pre-nursing, and home economics. 
"Kentucky has a great opportunity to expand its vocational services by devel-
oping Lincoln Institute," Young contended. The promise of Brown, how-
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ever, remained unfulfilled for Young despite Kentucky's acquiescence to the 
court decision. In 1955 it seemed clear that black Kentucky students who 
attended Lincoln Institute, a Class A high school, would have to integrate 
white institutions of lesser quality. Young candidly told a federal official that 
some people thought that "because a thing is white it is all right. They disre-
gard the ... enriched curriculum of Negro schools because they are Negro 
schools. There are thousands of white children in Kentucky that need the 
services of Lincoln Institute and we do not object to opening our doors to all 
races."21 
Clearly, Young saw integration as a mutual effort to desegregate both 
black and white schools so that outstanding institutions like Lincoln would 
survive. He sadly predicted that Negro schools with poor equipment and 
dilapidated buildings would close and cause black teachers "to lose out com-
pletely." He hoped that well-trained black educators would be hired in previ-
ously all-white schools. To reciprocate he advised black colleges to hire white 
faculty. Mournfully, he wrote in 1954, "It is ... a sad commentary on Ameri-
can democracy that a people should be held down for over two hundred years 
and denied the necessary funds to build decent schools and then should be 
called upon in the name of justice to give up the little they have so that justice 
might be done to all."22 The onus of integration, he believed, unfairly bur-
dened and jeopardized black institutions worthy of financial support and 
further academic development. 
Subsequent events seemed to justifY whatever fears Young may have 
had about the future of Lincoln Institute. Since the 1950s he believed that 
desegregation harmed black institutions and the black professionals affiliated 
with them. Within a decade after the Brown decision, black school closings 
in Kentucky reduced the number of black principals whom Young knew from 
twenty-five to four. This unpleasant reality compelled Young to insist that his 
successor at Lincoln should be black. To safeguard Lincoln Institute, Young 
lessened his enthusiasm for integration and defended the integrity of pre-
dominantly black schools. As his enrollments declined, Young proposed two 
strategies to keep his school open. They included unsuccessful attempts to 
preserve Lincoln as a black facility and several plans to develop the school as 
an integrated institution. 
Throughout Young's tenure as head of Lincoln Institute, the school 
owed its survival to legalized racial segregation. Numerous local and country 
school boards in Kentucky found it cheaper to send black students to Lin-
coln Institute rather than to build separate educational facilities. Mter the 
Brown decision, however, more black students entered previously all-white 
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schools. As a result, enrollments at Lincoln dropped. For a time, Young de-
pended on the school boards in nearby Simpsonville and Shelbyville to main-
tain their traditional arrangement. In the early 1960s one-third of Lincoln's 
student body was black. The addition of evening classes, an expanded voca-
tional curriculum, and high school equivalency courses helped to bolster sag-
ging enrollments. Despite the general decline in Lincoln's student popula-
tion, white and black supporters of the institution agreed to keep it open 
until Young's retirement in 1966. 
Young did not want Lincoln to close. Between 1966 and 1970 he and 
other Lincoln supporters pursued and discussed numerous strategies to keep 
it open. Efforts to establish it as a private boarding school for children of 
black professionals failed. In 1967, Lincoln Institute became part of the Uni-
versity of Kentucky and functioned as an interracial preparatory school for 
gifted but disadvantaged youth. For the three years that this program existed, 
Samuel Robinson, whom Young hired in 1960 as a biology teacher and later 
as his administrative assistant, served as principal. In 1970 the effort ended. 
Young believed that the state discontinued funding because "interracial boy-
girl relationships" were "too much" for whites in surrounding Shelby County. 
Soon thereafter, the trustees of the Lincoln Foundation, an indepen-
dent philanthropy which had aided Lincoln Institute since its inception, dis-
cussed ways to revive the school. One proposed that Lincoln Institute be-
come a branch of Berea College and educate urban blacks either in vocational 
subjects or in remedial courses needed for college admission. Under the terms 
of another proposal, Lincoln would serve as a state-supported vocational high 
school for '~ppalachian white and ghetto black students from the Louisville 
area." In other recommendations Lincoln would become a community col-
lege in the University of Kentucky system or an academy for Seventh-Day 
Adventists. Trustees discovered, however, that each possibility had limitations. 
One board member thought, for example, that "reestablishing Lincoln as a 
vocational high school is turning the clock backward The old Booker T. 
Washington concept of what was good for black people in his time does not 
speak to the present aspirations of the people to learn how to think for them-
selves, and for their community, rather than to learn how to serve the white 
man for better wages." Ironically, the death of Whitney M. Young Jr. in 1971 
created another alternative. In 1972 the campus of Lincoln Institute became 
the site of the federally financed Whitney M. Young Jr. Job Corps Center. 
True to the Lincoln heritage, the center imparted skills and vocational train-
ing to disadvantaged black youth.23 
As an important black Kentucky educator and leader, the career of 
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Whitney M. Young Sr. held profound significance for his son. Legalized ra-
cial segregation shaped southern black leadership in the generation before the 
civil rights movement. Black spokesmen developed close ties with sympa-
thetic but conservative whites who, while believing in the racial inferiority of 
blacks, supported efforts to improve their social and economic conditions in 
ways consistent with Jim Crow. 24 To attain such support black leaders articu-
lated goals for blacks that did not threaten white interests. This style of black 
leadership exemplified by Booker T. Washington influenced Whitney M. 
Young Sr., who stressed diplomacy and caution in his dealings with whites. 
He was not an "Uncle Tom." He believed strongly in black institutions under 
proud black leadership. He promoted racial integration whenever he could 
exploit a crack in the Jim Crow system. Ultimately, however, Young was a 
pragmatic leader who recognized that black objectives had to be reconciled to 
racial realities. His son learned these leadership techniques, but he used them 
to change racial realities and redefine and harmonize black and white inter-
ests in ways that enhanced racial equality. The elder Young was effective in his 
interaction with powerful whites. Despite his success, he negotiated with whites 
not as an equal but as a shrewd supplicant. His equally wise and diplomatic 
son approached whites with a directness and an urgency which would have 
been anathema to his father's generation. 
The relationship between father and son was especially close. The elder 
Young gave advice and kept careful watch over his son's evolving career. On 
several occasions, he wrote to his son's employers, all of whom were black, 
hoping that they, like surrogate fathers, would promote and oversee Whitney's 
professional development. He asked S. Vincent Owens, executive director of 
the St. Paul Urban League, who hired Young as industrial relations secretary, 
to give his son the training and experience he needed to advance within the 
National Urban League. He expressed similar sentiments to his friend Rufus 
E. Clement, president of Atlanta University, where Whitney would spend six 
years as dean of the School of Social Work. "I want to take this opportunity," 
wrote Young, "to express our appreciation for your interest in our son. We 
realize that it was largely through your influence that he was employed at 
Atlanta University."25 
At critical junctures in Young's evolving career he received advice and 
instruction from Owens, Clement, and Lester B. Granger, executive director 
of the National Urban League. All were contemporaries of his father, born 
between 1895 and 1909. They exposed him to effective black leadership strat-
egies in dealing successfully with powerful white businessmen, philanthro-
pists, and politicians. Young learned the uses of caution and diplomacy. Since 
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these men, especially his father, were also proud black leaders who were asser-
tive when whites perpetrated egregious injustices against blacks, Young learned 
that circumspect advocacy for blacks at times had to yield to urgent and 
militant articulation of black demands for equality and fair play. 
Whitney Jr. matured into a polished, versatile, diplomatic, but assertive 
black leader. His father acknowledged this fact in comments about Omaha 
residents who praised his son's successful efforts in race relations. The elder 
Young noted, "It is a rare thing ... for anyone to receive such complimentary 
letters from so many important people." In amazement he added, "We all 
have a few enemies ... but, it seems that ... you have manipulated things so 
skillfully that you made friends of potential enemies."26 Native ability par-
tially explained Young's career successes. Parental example and nurture were 
also responsible. Perhaps the relationship between another important black 
leader and his parents will illustrate this point. 
In writing about Martin Luther King Jr. and his unusual capacity to 
love, sacrifice, inspire, and lead, the noted black psychologist Allison Davis, 
in Leadership, Love, and Aggression, asserted that the civil rights leader "had 
the incredible good fortune to be loved by both his mother and father .... 
His personality seems to have combined his mother's intelligence and tender-
ness with his father's stubbornness, endurance, and fortitude." Davis further 
noted that King's "ego was strengthened in his very first years by learning to 
deal with a father who was tenacious, stubborn, enduring, and responsible." 
Moreover, his "identification with his father made Martin ... increasingly 
stubborn but patient, determined, but enduring and responsible-the image 
of his father." Consequently, King became "the first great Negro-American 
leader born of securely married parents of good economic position. He was 
also the only leader whose father did not early desert or deny him. Martin 
was his father's pride and joy."27 
Davis could have added that Martin Luther King Jr., like his father, be-
came a Baptist preacher committed to social activism. In 1935, for example, 
the elder King led a black voter registration demonstration to Atlanta's city hall, 
an unprecedented display of black assertiveness. King gained from his father a 
concept of the black church ministry that required militant leadership from the 
pulpit.28 
Davis was wrong, however, when he asserted that Martin Luther King Jr. 
was "the first great Negro-American leader born of securely married parents of 
good economic position" who deeply loved their son. Young shared this dis-
tinction. Both had fathers who achieved unusual success despite the constraints 
of legalized racial inequality. Both imbibed characteristics that shaped their 
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leadership style and how they dealt with whites. As sons deeply cherished by 
their parents, King and Young developed into confident, courageous, and 
creative black leaders. 
Their fathers, both integrationists, made them heirs to two different 
traditions in black leadership style. Martin Luther King Sr., an assertive black 
Baptist preacher, passed on to his son the mantle of militant ministerial leader-
ship. The son brought this tradition into full flower in the Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference. The Kings as pastors in the black church possessed 
greater independence than the Youngs, who labored in black institutions 
dependent on white financial support. Whitney M. Young Sr. headed a black 
secondary school that relied on the favor of whites. Caution and diplomacy 
offered the best means to achieve his objectives. Once he told Whitney, "I 
hope you will continue to be constructive and liberal in all your thinking .... 
Many problems connected with human beings cannot be solved in a day or 
even a thousand years, therefore it is highly important that one should exercise 
sound judgment and patience in trying to find a solution to many human 
problems. "29 His son observed the success of these methods and used them in 
the Urban League, an organization whose existence depended on such leader-
ship strategies. Nonetheless, King and Young became noted black spokesmen 
in the 1960s at a time when the civil rights movement had become increasingly 
militant. Black leaders, including Young, no matter how moderate, adapted 
their rhetoric and programs to fit these new realities in the black struggle for 
equality. Whatever inclination Young had toward militancy came largely from 
interaction with his mother. She resisted Jim Crow and refused to submit to 
its required practices. Diplomacy and circumspection characterized Young's 
leadership, but he blended these approaches with demands for immediate 
attention to racial problems and for urgent action to eliminate the "tangle of 
pathology" which afflicted the black population. This impatience with racial 
injustice dearly came from his mother. 
Young also deeply respected and admired his father. In 1955, Monrovia 
College, a missionary school in Liberia run by the African Methodist Episcopal 
Church, conferred upon the elder Young an honorary doctor of education 
degree. His son wrote to him with "extreme pleasure and pride" upon learning 
of this achievement. "It is reassuring and encouraging to see" honors "come 
to those who ... merit and deserve them."30 Seldom did Young miss an op-
portunity to bring his father's hard-won accomplishments to the attention 
of others. Ralph Edwards of the popular This Is Your Life television program 
considered a tribute to Whitney M. Young Sr. When his son learned of this 
possibility, he wrote to Edwards to urge a commitment. Young reviewed 
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his father's long years of service and sacrifice at Lincoln Institute. He told of 
his father's struggle to earn his B.A. and M.A. degrees. He added, "In the 
midst of all this he remained the ideal father and husband and companion to 
all of his children .... In spite of continuous limited financial resources, we, 
as children, were never made to feel any insecurity. His burden in this respect 
was shared only by his wife and consequently each of the children was sent 
off to school and received the necessities and even some of the luxuries, un-
aware of the very great sacrifice that was being made." Unfortunately, Edwards 
never did the show.31 
Young did not learn from his father in Pavlovian fashion. He had a 
mind of his own and used it in mature interaction with the elder Young. As 
his career evolved, he advised and consulted with his father as a peer, espe-
cially on Lincoln Institute affairs. Young Sr., respectful of his son's expertise, 
drew him to the Lincoln Foundation board of trustees in 1964. Young's unani-
mous election came at a time when integration challenged the existence of 
Lincoln Institute as a segregated school with a special mission to Kentucky 
blacks. The elder Young told his son, "I am particularly interested in your 
selection because ... the Foundation money belongs to Lincoln Institute as 
long as it is a school" and because the endowment should be increased to 
$125,000, "the point where it was originally." He added, "Lincoln Institute 
will continue to serve some special needs of the Negro people." With his 
impending retirement in mind, Young told his son that he wanted him to be 
actively involved in Lincoln Foundation affairs, "so that you can know ex-
actly what is going on at the institution which gave you life and your first big 
boost into the arena of the great." He advised his son to draw his own conclu-
sions from the reports.32 
His son did just that. As more black students took advantage of educa-
tional options created by public school integration, enrollments at Lincoln 
Institute declined. Young advised his father to consider alternative programs 
for the school. Lincoln, he believed, had served its purpose and had to change.33 
Young used his influence with the Rockefeller Foundation, to whose board 
he belonged, to support the joint application of the Lincoln Foundation and 
the Academic Affairs Committee of the National Association of Intergroup 
Relations Officials for $166,000 to establish university-based Intergroup 
Relations Study Centers. The program would train students for careers "in 
intelligent social action." Leading scholars would develop a curriculum. The 
Lincoln Foundation would administer the grant and operate centers at three 
universities in Oklahoma, Massachusetts, and Georgia that would test the 
effectiveness of the program.34 Although Rockefeller did not fund this pro-
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posal, Young's influence probably persuaded the agency to support a special 
project at Thomas More College in Covington, Kentucky. The Lincoln School, 
short-lived successor to the Lincoln Institute, educated gifted but disadvan-
taged black students. Since this state-funded effort ended in 1970, the 
Rockefeller Foundation agreed to grant $68,000 to assist Lincoln juniors and 
seniors. An accelerated summer program allowed juniors to finish their se-
nior subjects and graduate. Ten Lincoln seniors would receive two years of 
full financial support to attend Thomas More College.35 Such examples of 
Young's influence pleased his father and probably reinforced his respect for 
his son as a peer whose advice and counsel even the elder Young felt com-
pelled to seek. 
Whitney M. Young Jr., a major black spokesman who mingled with 
powerful whites in business, government, and philanthropy, bore the im-
print of his parents and other black leaders in the years preceding the civil 
rights movement. Diplomatic advocacy for black concerns became part of his 
leadership style. Deeply loved by both parents, Young became a confident 
and secure adult. He was sure of his talents and goals and was unafraid to 
challenge major white institutions with both caution and militancy to open 
opportunities to aspiring black Americans. 
2 
Growing Up 
with Jim Crow 
"\VJhitney M. Young Jr. grew up in the segregated South. Separate and 
W unequal conditions existed in every facet of black life including educa-
tion, employment, housing, and public accommodations. For Young, how-
ever, racial segregation did not affect him seriously. He was sheltered by his 
mother and father and exposed to unusually talented black professionals at 
Lincoln Institute, at Kentucky State College, and in Louisville among his 
parents' social peers. Reared in a comfortable middle-class environment, Young 
was occasionally cushioned from the harsh realities ofJim Crow. From child-
hood to early manhood, separate black institutions shaped his experiences 
and perspectives. Educated by black teachers, including his father, Young's 
exposure to whites was limited. Mter he was graduated from college, where 
he was a pre-med major, he worked as a teacher and coach at a black high 
school. He wished eventually to join the black elite as a physician. Within the 
black community as Whitney M. Young, M.D., he would command a high 
income and attain social prestige. Although some black doctors became noted 
leaders who challenged the racial status quo, most were content to practice 
medicine inconspicuously and enjoy their status as valued participants in 
black bourgeois society. fu a physician, Young probably would have had a 
black clientele, belonged to black fraternities and social clubs, and joined 
black medical groups. There would be little need to venture beyond the black 
community for professional or social associations. 1 
Young's World War II experiences, however, turned him in another di-
rection. fu a noncommissioned officer in a black army company overseas, he 
discovered that his talents lay in interracial mediation. He settled numerous 
disputes between black soldiers and their white superiors. fu a result, Young 
now knew that he could move blacks beyond Jim Crow institutions and prac-
tices toward broader social and economic opportunities. He no longer viewed 
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segregated institutions as shelters from a hostile white world but as impedi-
ments to fuller black advancement. 
In Kentucky Jim Crow affected every aspect ofWhitney Young's imme-
diate environment. In nearby Shelbyville he had to sit in segregated theater 
balconies. He also saw white and colored signs above water fountains and rest 
rooms. On trips to Louisville with his father he could eat meals only in the 
black section of town. The same racial restrictions existed for him in educa-
tion. Because Young was a precocious youngster, the local white postmistress 
volunteered to teach him to read and write, skills which he attained by age 
four and a halE His tutorials continued until he was nine years old. At that 
time he entered a segregated elementary school in Simpsonville. Called the 
Lincoln Model School, this facility was maintained for the town's black stu-
dents. Children of Lincoln Institute faculty and staff and those from the all-
black village of Montclair also attended. Fortunately, the school benefited 
from teachers and various instructional aids made available by Lincoln Insti-
tute.2 
Racial segregation mandated disrespect for blacks and subjected both 
adolescents and adults to incredible indignities. Not only did Young hear 
"nigger, nigger" on the way to Simpsonville's segregated elementary school, 
but he watched white townspeople, many of whom needed the patronage of 
Lincoln Institute, struggle to call his father Professor or Reverend, but never 
Mister. Segregation was a fact oflife. No matter how many times his mother 
disregarded white signs over water fountains and rest rooms, her defiance 
failed to protect her children from other more egregious examples of Ameri-
can apartheid.3 
Young experienced some integration at Lincoln Institute. His father 
hired a few white teachers who, like their black colleagues, worked closely 
with students. Despite their presence, Young and others knew that Lincoln 
Institute was another manifestation of Jim Crow in Kentucky. The practice 
of separate but unequal allowed Simpsonville to provide a high school for 
whites, but none for blacks. So Young and his two sisters transferred to Lin-
coln Institute for their high school training.4 
Lincoln was not inferior to white schools, because Whitney M. Young 
Sr. attracted an able faculty. In 1937, for example, he brought in several new 
black teachers, most of whom were graduates of black colleges. They included 
Joseph A. Carroll, a graduate of Kentucky State who taught agriculture and 
later chemistry and biology, and Kathleen A. McClain, an alumna of Louis-
ville Municipal College and an M.A. from Indiana University who became 
assistant principal and later a teacher of mathematics. Also in the group were 
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Anna Howard Russell, another Kentucky State graduate and an M.A. from 
Atlanta University who became dean of women, and Medora F. Hayes, who 
held a B.S. degree from Tennessee Agricultural and Industrial State College 
and who served as librarian and taught commercial courses.5 
Young enjoyed Lincoln as though it were a college campus. Physically 
small early in his adolescence, he participated in athletics as an unofficial 
manager to the Institute teams. By the time he reached his senior year, he was 
tall enough to make the basketball team. Young, who in earlier years skipped 
a grade, learned quickly from the Lincoln faculty. His academic achievements 
sometimes embarrassed his father. He took several classes from his dad and 
would make the highest marks on examinations or finish problems much 
faster than other students. As graduation day, June 2, 1937, approached, 
grades were tallied and Young was chosen valedictorian and his sister, Arnita, 
became salutatorian. Fearing the appearance of faculty favoritism, their fa-
ther tried in vain "to modify the situation." Lincoln teachers, however, re-
fused to deny these honors to the Young siblings.6 
Whitney and Laura Young tried to shield their children from the worst 
aspects ofJim Crow. One way was to join with other members of Kentucky's 
small black elite and promote social interaction between their children. Fre-
quently, Young and his sisters went to social events in Louisville and recipro-
cated with invitations to parties at Lincoln Institute. They mingled with the 
Wilson sisters, whose father was principal of Louisville's Central High School. 
They also saw Alice Clement, daughter of Rufus E. Clement, a Northwestern 
University Ph.D. and dean of Louisville Municipal College. Charlotte Smith, 
whose father was an executive in a black-owned insurance company, was an-
other member of this small circle of friends. 
His father's colleagues in the Kentucky Negro Education Association 
opened still other friendships for Whitney. William Shobe, a teacher in 
Middlesburg and Lynch in western Kentucky brought his son, Benjamin, for 
visits to Lincoln Institute. Similarly, Harvey C. Russell, a teacher and school 
official at various times in Louisville, Frankfort, and Paducah, brought his 
son, Harvey Jr., to Lincoln Ridge where he came to know Young and his 
sisters. Some of these relationships were solidified at Kentucky State College 
where Shobe became Young's roommate and Russell became a lifelong friend 
and confidant? 
Young's decision to attend Kentucky State seemed as natural as going to 
Lincoln Institute. First, he won an athletic scholarship, then his sister Arnita 
and numerous friends entered with him, and finally, his father knew the presi-
dent and several faculty members. Moreover, like the segregated schools in 
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Simpsonville and Lincoln Institute, Kentucky State was another experience 
in Jim Crow education. Established in 1886 by the state legislature as Ken-
tucky State Normal School for Colored Persons, the institution achieved land 
grant status in 1902 and added "Industrial Institute" to its title. When Young 
entered in 1937, it was called Kentucky Industrial College for Colored Per-
sons, but before his graduation the school became Kentucky State College for 
Negroes. Fortunately, Kentucky State, like Lincoln Institute, possessed able, 
dedicated administrators and faculty. It probably had a greater proportion of 
Ph.D.s than most state institutions.8 
Numerous administrators and faculty strongly influenced Young. Per-
haps Rufus B. Atwood, president of Kentucky State since 1929, knew him 
best. Born in Hickman, Kentucky, Atwood earned an A.B. degree from Fisk 
University in 1920, a B.S. from Iowa State, and the M.A from the University 
of Chicago. A World War I veteran, he served six years as dean at Prairie View 
Agricultural and Mechanical College in Texas before coming to Kentucky 
State. A close friend of Young Sr., Atwood was active with him in the Ken-
tucky Negro Education Association and in the Psi Boule of the prestigious 
Sigma Pi Phi Fraternity, an elite organization founded in 1904 for black male 
college graduates. Like the elder Young, Atwood's experience as head of a 
black school dependent on white financial support proved instructive to the 
future black leader. As with his father, Young observed Atwood use his skills 
of negotiation and persuasion to maintain funding from the state legislature 
for black higher education. 
Perhaps second to Atwood in their influence on Young were Henry C. 
Cheaney and Henry A Kean. Cheaney, Young's history professor, was a na-
tive of Henderson, Kentucky. He earned his AB. degree from Kentucky State 
and the M.A and Ph.D. degrees, respectively, from the University of Michi-
gan and the University of Chicago. He joined the Kentucky State faculty in 
1936. Kean was Kentucky State's athletic director. Young served him as trainer 
to both the football and basketball teams.9 
A popular personality of Kentucky State, Young participated in a broad 
range of campus activities. Initiated with six others into the Beta Mu chapter 
of Alpha Phi Alpha, he became the fraternity's vice president. He was also 
elected class president during his junior year. Now six feet two inches, Young 
played intramural basketball on a three-man team called "the Louisville." As 
football manager he accompanied the Kentucky State team to games with 
other black colleges in the Midwest Athletic Conference including Tennessee 
State, West Virginia State, Virginia Union, Wilberforce in Ohio, and Lin-
coln in Missouri. Occasionally the team played Florida A&M and Lane and 
28 Militant Mediator 
Knoxville Colleges in Tennessee. Whether the games were played at home or 
away, Young and other black students remained in a separate Negro world. 
When he traveled with the team to meet rivals in Tennessee or Virginia, only 
segregated facilities were available to them. Even if they played a home game, 
they were largely restricted to Kentucky State's hilltop campus, which over-
looked a segregated Frankfort. IO 
When Young met Margaret Buckner, a shy and reserved student from 
the Midwest, this event proved to be more important than any other occur-
rence during his stay at Kentucky State. Born in Campbellsville, Kentucky, 
Young's future wife moved to Aurora, Illinois, at the age of three or four. Her 
mother, Eva Carter Buckner, already had siblings in this Midwest factory 
town and had allowed an older daughter to board with an aunt and attend 
the local schools. Margaret's father, Frank W Buckner, arrived in Aurora be-
fore his wife and daughters. They followed after he found a job at the Com-
monwealth Edison Company as a fireman. Frank and Eva Buckner settled in 
Aurora at great professional sacrifice. Both had normal certificates and taught 
school in Kentucky. Frank Buckner also supplemented the family income 
with a grocery store. Schooling for their five daughters became crucial. Ken-
tucky provided inferior schools for black children. In most communities no 
high school existed at all for black students. Since the Buckners did not want 
their children to attend Lincoln Institute or West Kentucky Vocational School 
in Paducah, they opted for a move north. The remote possibility of finding 
teaching jobs in Aurora did not dissuade them from leaving Kentucky. What 
seemed most important was a better public school education for the Buckner 
children. 
Growing up in Aurora exposed Margaret to minimal racial segregation. 
Although her maternal relatives lived in a predominantly black enclave known 
as Cartersville, the Buckners lived where whites were a majority. In 1920 
Aurora had 627 blacks within a population of 35,765. Since blacks made up 
a tiny percentage of all Aurora residents, housing segregation was not an 
urgent concern to whites. Margaret attended integrated schools where all of 
her teachers were white. Several took a special interest in her, and she excelled 
in her studies. She supplemented her formal schooling with an avid interest 
in reading. Not surprisingly, the public library had her as a regular patron. 
Her parents encouraged her academic development by allowing her to skip a 
grade. I I 
Like most of her white peers, Margaret wanted to attend either North-
western University or the University of Illinois, the leading institutions in her 
state. She wanted to study journalism, earn her degree, become a "bachelor 
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girl," and live in her own apartment. Margaret's superb academic record clearly 
qualified her for admission, but her parents lacked the money to send her to 
the institution of her choice. Her older sister, Eugenia, a graduate of Louis-
ville Municipal College and a teacher in Kentucky, suggested that Kentucky 
State College for Negroes was affordable and would provide an antidote to 
Margaret's predominantly white environment and acculturation in Aurora. 
Another sister, Virginia, who subsequently enrolled in the Chicago Musical 
College, was graduated from high school along with Margaret. For the 
Buckners to finance a college education for two daughters simultaneously 
was difficult enough without Margaret attending an expensive institution. 
Kentucky State seemed the best alternative. 12 
When Margaret arrived at Kentucky State, her roommate remembered 
that she seemed far ahead of most students in both poise and cultural aware-
ness. Studious and serious, Margaret commenced her stay at Kentucky State 
mostly in the library or in her dormitory. Unaccustomed to racial segrega-
tion, it took time for her to feel comfortable within the predominantly black 
environment of Kentucky State. At her job selling tickets at football games, 
she displayed minimal interest in the outcome of the competition between 
her alma mater and its black college rivals. As soon as the ticket window 
closed, Margaret returned to her room to listen to Illinois and Northwestern 
games on the radio. She had black hometown friends on both teams, and 
their athletic exploits mattered more to her than those of the Kentucky State 
players. 13 
Eventually, Margaret felt more comfortable at Kentucky State. Since 
she had never been exposed to black teachers, the quality of the Kentucky 
State faculty impressed her. Her friendship with Ann Heartwell, a psychology 
instructor and dean of women, helped her adjust to her new environment. 
Moreover, she became involved in several extracurricular activities. She served 
as president of Alpha Kappa Alpha Sorority, Tau Sigma Honor Society, and 
the Kentucky Players. She was secretary of both the Student Council and the 
Pan Hellenic Council. She belonged to a few other groups including the 
Committee on College and National Defense. 14 
The school newspaper, the Kentucky Thorobred, on which Margaret 
served as associate editor, provided her with the perfect outlet for her journal-
istic interests. She wrote on a broad range of topics including propaganda, 
FDR's election to a third term, and campus gossip. In all her articles Marga-
ret experimented with satire, sarcasm, and other literary devices to develop 
her writing skills. Like Langston Hughes, who created the comic figure 
"Simple," Margaret brought her own character, "Needless Ned," into being. 
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Ned, a campus resident always on the sidelines, always a spectator, was the 
first to complain about meals and to sneer at campus organizations and pro-
grams, but he never patticipated in any of the groups and activities, "To 
him," wrote Matgaret, "the athletic program was o.k. but Needless was the 
type who cheered the team when it was going strong and deserted it when it 
went down."15 
During her final year at Kentucky State, Matgaret wrote an essay in the 
Thorobred on "Passing the Buck" in which she discussed school spirit and 
made a patting shot at the Needless Neds who populated the student body. 
She thought that Kentucky State needed more "oneness of purpose, ideal, 
and creed" and should "strive together for a definite culture and intelligence 
that we can and should represent." She added, "To me it represents a thought 
which arises from four yeats of living in a different environment with a differ-
ent group of people." Ironically; through Margatet's critique of her alma mater 
came an acceptance of Kentucky State as her school. She had overcome her 
eatlier suspicion and alienation from this thoroughly black institution. 16 
Beyond these extracurricular activities, Margaret, an attractive sopho-
more, drew closer to Kentucky State and its campus life when she started to 
accept dates from male admirers. For a brief time, a member of Kappa Alpha 
Psi, Oscar Long of Louisville, succeeded in getting her attention. Generally, 
the male students from Chicago, Louisville, and other large cities seemed 
more urbane and sophisticated than their rivals from Kentucky's rural com-
munities. Nonetheless, Long had a formidable competitor in the boyish and 
unpolished Whitney Young. He had noticed Margaret during a chapel ser-
vice. Although Young received no reply to the note he wrote to Margaret, he 
did not give up. Since Ersa Hines of Paducah, Kentucky, a friend of his sister 
Arnita, was Margaret's roommate, he tried in vain to win her as an ally in his 
romantic pursuit. Finally; during a campus homecoming, Young, in a brazen 
move, jumped into the taxi cab in which Ersa and Matgaret were riding to a 
movie. Margaret was at first taciturn, but eventually she found Young to be 
both "charming and disarming." Over time, as she warmed up to him, they 
dated steadily and each became off-limits to other potential suitors. 17 
Young was graduated from Kentucky State in 1941, and Margaret fin-
ished a year later. Although he did well in his major, natural sciences, Young 
depended on Matgaret for help in other courses. His mastery of syntax was 
deficient, so she edited some of his term papers. Clearly; a deepening com-
mitment was developing between the two; nonetheless, graduation compelled 
each to choose a vocation and find a place in the separate black world for 
which Kentucky State had prepated them. 18 
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Young still wished to become a physician. Although some northern 
white medical schools admitted blacks, none in Kentucky did. Howard in 
Washington, D.C., and Meharry in Nashville, Tennessee, the nation's only 
black medical schools, remained the most realistic options for potential black 
doctors. Young applied to each institution, but both turned him down. Since 
he could try again the following year, Young took a job as mathematics in-
structor, basketball coach, and assistant principal at the all-black Rosenwald 
High School in Madisonville, Kentucky.19 
Young enlisted in the army reserve on July 22, 1942, and worked as a 
mechanic learner with the War Department Signal Service at Large at the 
Lexington Signal Depot. He was reassigned on October 1, 1942, and became 
a junior repairman trainee and an assistant radio mechanic. On May 6, 1943, 
he was ordered to active army duty and was accepted into specialized train-
ing. Although he had hoped that the army would send him to medical school, 
he was assigned instead to an engineering training program. He studied elec-
trical engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology along with 
two other blacks. From January lO to April 1, 1944, he studied at Rhode 
Island State College in Kingston. He continued the program for a brief time 
at the Army Air Force Technical Training Command in Kerns, Utah. Abruptly, 
the army ordered Young and others to report overseas. He was put into an all-
black combat engineers battalion that built bridges and roads for the infan-
try.20 
Occasional furloughs allowed Young to visit Margaret. While still in 
the United States, he wrote her to propose marriage. Margaret accepted, and 
the ceremony took place at the Buckner home in Aurora, Illinois, on January 
2, 1944. They had a short honeymoon in Chicago. In September 1944 he 
was shipped to Europe. Margaret was now a war bride. 
During the war, both Margaret and Whitney made important voca-
tional decisions. Margaret was graduated in 1942 from Kentucky State with 
a B.A. in English and French. Financial necessity required her to work during 
her entire stay at Kentucky State. A fifteen-dollar-per-month job funded by 
the National Youth Administration (NYA) helped with a large portion of her 
board. After graduation, she remained on campus as an instructor in fresh-
man English. She also worked for the superintendent of buildings and grounds 
at Kentucky State and later as cashier in the business office under J.D. Stewart. 
While in the business office Margaret interacted extensively with students 
and frequently talked with them about their vocational plans. Most of them 
chose such traditional fields as teaching and preaching without realizing that 
broader career options were available to them. This experience persuaded 
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Margaret to seek a graduate degree in counseling so that she could help such 
students to develop their potential more fully. Dean J. T. Williams urged Mar-
garet to choose either Indiana, Michigan, or Minnesota. Margaret opted to 
do further study at the University of Minnesota.21 
Young's ultimate career plans were less certain. He still wanted to study 
medicine. Engineering had also become an option. Nonetheless, a final deci-
sion had to await the end of the war. In the meantime, in confronting America's 
unpleasant racial realities in the army, Young discovered that his talents lay in 
ameliorating these conditions. 
The U.s. army and the other branches of the armed services mirrored 
the segregation and discrimination prevalent in American society. All army 
units were segregated and under the command of white officers. Separate 
facilities existed for black and white soldiers. When blacks who were sta-
tioned in southern towns left their bases, they were subjected to disrespect 
and ridicule. At times racial violence occurred between black soldiers and 
white civilians. As in previous wars, the army was reluctant to dispatch blacks 
into combat. They were usually assigned to engineering and labor battal-
ions.22 
Whitney Young became a part of this segregated army. Because he held 
a college degree and had done some graduate work at MIT, he advanced 
quickly from private first class to first sergeant. When he arrived in France, 
Young remained in an all-black company commanded by white officers. Their 
duties required them to travel ahead of the infantry to build roads and bridges. 
Recalcitrant black soldiers, however, frequently disobeyed white officers and 
continued their disobedience even when reprimanded. The white officers 
became so intimidated by such insubordination that they refused to leave 
their tents at night. To protect themselves against German air raids, Ameri-
can military camps put the lights out at night. Under these circumstances, 
white officers did not wish to tempt black soldiers, with darkness as the per-
fect cover, to provoke a fight.23 
Young decided to intervene. He probably felt empowered by his posi-
tion as a noncommissioned officer to address these racial issues. In any case, 
Young offered to relay orders to black soldiers in return for concessions from 
their military superiors. He stressed that blacks wanted to be treated with 
respect, get passes regularly, suffer less severe punishments for petty offenses, 
and receive promotions. Moreover, white officers agreed to share the liquor 
that they hoarded for themselves, and they became more tolerant toward 
black soldiers dating European women. Because continued insubordination 
was the alternative, Young's proposals were given a try. Improved treatment 
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made these black soldiers more willing to obey orders, and Young discovered 
his own hidden talents, which loosened his commitment to a medical ca-
reer.24 
It had not occurred to Young to choose a vocation related to race rela-
tions. If he continued his pursuit to become a physician, he would avoid 
substantial interaction with whites, especially if he remained in the South. 
He would probably attend a black medical school, intern at a black hospital 
in the South or a large northern city, and treat black patients. Minimal con-
tacts with whites would be required. While a student at Kentucky State, Young 
had once been a delegate to an interracial national YMCA conference. This 
was one of a few brief encounters with whites. Young had never thought that 
he could articulate black demands and mobilize white support for the achieve-
ment of these objectives. Experiences in a segregated American army that 
fought Nazism and racism brought the subject of race relations to a new level 
of consciousness in Young's mind. Success in finding common ground for 
white officers and black soldiers to deal with each other with civility and 
compromise caused Young to think of other career possibilities in which to 
employ these newly found talents.25 
World War II was a watershed in Whitney Young's life. Aside from the 
usual rigors of military life, he came to realize the urgency of allaying mount-
ing racial tensions in both the armed services and American society in gen-
eral. At home, blacks dissatisfied with residential segregation and police bru-
tality rioted in urban areas, including Detroit and New York City. In major 
defense industries black workers went on strike to complain about employ-
ment discrimination. Overseas, as Young himself observed, black soldiers dis-
obeyed white officers who enforced Jim Crow practices. ''As an American 
Negro," he wrote aboard ship in December 1945, "I don't expect to find any 
great liberal changes" upon return to the United States. He would be in-
volved, however, in finding solutions to his country's nagging racial prob-
lems.26 
Moreover, Young pondered the meaning of World War II, especially for 
black soldiers who encountered segregation for the first time in the army. 
Again he expressed uncertainty as to whether he and other black soldiers 
would be received and accepted "gratefully" in postwar America. Yet for what 
did they fight? "To appease mad politicians in their thirst for power. Maybe 
to prove or disprove racial or national superiority. Maybe, but I still would 
rather think of it as the most vivid portrayal of a man's conviction as to what 
is right and what is wrong." Whatever the reasons for war, Young wished 
freedom for all the "little peoples of the earth, a miner in Bolivia, a coolie in 
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China, a beggar in India, yes, even a little colored boy in Miss[issippi]."27 
After Young's ship arrived in New York City, he went to his separation 
center at Fort Knox, Kentucky, where he was honorably discharged from 
the army on January 12, 1946. He reenlisted in the army reserve and served 
honorably until January 12, 1949.28 
After his discharge from active duty, Young joined his bride in Min-
neapolis. Margaret was certain of her vocational goals, but the young first 
sergeant was not sure of his. As his interest in medicine waned, his attraction 
to social work grew. Social work appeared to offer the best opportunities to 
do on a grander scale what he had accomplished during the war in getting 
better treatment for black soldiers in a Jim Crow army. The choice seemed 
clear. As a social worker, he could address the societal ills that afflicted blacks 
in post-World War II America. 
3 
Maturing in Minnesota 
",\VJhitney Young's later effectiveness as a national black leader owed much 
W to his early professional experiences in Minnesota and Nebraska. From 
his work with National Urban League affiliates in Minneapolis and St. Paul 
he learned important lessons in mobilizing interracial support for black ad-
vancement. He persuaded influential whites in these communities, especially 
in business, to cooperate with League efforts to broaden employment oppor-
tunities for blacks and to become permanent backers of these local affiliates. 
At the same time, Young recognized that black activism represented another 
effective means to break down racial barriers. Both as a participant and as a 
behind-the-scenes supporter, Young reasoned that on appropriate occasions, 
black protest could achieve some League objectives faster than the patient, 
less confrontational efforts of sympathetic whites and cautious blacks. 
Nonetheless, when Young arrived in Minneapolis in 1946, he was still 
uncertain about his vocational objectives. Margaret had lived at the Phyllis 
Wheatley House, a social settlement in a predominantly black section of the 
city. When her husband arrived, they rented space in a family home. 1 As 
Young debated whether a medical career or race relations work suited him 
better, Margaret continued study toward the master's degree in psychology 
and prepared for the arrival of their first child, Marcia, in the late autumn. In 
the meantime, Mr. and Mrs. Ashby Gaskins, one of whom studied at Ken-
tucky State with Margaret, helped Young to overcome his indecision. They 
observed that his interpersonal skills, so ably demonstrated overseas in the 
army, made social work the better career choice. Besides, they had jobs in the 
social services and could certainly identifY a potential colleague.2 
Young probably possessed greater certainty about pursuing a career in 
social work and race relations than those around him suspected. His pivotal 
role in the amelioration of racial tensions in his Jim Crow army unit resulted 
in tangible gains for black soldiers and greater understanding of the inequi-
ties of racial discrimination among once insensitive white officers. These ex-
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periences influenced Young's decision to enroll at the University of Minne-
sota School of Social Work on March 29, 1946. 
Since the late nineteenth century, blacks had been graduating from the 
University of Minnesota. Between 1880 and 1909 only eight blacks received 
degrees, but the university remained open to other blacks, and an increasing 
number earned undergraduate and graduate diplomas. Moreover, numerous 
black alumni and alumnae achieved unusual success in the professions and in 
agencies for racial advancement. During the 1940s the School of Social Work 
accepted black students and reached out to black communities in the Twin 
Cities through graduate student field assignments in the Phyllis Wheatley 
Social Settlement in Minneapolis and the Hallie Q. Brown Community House 
in St. Paul. When Young entered the University of Minnesota, he enrolled in 
an institution with a tradition of racial liberalism where he could refine and 
discipline his considerable interpersonal skills.3 
The Youngs sometimes speculated on what would have happened if she 
had chosen Michigan or Indiana rather than Minnesota to pursue her gradu-
ate work. Surely, Young's life would have taken a different turn. He would 
not have met John C. Kidneigh and Gisela Konopka, two social work profes-
sors who strongly shaped his graduate education and his approach to race 
relations. Kidneigh came to the University of Minnesota from a varied career 
in government social service on the municipal, state, and federal levels, espe-
cially while living in Utah and Colorado. Born in 1907 in Oregon, Kidneigh 
earned the B.A. from the University of Utah and the M.A. from the Uni-
versity of Denver. He worked as a high-level official in Social Security from 
1943 to 1946 when he became an associate professor and associate director 
of the School of Social Work at the University of Minnesota. In 1947, at 
Kidneigh's strong urging, the institution hired Gisela Peiper Konopka. Born 
in Berlin in 1910, she studied at the University of Pittsburgh and earned 
her doctorate from Columbia University. From 1943 to 1947 she served as 
a psychiatric group worker for the Child Guidance Clinic in Pittsburgh 
before she went to the University of Minnesota to develop its group work 
curriculum. Kidneigh also brought in Ruby Pernell, a black social work 
alumna from the University of Pittsburgh, to assist Konopka in group work 
courses.4 
Kidneigh's presence at the social work school helped to make it unusu-
ally receptive and relevant to blacks. For example, Gisela Konopka's experi-
ence as an inmate in a German concentration camp made her a unyielding 
foe of racism in any form. The addition of Ruby Pernell to the staff integrated 
the teaching faculty for the first time. Moreover, Kidneigh maintained a close 
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relationship to the black communities of St. Paul and Minneapolis. He em-
ployed the executive directors of the St. Paul and Minneapolis Urban Leagues 
as paid field instructors who helped train social work students, both black 
and white. Also, other black institutions in the Twin Cities received UM 
students for field assignments. Furthermore, Kidneigh, Konopka, Pernell, 
and others accommodated Urban League staff from the two affiliates who 
wished to take courses. 5 
Dean Monica Doyle admitted Young to the social work program be-
cause of a recommendation from his army superior. Still dressed in his sergeant's 
uniform, Young came to graduate school on the GI bill. Although he was not 
unusually studious, he approached his graduate education with greater cer-
tainty about his vocational objectives than if he had entered earlier in the 
1940s. Young enrolled in standard social work courses, but he concentrated 
on the group work curriculum. His performance was outstanding in such 
courses as the history of social work, the dynamics of human behavior, and 
community organization, which he took from John Kidneigh. He received 
B's in other courses in psychology, statistics, public welfare, and the prin-
ciples of group work. Apparently his disinterest in social pathology earned 
him an embarrassing C. 6 
Young exerted little energy in those courses which he deemed unrelated 
to his carefully focused concerns with race relations. Kidneigh recalled that 
an annoyed psychiatrist, who taught Young in a course related to psychopa-
thology, complained that he was bored and unenthusiastic. Young's attitude 
about the psychiatric course related to some other academic deficiencies that 
Kidneigh identified. He remembered that Young should have studied more 
history, political theory, and other subjects that stressed the ability to concep-
tualize issues, put them in theoretical frameworks, and understand them in 
historical contexts. What Kidneigh and others eventually understood was 
that Young preferred the pragmatic and applied aspects of education. For 
him solutions depended on the discovery of a successful strategy and appro-
priate methods to ameliorate racial tensions and broaden social and economic 
opportunities for blacks. Perhaps for these reasons Young excelled in his field-
work assignments where interpersonal skills rather than academic abilities 
seemingly proved more useful. 
Despite these shortcomings, Kidneigh wrote in January 1947 that 
Young's record was very good and that he had impressed the faculty with his 
"sincerity, integrity, sound reasoning and grasp of social work principles." 
Additionally, Young satisfactorily completed one phase of his field experience 
in basic casework at the UM training center at the Hennepin County Welfare 
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Board? He was not interested in casework, however, but in race relations as 
pursued by the National Urban League. 
Founded in 1911 in New York City by middle-class blacks and wealthy 
and philanthropic whites, the National League of Urban Conditions among 
Negroes aimed to assist southern blacks new to northern cities to find gainful 
employment and decent housing. The League resulted from a merger of three 
interracial New York City organizations: the Committee for Improving the 
Industrial Condition of Negroes in New York, the National League for the 
Protection of Colored Women, and the Committee on Urban Conditions. 
After the merger, a national office stabilized with the appointment of Eugene 
Kinckle Jones as a full-time field secretary in 1911 and executive director 
from 1917 to 1941. The League also authorized the founding of affiliates in 
several cities. In 1918 there were twenty-seven affiliates, although some of 
them had failed by 1935. By this date permanently established Leagues ex-
isted in Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, Chicago, Newark, Cleveland, Detroit, and 
St. Louis. Under Jones's successor, Lester B. Granger, who served as executive 
director from 1941 to 1961, the League grew from thirty-seven to sixty-six 
affiliates. Funded nationally by the Rockefeller and Rosenwald philanthro-
pies and locally by community chests, the League generally eschewed mili-
tant agitation for black political and constitutional rights, but it tended to 
stress to potential white employers the need for broadened economic oppor-
tunities for urban blacks. 8 
The League movement spread to St. Paul in 1923 and to Minneapolis 
in 1925. To ensure greater financial efficiency, the two affiliates merged in 
1926 to form the Twin Cities Urban League. Not until 1938 did they sepa-
rate and become autonomous again. The University of Minnesota School of 
Social Work listed the two Leagues among two dozen social agencies whose 
supervisors provided fieldwork instruction to students. Young could have 
chosen among various welfare agencies including religious and secular hospi-
tals, the state psychiatric institute, veterans' facilities, and family and children's 
services. His interest in race relations and social change drew him to the 
Minneapolis Urban League to enhance his social work training.9 
Before Young arrived at the offices of the Minneapolis affiliate, he al-
ready had made work in the League his vocational objective. While he was 
living in Kentucky, his father's extensive professional contacts allowed him to 
meet Julius A. Thomas, the executive director of the Louisville Urban League. 
Thomas's distinguished appearance and impeccable attire impressed Young, 
who aimed to emulate him. Whether Young wanted to imitate Thomas's 
stately mien or his leadership of Louisville blacks is unclear. Nonetheless, two 
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other factors that more decisively drew him into the League can be identified. 
First, Young probably knew since his Kentucky years that the League offered 
the best opportunity to improve the socioeconomic condition of blacks and 
to involve whites in a direct way in black advancement. Moreover, the orga-
nization needed precisely the kind of interpersonal skills he had demonstrated 
in the army. Second, the social work school at the University of Minnesota, 
especially under Kidneigh's direction, made the St. Paul and Minneapolis 
Urban Leagues a part of its field education program. AB a result, Whitney 
Young was thrown into constant contact with the two affiliates. lo 
James Tapley Wardlaw, who had studied sociology at Atlanta University 
under W.E.B. DuBois, served as the executive director of the Minneapolis 
Urban League. AB Young's field instructor, Wardlaw supervised his earliest 
work in the League and broadened his contacts within the national organiza-
tion. Under Wardlaw's direction, Young completed a wide range of assign-
ments that immersed him in routine League activities. He accompanied the 
industrial secretary to personnel offices, union halls, and employment bu-
reaus to explore job opportunities for prospective black applicants. He coun-
seled with some applicants who experienced placement problems. He also 
made field visitations to other agencies from which the Minneapolis Urban 
League needed technical assistance. Moreover, Wardlaw sent him to the state 
capitol in St. Paul to compile summaries of all bills pending in the legislature 
that pertained to social welfare issues. Young also contacted knowledgeable 
persons in the Twin Cities to solicit their views on these legislative matters. 
He performed his duties so thoroughly that Wardlaw permitted him to present 
his findings to a mee'ting of the Minneapolis Urban League board of direc-
tors. 
To Young's field consultant at the university, Wardlaw wrote that he 
showed "positive evidence of growth." Young has the "capacity for objectivity 
in his relationships with both clients and office staff, and very favorable re-
sponses were made as [a] result of his contact with our board members and 
representatives of other agencies." Because Young wanted a job with the League, 
an elated Wardlaw told Ann Tanneyhill, the director of vocational guidance 
at the national office, "I have been greatly impressed with Mr. Young's capac-
ity for initiative, thoroughness, and sincerity." Although Young had another 
quarter to spend at the Minneapolis Urban League, Wardlaw did not believe 
that his favorable assessment had been premature. Young was his apprentice, 
and clearly Wardlaw was proud of him. 
To complete Young's introduction to the League, Wardlaw took him to 
St. Louis to attend a meeting. There Young met some of his future colleagues. 
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Although he expressed a lingering desire to attend medical school, Young 
now seemed convinced that the League was where he wanted to be. Wardlaw 
had shown him the wider world of this national organization, and Young wanted 
to be a part of it. 11 
Proximity to two League affiliates gave Young unusual opportunities to 
observe and compare the operations of both the Minneapolis and St. Paul 
organizations. Although the Minneapolis affiliate provided him with valu-
able fieldwork experiences, the St. Paul affiliate offered what seemed a useful 
subject for his M.A. thesis. John Kidneigh and Monica Doyle, who served as 
his field consultants while he worked with the Minneapolis affiliate, approved 
his proposal to write a history of the St. Paul Urban League. 
The thesis discussed the League's philosophy of social work as applied 
to race relations. The League, an interracial social work agency, recognized 
that blacks needed allies to overcome oppressive societal conditions. It em-
ployed a group work strategy to ameliorate these seemingly intractable ob-
stacles which blocked the progress of disadvantaged blacks. Like the parent 
organization, the St. Paul Urban League emerged in response to massive black 
migration to the cities and the racial discrimination that blacks encountered 
in employment and housing. In the thesis Young recounted the development 
of the St. Paul affiliate. Mainly a narrative account, Young uncritically pre-
sented the League's functions in housing, job placement, vocational guid-
ance, and other efforts to increase economic opportunities for blacks. 12 
Although Young believed in interracial cooperation, he was not naive. 
Moreover, he clearly understood why blacks in St. Paul initially greeted the 
League's interracialism with suspicion. When efforts to' start the St. Paul Ur-
ban League commenced, blacks gained the assurance of the local community 
chest that regular financial assistance would be forthcoming. To allay fears 
that the community chest and another white agency would dominate the 
infant organization, St. Paul blacks agreed to raise their share of the League's 
operating funds. Not until both blacks and whites were elected to the board 
did agreement occur about the necessity for the board to be interracial. Young 
understood that without black representation on the board and black finan-
cial support to match white contributions, the League's famed interracialism 
would be a dead letter. Otherwise, whites would control, and equal participa-
tion in setting League policy would not exist. 13 
Despite a promising beginning, the St. Paul Urban League had some 
problems in implementing its interracial power sharing. The NUL mandated 
that the executive boards should be equally represented by both white and 
black citizens. Attempts were also made to achieve an occupational balance 
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among white board members. Young thought the policy foolhardy, since it 
meant "having some officers who have never employed Negroes." Still, as 
Young observed, "It was many years before all of these men retired or were 
replaced." He also noted that their presence on the St. Paul board not only 
tended to destroy the confidence of the already suspicious Negro, but their 
activities inhibited some efforts to improve significantly the condition of 
League clients. Insightfully, Young identified a crucial issue that he would 
encounter as a League executive, that is, how to balance black input and 
white participation in League affairs on a basis of true equality and articulate 
objectives behind which both groups could rally. 
Young's thesis revealed a thorough knowledge of the Urban League move-
ment. Moreover, his complete mastery of the development of the St. Paul 
affiliate gave him valuable historical information and a pragmatic understand-
ing of its operations that would prove especially useful in his future dealings 
with the agency. His intimate study of the St. Paul Urban League also 
emboldened him to make suggest ways to stabilize fiscal support from the 
community chest, to continue cooperation with the University of Minnesota 
School of Social Work in encouraging students to enter the League move-
ment, and to revive the Urban League Guild to allow black and white women 
to work together for black advancement. 
Although he was certain that the League, as a service agency, had a large 
role to play among blacks in the Twin Cities and elsewhere, Young remained 
uneasy about the differing ways that blacks and whites understood the term 
interracial. To blacks it usually meant white financial support and consulta-
tion. To whites it frequently implied significant input into the major deci-
sions of the affiliate, since their monies mainly sustained the organization. 
Most local executives wanted white contributions and assistance, especially 
when a white board member could intervene with a recalcitrant employer 
who refused to deal seriously with a League representative. Clearly, blacks 
wanted whites to be silent partners! 
In many League cities there were efforts to make affiliates black commu-
nity organizations whose objectives blacks defined, albeit with white financial 
support. What Young identified in his thesis as suspicion by St. Paul blacks of 
white attempts to control the League through the community chest were am-
bivalent feelings about the League's emphasis on interracialism. Unsure him-
self, Whitney Young entered the League movement with similar perspectives 
about the group's interracialism. Although he stressed the importance of black 
community support of League objectives, he grew to recognize the impor-
tance of increased white involvement and support of the organization. 14 
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In August 1947 Young's thesis earned him the M.A. degree in social 
work from the University of Minnesota. Although he did his major field 
assignment with the Minneapolis Urban League, S. Vincent Owens, execu-
tive director of the St. Paul Urban League, had been interested in Young from 
the time he entered the School of Social Work. Apparently Young's thesis 
topic solidified their relationship. Young filled an unexpected vacancy at the 
St. Paul affiliate when its industrial relations secretary left to resume his teaching 
career. IS 
Born in 1909 in Kansas, Owens was graduated from the University of 
Kansas and studied at the New York School of Social Work as an Urban 
League fellow. Later he earned the M.A. degree in social work from the Uni-
versity of Minnesota. He acquired broad experience in social service adminis-
tration in Atlanta as an official in the Federal Emergency Relief Administra-
tion, at the Maryland State Transient Bureau, in Louisville as head of the 
Negro Division of the United States Employment Service, and in New York 
City in the Service Bureau for Negro Children. He became the executive 
director of the St. Paul Urban League in 194U6 
Owens earned a reputation for militancy among St. Paul blacks. In 
1947, for example, James S. Griffin, a six-year veteran on the St. Paul police 
force, was denied a promotion because of his race. Owens called the civil 
service board to request a copy of its employment manual. Promptly, he showed 
police officials how they had violated the rules in dealing with Officer Grif-
fin. As a result Griffin received his promotion. In another instance, Owens 
intervened when a theater owner refused entry to a group of black youths. 
Although tall, husky, and broad shouldered, Owens talked gently to the pro-
prietor and pointed out that televisions would soon be common in most 
households and might damage his business. It was foolhardy for him to turn 
away customers under these circumstances. Apparently, Owens persuaded 
him to open the cinema to blacksY 
While Owens established his legitimacy as a black community leader, 
he also gained credibility among whites in business and government. His 
tenure as head of the St. Paul Urban League during the entire span of World 
War II put Owens in a pivotal position to influence white politicians and 
white employers who were fearful of the epidemic of black unrest that af-
fected other parts of the country. At military installations both in the United 
States and overseas, recalcitrant black servicemen, tired of segregation and 
mistreatment, became restive, disobedient, and at times violent. Black work-
ers, equally impatient with the persistence of employment discrimination, 
ignored federal, union, and company officials and staged wildcat strikes dur-
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ing the war to protest unfairness in the workplace. Additionally, black urban 
residents, especially in New York City and Detroit, rebelled against crowded 
and substandard housing, police harassment, and other racial injustices. These 
conditions caused serious riots in several major cities. I8 Governor Edward 
Thye wanted to avert such catastrophes in his state, particularly in the Twin 
Cities. 
While seated next to Michigan governor Harry F. Kelly at a governors' 
conference in Columbus, Ohio, in 1943, Thye noticed his colleague leave to 
take an important telephone call. Kelly returned and informed Thye that a 
major race riot had erupted in Detroit. Resolved that this would not happen 
in Minnesota, Thye appointed an interracial commission to study any sig-
nificant conditions that might cause serious social disorders. The commis-
sion included fourteen members of whom five were black, including S. Vincent 
Owens. 
Although the commission met in the governor's office, it had neither 
budget nor staff. Despite this lack of resources, the members believed that a 
study of job discrimination against black workers in Minnesota would pro-
vide needed information to political and business leaders who wanted to 
improve race relations. Owens offered the commission office space at the 
League and allowed the affiliate's industrial relations secretary, Charles F. 
Rogers, to direct the study. Predictably the report observed that the St. Paul 
and Minneapolis Urban Leagues possessed both the skills and the personnel 
to ameliorate difficulties in employment placement for blacks. Moreover, it 
was noted that Duluth needed an Urban League. The report suggested that 
municipal and civic leaders in that community should use the services of the 
Twin Cities affiliates to help improve employment prospects for Duluth blacks. 
Completed in 1945, the interracial commission report drew upon data which 
the two affiliates provided and depended on personnel from the St. Paul agency. 
In the process, Owens brought his affiliate into statewide prominence and 
enhanced his position as a leader. Thye credited Owens and Rogers with 
producing the essential elements of the report. Even Thye's successor, Gover-
nor Luther Youngdahl, in response to Owens's continued involvement in 
state affairs, told NUL director Lester B. Granger that Owens was "a high class 
gentleman, of fine personality and unusual ability." Such commendations 
proved important to Whitney Young, since Owens became his mentor in the 
League. 19 
Owens had few if any qualms about hiring Young to replace Charles F. 
Rogers as industrial relations secretary and director of vocational guidance. 
Others in the Twin Cities already marked him as a "comer" in the area's com-
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munity affairs. While he was still at the university, the Minneapolis Junior 
Chamber of Commerce elected him a member. When he assumed his duties 
at the St. Paul Urban League, the president of that city's junior chamber of 
commerce accepted his membership transfer. k an associate to the increas-
ingly influential S. Vincent Owens and newly affiliated with an important, 
predominantly white civic organization, Young started work in the St. Paul 
Urban League with promising connections.2o 
Whitney Young became aware of the twofold challenge that lay ahead 
of him in St. Paul. First, he grew to recognize the importance of white finan-
cial contributions to the League and the indispensable assistance of civic and 
business leaders in softening employer opposition to job advancements for 
blacks. At the same time, like S. Vincent Owens, Young realized that black 
community support of League leadership and programs was crucial to the 
group's credibility as the representative voice of the city's largest racial minor-
ity. In another context, one black scholar has noted that black leaders need 
external sources of white political and economic support "while they simulta-
neously require legitimation internally among blacks."21 Young started to 
learn that effective leaders had to articulate the integrationist aspirations of 
middle- and working-class blacks. 
This dialectical tension between two different constituencies put the 
League in difficult circumstances. Simultaneous satisfaction of both groups 
was hard to achieve and maintain. Yet, for the three years that Young worked 
with Owens, that seemingly impossible feat was accomplished. Young was 
fortunate to work in Minnesota during the terms of two governors and other 
political leaders who responded effectively to the national wartime militancy 
of black Americans. Wishing to avoid the racial violence and protest preva-
lent in other cities, the military, and the workplace, Minnesota's political and 
business leaders moved to establish commissions, enact legislation, and pres-
sure racially recalcitrant employers to take the offensive, anticipate black de-
mands, and respond to them before significant unrest occurred. Ironically, S. 
Vincent Owens, Whitney Young, and others, inspired by that same mili-
tancy, mobilized blacks to press for broader opportunities, particularly in 
employment. Their organizational skills and credibility among blacks brought 
success in breaking down racial barriers. Additionally, the presence of a sym-
pathetic white elite that disdained Jim Crow and actively cooperated with 
League leadership proved equally crucial to the advancement of blacks in the 
Twin Cities. 
At the time that Young assumed his duties at the St. Paul Urban League, 
Governor Luther Youngdahl, a devout Lutheran, continued the racial liberal-
Maturing in Minnesota 45 
ism of his predecessor. Youngdahl pushed, though unsuccessfully, for a Fair 
Employment Practices Committee bill in 1947, 1949, and 1951. Byexecu-
tive order he desegregated the Minnesota National Guard in 1949, and he 
mandated nondiscriminatory hiring in state government. In an important 
symbolic gesture, Youngdahl joined the St. Paul NAACP, and he personally 
investigated racial discrimination at a Lutheran-run invalid hospital.22 Hubert 
Humphrey's efforts as mayor of Minneapolis complemented the governor's 
racial egalitarianism. He sponsored legislation to create a municipal FEPC. 
With lobbying from his human relations committee, headed by Reverend 
Rueben H. Youngdahl, the governor's brother, the measure passed in 1947. 
Humphrey, who held membership in the Minneapolis Urban League, also 
solicited its advice concerning some nominees to the agency.23 Youngdahl 
and Humphrey, a Republican and a Democrat, helped to develop a biparti-
san consensus among some officials in both government and business to ef-
fect advancement for blacks. Work in such an atmosphere greatly aided 
Whitney Young and others concerned with the improvement of race rela-
tions. 
Young aimed his efforts at major breakthroughs in employment, and he 
challenged numerous Jim Crow practices in St. Paul. Vincent Owens, his 
boss, and Charles Rogers, his predecessor, had already written most of "The 
Negro Worker in Minnesota," the first report of the governor's interracial 
commission. In it they surveyed Minnesota's principal employers and labor 
unions and their record in race relations. As a result, when Young assumed 
the job of industrial relations secretary, he had relevant information available. 
Additionally, Charles Washington and Owens, the successive directors of the 
League, within the previous decade persuaded some employers to hire blacks 
in formerly lily white positions. To maintain this momentum, Young was 
relieved of routine job placement responsibilities. He transferred, for example, 
household employment to the Minnesota State Employment Service. "The 
Urban League is not an employment agency," Young declared in his annual 
report. Consequently, he focused his energies on opening jobs in fields where 
blacks had not worked before.24 
With an experienced superior on hand and with modest improvements 
in the racial environment, Young commenced his work. To enhance his effec-
tiveness, he secured assistance from League board members and other influ-
ential whites. For example, when he tried to persuade a St. Paul laundry 
owner to offer jobs to blacks, white board members Walter Rock, a school 
administrator, and Carl Schuneman, a major retailer, accompanied him on a 
visit. The presence of Rock and Schuneman helped Young to persuade the 
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proprietor to end his discriminatory practices. On another occasion he suc-
ceeded in getting blacks hired at Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing (3M). 
Again, intervention from influential whites, friendly to League objectives, 
probably helped.25 
Although Young's predecessors had made some employment advances 
for blacks, much remained to be achieved. In 1948, for example, Young re-
ported that only 100 area manufacturing companies out of 800 employed 
blacks. In 1949, he added sixteen firms to that list. In 1950, however, he 
persuaded ten companies to hire blacks, especially in nontraditional jobs. In 
each instance, blacks secured employment in occupations that had been ex-
clusively white, including jobs as a chemist, laboratory technician, watch re-
pairman, and bookkeeper. 26 
Young pursued numerous other methods to advance the occupational 
interests of St. Paul blacks. Probably with assistance from S. Vincent Owens, 
Young developed working relationships with several persons and agencies in 
the state government. When the Governor's Interracial Commission autho-
rized a follow-up study of Minnesota black workers, committee members 
chose Whitney Young and William Seabron, the industrial relations secretary 
of the Minneapolis Urban League, to research and write the report. In 1949 
they produced "The Negro Worker's Progress in Minnesota." Young and 
Seabron reported significant black employment gains in the public utilities, 
where a dozen black males, for example, became motormen and conductors 
at Twin City Transit and four black females took jobs as switchboard opera-
tors; both were unprecedented developments. They also noted gains in local 
department stores, in state, county, and municipal employment, and in sev-
eral factories. 
Employers in beverage production, trucking, milling, railroads, and food 
processing resisted hiring and upgrading black workers. Predictably, Young 
and Seabron placed collective responsibility for the lack of progress in some 
occupational areas on timid or racist employers, unfriendly labor unions, 
restricted access to apprenticeship programs, and poorly administered voca-
tional guidance efforts in public schools. They also noted racial discrimina-
tion by various employment recruitment agencies, both government and pri-
vate.27 
This special assignment with the governor's interracial commission rep-
resented only one of several ways that Young sought to influence public offi-
cials to promote broader employment opportunities for blacks. In St. Paul, 
the seat of Minnesota's state government, he grew to understand politics bet-
ter, specifically the role of reciprocity in achieving important League objec-
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tives. In 1949, for example, he helped Governor Youngdahl by testifying 
before legislators in support of various mental health proposals. The bill's 
passage pleased Youngdahl, who thanked Young for his support and asked 
him "to stand by for continued help." He wanted Young's further assistance 
to get patient-centered hospitals as well as detection and preventive services 
for the mentally ill. Mental health was an important issue within social work, 
Young's chosen profession, but League objectives to improve black employ-
ment were uppermost in his mind. In return for his support for Youngdahl's 
mental health legislation, Young probably pressed the governor to hire black 
professionals once public agencies in the field were established. So Youngdahl 
informed Young that representatives from the Citizens Mental Health Com-
mittee and the Minnesota Civil Services would contact him with notices 
about "job openings and methods of calling these to the attention of your 
community." Apparently, the governor and Young tacitly agreed that two 
deprived minorities could benefit equally from this new legislation.28 
Similarly, Young intervened with Bernhard LeVander, Minnesota's Re-
publican state chairman, to help Louis Moore, a St. Paul black with training 
in agricultural economics, to become a meat inspector. Through LeVander's 
efforts and Young's persistence, an aide to the governor contacted the state 
commissioner of agriculture to urge employment for Moore. Although it is 
unclear whether Young successfully assisted Moore, this episode further illus-
trated his attempts to enlist the support of state government to broaden em-
ployment opportunities for blacks.29 
Young also supported efforts to enact laws against job bias. Despite 
legislative opposition to a Minnesota Fair Employment Practices Committee 
(FEPC), Governor Youngdahl repeatedly introduced bills in the late 1940s to 
outlaw discriminatory hiring practices. Wishing vainly for the eventual suc-
cess of these bills, Whitney Young, in several speaking engagements, tried to 
mobilize backers for the governor's proposed legislation. In 1949 during leg-
islative hearings for the bill, Young argued the Negro's case for FEPC. At a 
meeting of college YMCA-YWCA chapters hosted by Maca1ester College in 
St. Paul, Young spoke on "Practices Which the Fair Employment Practice Bill 
Would Eliminate." Although the legislature rejected various FEPC propos-
als, Young succeeded in informing Minnesotans about those barriers which 
restricted job advancement for blacks.3D 
For over a decade, the National Urban League strongly promoted a 
vocational guidance program to alert and prepare black youth for jobs in new 
and developing occupations. The effort also aimed to inform whites that 
opposition to black employment advances was detrimental to society. At the 
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St. Paul Urban League, vocational guidance was included in Young's job port-
folio. Like his other efforts in improving employment opportunities, Young 
used the vocational guidance program to broaden job prospects for the League's 
future clients. In 1948, for example, Young invited his predecessor, Charles F. 
Rogers, to show films to area youth about becoming skilled workers. In 1949, 
Young held numerous meetings with school personnel, private and public 
counselors, parents, employers, labor organizations, authorities on the state 
level, and black youth. During Vocational Opportunity Campaign Week, 
Young employed the print media, radio, and several community groups to 
discuss new occupational fields for which black adolescents needed to pre-
pare. Young noted that the week was "climaxed with a program at Hallie Q. 
Brown House ... [where] several young people who have been successful in 
a variety of occupations told of their work and the preparation needed." Shortly 
thereafter, Young shared his experiences with other Urban League officials at 
a national vocational guidance meeting in Chicago. How many black youth 
in St. Paul benefited from these efforts is unclear. Nonetheless, this educa-
tional program provided information about new occupations still unaffected 
by racial discrimination.3! 
Young recognized that appeals to whites in government and business 
were not enough to effect racial advancement. He learned that black commu-
nity mobilization supplemented traditional League approaches and would 
help to end many unfair racial practices. Like Young, numerous college-edu-
cated blacks in Minneapolis and St. Paul also wanted to eliminate racial dis-
crimination. Consequently, Young, who counted a number of these indi-
viduals as friends, led some and assisted others in selectively challenging Jim 
Crow practices in the Twin Cities. 
Young's social life drew him into numerous group affiliations. He re-
mained an active member of Alpha Phi Alpha. The Alphas, the nation's old-
est black fraternity, established Mu chapter at the University of Minnesota in 
1912. When university officials banned graduate members from all campus 
fraternities, adult Alphas in 1946 started Gamma Xi Lambda Chapter. Young 
played an important role in developing the new affiliate. The Duke and Duch-
ess Club and the No Name group, though less formal than Alpha Phi Alpha, 
claimed an equal amount of Young's time. The former was a couples club 
whose members were recent graduates of black colleges. Deliberately bour-
geois in outlook and behavior, the Dukes and Duchesses wished to demon-
strate in social events and other activities that blacks could be classy and 
sophisticated. The No Name group included Ashby Gaskins, the social worker, 
Carl T. Rowan, the Minneapolis Tribune reporter, Charles Rogers, the teacher, 
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and Young. They met monthly to dine, play cards, and discuss current events. 
Each of these groups provided Young, an avid partygoer, with opportunities 
to blend good times with social action.32 
Although socializing remained the raison d' etre for the Alphas, the Dukes 
and Duchesses, and the No Names, serious issues were always present in 
discussions, and frequently direct action resulted. Often Young, usually with 
a drink in hand, turned frivolities toward topics on the state of American race 
relations. Although his friends knew him as the life of the party, they also 
acknowledged Young as the one most serious about black advancement. In 
1949, Frank Stanley, editor of the Louisville Defender and a family friend, 
wrote to tell Young that he was considering running for president of Alpha 
Phi Alpha. In his reply Young noted that opposition to the incumbent stemmed 
in part from his uncertainty as to whether Alpha involvement with civil rights 
was desirable. His favorable response to Stanley seemed to indicate that the 
Louisville editor believed in Alpha participation in civil rights. That won 
Young's support and his promise to get delegates in his section to endorse 
Stanley. 33 
Although fraternities existed primarily for social interaction, Young be-
lieved that they should not hide from pressing societal issues. During the 
winter of 1949-50, Arthur McWatt represented Mu chapter of Alpha Phi 
Alpha on the University of Minnesota Interfraternity Council. He also served 
on a special subcommittee that made appeals to the national officials of cam-
pus fraternities to urge their chapters to eliminate discriminatory clauses from 
their constitutions. McWatt invited Whitney Young to join him and a white 
student from Sigma Nu to meet the several fraternities and sororities about 
this matter. They succeeded in two or three instances in persuading the groups 
to end racial exclusion.34 
Young's influence moved the Duke and Duchess Club to activism. On 
one occasion he persuaded fellow members to attend the performances of a 
well-known musician who was appearing at a local ballroom. Since the estab-
lishment barred blacks, one of the club members, a person of very fair com-
plexion, went to purchase tickets. To the utter astonishment of the propri-
etor, the Youngs and other black couples arrived at the ballroom. Of course, 
they were refused service and asked to leave. Within a short time, the League 
and NAACP of St. Paul jointly filed a suit. As a result, the court fined the 
proprietor one hundred dollars. The No Name Club did not have any such 
dramatic protest to its credit. Nonetheless, two of its members, Whitney 
Young and Charles Rogers, cooperatively and aggressively pressured the St. 
Paul school board to hire more black teachers.35 
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Young enhanced his activist credentials with a membership in the St. 
Paul NAACP. In 1948 he was nominated to the executive board of this 265-
member chapter.36 He and several black professionals in 1949 founded a 
Twin Cities chapter of the Frontiers service organization. Established by 
Nimrod Allen, executive director of the Columbus Urban League in Ohio, 
the Frontiers promoted various projects to improve their communities and to 
encourage leadership and excellence in the business and professional lives of 
the members: Carl T. Rowan was elected president, and Young was named to 
the board of directors. The Frontiers deliberately held their meeting in deseg-
regated hotels in St. Paul and Minneapolis to make sure that the facilities 
remained open to blacks.37 
In these groups Young either spearheaded or participated in efforts to 
effect racial change in the Twin Cities. He was successful partly because he 
had become well connected in the local black leadership network. Affiliation 
with important organizations and his leadership role within them legitimized 
Young as a community spokesman and emboldened him to move against 
racial injustices. His network expanded and his legitimacy enhanced as he 
became involved in St. Paul's black religious community. Young joined St. 
James African Methodist Episcopal Church, a leading congregation, and within 
a short time the pastor, Reverend Benjamin N. Moore, appointed him to the 
board of stewards. Moore and St. James members James W Crump and Lillian 
Parks Balenger served on the board of the St. Paul Urban League. Young also 
developed ties with St. Paul's oldest black congregation, Pilgrim Baptist 
Church. The pastor, Floyd Massey Jr., also belonged to the League board. 
Young spoke at Pilgrim in 1949 to the church's Baptist Youth Fellowship on 
"The College Will Open the Door." Moreover, his wife, Margaret, taught in 
the church school at Pilgrim.38 
Young became a successful spokesman in the Twin Cities for another 
reason. The thrust of the NUL movement in the postwar period aimed at 
placing qualified blacks in middle-class occupations. Those in St. Paul with 
whom Young associated were blacks who could benefit from this new thrust. 
They wanted broader social and economic opportunities, heretofore denied 
to the black middle class. Sue Williams exemplified these aspirations. A gradu-
ate of Fisk University, Mrs. Williams came to St. Paul as a bride in 1943. At 
that time the St. Paul Urban League supplied personnel to work in a local 
National Youth Administration project. S. Vincent Owens gave her an NYA 
position that lasted until 1944. Subsequently, she organized an Urban League 
Guild, an interracial women's support group for the St. Paul affiliate. When 
Young became industrial relations secretary, Mrs. Williams and her husband, 
Maturing in Minnesota 51 
Alfred, joined the Youngs and other black college-educated couples to form 
the Duke and Duchess Club. Through the organization she put on an annual 
Cotton Ball to raise money for the St. Paul Urban League. She was much 
impressed with Young's successes in opening new employment opportunities 
for St. Paul blacks. Both she and Young tried in vain to persuade Alfred Wil-
liams, who held a baccalaureate degree, to forego more lucrative pay as a 
railroad worker in exchange for one of the more prestigious positions that 
Young had wrested from once recalcitrant employers. 39 
It must be stated, however, that what seemed to be community mobili-
zation against racial discrimination in employment and public accommoda-
tions was actually black bourgeois activism designed to achieve special class 
benefits. Although the rhetoric signified racial advancement for all blacks, in 
reality much of what the League accomplished through Young's efforts pri-
marily helped upwardly mobile blacks. It was therefore ironic that in 1949, 
Young complained that less than 12 percent of the adult black population 
supported the Urban League of St. Paul. Perhaps the city's lower-class blacks, 
especially those who were marginally employed, had a clearer view of League 
objectives than Young himself.40 
Despite this lack of unanimity within the St. Paul black community, 
Young learned a valuable lesson. He discovered that an atmosphere of racial 
liberalism created and maintained by such influential political leaders as Gov-
ernors Thye and Youngdahl and Mayor Hubert H. Humphrey facilitated 
League efforts in breaking down various discriminatory barriers. This setting 
also made the protests of numerous black middle-class groups more certain 
of success. In a different environment such strides would have been in vain. 
After all, St. Paul blacks in 1950 numbered only 5,666, a miniscule percent-
age of a total population of 311,291.41 Even if middle-class blacks had the 
solid support of other segments of their community, their numerical strength 
would remain inconsequential. Therefore, influential white support for de-
segregation accounted more for significant racial advancement in St. Paul 
than the vigor and effectiveness of black middle-class protests. Nonetheless, 
such demonstrations of black resolve contributed greatly to Young's leader-
ship training. Despite the goodwill of white business and government lead-
ers, whites were reminded that blacks were dissatisfied with their status and 
were unwilling to wait indefinitely for basic social and economic improve-
ments. These were lessons that Young did not forget. 
Most important of all, in Minnesota, Young became increasingly com-
mitted to racial integration. No doubt he gained much satisfaction from his 
ability to lead and mobilize middle-class blacks. That was not difficult. A 
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product of the black middle class himself, Young understood and embraced 
its values and aspirations. At the same time, much of what middle-class blacks 
wanted in terms of broader social and economic opportunities required the 
vigorous support of whites. Young came to enjoy his visits to white groups to 
advocate black advancement, to educate his listeners about black aspirations, 
and to enlist their help in achieving these goals. As his invitations to such 
gatherings increased, he undoubtedly gained greater confidence in his ability 
to communicate with whites, challenge their misperceptions about blacks, 
and attract their support to black betterment groups. 
Apparently, Young made significant headway toward enlisting white 
support for black advancement. The Jewish War Veterans' Auxiliary benefited 
from his "thorough" discussion of the special report on civil rights written by 
a Truman presidential panel and indicated a desire for more programs of this 
nature. He also made a successful appearance in 1948 at Iowa State Teachers 
College at a social issues conference. Later, he spoke at Peace Evangelical and 
Reformed Church in St. Paul, where the pastor congratulated him on "a splen-
did job of presenting the issues in a manner that deepened friendship be-
tween the races. "42 
When Young talked about integration, he referred to broadened social 
and economic opportunities that drew blacks into mainstream institutions as 
equal participants. Integration meant more than better jobs and access to 
public facilities once closed to blacks. It also allowed blacks to reach for social 
and cultural possibilities beyond their separate black communities. He thought 
that blacks should be emancipated from the narrow confines of an isolated 
Negro world. For Whitney and Margaret, an early flirtation with Unitarian-
ism helped to serve this purpose. 
American Unitarianism had its roots among dissident New England 
Congregationalists who in the nineteenth century opposed the trinitarian 
view of the deity, denied the divinity of Jesus, and believed in the perfectibil-
ity of human character and the ultimate salvation of all souls.43 Unitarians 
stressed the importance of independent thought and encouraged unusual lib-
eralism in theological matters. The organization had never attracted many 
blacks. Around 1949, when the Youngs expressed interest in the denomina-
tion, no more than a few hundred blacks nationwide affiliated with Unitar-
ian churches.44 Yet, for the Youngs, Unitarianism seemed to satisfY a desire to 
ponder transcendent issues without the baggage of race. 
Neither Whitney nor Margaret could seriously criticize the pastors of 
the churches they attended. In the pulpit of St. James AME Church stood the 
Reverend Benjamin Nelson Moore. He had earned degrees from both the 
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college and seminary at Northwestern University, and he held a master's de-
gree from the University of South Dakota. A fervent advocate of social activ-
ism, Moore promoted the passage of a federal FEPC, belonged to the governor's 
interracial commission, and served on numerous social welfare boards. Simi-
larly at Pilgrim Baptist, where Margaret attended, Reverend Floyd Massey 
Jr., who was graduated from Johnson C. Smith University and Colgate Roch-
ester Divinity School, believed strongly in a social gospel. With Moore, he 
served on the board of the St. Paul Urban League, and he belonged to the 
Minnesota Council for the FEPC and to the board of the community chest. 
With ministers of this caliber, why would the couple consider leaving congre-
gations that projected such influence and relevance to the St. Paul black com-
munity?45 
No matter how impressive were the credentials and social activism of 
Moore and Massey, they met with stiff competition from fellow League board 
member Arthur Foote. As pastor of the Unity Church of St. Paul, Foote's 
social involvements hardly matched the more extensive affiliations of his black 
ministerial colleagues. It is likely that Foote drew the Youngs to Unity Church, 
although Margaret recalled in later years that some black friends probably 
had invited them. Foote's congregation represented opportunities for broader 
interracial fellowship and intellectual interaction beyond the black commu-
nity that St. James and Pilgrim could not offer. So the couple occasionally 
attended Unity Church. Certainly to Whitney and Margaret, that's what in-
tegration ultimately meant: to move beyond race in the totality of one's so-
cial, economic, and cultural interactions. 
Nonetheless, the Youngs remained ambivalent. For Margaret, Unitari-
anism was too intellectual and too removed from the day-to-day realities of 
black life. She and Young did not join Foote's congregation. In a few years, 
however, their doubts would be resolved, and they would move closer to the 
Unitarian Church.46 
Besides positive experiences with white Unitarians, there was much in 
the general climate of race relations to instill optimism in Whitney Young 
and to deepen his commitment to racial integration. The Roosevelt and 
Truman administrations made unprecedented efforts to include blacks in fed-
eral programs and to promote their advancement. Moreover, in the 1948 
national election, President Truman and other influential Democrats, including 
Hubert Humphrey, made civil rights an important item on the liberal agenda.47 
Additionally, in Minnesota, both Democratic and Republican leaders gave 
increased attention to civil rights matters and proposed major governmental 
initiatives against employment discrimination. Mindful of these developments, 
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Young became optimistic about further improvements in race relations, and 
he was certain that integration had become an achievable goal. In 1948 he 
told his father, "I see a new day dawning in this whole field of race relations. 
Never before in history has public opinion been stronger for a more demo-
cratic society. All about the country we see evidence, small as they may be of 
changing patterns." In affirmation of his belief in integration, Young added, 
"More and more, Negro youth are going to be called upon to identify them-
selves, not as Negroes, but as people whose success or failure in life depends 
on their own initiative and perseverance."48 
A short time later, in an interview with Carl Rowan in the St. Paul 
Recorder, Young, fresh from a trip to Atlanta, said that social forces were "ham-
mering out interracial progress in Dixie." At a Henry Wallace presidential 
campaign rally, he noted, whites and blacks had expressed a common interest 
in civil rights. Moreover, Young claimed not to have encountered any dis-
crimination in transportation while in the city. He also indicated the pres-
ence of whites at a social work conference at Atlanta University. He said, "It 
was interesting to see those students from white southern schools come out 
to ... talk over the nation's problems. They came without the patronizing of 
'working for you people' attitude. They didn't just discuss race relations with 
Negroes, but all the problems now facing America. "49 Clearly, Whitney Young 
was convinced that racial equality was both a desirable and an attainable 
objective to which he could devote his energies. 
A committed integrationist and community activist, Young had learned 
and accomplished a great deal between 1946, when he entered the University 
of Minnesota, and 1950, when he left the Twin Cities. He was becoming a 
polished and sophisticated leader. Integration was the objective, and he knew 
that blacks could not rely entirely on whites but had to use a range of activist 
tactics to achieve the goal. When such techniques proved inappropriate, he 
enlisted the help and intervention of sympathetic whites to accomplish what 
protest could not. S. Vincent Owens, from whom he learned many of these 
lessons, believed Whitney to be an exceptional young man with a lot to offer. 
In 1949 he told NUL officials that Young deserved "a promotion in terms of 
leading a department or serving as an Executive Secretary of one of our affili-
ates." He added, "We should make use of him at the earliest possible date. I 
don't feel that he should be permitted to become discouraged because his 
talents are not utilized to the fullest extent." Owens believed that he had 
done all that he could for his colleague in both training and compensation. 
"We have recognized Mr. Young's ability and interest by increasing his salary 
within a two-year period from $2,700 to $3500."50 
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Moreover, Owens encouraged Young to write to Lester Granger, NUL 
executive director, about job possibilities. Owens believed that Baltimore and 
Omaha were good prospects. At his boss's urging, Young successfully applied 
to become executive director of the Omaha Urban League. Now he would 
have to demonstrate independent leadership in a new setting without the 
helpful instruction and protection of his numerous Minnesota friends and 
supporters. 
4 
Becoming a Leader: 
The Omaha Years 
A tough job lay ahead of Whitney Young in racially conservative Omaha, 
Nebraska. Segregationist practices barred blacks from most downtown 
hotels. Restaurants did not welcome black patrons, and even the airport 
cafeteria refused them service. Housing for blacks was sharply restricted to 
designated areas bordering 24th Avenue. Even some churches steadfastly 
resisted efforts to integrate their congregations. Most appalling to Young 
was the refusal of Omaha's biggest firms to hire blacks. Even when excep-
tions were made to these racial customs, they yielded only to minor modi-
fications. For example, in the 1940s, the exclusive Fontenelle Hotel agreed 
to provide lodging to the nationally acclaimed contralto Marian Anderson-
-but only if she compromised her dignity by riding to her room on a freight 
elevator! In public accommodations, housing, employment, and even reli-
gion, Omaha drew a color line that disfavored blacks in ways resembling 
the Jim Crow South. l 
Clearly, greater liberality in racial matters existed in the Twin Cities 
than in Omaha. Although Young would now fight on a different battlefield, 
he found that methods he developed in Minneapolis and St. Paul held similar 
promise in a more recalcitrant Omaha. Young promoted militant but non-
violent action against Jim Crow practices and acknowledged its importance 
as an effective instrument for social change. At the same time, he encouraged 
influential whites serving on his Urban League board to strongly encourage 
employers, proprietors of public facilities, and realtors to drop the color bar-
rier. Young believed that only when these simultaneous efforts occurred would 
his skills of persuasion, negotiation, and diplomacy be used most produc-
tively. He built on other lessons he learned in the Twin Cities. He increas-
ingly recognized that his effectiveness as a leader depended on how well he 
advanced the integrationist objectives of middle- and working-class blacks. 
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When Young assumed leadership of the Omaha affiliate in 1950, he 
found a thriving organization. During the previous decade as Omaha's black 
population grew from 12,015 to 17,011, the League shifted from a commu-
nity center with programs in public health, recreation, scouting, and social 
services for black soldiers and defense workers to an organization increasingly 
focused on civil rights activism. The affiliate deepened its commitment dur-
ing World War II to job training for unskilled black workers and initiated 
referrals of such laborers to various placement agencies. Between 1939 and 
1950 the League made some employment breakthroughs in jobs once off-
limits to blacks. It also helped to agitate successfully for a local branch of the 
federal Fair Employment Practices Committee. As the affiliate displayed in-
creased militancy in advancing job and housing opportunities for blacks, it 
completed the transition from a social service agency to one of civil rights 
advocacy.2 
Within this context, the board of directors of the Omaha Urban League 
sought to replace M. Leo Bohanon, one of two executive directors who guided 
the affiliate through these recent changes. The associate executive director of 
the National Urban League, R. Maurice Moss, submitted Young's name along 
with some others. Six candidates were considered. The committee eliminated 
half of them and interviewed the remaining three including Young. One had 
been on the industrial staff of both the New York and National Urban Leagues. 
Another candidate had experience as a League executive in Warren, Ohio, 
and in the Baltimore Housing Authority. Another contender had been a suc-
cessful industrial relations secretary in the Washington Urban League. Con-
cerning Whitney Young, Moss wrote that he "is younger than the others ... 
but his work in the Minneapolis area has stamped him as one of the most 
promising men in the industrial ranks .... He has an outgoing personality 
and impresses one with his quick grasp of total situations and his ability to 
plan and to carry through programs." 
Whether Moss pushed Young's candidacy beyond this written recom-
mendation is unclear. Surely he and other national officials knew that Young 
had become restless in the Twin Cities and was eager for greater indepen-
dence and responsibility. Apparently, they helped him to get an interview for 
the Omaha position. Predictably, his interaction with local board members 
was so successful that his competitors quickly paled in comparison. They 
offered Young the job, and he wisely accepted.3 
Young was fully prepared for this new challenge by the lessons he had 
learned in Minnesota. He knew that League objectives needed steadfast en-
dorsements from the local white elite and from the black community. If ei-
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ther group withdrew its support, Young believed that his effectiveness would 
be seriously compromised. Trying to reconcile different white and black per-
ceptions of progress, pace, and objective truly put Young in the middle. How 
well he managed this paradoxical position would determine his success in 
Omaha. 
Young quickly discovered that local board members were his biggest 
assets. The presence of Otto W. Swanson and Alfred C. Kennedy proved to 
be a real boon. Both were veteran white businessmen who knew many mem-
bers of Omaha's economic establishment. Swanson, the president of the 
Nebraska Clothing Company and an active Lutheran layman, was already 
involved in a host of civic and charitable endeavors. Kennedy was president 
of McFarland and Kennedy Realty, and he held a number of influential 
positions in local and national real estate organizations. Both men, while 
believing strongly in racial equality, preferred conservative and noncoercive 
methods to achieve this objective. Kennedy, for example, opposed laws that 
penalized employers who refused to hire blacks. He and Swanson favored 
voluntary compliance. Nonetheless, the two businessmen frequently ac-
companied Young to meetings with recalcitrant employers to urge the hir-
ing of blacks in skilled and white-collar occupations. They also put their 
reputations on the line in pursuit of broader social and economic opportu-
nities for blacks. Swanson not only hired two black salesmen in his com-
pany but backed Young in a vain effort to get other clothiers to do the 
same. Kennedy firmly supported blacks who settled beyond the 24th Av-
enue ghetto in all-white neighborhoods and helped them find mortgage 
money to finance these efforts. Such a stand was unprecedented among 
Omaha realtors.4 
Equally eager to support Young in encounters with racially insensitive 
employers and proprietors of various public establishments were two young 
white entrepreneurs, William Ramsey and N. Phillips Dodge. More militant 
than Swanson and Kennedy, they were Young's contemporaries and shared 
his impatience with white Omaha businessmen who preferred that black 
progress proceed at a snail's pace. A lawyer by training, Ramsey was vice 
president and manager of the American Road and Equipment Company. 
Dodge worked in his family's realty company, one of the oldest and largest in 
Nebraska. Margaret R. Fischer, a veteran board member and lawyer, and June 
H. Vance, a prominent civic leader, joined Ramsey, Dodge, and Young in 
developing the Omaha Urban League into a forceful advocate for racial ad-
vancement.5 Blacks on the board backed Young's efforts to establish an even 
more activist League affiliate. Board members Charles Davis, a lawyer and 
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bank official, and Eugene Skinner, Omaha's first black principal, had wanted 
to hire Young because of his forthright leadership in the Twin Cities.6 
Young knew that a strong board of diverse influence within the city 
would be key to any success he might enjoy. He carefully added new mem-
bers as terms expired. With Alfred Kennedy's help, Young persuaded leading 
white businessmen to join the board, including Lloyd Skinner, the food manu-
facturer, and Roman Hruska, the politician and future U.S. senator? 
A strong board was not enough, however. The infrastructure of the 
Omaha affiliate, although improved under Young's predecessor, M. Leo 
Bohanon, required additional growth and change. Increased contributions 
from the community chest, which pulled the annual budget from $12,000 to 
$28,000 between 1950 and 1953, laid the groundwork. Also, Young aggres-
sively urged new supporters to aid the League through the purchase of mem-
berships. In 1953 the Omaha affiliate claimed one thousand members, up 
from seventy-five in 1950.8 
These financial developments allowed Young to increase the staff from 
three to five. Marion M. Taylor, the industrial relations secretary, held this 
post and functioned as acting executive director until Young's arrival from St. 
Paul. Although he claimed an excellent relationship with his new boss, diffi-
culties occurred and he resigned in 1953. To replace Taylor, Young brought 
Milton Lewis from Erie, Pennsylvania. The board also allowed him to hire a 
community services secretary to coordinate activities with local black organi-
zations. The new appointee, Wesley T. Cobb of Toledo, Ohio, like Lewis, 
held a master's degree. With an expanded staff, including two office secretar-
ies, the affiliate became an increasingly efficient operation prepared to pre-
cipitate and implement important social changes.9 
Beyond these personnel matters, Young was most concerned abour em-
ployment opportunities for Omaha blacks. He believed that improved job 
prospects were key to all other advancements for his constituents. He spoke 
out constantly about the issue. Soon after his arrival in Omaha, he declared 
to local businessmen that "eliminating discrimination against racial groups is 
good business." Greater economic opportunities for blacks meant "an in-
creasing market for business." He challenged businessmen to "take the initia-
tive in ending job discrimination against Negroes." Young further noted, 
"We are going to give employers a chance to set a precedent--to show that the 
Sermon on the Mount is more than just pretty words."lo 
Of course, Young was not about to pay mere lip service to this objec-
tive. He used private persuasion and negotiation, the assistance of influential 
white board members, agitation for governmental intervention, and nonvio-
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lent direct action to improve job possibilities for Omaha's restless black popu-
lation. 
Young knew firsthand from his Minnesota experiences that fair em-
ployment practices legislation helped to expand job opportunities for blacks. 
The federal FEPC during World War II had been very effective in curtailing 
employment discrimination. Federal investigators had statutory authority to 
recommend the withdrawal of government contracts from recalcitrant em-
ployers. Although the federal FEPC expired in 1946, ten states established 
their own agencies by 1950. Efforts to enact a Nebraska FEPC started shortly 
before Young's arrival. Omaha's black state legislator, Senator John Adams 
Sr., introduced a bill in 1949. It was defeated, and he resubmitted it in 1951. 
Young did much to urge passage of the bill. In an Omaha Personnel 
Association panel discussion, he explained why legislation was needed given 
the discriminatory behavior of white employers. He traveled to Lincoln, the 
state capital, to plan strategy with Theodore Sorensen, a University of Ne-
braska law student, who had advised Senator Adams in drafting the original 
proposal. Young also testified as a witness before the legislative committee 
considering the bill. He brought other people to the hearings to display 
grassroots support for the proposed law. 11 
Again the bill was unsuccessful. Organized Nebraska businessmen 
thought that the proposal was too radical, and some even referred to Sorensen, 
the son of a former Nebraska attorney general, as a communist. Apparently 
the same view prevailed within Nebraska's unicameral legislature. In an ear-
lier effort to gut the bill, one legislator proposed that cities and towns pass 
their own ordinances. Although Senator Adams opposed the substitute mo-
tion, the idea bore some fruit for Whitney Young. When the Adams bill met 
defeat, Young, always the pragmatist, spearheaded a new effort to induce the 
city council of Omaha to establish a local FEPC. He gave a hard-hitting speech 
to the white Omaha Ministerial Union in which he was critical of its silence 
on a city FEPC, and he strongly urged its members to support it. He also asked 
attorney Elizabeth Pittman to write a draft ordinance for consideration by 
the city council. They enlisted further assistance from Mary Frederick, a promi-
nent white civic leader, but even with her influence, Young failed to get a 
hearing from the council. 12 
It was apparent that influential white Nebraskans, especially those in 
business and in state and local government, strongly opposed coercive mea-
sures to end employment discrimination. Those concerned about limited job 
mobility among blacks advocated voluntary efforts to achieve equal opportu-
nity. Such individuals encouraged Whitney Young and his industrial rela-
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tions secretary, Marion Taylor, to work through Omaha's Mayor's Commit-
tee on Human Relations. As the two officials moved to increase opportuni-
ties for blacks in public sector jobs, the agency's support proved crucial to 
their success. They urged the Metropolitan Utilities District to hire blacks as 
electrical engineers and mechanics. After a series of meetings with the MUD 
board and the Mayor's Committee, a resolution was passed promising that 
blacks would work in all departments and would be upgraded and promoted 
on the basis of their ability to perform. At the recommendation of the League, 
at least two black women were hired in clerical positions in Omaha munici-
pal offices, and two other secretaries were placed in the county public assis-
tance agency and in the city-county health department. Moreover, discus-
sions with city officials yielded commitments to give blacks a fair chance to 
take both police and firefighter exams. For the latter positions Young even 
urged black candidates to come to the League office for advice in passing the 
test. Although these negotiations with municipal officials yielded major com-
mitments, only a few jobs were immediately offered to blacks. That's why 
Young preferred a state or local FEPC to compel the city, the utilities board, 
and private employers to make good on their promises and apply concrete 
actions to their "pretty words." 13 
In neither instance did Young get everything that he wanted. No FEPC 
was forthcoming. From municipal and county agencies came merely prom-
ises to give black applicants fair consideration, and only a few clerical jobs 
became available to black women. Young turned to other strategies. To gain 
greater access to local businessmen, Young asked influential white board mem-
bers to accompany him to meet employers and urge them to be more recep-
tive to blacks seeking jobs. In some cases, he motivated white board members 
themselves to set the right tone by opening jobs to blacks in their own estab-
lishments. Lloyd Skinner, for example, already employed three black women 
at his Skinner Manufacturing Company. In 1951 he hired four black men to 
work in semiskilled positions. 14 
During encounters with fellow white businessmen, board members dis-
covered the entrenched position of racism in the Omaha job market. They 
were amazed when so few large employers expressed interest in the important 
but conservative work of the League and its goal of enhancing black employ-
ment. In such circumstances N. Phillips Dodge was astounded by Young's 
patience in dealing with raw racial prejudice. Dodge accompanied him to a 
meeting with the president of a large Omaha firm. The employer, attempting 
casual affability, told Young about the several Negroes whom he knew. Of 
course, those individuals were his personal stewards! After Young cordially 
62 Militant Mediator 
but firmly pressed him about hiring blacks in such responsible positions as 
lawyers, engineers, draftsmen, and surveyors, the employer seemingly yielded 
to his argument. Although he promised to hire some black trainees, however, 
he insisted that they work among the white employees with glass partitions 
around them. Young held his temper and agreed to the employer's terms, at 
least for the moment. He and Dodge returned for one or two follow-up meet-
ings. Helped by Dodge's presence and his own persistence, Young ultimately 
convinced the businessman that the glass partitions were a needless and both-
ersome expense. 15 
On another occasion, Young, Dodge, William Ramsey, and Lloyd Skin-
ner plotted a preemptive strike on employment discrimination in Omaha. 
Western Electric planned to build a new plant in the city on land that Dodge's 
realty company sold to the firm. Young and his three board members visited 
company officials to urge a fair employment policy. Western Electric agreed 
but then reneged. With Dodge, Ramsey, and Skinner behind him, Young 
persuaded the company to honor their original agreement on open employ-
ment. 16 
Black board members, although less influential in the larger business 
community, assisted Young's efforts to improve job opportunities. Arthur 
McCaw, perhaps Young's closest friend and confidant, came in contact with 
all the city's businesses as chief tax examiner. As a result, McCaw knew where 
employment breakthroughs would likely occur. Whenever possible during 
his tax interrogations, McCaw would mention Young, the League, and their 
employment goals. Another board member, pharmacist Lillian Dorsey, wrote 
to Mutual of Omaha to protest its discriminatory employment policies. Un-
fortunately, a conversation with the insurance firm's president failed to pro-
duce any openings. 17 
Young valued board members' assistance in breaking employment bar-
riers, but he remained convinced that protest and other nonviolent direct 
action tactics proved equally effective in routing job discrimination. Although 
the Urban League was not a protest organization, Young cooperated with 
groups that were. When such groups aimed to increase employment oppor-
tunities, Young enthusiastically, though at times surreptitiously, aided their 
efforts. His close ties with Father John Markoe, a Jesuit priest, and the De 
Porres Club clearly illustrate the point. 
Father Markoe, whom Young esteemed and greatly admired, had been 
a 1914 graduate of West Point. Service in the southwest leading units of 
black soldiers exposed him to racial issues. His departure from the army and 
his triumph over alcoholism preceded his entry into the Society of Jesus in 
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1917. After ordination, he served two black parishes in St. Louis. In 1944 
Markoe integrated the Jesuit-sponsored St. Louis University. So great was the 
hostility that he transferred to Omaha's Creighton University, another Jesuit 
institution. A group of Creighton students in 1946 had become dismayed 
over the disappointing state of race relations in Omaha. One of them, Denny 
Holland, asked Father Markoe to help them organize a group to promote 
interracial justice and charity. Formally chartered in 1947, the De Porces 
Club, named after a black Catholic saint, drew an interracial group of stu-
dents, social workers, and other Omahans to its membership.I8 
Young was most attracted to the militancy of Markoe and the new or-
ganization. De Porces members staged boycotts, formed picket lines, and 
precipitated sit-ins whenever employers discriminated against blacks. Some 
of their tactics were quite creative. To prod the Omaha and Council Bluffs 
Street Railway Company to hire black drivers, Markoe and others boarded 
buses during the rush hour. Each of them deposited the fare of seventeen 
cents into the receptacle, one cent at a time, an action which stalled the bus 
and its driver during the worst part of the day. Whenever Young had diffi-
culty persuading recalcitrant businessmen to hire blacks, the De Porces Club 
and its militant tactics helped to cast the League director as much more mod-
erate and reasonable than the unmanageable Markoe and his compatriots. 
Frequently, businessmen preferred to negotiate with Young rather than with 
De Porces spokesmen. Young and Markoe encouraged each other in the dis-
charge of their different duties. I9 Sometimes when De Porces demonstrators 
put up picket lines to protest an offensive employment policy, Young would 
make a symbolic appearance at the scene. One contemporary remembered 
that Young had actually walked a picket line with club members.20 
Young's deepest involvement in a De Porces demonstration focused on 
the Omaha Coca Cola Bottling Company. Based on information requested 
from the Omaha Urban League, De Porces criticized the firm for discrimina-
tory hiring practices in the fall of 1950. When the manager agreed to inter-
view blacks within the next several months, the club withheld its ptotest. It 
was evident by April 1951 that no blacks had been hired. Consequently, the 
club organized a boycott. Businessmen in Omaha's black neighborhoods 
heeded the club's request and refused to sell Coca Cola. After six weeks, the 
firm wanted to negotiate. Whitney Young and Denny Holland handled the 
talks and subsequently announced that two blacks had been hired and that 
no further discrimination would take place.21 
The alliance between Young and Markoe's De Porces Club had been so 
close that when breakthroughs occurred, credit in some instances belonged 
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to both. De Porres members and the Omaha Urban League probably shared 
the honor of persuading cab companies to hire black drivers. Similarly, Markoe 
rejoiced over the Reed Ice Cream Company's decision to hire a black saleslady 
at the main store. Apparently, Young knew about the De Porres effort and 
consulted with Markoe and Holland during the long hard pull to bring that 
small victory to fruition. 22 
Young also built upon efforts that Leo Bohanon and Marion Taylor had 
initiated prior to his arrival. In the brewery industry, for example, Young's 
predecessors had been working with personnel officials at Pabst, Blatz, Schlitz, 
and their counterparts in the Brewery and Distillery Workers Union in soft-
ening white employee opposition to blacks. That effort paid off after Young 
came to Omaha, and by August 1950, those companies started to hire blacks. 
Young worked closely with the Nebraska Employment Service and inaugu-
rated a new policy with the agency. He reported in 1950 that the service 
placed more blacks than in previous years because of "our increased contacts 
with industry selling them on the idea of including Negro workers in their 
requests." Consequently, the state employment office made more frequent 
requests to the League to refer qualified blacks for job openings.23 
Because Young skillfully mobilized support from influential members 
of the League board, state and local government officials, the militant De 
Porres Club, and other allies, major employment breakthroughs for Omaha 
blacks occurred. In December 1952, Young reported ninety-three new open-
ings. These positions included architects, milktruck driver-salesmen, a claims 
official at the Nebraska State Employment Service, an assistant librarian in a 
municipal public library, stenographers in various firms, and numerous other 
jobs never before held by blacks. In some instances, it was simply a matter of 
calling employers' attention to qualified blacks already on their payroll. At 
Northwestern Bell, for example, two black women advanced from elevator 
operators to long-distance operators. One was an alumna of a technical school, 
and the other had taken business courses in high school and college. Young 
and Marion Taylor persuaded Northwestern Bell that their training could be 
utilized better in these new positions.24 
To achieve these gains, Young occasionally yielded to embarrassing com-
promises. J.L. Brandeis, a major Omaha department store, refused to hire 
black women as salespersons. Young had much help from white board mem-
bers in trying to break this employment barrier. Otto Swanson intervened 
with a high Brandeis official to argue for a change in policy. The wives of 
William Ramsey and N. Phillips Dodge anonymously went to Brandeis and 
other department stores to tell managers that they would welcome a black 
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salesperson. Ultimately, with constant prodding by Young, Brandeis agreed. 
Store officials insisted, however, that the employee start in the infant wear 
department, where her race would be least offensive. The person assigned to 
the job was already on the payroll as an elevator operator. Some blacks then 
complained that Young accomplished these changes at Northwestern Bell 
and J.L. Brandeis because he consented to employer preferences for light-
skinned blacks, since they would presumably mingle better with whites. Some 
Omaha blacks believed that Young acquiesced to these experiments because 
their likely successes would later open jobs to darker-skinned applicants.25 
While the broadening of employment opportunities proved a difficult 
barrier to penetrate, Young found efforts to promote integrated housing equally 
hard. According to Alfred Kennedy, blacks were restricted to older neighbor-
hoods where the houses had been built in the late nineteenth century on lots 
only thirty feet wide. He further noted that in a number of cases more than 
one house had been built on a single lot. Although Omaha's black population 
increased by 38.3 percent between 1940 and 1950, Kennedy observed that 
only thirty new homes had been built for black occupancy. Young discovered 
that segregated housing patterns compelled the city's 1940 black populace to 
occupy an area thirty blocks long and eight blocks wide. Although their num-
bers grew by at least 5,000 persons a decade later, only one additional block 
in Omaha's black section became available for housing. Shortly before Young's 
arrival, his predecessor completed a survey which indicated that 50 percent of 
all appraised homes in Omaha's black community met minimum standards 
for occupancy. Approximately 9.2 percent required major repairs, and 15.2 
percent of black housing needed to be condemned!26 
Blacks bold enough to move beyond the 24th Avenue corridor met 
reluctant lenders, frightened sellers, and hostile white neighbors. Dr. A.B. 
Pittman, a black veterinarian, started his practice in a building in nearby 
Benson. Resentful whites, however, pressured his landlord to cancel the lease. 
When Pittman decided to build a home on the outskirts of Omaha, he tried 
to get a loan from a local insurance company. After he cared for the pet of the 
wife of the company's founder, she dispatched him to the firm's treasurer to 
get a loan. The official refused, and surprisingly the woman then concurred 
with the treasurer. They believed that the neighborhood needed to be saved 
from Pittman and other blacks. Numerous white homeowners, despite the 
Supreme Court's ruling in Shelley v. Kraemer (1948), held deeds that barred 
sales to blacks.27 
Young had trouble finding decent housing, and so did his new black 
secretary, Lavonne Curtis of Pierre, South Dakota. Phil Dodge intervened 
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and helped Young find a home in a transition area on the periphery of the 
24th Avenue area. Because a number of Catholics lived nearby, Father Markoe 
helped Whitney and Margaret to move in. Devout parishioners were reluc-
tant to start trouble around the well-known Jesuit priest. Markoe and the De 
Porres Club did the same when a black air force veteran, Woodrow Morgan, 
bought a house in a white neighborhood. Although anger was directed at the 
white owner, the realtor, and the finance company, neighbors threw stones 
into the house of the new black residents. Young called up Father Markoe 
and De Porres members, who came the next morning to assist the Morgans. 
No altercations occurred. Again, Markoe's priestly garb helped to preserve 
the peace.28 
Overcrowded black neighborhoods and resistance from white residents, 
realtors, and mortgage bankers convinced Young that housing, like employ-
ment, was an urgent issue that he could not ignore. Two tasks lay ahead of 
him. First, he had to educate white realtors about the harmful effects of resi-
dential segregation and mobilize their support to end it. In this effort, Young 
persuaded Alfred C. Kennedy and N. Phillips Dodge, successive presidents 
of the Omaha Urban League, to intervene with fellow realtors and convince 
them of the importance of desegregated housing. Second, to further expand 
the pool of available homes, Young believed that public housing agencies 
needed to relieve the overcrowded conditions in Omaha's black neighbor-
hoods. 
As with employment issues, Young asked Kennedy and Dodge to play 
major roles in the fight against segregated housing. Neither man opposed the 
principle of open housing, and both tried to persuade their colleagues to 
adopt the same attitude. Clearly, it was their influence which drew to the 
League's housing committee five members of the Omaha real estate board, 
three of whom had been past presidents. 
Kennedy discredited the notion that poor housing conditions among 
blacks were attributable to their alleged racial inferiority. They lived in slum 
areas because they could not afford better residential areas. "If the Negro were 
employed on the basis of his ability, without discrimination," Kennedy de-
clared, "he could afford reasonably good housing." Racial discrimination also 
caused slum conditions. "White citizens," he believed, had "an arbitrary, un-
reasonable and wholly unjustified attitude" toward blacks. He added, "In 
complete disregard of the law, custom has pushed the minority group into a 
small area of older houses, drawn an imaginary line, ... and said, 'Stay there.'" 
Kennedy was impressed with the newly integrated air force with its black and 
white officers living side by side, without friction, at Offutt Field near Omaha. 
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The same could be accomplished among civilians, he contended. Iflocal and 
county government condemned substandard homes, if mortgage companies 
lent to qualified borrowers regardless of color, and if inexpensive existing 
housing in good neighborhoods became available to blacks, then slum areas 
would eventually disappear. Ultimately, Kennedy contended, "The barrier 
around the Negro neighborhood must be removed. Negroes must be free to 
move into neighborhoods where their economic status permits them to live." 
To translate these sentiments into action, Kennedy intervened for Dr. 
A.B. Pittman when he could not find favorable mortgage terms to build a 
new home in a white area. Kennedy helped Pittman get a loan from the New 
York-based Aetna Life Insurance Company.29 
Apparently, the efforts of Kennedy and Dodge had some salutary effect 
upon Omaha realtors. In 1950, for example, the League's housing committee 
sponsored a forum in a black church on housing. The real estate board deemed 
the meeting important enough to send a representative to appear on the panel. 
When NUL head Lester Granger visited Omaha in early 1953, he addressed 
125 members of the real estate board. Theodore Maynor, former president of 
the National Association of Real Estate Boards, responded favorably both to 
Granger's speech and to Dodge's general attempts to sensitize him to the 
work of the Omaha affiliate. Maynor noted that businessmen "promised to 
sit down and work out a program to improve local housing conditions." 
Moreover, some realtors became more willing to sell to blacks in transition 
areas.30 
Dodge attempted to liberalize other Omaha realtors, bur those efforts 
met with less success. He managed to get antidiscrimination resolutions en-
acted by the local and state real estate boards during his presidency of the 
latter group. He also persuaded the local organization to go on record against 
blockbusting. None of these efforts, however, resulted in any substantive 
improvements. In fact, when he accompanied Father Markoe to stand with a 
black family moving into a white neighborhood, the real estate board con-
cluded that Dodge was "nuts."31 
While Young encouraged Kennedy and Dodge in their attempts to sen-
sitize realtors to racial issues, he neither waited nor depended on these efforts 
to end segregated housing. Instead, he and independent white realtors, builders, 
and lenders brought relief to those in substandard and overcrowded housing. 
In 1950 Young initiated a joint effort to build homes for Omaha blacks. He 
selected sites, chose contractors, and gained the cooperation of various white 
businessmen in the housing field. To underwrite the venture, Young secured 
support from the League housing committee chairman, Charles Davis. Davis 
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headed the black-controlled Carver Savings and Loan Association, which 
promised to lend money to prospective home buyers. Young also received 
advice from De Hart Hubbard of the Federal Housing Authority, and he 
attracted FHA guaranteed 10ans.32 
One firm finished two houses in 1952 and 1953. Another group started 
construction on four houses in 1953. The success of these undertakings mo-
tivated an Omaha life insurance company to make available $150,000 in 
FHA-insured mortgages to the black community. Young correctly boasted that 
more new homes had become available to Omaha blacks within three years 
than in the preceding decade.33 
Young had reason to be heartened by these developments. He noted, 
"With the tacit approval and cooperation by these various groups, Negro 
citizens have been permitted to buy homes in at least ten adjacent blocks of 
the heretofore almost completely segregated neighborhoods." He went on to 
tell a National Urban League official, "I believe that all too often many of our 
staffin the Urban League movement adopt a hopeless attitude with regard to 
real estate men, bankers [and others]. My experience has shown that there are 
individual realtors like individual employers who may be educated in spite of 
the policies of the National Real Estate Board and the National Manufactur-
ers Association, which in many cases we are opposed to." While undocu-
mented, Kennedy and Dodge must have helped Young make contact with 
various realtors, builders, and lenders. Their moral exhortations persuaded 
few, but once Young injected pecuniary benefits in his League objectives, the 
assistance of Kennedy and Dodge became more effective. 
Young knew that businessmen held the key to improved housing for 
blacks. He contended, "In presenting our need we should minimize public 
housing and emphasize the need for private enterprise." The truth of that 
contention had been demonstrated to Young's satisfaction. Nonetheless, public 
housing was a fact oflife in Omaha, and although private sales were preferred 
by Young and the leading realtor on his board, he could not overlook the 
rampant racial discrimination in housing projects that eroded black living 
standards. Two major issues confronted the League executive director. First, 
he wanted to end racial separation in existing public dwellings, and second, 
he tried to prevent residential segregation in newly built projects.34 
With federal funds in 1936, Omaha built 1,078 public housing units 
for blacks and veterans. City officials located the dwellings on two sites in 
North Omaha and South Omaha. Arbitrarily, the Omaha Housing Author-
ity permitted blacks to rent apartments on both sites, but compelled them to 
live in segregated buildings. To accommodate other low-income blacks and 
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whites in need of decent but affordable housing, the Omaha City Council in 
1949 authorized the construction of seven hundred additional units. Build-
ing began in 1951 at three sites, all of which were located within Omaha's 
black community. At this point, Young and the League's housing committee 
announced their intention to prevent residential segregation in the new units 
and to initiate desegregation in the older projects as vacancies in the build-
ings occurred. Black members of the committee vigorously pushed the issue 
over the objection of some whites. Young sided with the black members, and 
they gradually persuaded their fellow members to present a united front. 
Arthur McCaw initially stirred Young on this issue. While driving past 
the public housing units, McCaw noticed the construction of an earthen 
embankment designed to further segregate black and white tenants who were 
already living in separate buildings. McCaw told Young, who then called 
together his housing committee to press for the desegregation of Omaha public 
housing. 
Armed with information from the Federal Housing Act and the experi-
ence of other cities with integrated public housing, Young and the housing 
committee asked Omaha's mayor to eliminate race as a criterion for any pub-
lic housing assignments, to appoint a black to an upcoming vacancy on the 
housing authority, and to employ blacks in the agency. Within three weeks 
the mayor appointed a black to the housing authority. The new official then 
proposed that the agency consider the League's other requests. A housing 
authority member who wished to delay any further changes persuaded the 
other officials to postpone action until William Hill, the race relations ad-
viser of the Federal Public Housing Administration, came to Omaha from 
the Chicago regional office to discuss matters with them. 
Hill arrived and met with the housing authority and with the League's 
housing committee. League members assured Hill that their protest was not 
a smokescreen for efforts to sabotage future public housing. Young bluntly 
told Hill that he and his committee strongly advocated public housing, but if 
future projects were "dependent upon continued segregation, then the Negro 
community would not support it." Hill ultimately recommended that the 
mayor and the housing authority approve the League request to end segrega-
tion in public housing along the lines that Young and the housing committee 
suggested. 
The housing authority stalled again. After a few months, at a dosed 
meeting, a divided agency voted for the principle of integration and gradual 
implementation. At this point Young and the League mobilized biracial com-
munity support from labor, industry, churches, and numerous organizations. 
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He urged them to appear at the housing authority meetings, write letters, 
and otherwise pressure for complete acceptance and action on public hous-
ing integration. Young and the committee also visited the mayor and warned 
that if the housing authority failed to act, they would ask the city council to 
pass an ordinance to authorize and implement integration. The mayor re-
treated from this potential source of political embarrassment and urged housing 
officials to respond to League demands. Representatives from a host of orga-
nizations attended the next housing authority meeting. Alfred Kennedy reit-
erated the League's request and then called on other speakers from the com-
munity to state their support. Finally, the housing authority, after some 
disunity, enacted a policy of no segregation in new and future public housing 
and desegregation of existing units as vacancies occurred. . 
Again Young demonstrated his consummate leadership skills in mobi-
lizing blacks and whites behind League objectives. He responded speedily to 
militant black members on his League housing committee who wanted to 
take an uncompromising stand against residential segregation. At the same 
time, he persuaded reluctant white members to join him and their black 
colleagues in taking the moral high ground against public housing segrega-
tion. Perhaps the involvement of federal monies with their strictures, how-
ever vague, against segregation also strengthened the resolve of whites on the 
housing committee. In any case, once Young drew whites into the fray, they 
and the blacks attracted support from numerous other community groups. 
Ultimately, the mayor and the housing authority could ignore neither the 
biracial support that desegregation attracted nor the endorsement ofWilliam 
Hill of the FHA. Young's leadership produced the appointment of a black to 
the housing authority and a forthright policy against segregation, as well as 
screening of black applicants for assistant manager, tenant counselor, and 
clerical positions in the agency. "All in all," wrote Young, "we feel this is 
another example of how the Urban League, through its interracial social work 
approach and utilizing the processes of community organization, brings about 
improved conditions for Negro citizens." What Young failed to stress, either 
because of strategy or oversight, were the pivotal roles of black militant de-
mands and federal support, both of which moved whites in the local League 
and in city government to end segregation in public housing.35 
Although encounters with Omaha city authorities had been successful 
over public housing matters, Young fell short of his goals on slum clearance 
issues. The Federal Housing Act of 1949 included a Slum Clearance and 
Redevelopment Program. Responsibility for administering the initiative be-
longed to the Omaha Housing Authority. Before action commenced, the 
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agency chose six areas within the city to study as potential targets for the 
program. Without the knowledge and advice of Whitney Young and the 
League's housing committee, the housing authority selected an inappropriate 
area within the black community to investigate. Once again city housing 
officials aroused Young's ire. He and the housing committee emphatically 
asserted that this particular Negro section had not been chosen "with the 
thought of improving what was obviously our worst slum." Instead, the hous-
ing authority preferred to beautify the area surrounding the new public hous-
ing project, a decision that would do little to further expand housing for 
blacks. 
Young charged the agency with an egregious oversight. He and other 
League officials met with housing authority members to suggest that they 
study a ghetto area in need of much greater attention than the newly fur-
nished housing project. The neighborhoods that the League's interracial hous-
ing committee recommended for investigation contained some of the city's 
worst housing. Young noted that the 1950 census figured that one-third of 
the dwellings had no indoor toilets and one-tenth had no hot and cold run-
ning water. Additionally, Young observed that in the neighborhood was "our 
greatest incident of illness, crime, delinquency, and definite fire hazard." Fur-
thermore, banks consistently refused to grant loans for home improvement, 
and insurance companies refused to insure most of this property. To make 
matters worse, the rate of absentee ownership of these slum dwellings ex-
ceeded 50 percent. The housing authority's six recommended areas nearly 
became a fait accompli before Young and others conferred with the agency 
and persuaded it to abandon its earlier beautification proposal. Instead, the 
housing authority agreed to investigate the blighted area suggested by the 
League's housing committee. 
So that black leaders in Omaha would understand his impromptu meet-
ing with the housing authority, Young met with the black clergy, the Federa-
tion of Colored Women's Clubs, the Omaha NAACP, and other organizations. 
He informed them that an opportunity existed to improve living conditions 
in the city's most depressed black neighborhoods. He probably explained 
that the League's singular action was not an attempt to upstage other groups 
but an attempt to get substantive improvements in Omaha's black ghetto. He 
drew additional support from black physicians and black lawyers as well as 
from the chamber of commerce and the real estate board to petition the city 
council to pass an ordinance that included the blighted black neighborhoods 
as areas needing investigation by the housing authority. 
Young's new effort failed miserably. He accused the white Small Prop-
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erty Owners Association, whose members held title to much of Omaha's slum 
property, of misrepresenting League actions and recommendations to the hous-
ing authority. Young noted, "They were successful in getting a couple of 
'jackleg' Negro ministers and a political 'Hanger-on''' to convince black slum 
residents that the League would get them evicted from their homes. 
Young fought back. In a long letter to Omaha's black ministers, he 
reminded them of the disgraceful condition of the targeted black neighbor-
hoods. He stressed that all the proposal required was an investigation of the 
area. He emphatically declared, "If the study comes up with the specific rec-
ommendations that certain areas be cleared, but does not reveal a satisfactory 
plan of relocation of families into private homes, does not promise more than 
fair return for the homes bought, or does not assure us that new individual 
dwellings will be built in the area available for Negro citizens and at prices 
they can afford, then we will of course withdraw our support." What Young 
wished to accomplish was not a blanket condemnation of the entire blighted 
area, but identification of salvageable houses susceptible to rehabilitation. It 
was necessary, however, to refer to the whole area in the ordinance "so that 
the truly run-down and deteriorated homes will be weeded out." Finally, 
Young pur on the line his own credibility and that of his organization. He 
said, "The Urban League--which has demonstrated its concern for Negro 
citizens by opening up jobs in department stores, the utility district, the tele-
phone company, and the public library; and has demonstrated its interest in 
housing by securing a policy of no segregation in public housing and has 
educated real estate men so that Negro citizens are now able to move peace-
fully" beyond the ghetto "does not need to sell you on its sincerity and value 
to our community." The ministers responded favorably to Young's appeal 
and repeated his analysis to their congregations. Unfortunately, their efforts 
were not enough. 
Young claimed that those who opposed the program either had too 
little information or were "deliberately misinformed by persons who exploit 
this area for their own purposes." Clearly, the Small Property Owners Asso-
ciation through its black henchmen successfully stirred the fears of blacks in 
the targeted neighborhoods and convinced them that evictions were immi-
nent. Protests from these persons persuaded the city council, which had been 
favorable to Young's proposal, to table the issue. As a result, black Omaha lost 
an opportunity to rehabilitate several incredibly debilitated neighborhoods 
with federal funds. 36 
Reginald A. Johnson, the League's national coordinator of housing ac-
tivities, and Frank S. Horne, assistant to the administrator of the Federal 
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Housing and Home Finance Agency, assessed Young's leadership in the rede-
velopment effort and still hoped to salvage success from the endeavor. Horne, 
a former member of FDR's famed "black cabinet," suggested that Johnson 
forward to Young an appraisal on why he failed. The lengthy evaluation, 
which consisted of poignant questions prepared by Horne's staff, stressed 
Young's negligence in communicating the local League's perspectives on the 
study areas in a full and timely manner to the relevant parties in the contro-
versy, especially those in the affected slum neighborhoods. Horne acknowl-
edged that the Omaha Housing Authority did not contact Young about the 
existence of a housing investigation. Nonetheless, he chose to brief black 
middle-class leaders and organizations but not the grassroots residents who 
would be potentially affected. This oversight cleared the way for white slum-
lords and their black sycophants "to succeed in developing and corralling a 
degree of Negro opposition" to Young's wiser and more beneficial efforts in 
their behalf Horne also believed that Young should have had banks and fire 
insurance companies ready to communicate their assurances to potentially 
displaced slum residents. 37 
Horne's hindsight proved partially perceptive. The League and Young 
clearly neglected to talk directly to the tenants and homeowners in the blighted 
area. That would have happened, however, even if the Omaha Housing Au-
thority had informed him of its plans earlier rather than later. Young viewed 
his role and that of the Omaha Urban League as coordinator, facilitator, and 
troubleshooter. Young and the League equipped other organizations and 
spokespersons with the information, objectives, and programmatic assistance 
to improve the condition of the black community. Hence his failure to com-
municate with ghetto residents, while wrong, was not the result of negligence 
but the consequence of a particular leadership tactic. 
Although employment and housing issues claimed most of Young's en-
ergies, he eagerly attacked other examples of racial discrimination and segre-
gation. Some of these concerns took him beyond what League executives 
normally addressed. Young acted on any urgent issue or practice that de-
graded blacks or limited their opportunities. At times these matters drew him 
deep into politics, into protest, and other spheres that League officials usually 
eschewed. Young seldom demurred but became a versatile local leader cogni-
zant of the smallest injustice perpetrated against blacks. 
When Young arrived in Omaha in 1950, the public schools employed 
twelve black teachers, including Wanasebe Fletcher and Eugene Skinner. Both 
men along with two white principals belonged to the board of the Omaha 
Urban League. Like board members Kennedy and Dodge, who advised Young 
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on housing issues, the four educators told him about pressing concerns in the 
public schools. Skinner helped to acquaint Young with the school system 
shortly after his arrival. He invited the new executive director to give the 
commencement address at Long Elementary School, where he was princi-
pal.38 
Unexpectedly, the issue of black teachers and their segregated status in 
the Omaha public schools was thrust upon Young. Before Young officially 
assumed his duties, League board members selected Harry A. Burke, the school 
superintendent, as one of their four achievement award recipients. Although 
saluted by the League for educational innovations in black schools, Burke 
was blamed for the system's poor representation of black professionals. G. 
Aneita Hayes spoke for those blacks who opposed the honor for Burke. In a 
telegram to Lester Granger, the League's national head, she accused Burke of 
paying black teachers less than their colleagues and assigning them exclu-
sively to all-Negro schools. She held that if the League board insisted on the 
award for Burke, this would be detrimental to the League's national program 
and would weaken community support for the affiliate. Hayes promised a 
public protest against the presentation. 
Lester Granger had warned Young about Mrs. Hayes before his arrival 
in Omaha. "In fact, she came in the first day I was in the office," replied 
Young, "and [she] went into a tirade: about Burke and the 'reactionary, anti-
Negro, anti-labor' local League board that chose him." Young personally be-
lieved that "there might possibly be some question" about Burke's attitudes 
toward blacks, but her "charges are greatly exaggerated and some only hear-
say." Although he told Mrs. Hayes that he would take her concerns under 
advisement, he was most interested in thwarting her planned demonstration. 
He informed her that "any public protest would be in poor taste" and would 
harm the League. With difficulty, Young persuaded her to say which groups 
would back her. Actually no community protest existed. Young was further 
assured when he met with the black ministers' alliance and others mentioned 
by Mrs. Hayes. All noted that she lacked their support. Ultimately, she called 
off the protest and promised Young her utmost cooperation. Although he 
doubted her sincerity, he preferred not to have her as an enemy. 
Mrs. Hayes had competed with Young for the League position, so he 
questioned her support of his leadership. Nonetheless, he concluded that 
"there was some justification for the protest and sufficient community inter-
est surrounding it to warrant our taking some positive action." Young further 
believed that Omaha blacks had numerous problems that took precedence 
over the school situation. Nevertheless, the presence of twelve black teachers 
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in two all-Negro schools and the negative sentiments expressed toward Burke 
by blacks other than Mrs. Hayes gave Young ample justification to look fur-
ther into this matter. 
Young probably believed that the board used the award to Burke as a 
wedge to improve his performance on issues that mattered to blacks. That 
strategy met with only partial success. Within three years the number of black 
teachers more than doubled to twenty-six in six schools, five of which were 
integrated. Moreover, offensive minstrel shows at some high schools were 
discontinued. Despite these important gains, Young did not succeed in get-
ting black teachers hired in the high schools nor did school officials authorize 
the faculty to participate in training programs on teaching human and race 
relations courses. The probable intervention of the three principals who served 
on the League board helped Young with some hiring gains. How much of his 
successes and setbacks were attributable to Burke or the school board is un-
certain. With over two dozen teachers now in the school system, Young was 
correct to support his board's decision to give an award to such a dubious 
recipient as Harry Burke.39 
Whatever the case, Young believed that blacks should no longer depend 
on Burke and other white school officials to advance their interests. He di-
rected his new industrial relations secretary to collect data on the school sys-
tem. He also persuaded attorney Elizabeth Pittman to campaign for a seat on 
the school board. Eleven candidates were running, but Young told blacks to 
vote only for Pittman. The strategy apparently worked because in 1953 she 
became the first black school board member in Omaha, beating the school 
board's endorsed slate. Again, Young used unorthodox methods behind the 
scenes to achieve ends that the League's traditional tactics could not accom-
plish.40 
Young also attacked racial discrimination in Omaha's public facilities. 
Although the NAACP usually tackled such issues, the Omaha Urban League 
had developed an early concern with these unfair practices. During the 1940s, 
the League board tried to promote integration by holding its annual banquet 
downtown. Since no hotel would accommodate them, the chamber of com-
merce offered its facilities. When Young arrived in the 1950s, only one hotel 
and two downtown restaurants served blacks. This venture, like those in 
employment and housing, became a direct effort between Young and mem-
bers of his board. Black and white board members would go separately to 
selected restaurants to query the management on integration. Later, each re-
ported at a board meeting on what happened. Young and Phil Dodge also 
began dining together in segregated restaurants. The two would enter the 
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establishment and Dodge would introduce Young either to the proprietor or 
to the maitre d'hotel. The Dodge family name not only ensured service for 
the two but accomplished integration. To make certain that service for blacks 
continued, Young would return to the restaurant with another white or with 
a member of his staff. If a problem arose, Young called Dodge, and he would 
come back to make sure that these integration efforts would be maintained. 
"Whit was a good quarterback," remembered Phil Dodge. "He knew how to 
use his blocking backs!" With these precedents set, Young commenced work-
ing with the Hotel and Restaurant Association and eventually achieved com-
plete integration of downtown hotels and eating places. His persistence and 
strategizing played an important role in this victory, but Dodge's backing 
made the difference.41 
In Omaha, Young developed a mature understanding of leadership. 
Whether ideas to initiate action against discrimination in employment, hous-
ing, education, or public accommodations came from him or emanated from 
others, Young wisely sought support from both blacks and whites to achieve 
these objectives. Although he supported League methods of persuasion and 
closed-door negotiations, he seldom hesitated to abandon these tactics when 
direct action and protest promised better results. He appreciated his associa-
tions with important Omaha whites, especially those on his board, but never 
was he awed by them. Instead, he tried to steer their influence toward effect-
ing swift social change in Omaha's racial environment and practices. When-
ever these efforts were unsuccessful, Young, who never seemed to run out of 
alternatives or potential allies, turned to government, on the federal, state, 
and local level, to strengthen his thrust against racial discrimination and seg-
regation. Jockeying among white businessmen, board members, the militant 
De Porres Club, politicians, fellow blacks, and liberal whites, Young sought 
support and action, depending on the issue, from some or all of these groups 
and individuals to achieve his goals. 
During his three years in Omaha, Young gained increased visibility 
among Omaha whites and eventually among some with statewide influence. 
Because of his activism in employment and housing, he had already become 
familiar to local employers, the real estate board, the chamber of commerce, 
contractors, and mortgage bankers. Not surprisingly, his name also became 
better known within other influential circles. Never one to pull any punches 
about the urgency of ending racism, Young was outspoken about discrimina-
tion and segregation to whatever white organizations he addressed or with 
which he associated. The president of the local B'nai B'rith thanked him for 
his "very revealing and interesting discussion of your people." She agreed that 
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resolution of racial issues was vital to ensure domestic peace. The general 
secretary of the Omaha YMCA admitted, "You had a rather stormy start with 
our Y's Men's Club, but I think it all added up to definite growth on the part 
of the members."42 
Increasingly, this wider exposure made Young more active in various 
organizations with few if any black members. In 1953, for example, the Ne-
braska Welfare Association elected Young its first black president. The group 
consisted of 250 professional and lay social workers concerned with health 
and welfare issues. Young's statewide fame also brought him to the attention 
of Nebraska governor Robert B. Crosby. Crosby asked him to serve on his 
human relations committee, an agency to study whether discrimination on 
the basis of race, creed, or nationality existed in Nebraska. After the survey 
was completed, the governor solicited recommendations on how to solve the 
problem. Since no funds had been budgeted for the committee, Young and 
other potential members had to bear their own personal expenses. In any 
case, the request came too late, because Young's departure from Omaha was 
imminent.43 
That whites were not all alike was a significant lesson that Young learned 
in Omaha. His increased ability to discern differences enhanced his effective-
ness in enlisting their help in specific causes they would likely support. More-
over, he discovered the boundaries beyond which some whites could not be 
pushed in pursuit of racial equality. His intimate associations with Alfred 
Kennedy, Phillips Dodge, and John Markoe illustrate these points. 
Kennedy typified the conservative Republican businessman. Appeals to 
his conscience and to his sympathies for wronged Mrican Americans were 
not enough to draw him into the fight for black equality. Rather, racial jus-
tice was a practical matter, an issue of common sense and fair play. How 
could you ask black soldiers to risk their lives in the Korean War, yet deny 
them decent jobs and housing in the States? With a war going on in Asia and 
"an impending shortage of manpower" at home, Kennedy told businessmen, 
"This is no time to discriminate." Because "foxholes have no color line," 
neither should employers. At the same time Kennedy held firm views on a 
range of subjects with which Young disagreed. He opposed empowering gov-
ernment to end job discrimination among private employers and he was un-
friendly to federally subsidized public housing. Kennedy also believed that 
blacks bore a major responsibility for integration and becoming a part of the 
mainstream. He criticized them because so few attended the opera, symphony 
performances, and community playhouse productions. He contended that 
their presence at such events would increase white acceptance ofblacks.44 
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Young worked amiably with Kennedy despite some of his dubious per-
spectives. Because Kennedy believed strongly in the private sector, he vigor-
ously endorsed Young's efforts to increase the supply of housing for blacks 
through voluntary cooperative efforts among mortgage bankers, realtors, and 
contractors. Kennedy also contended that greater involvement by white busi-
nessmen in League affairs would yield voluntary moves to end employer dis-
crimination, a better alternative than government coercion. Although Young 
was a staunch FEPC advocate, he encouraged Kennedy's efforts to enlist greater 
voluntary support among white employers. 
Young understood that the Omaha realtor, despite his conservatism, 
was far more progressive than most of his peers on matters of race. That 
explains why Young encouraged Kennedy's League involvement by urging 
him to lead a discussion at the 1951 national convention in St. Paul, Minne-
sota. And that's why Young defended him even when Kennedy expressed his 
conservative views to a clearly irritated black audience. Legislation is not the 
way to solve racial problems, declared Kennedy. Although Young disagreed 
with him, he rescued Kennedy from this monumental faux pas.45 
Perhaps Kennedy perceived that Young had sacrificed his own credibil-
ity to salvage the dignity of a middle-aged white man trying to grapple with 
the complexities of race relations. Maybe such sentiments shaped the letter 
Kennedy wrote to Young's parents before his departure from Omaha. He 
admired Young and noted, "I knew we could not expect to keep him here, 
too long. I was confident he would outgrow his job." Kennedy predicted that 
Young would eventually make a national contribution "to the cause of good 
relations which is the cause of these United States of ours."46 
Whether Young's presence had a mediating influence upon Kennedy 
cannot be determined. After Young left Omaha, Kennedy's growth in race 
relations seems to have ended. When a black member of the community 
chest board suggested that Young return to replace the fired executive direc-
tor at the latter's lavish $15,000 salary, Kennedy opposed the idea. He was 
also against the governor's proposal to name Arthur McCaw, the veteran tax 
examiner, as director of the tax assessor's office. In later years, as urban decay 
overtook downtown Omaha, Kennedy blamed blacks. Perhaps it is too far-
fetched to argue that the absence of Whitney Young in Omaha left no black 
of sufficient influence to prevent Kennedy's ideas from degenerating from 
conservative to reactionary.47 
Greater familiarity and ease, however, characterized Young's relation-
ship with N. Phillips Dodge. They were about the same age and well edu-
cated. Dodge held a degree from Harvard, and Young possessed a master's 
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degree from Minnesota. As veterans of World War II, they viewed race rela-
tions from a broadened, cosmopolitan perspective. Because they held liberal 
theological views, Young and Dodge shared an interest in the Unitarian 
Church. 
Dodge served on an Omaha Urban League committee in 1949 and 
became aware of "the shocking condition of housing for Negro citizens." He 
accepted an invitation to join the League board in 1950 and later succeeded 
Kennedy as president of the Omaha affiliate. Young was cognizant of his 
friend's important family name and his enviable connections as a board mem-
ber of the local utilities company, as a bank trustee, and as a director of the 
real estate board. Young's relationship with Dodge rested on a mutual regard 
for their friendship and on Young's desire to use Dodge's considerable civic 
and business influence to open doors for Omaha blacks. There was nothing 
manipulative about Young's objective. Phil Dodge fully understood the na-
ture of their relationship, and he acquiesced. 
Far from functioning as a black spokesman anxious to win the favor of 
influential whites, Young independently articulated his own objectives as a 
leader and creatively chose different strategies to achieve them. While Young 
never eschewed direct action protest, he knew that the presence and inter-
vention of important whites sometimes accomplished the desired end with 
less trouble and fuss. Young called Dodge one day and asked that they meet 
immediately at a certain local hotel. Young had learned that blacks on a visit-
ing baseball team had arrived in Omaha and were refused service at the hotel 
despite their reservations. The white teammates vowed not to room there if 
black players could not stay. A minor scene resulted. As Young and Dodge 
talked with hotel officials, some visiting white salesmen, who regularly lodged 
at the hotel, learned of the dispute and staged their own protest against this 
discriminatory conduct by taking rooms in another establishment. Young 
and Phil Dodge could not reason with the management. Consequently, Dodge 
went to his friend, Gene Eppley, proprietor of the exclusive Fontenelle Hotel, 
told him 'of the situation, and persuaded Eppley to invite the team to lodge at 
the best hotel in Omaha. Although the Fontenelle had a reputation for treat-
ing blacks rudely, Dodge's intervention changed that. Young wisely chose an 
influential white businessman to achieve what protest could not resolve in 
the short run. Phil Dodge was acutely aware of his role. 
Dodge allowed Young to push him further into the fight for racial equal-
ity than Young could ever shove Kennedy. Nonetheless, neither Young nor 
Dodge could predict the heavy emotional toll that Phil's racial liberalism 
extracted from him in conservative Omaha. Dodge tried repeatedly to get 
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other influential whites to join him on the local Urban League board. His 
neighbor, a prominent surgeon, was a prime candidate. Dodge thought that 
the surgeon would contribute much to the League. When he refused, Dodge 
accepted his answer without rancor. Later, when Dodge attempted a run for 
the Nebraska legislature, the surgeon led a surreptitious effort in their neigh-
borhood to thwart his candidacy. He told fearful neighbors that, if elected, 
Phil Dodge would move blacks into their area to live. When Dodge learned 
of his friend's duplicity years later, he was astonished and deeply offended. 
Perhaps he, unlike Kennedy, came to a better understanding of what Young 
wanted to accomplish in Omaha and the odds that were stacked against him.48 
Young's dealings with John P. Markoe were more formal than his rela-
tionship with Phil Dodge, perhaps because Markoe was a priest and a genera-
tion older than Young. Markoe often exhibited fatherly pride in Young's work. 
Young, in turn, esteemed Markoe's longtime concern for blacks and his un-
stinting support for their full equality. Never before had Young met a white 
man who so willingly and consistently sacrificed his reputation and voca-
tional advancement to identify with the struggles of blacks. In Roman Catholic 
circles, especially in St. Louis and Omaha, Markoe was often criticized be-
cause of his conspicuous and unyielding opposition to Jim Crow, whether 
practiced by the Church or by secular society. Markoe affirmed for Young the 
existence of some whites whose advocacy for black advancement grew be-
yond occasional liberalism to total commitment and complete disregard for 
damaged reputations and other personal consequences. Young and Markoe 
were not simply acquaintances. They were fellow warriors who battled dis-
crimination and segregation with seriousness and urgency.49 
Young participated in several De Porres Club projects to desegregate 
various facilities in Omaha. By the same token, Markoe and his organization 
also helped Young and his affiliate. In 1952, for example, the club assisted 
Young in a drive to increase League membership. Additionally, neither Markoe 
nor Young believed that the Church was exempt from desegregation. Origi-
nally, the Omaha Roman Catholic diocese established St. Benedict'S parish as 
a segregated congregation to serve blacks. As they moved slowly but steadily 
beyond the confines of the ghetto, St. Benedict members wanted to attend 
churches and parochial schools that were closer to them. To maintain the 
existence of St. Benedict's, but as an integrated congregation, Markoe and 
Young drew new boundaries within which St. Benedict's would draw new 
parishioners. These new areas included those originally assigned to white par-
ishes.50 
Young must have been proud of his association with Father Markoe. In 
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1951 the Omaha Urban League awarded the Jesuit its outstanding service 
award. Later that year, Markoe appeared as a discussion leader at the NUL 
convention in St. PaulY 
Kennedy, a conservative, believed in private voluntary efforts to end the 
mistreatment of blacks; Dodge, an upper-class liberal, contended that white 
elite intervention and influence would break down racial barriers; and Markoe, 
a grassroots activist, advocated protest and other direct action techniques. All 
three enlightened Young on the different roles and approaches whites could 
employ to further League goals. He learned that anyone of these strategies, 
depending on the issues and circumstances, was useful in broadening oppor-
tunities for blacks. The attitudes and actions of Kennedy, Dodge, and Markoe 
taught Young valuable lessons on the multiple ways that whites could func-
tion in battles against racial inequality. 
While Young mobilized different segments of white support for racial 
advancement, he found it equally important to mirror and represent the per-
spectives of Omaha blacks. To maintain his credibility as a black leader, Young 
worked to convince blacks that he promoted their objectives rather than the 
agendas set by influential whites on his League board. Obviously, he occu-
pied an uncertain middle position! Sandwiched between a conservative white 
community and an expectant, perhaps impatient, black constituency, Young 
had a delicate balancing act to perform. Although he showed deftness in 
dealing with powerful Omaha whites, Young tried to demonstrate similar 
skill in cultivating black supporters. 
Young made a sustained effort to cooperate and coordinate activities 
with other black leaders and organizations in Omaha. Every Saturday morn-
ing, the local "black cabinet" met at the YMCA to discuss the week's events, 
vent grievances against one another, and use the session to prevent divisions 
among them. Whitney Young and Marion Taylor regularly attended. The 
cabinet also included Ralph Adams, an attorney and president of the Omaha 
NAACP, Charles Davis, a lawyer, banker, and exalted ruler of the local black 
Elks, Alyce Wilson, director of the Woodson Settlement, and the executive 
secretaries of the "colored" YMCA and YWCA. Eugene Skinner also came to 
describe conditions in the public schools. 
Besides serving as a clearinghouse for information, grievances, and strat-
egy, the local black cabinet attained some concrete goals. Their unity per-
suaded the municipal government to hire more black policemen, and they 
lobbied for the appointment of Ralph Adams as chairman of the police com-
munity relations board. That agency oversaw police activities and conduct 
within the black community. Whatever success Young achieved as a spokes-
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man derived in part from his intimate involvement with Omaha's council of 
black leaders. 52 
Young further developed these associations through active participa-
tion in other black organizations. Because the cabinet functioned as an inter-
locking directorate, Young's efforts to broaden his contact with blacks was 
enhanced. For example, Charles Davis, Eugene Skinner, and Ralph Adams of 
the NAACP were board members of the Omaha Urban League. At the same 
time, Young served on the Omaha NAACP board and supported NAACP marches 
against racial injustice. When Adams invited him to address his organization's 
mass meeting in March 1950, Young told the audience that blacks needed to 
use two principal tactics to improve their condition. He emphasized support 
from local and national civil rights groups, and he urged "sound political 
action." Young believed that blacks should discuss and decide which issues 
"vitally affect the masses of Negroes and let political representatives know 
what we expect of them." Young and the League cooperated with the NAACP, 
labor unions, Americans for Democratic Action, and other groups to lobby 
for the passage of an Omaha fair employment practices ordinance. While 
committed to traditional League methods of negotiation to effect change for 
blacks, Young never hesitated to supplement this approach with political 
mobilization and direct action strategies.53 
Young further enhanced his credibility as a black leader when he joined 
Hiram Lodge #10 of the Prince Hall Masons. He also spoke frequently in 
Omaha's black churches. In 1950, he addressed a career institute at Zion 
Baptist Church. Soon thereafter he was the Men's Day speaker for St. John 
Mrican Methodist Episcopal Church and Hillside Presbyterian Church. Al-
though Young became a regular participant in fraternal and religious events, 
he regularly loitered, if only for a few minutes, on 24th Avenue, the center of 
Omaha's black community. There one heard the familiar refrain, "Hey, 
Whitney," from scores of black men who would ask, sometimes seriously, 
other times jovially, "Can you get me a job?" Young's standard response was, 
"Come down to the League office and we'll see what we can do." He was 
clearly in touch with the grassroots institutions of black Omaha and with its 
people. 54 
Most Omaha blacks held Young in high regard, but he could not always 
garner consensus among black leaders. Arthur McCaw, Young's best friend, 
was probably his closest ally and consistent supporter. As chief tax appraiser 
in Omaha and then as state budget supervisor, McCaw had become an im-
portant political figure. Moreover, he had been an Omaha Urban League 
official serving in the 1940s as boys' work secretary and also as president of 
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the Omaha NAACP. These experiences further solidified Art's friendship with 
Whitney. McCaw's stature as a Nebraska state official had advanced to the 
point in 1953 that President Eisenhower considered his candidacy for gover-
nor of the Virgin Islands. Young praised him for the respect he earned as tax 
appraiser from Omaha's top businessmen and his ability to relate to the black 
community. These attributes, Young contended, qualified McCaw for the 
post. McCaw did not get the job, however.55 
Whatever envy McCaw's prominence engendered among rival blacks, 
some of the fallout rained on Young. When Young and the League persuaded 
the housing authority to name a black to the board, municipal officials wanted 
McCaw, whose credentials also included a license in real estate. Young thought 
it was a good idea, but the local black cabinet opposed it. Instead of McCaw, 
they urged the appointment of Charles Davis. Because McCaw did not want 
the position and had not sought it and because Davis was acceptable to both 
him and Young, a conflict was averted. Young felt sufficiently uneasy about 
some of the local black leaders that he told McCaw they seemed "to be losing 
steam but will bear watching!"56 
Young's continued flirtation with Unitarianism imposed a subtle but 
serious threat to his credibility as a black community spokesman. Although 
many blacks eschewed regular church attendance, nearly all agreed that the 
black church lay at the heart of their community life. Accordingly, Young 
cultivated Omaha's black clergy and involved them in League programs and 
initiatives. Perhaps his best ministerial friend and admirer was the Reverend 
Sanders H. Lewis, the pastor of Omaha's oldest and largest black congrega-
tion, the 700-member St. John AME Church. Young liked Reverend Lewis 
because of his broad interest and involvement in the civil rights struggle. The 
cleric had been president of the Omaha NAACP. Always hungry for the latest 
information about progress against Jim Crow, he often asked Young about 
the state of the black struggle. Young would then outline progress on state 
and local FEPC laws, Eisenhower's civil rights stands, southern black voter 
registration, integration of the armed forces, and other crucial issues. 
Young visited all of Omaha's black churches, and despite a rumor that 
he would join the exclusive St. Philip Protestant Episcopal Church, the League 
director, at least publicly, did not favor one congregation over another. None-
theless, Young had a fondness for St. John. Some of his board members and 
coworkers worshiped there. Moreover, his attachment to Reverend Lewis and 
his superb preaching made it difficult for Young to remain neutral. At the 
same time, Reverend Lewis grew increasingly concerned that Young had not 
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been saved. During a series of sermons on faith, Lewis preached ''And Enoch 
Walked with God" and drew Young to the altar to confess Jesus Christ. 57 
Although Young claimed to be an officer of St. John on his resume, few 
others knew of his affiliation. Better known to black Omahans was his asso-
ciation with the Unitarian Church. 58 Phil Dodge belonged to the First Uni-
tarian Church and served on the trustee board. The Reverend John Cyrus 
was a member of the Omaha Urban League board and attempted to educate 
white clergy about the black struggle. Young's previous exposure to the Uni-
tarian Church in the Twin Cities gave Dodge and Cyrus an edge in attracting 
him to their church. Margaret Young taught the Sunday school class that 
daughter Marcia attended. Ultimately, Young discovered that affiliation with 
the Unitarians harmed his credibility among blacks. He knew that his seem-
ing abandonment of the black church for a white congregation was perceived 
as an act of racial disloyalty. In fact, one black board member recalled nega-
tive reactions to the news that Young was becoming a Unitarian. Young re-
turned to the black church, although Margaret and Marcia remained with 
the First Unitarian congregation. Perhaps Young was moved by Reverend 
Lewis's fervent preaching, but clearly his deepening ties to St. John AME 
Church helped to save his leadership as much as his soul. 59 
Although Young may have stumbled because he embraced Unitarian-
ism, his increasingly visible accomplishments in the League rescued his repu-
tation. Achievements in employment and housing won the applause of blacks 
and some influential whites. Other initiatives in health, recreation, and edu-
cation broadened the involvement of the Omaha Urban League. For example, 
Young cooperated with efforts of the city health department to provide free X 
rays for tuberculosis in the black community. In joint sponsorship with the 
board of education and the city recreation department, Young drew black 
youth to the New Kellom School and Recreation Center to use the swim-
ming pool and other athletic facilities. Also, the League administered a spe-
cial fund, the Osmond scholarship, to encourage blacks to enter technical 
fields. As a result, two black physicians were able to finish their postgraduate 
training. 60 
These achievements drew praise from Young's boss, Lester B. Granger, 
head of the National Urban League. Granger made at least two visits to Omaha 
during Young's tenure. After the second trip in 1953, he was heartened by the 
increased support of the League by the large "colored" attendance at the an-
nual dinner. Young also arranged for him to speak to 125 members of the 
Omaha Real Estate Board, and he set up interviews for Granger on television 
and with a major newspaper. Granger told others in the national office, "I got 
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the impression of an extremely successful League program being operated in 
Omaha. The type and size of the attendance at the Annual Meeting was itself 
impressive, but even more impressive were the comments made ... by prac-
tically everyone with whom I came in contact."61 
Young's stature in the League also grew because he helped to shepherd 
the faltering affiliate in Lincoln, Nebraska. When veteran executive secretary 
Clyde W. Malone died in 1951, Young went to Lincoln as the League's na-
tional representative to give the eulogy at Quinn Chapel AME Church. De-
spite dissatisfaction with Malone's successor, Young worked with George 
Randol, the deceased's brother-in-law, to expand housing for Lincoln blacks. 
The reactivation of the air force base promised to draw hundreds of new 
black residents to a sharply restricted housing market. Randol had studied for 
a real estate license to help relieve the housing shortage. Young consulted 
with Randol about strategies to get mortgage monies available and put him 
in contact with a Federal Housing Administration official. Young's interven-
tion also drew Alfred Kennedy and Phil Dodge to assist Malone's successor, 
Sydney Alexander, with real estate matters. Kennedy came in 1953 to speak 
on housing at a Lincoln Urban League dinner.62 
Young was one of a group of up-and-coming League executives who 
became increasingly disenchanted with Granger's leadership. Willingness to 
employ direct action techniques and politics characterized Young's leadership 
tactics in Omaha. Local executives used similar methods to press more vigor-
ously for black advancement. In employment, for example, Young and his 
colleagues at other affiliates thought that FEPC legislation would be indispens-
able to their efforts to prod resistant businessmen to hire blacks. Granger 
opposed these efforts. He believed that during World War II, the federal FEPC 
had been ineffective. Moreover, he felt that since Congress would not resur-
rect the agency after its 1946 expiration, it was a lost cause. 
Granger's lack of militancy irritated other affiliate executives, including 
Edwin "Bill" Berry in Portland, Oregon, Alexander Allen in Pittsburgh, Sidney 
Williams in Chicago, Leo Bohanon in St. Louis, and Whitney Young in 
Omaha. Both Young and his predecessor, Bohanon, for example, had worked 
for the passage of a Nebraska FEPC. These five men called themselves the 
"Disturbed Committee." They also deplored the strained relations between 
Granger and the successive heads of the NAACP, Walter White and Roy Wilkins, 
and the lack of cooperation between the national offices of each organization. 
Young and Ralph Adams of the Omaha NAACP served on each other's board, 
and so did their counterparts in other cities. The Disturbed Committee wanted 
the same unity on the national level. 63 
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Young had his own personal problems with Lester Granger. In 1950, 
while Granger was visiting Omaha, Walter White arrived, apparently to pro-
mote his latest book. To avoid conflict and to convey the idea of cooperation 
with the Omaha NAACP, Young scheduled Granger to speak a day before White. 
Mindful of the friction between the two leaders, Young assured his boss that 
White's appearance "came out a poor second" to his own.64 
Young's desire to defuse Granger's potential irritation over White's speak-
ing engagement was understandable. Less tolerable was Granger's cavalier 
manner toward League officials. The NUL board of directors already com-
plained that he implemented programs and initiatives without its full back-
ing.65 Young had been trying to get an increase in Omaha's dues allocation to 
the national organization. Soon after his arrival in 1950, he sent in a $295 
check in response to an appeal from Granger. Young said, "I recognize it is a 
very small amount, but hope it will help in meeting the immediate needs 
mentioned in your request." He was nonetheless surprised and much irri-
tated to learn that Granger had already requested an increase in a separate 
letter to Omaha's community chest, the affiliate's principal funding source. 
That appeal was rejected. With his anger seemingly under control, Young 
told Granger that ifhe had known about the correspondence, "I could possi-
bly have prepared our local Chest so that it might have received a more recep-
tive reply.» In the end, Young's intervention with Alfred Kennedy, who be-
longed to the boards of both the League and the community chest, got approval 
for the increase.66 Granger's highhandedness and insensitivity reinforced 
Young's doubts about his leadership. 
Young now began considering other vocations. Fortunately, the School 
of Social Work at the University of Nebraska needed a part-time instructor in 
the group work course. Astonishingly, Young and a part-time lecturer in com-
munity organizations were the only social workers in the whole state who 
were academically qualified to teach these subjects. In 1951 Young's board 
permitted him to teach one afternoon each week from January to June at the 
Lincoln campus. Soon after he broke the color line on Nebraska's faculty, . 
Creighton University in Omaha invited him to teach in its adult education 
program. With these academic experiences now on his resume, Young could 
look beyond his three years in Omaha to a broader range of alternatives, 
perhaps outside the League movement. Interest in Young from the School of 
Social Work at Atlanta University raised the issue for him. He thought he had 
done all he could in Omaha and now was the time for a change.67 
In a conversation with Granger, Young learned that his boss had no 
plans for him. When Granger mentioned the top post in the dispirited and 
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disorganized Washington Urban League, Young politely demurred. With few 
opportunities in the League available, Young decided to go to Atlanta Uni-
versity to head its School of Social Work. He resigned his job in Omaha in 
November 195368 and took Margaret and their daughters, Marcia and infant 
Lauren, to Georgia. 
Young left the conservative midwestern city as a polished, pragmatic 
leader. Although devoted to the League and its emphasis on negotiation, 
persuasion, and pleading for sharp improvements in the social and economic 
condition of blacks, Young refused to be satisfied with these tactics alone. He 
was results oriented. If direct action, political involvement, or surreptitious 
plotting of boycotts wisely supplemented traditional League methods, then 
Young unhesitatingly embraced these approaches. Although he gained a so-
phisticated understanding of whites and their different perspectives and pref-
erences on effecting racial advancement, Young occasionally failed to consult 
a sometimes fractured black community. Perhaps he was so relieved when he 
exploited an opening in the otherwise closed mind of an Omaha employer 
that he forgot that cultivation of his black constituency required the same 
expenditure of time and energy as he devoted to winning over recalcitrant 
whites. 
5 
An Activist Educator 
'Toung did not choose to become a full-time social work educator because 
1. the ivory tower suddenly held greater attractions than the untidy world 
of social work practice. Rather, he reached a vocational dead end in a con-
strained League structure with limited opportunities for ambitious and rest-
less local executives eager for promotions. While Atlanta University repre-
sented an alternative, it was not necessarily the most desirable. As Young 
grew accustomed to his new environment, however, he became increasingly 
aware of a burgeoning civil rights movement throughout the South. As dean 
of the region's only accredited school of social work primarily for blacks, 
Young envisaged a pivotal role for graduates in effecting social change, and he 
developed an academic program to achieve that result. Moreover, as a social 
worker with activist credentials, Young developed into a strategist and con-
sultant to those in the forefront of the emergent civil rights revolution. 
Young entered social work during the Truman administration, a period 
that one scholar has called the coming of age of civil rights as a national issue. 
Harry Truman, the first president to go to Harlem to seek black votes, com-
piled such impressive initiatives in civil rights that it became a federal prior-
ity. They included the desegregation of the armed forces, executive orders 
banning government contracts to discriminatory employers, and a hard-hit-
ting commission report, To Secure These Rights, which condemned Jim Crow.! 
With that momentum, even the reluctant Eisenhower administration acknowl-
edged the increased importance of civil rights in national politics. A hesitant 
and at times hostile Dwight D. Eisenhower advanced the civil rights agenda 
extending from efforts to eliminate Jim Crow from public facilities in the 
District of Columbia, to pressure on employers voluntarily to end job dis-
crimination, to the armed enforcement of school desegregation in Little Rock, 
Arkansas. The 1954 Brown decision, a unanimous Supreme Court opinion 
written by an Eisenhower appointee, outlawed public school segregation and 
put the civil rights struggle on a new plateau of legitimacy and importance.2 
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Young knew that black grassroots activism in politics and protest had 
moved these diffident presidents to act. He had participated in broad-based 
efforts to enact FEPC legislation in Minnesota and Nebraska. Hundreds of 
blacks, primarily in the North and West, crusaded to get FEPC laws on the 
regional and local levels. Southern blacks focused on unequal treatment on 
local transit systems. In 1953, 1955, and 1956 in Baton Rouge, Montgom-
ery, and Tallahassee, respectively, successful bus boycotts taught blacks that 
their economic power gave them sufficient leverage to end some Jim Crow 
practices. These actions, especially those which drew upon the growing mili-
tancy of southern blacks, culminated in a sustained thrust for racial equality. 
Successful challenges against seemingly impregnable white institutions and 
practices helped to transform these disparate and random efforts into a civil 
rights movement.3 In this general setting of heightening consciousness and 
action on civil rights issues, Whitney Young led the School of Social Work of 
Atlanta University. 
Young was one of more than a dozen candidates who competed to suc-
ceed Forrester Washington, who headed the school from 1927 until his re-
tirement in 1954. Although Washington preferred another applicant, At-
lanta University president Rufus E. Clement chose Young. 4 Social work faculty 
and graduates expressed puzzlement over his selection. Some professors noted 
that Young would be the only one of the five deans without a doctorate. 
Others scorned his lack of published scholarship. Doubts about his suitabil-
ity also surfaced within the school's alumni chapter in New York. Apparently 
his age, thirty-two, and his academic inexperience annoyed some chapter 
members. In a vigorous defense of his credentials, Young observed that most 
alumni and alumnae did not know of his teaching stints in social work at the 
University of Nebraska and that he had supervised social work students from 
the University of Minnesota and Atlanta University. He also possessed "top 
recommendations from the key persons in the Council on Social Work Edu-
cation" including his former dean at the University of Minnesota, John 
Kidneigh. Ersa Hines Clinton, the president of the New York chapter and a 
fellow Kentucky State graduate, assured Young that no one felt any resent-
ment toward him personally. Rather, chapter members wanted to participate 
in the selection process and perhaps offer themselves as candidates for the 
position.5 
Fortunately for Young, most of Atlanta's social work faculty already knew 
him. He had been a field supervisor for their students and a participant in 
their school's annual institute for off-campus instructors. Moreover, some 
faculty remembered him from various professional meetings. They found their 
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new dean more than a full generation younger than their previous boss and 
possessed of an entirely different management style. Whereas Forrester Wash-
ington operated the school autocratically, Young believed in shared gover-
nance. He relied heavily on the advice of senior faculty, and he yielded deci-
sions on curricular reform to them.6 Moreover, he vigorously prodded President 
Clement to raise faculty salaries and provide extra funds for professional travel. 
For example, Young told his boss that "the wide gap between what we pay our 
faculty and what is paid in other schools" made it difficult to hold top-notch 
teachers. Clement then directed Young to inquire about faculty salaries at 
comparable schools of social work in the South. Young wrote to fellow deans 
at Tulane and Washington Universities. Their prompt replies, noted Young, 
"confirm quite definitely my concern about our faculty being considered 
underpaid." These testimonies apparently swayed Rufus Clement, because 
Young thanked him several months later for increasing salaries.? He also asked 
Clement to increase the professional travel allowance from $4,000 to $5,000 
in the 1954-55 budget. He wanted funds to pay partial expenses for four 
additional faculty members to attend the 1954 convention of the National 
Conference on Social Work. Despite this "abnormal representation," it was 
important because several professors had not attended the annual meeting in 
five or six years. Young was told that his request was impractical, and he was 
only allotted enough to pay the partial expenses for one professor to attend 
the conference.8 
Outside funding enabled Young to hire new faculty and field supervi-
sors and to enhance the curriculum. His predecessor, for example, left him 
$22,000 from a Rosenwald Fund grant. Young used it to support psychiatric 
social work courses and to send a faculty member to the Menninger Clinic 
for further study. An $8,300 federal grant from the Office of Vocational Re-
habilitation compensated three part-time instructors and paid for an insti-
tute course for one of his professors.9 A $9,600 grant from the National 
Institute of Health increased the staff associated with the School of Social 
Work.!O 
As Young increased the number of field supervisors to mentor his stu-
dents and the range of agencies where they did their practicums, he wanted 
to deepen connections to the Atlanta campus. He asked Clement for money 
to sponsor an annual institute for field supervisors so that they could con-
tinue to place students in their agencies.!! 
Each institute focused on a timely theme in social work practice. The 
1954 conference discussed curricular issues, and the 1955 gathering dealt 
with teaching methods in supervision. Young also hired consultants for the 
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institutes: John Kidneigh in 1954 and Florence Poole of the University of 
Illinois in 1955. Field supervisors, both black and white, attended these con-
ferences, representing such diverse organizations as the Veterans' Administra-
tion, settlement houses, family courts, hospitals, YMCNYWCAs, and League 
affiliates. Even with the diversity Young constantly tried to increase the num-
ber of participating agencies in his school's field supervision. He had the 
opportunity in 1954, for example, to involve potential supervisors at Atlanta's 
Family Service Society. Although officials were willing to train students with-
out a fee, $500 was needed to rent downtown office space. In his successful 
bid for assistance from President Clement, Young noted that "the Family 
Service Society is ... considered the top agency for training case workers." 
He added, "In most schools the full-time faculty person is employed to handle 
a student training unit in this type of agency. However, we have sold the local 
agency on using its very fine staff and giving the School supervision free of 
charge."12 
While mindful that the School of Social Work played a special role in 
educating blacks, Young wanted it to conform to all the norms and regula-
tions of the profession. Meeting the expectations of the National Conference 
of Social Work and especially the Council on Social Work Education meant 
enhancing the school's reputation and retaining its accreditation. Young of-
ten told Clement that he tried to maintain a top-notch accredited school and 
faculty whose program was always under review by the Council of Social 
Work Education. He added, "This Council, and I believe rightly so, gives no 
consideration to the fact that we are a Negro school." Rather, the agency 
compared Atlanta's program with the programs of other schools and refused 
to consider race as a mitigating factor. With this kind of scrutiny, Young 
knew positively that whatever his school gained in curricular innovation or 
faculty achievement met a universal standard. 13 
Just as Young arrived at Atlanta University, the Council on Social Work 
Education issued a new manual on curriculum that would become the basis 
for future accreditation. It required new or reorganized courses and special 
team-taught subjects in such areas as human growth and development. Pro-
fessors in medicine, social work, and psychology were required. Young and 
his faculty also revised substantially the objectives of the curriculum and put 
greater stress on students acquiring a variety of conceptual and research skills 
and a specific competence either in casework, group work, or community 
organization. They also wanted "to stimulate in the student a desire to con-
tinue his professional growth through continuous study and participation in 
professional activity." The council had once regarded the school's unclear 
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curricular objectives as its number one problem, but after a year's study, Young 
and the faculty hammered out these substantially revised academic aims. l4 
Young made certain that as many social work educators and consult-
ants had input in Atlanta's curricular changes as possible. Sure acceptance 
from the council would more easily result from such contacts, and greater 
respect for the school would also occur. Even before he left Omaha, Young 
visited several institutions and talked with "people responsible for accredita-
tion and some who have made the greater contributions toward curriculum 
formation." After he assumed his position, Young drew consultants from the 
National Institute of Mental Health, the American Association of Social 
Workers, the Office ofVocational Rehabilitation, and the American Founda-
tion for the Blind to advise the faculty about curricular reform. l5 
Perhaps Katherine A. Kendall, consultant on educational services at the 
Council on Social Work Education, was Young's most important visitor. She 
met with the faculty and observed that its work on curriculum development 
was "truly remarkable." She advised Young to evaluate the new programs and 
their impact on the fieldwork of students during their matriculation and in 
their jobs after graduation. She also commended Atlanta for special curricu-
lar innovations that she wanted other schools of social work to emulate. Young 
was particularly pleased when Kendall praised the faculty's up-to-date infor-
mation from recent council meetings. Kendall observed that they knew of 
new developments in curriculum and utilized information from the various 
program and workshop sessions. Discussions with colleagues from other in-
stitutions also seemed to inform the faculty's comments. Clearly, Young's vig-
orous encouragement of greater faculty attendance at professional meetings 
paid off.16 
Winning recognition and congratulations from social work educators 
for his work at Atlanta University had become an important goal for Young. 
Mter Kendall reported her findings to the executive director of the council, 
he told Young, "I do not know what it is you are doing in Atlanta, but Mrs. 
Kendall has come back starry-eyed about the work which you and your fac-
ulty are doing in your curriculum studies. We find this exceedingly hopeful 
and want you to know what a real contribution this is to the field."l7 
Accreditation from the Council on Social Work Education and the 
American Association of Medical Social Workers for courses in that field was 
the tangible result of curricular reform. The association financed two visits 
for its representative to determine whether the dean and the faculty were 
competent to carry out a program in medical social work. Ultimately, both 
the association and the council granted their approval in May 1955. Since 
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Young credited Professor Hortense E. Lilly with developing the field, he prod-
ded Clement to send her a commendation. He also cultivated support from 
the university administration and from a wide range of social work educators 
to bring this curricular change to fruition. IS These efforts helped Young to 
push his institution into the mainstream of social work education and to 
alert others to the academic ascent of the school. Young started to think boldly 
of a Ph.D. program. He conceded that the endeavor was five to ten years into 
the future, but such projections indicated Young's growing confidence in his 
school and its prospects.19 
Perhaps the best barometer ofYoung's achievements as a university dean 
was the stabilization of enrollment in the School of Social Work. Toward the 
end of Washington's stewardship, enrollment fluctuated. During the 1951-
52 academic year, for example, Washington reported ninety-seven students. 
Within two years, however, Clement called attention to decreased enroll-
ment. Washington replied, "Our decrease was less than the decrease in gen-
. eral for all schools of social work in the country." In 1954-55 enrollments 
during the Washington-Young interregnum stood at eighty-nine students 
during the first semester and sixty-nine students during the second semester. 
Those numbers improved substantially during the 1955-56 academic year to 
ninety-two and eighty-six in the first and second semesters, respectively.20 
While the previous figures reflect combined full-time and part-time enroll-
ments, Young's achievement in increasing the student body is best seen in the 
growth from sixty-four full-time students in 1954 to ninety-two in 1958, 
when Young noted that applications had grown so much that "we are able to 
be increasingly selective in our admissions process."21 
Young's lead in expanding financial aid to students was probably the 
biggest factor in the growth and stabilization of enrollments. Some of these 
efforts built on programs that his predecessor started, and others stemmed 
from Young's initiatives. Forrester Washington cooperated with the Southern 
Regional Education Board in accepting funds from southern states that paid 
tuition for black social work students to attend Atlanta University rather 
than challenge segregated institutions closer to home. During the 1953-54 
academic year a dozen students from Alabama, North Carolina, and Tennes-
see came to Atlanta under this program. That arrangement continued under 
Dean Young. For example, Tennessee paid $3,550 for the 1954-55 academic 
year for state students, and a few months later Alabama made a partial pay-
ment of $1 ,500 for its residents enrolled in the School of Social Work. Wash-
ington, however, seemed sure that Young agreed that "any right thinking 
Negro" would be glad to see that practice end.22 
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At the same time Young asked Clement to increase university scholar-
ships to social work students from $3,000 to $5,000 annually, since the former 
figure "constitutes very little financial help to students." Echoing Washington's 
warning that the Brown decision of 1954 would prompt white institutions to 
admit blacks to their schools of social work, funds from the Southern Re-
gional Education Board would end. Additional scholarship assistance made 
it imperative to offset these potential losses. 23 
Funds from grants that Dean Young helped to secure earmarked finan-
cial aid for students. In 1956, for example, the National Foundation for In-
fantile Paralysis Fund provided two scholarships totaling $1,700. Funds to 
assist students also came from the National Institute of Mental Health and 
the Office of Vocational Rehabilitation.24 Various alumni chapters made im-
portant contributions as well. The National Alumni Association set up the 
Forrester B. Washington Loan Fund, and the New York chapter initiated its 
own annual scholarship. Overall, Young increased scholarship aid from $6,000 
in 1954 to about $32,000 in 1958.25 
The admission of white students was another strategy that Young used 
to stabilize enrollments. Even before he came to Atlanta, he and Clement 
discussed the potential impact of desegregation on Atlanta University and 
the social work program. They concluded that the opening of other social 
work schools in the South to black students would not threaten enrollments 
at the Atlanta School. Young added that the school could become the most 
attractive center for social work education in the region. Since 1950, his 
predecessor had presented the applications of white students to the university 
as "test cases." The trustees, however, demurred because they feared Georgia 
would withdraw their tax-exempt status if whites were admitted. The Brown 
decision removed that threat, and in 1956, Young admitted the first white 
full-time students. No doubt, the curricular innovations, especially the re-
cently accredited medical social work field, brought Young's ambition to make 
the school attractive to both whites and blacks closer to fruition. 26 
Young also inaugurated a program of continuing education for em-
ployed social workers who lacked the master's degree. To explain the curricu-
lum and other requirements, Young arranged meetings between his faculty 
and local agency executives who would employ the potential pupils. They 
discussed various methods of scheduling, means of funding, and the subjects 
for study. When one agency executive asked whether the Georgia Merit Com-
mission approved the program, Young quickly and proudly declared that the 
school was accredited by the Council on Social Work Education and had the 
highest rating that any school could have and that its curriculum was ac-
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cepted by all agencies and boards. Young's answer demonstrated increased 
confidence to this interracial audience about the school as a mainstream in-
stitution that could serve social workers, both black and white.27 
The placement of graduates was further evidence of the institution's 
growing interracial clientele. The involvement of whites as field supervisors 
helped Young to build on another of his predecessor's initiatives, that of plac-
ing graduates in predominantly white agencies. The school regularly awarded 
degrees to students who became officials in various League affiliates and in 
black community centers. Increasingly, Atlanta University graduated social 
workers for hospitals, public welfare agencies, charities, juvenile and criminal 
justice facilities, and other organizations that served an interracial, constitu-
ency.28 
Although administrative responsibilities claimed most of his time, Young 
taught courses on social services and served in the university senate, as chair-
man of the university faculty, and on a committee to oversee the sociology 
department. He was an ex officio member of all social work committees, 
both administrative and academic, including fieldwork and admissions, so-
cial work practice, human growth and development, and social services.29 
The onetime community leader and organizer had become a full-fledged aca-
demic. Some who were skeptical of Clement's choice had many of their doubts 
allayed, especially since Young's national and regional visibility and promi-
nence as a social work educator became evident to administrators and faculty 
at Atlanta University. 
Young's achievements at the School of Social Work resulted in numer-
ous committee appointments. Clement urged Georgia governor Ernest 
Vandiver to appoint Young to a statewide committee to improve services to 
"colored inmates" at the Milledgeville mental hospital. His professional col-
leagues, most of whom were white, nominated him to executive boards of 
major national organizations in social work, including the Council on Social 
Work Education and the Planned Parenthood Federation. Similarly, Young's 
reputation drew him to executive boards of social work groups on the state 
and local levels. They included the Georgia State Welfare Conference, the 
Georgia Association for Mental Health, the Atlanta Tuberculosis Associa-
tion, and the Atlanta chapter of the American Association for the Physically 
Handicapped.30 
Perhaps more important, Young became a consultant to several public 
and private agencies, thus enhancing his influence and posture as a national 
expert on a wide range of social welfare issues. The Southern Regional Coun-
cil, an influential interracial commission for gradual racial change, chose Young 
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in 1955 as a paid consultant to its program on Mental Health Training and 
Research. He was reappointed in 1957. Young was also a consultant with the 
Georgia Committee on Interracial Cooperation, which was affiliated with 
the SRC. Also in 1955 Young accepted a three-year appointment as a consult-
ant to the federal Bureau of Public Assistance and Children's Bureau Com-
mittee on Training. In a letter to Clement, Young revealed his hope that 
contacts with this small, select group of committee members would bring 
prestige to the school and alert him to federal funds that might be available 
for training social workers. That probably led to his later appointment to 
President Eisenhower's White House Conference on Youth and Children. He 
also belonged to a commission established by the National Council of 
Churches to help prepare its conference on the Church and Social Welfare. 31 
Moreover, Young maintained a phenomenally busy speaking schedule. 
He delivered addresses to a broad array of professional social welfare and 
social work organizations, university groups, civil rights agencies, fraterni-
ties, and alumni. For example, his topics ranged in 1958 from "Education for 
Citizenship" to the Albany, Georgia, chapter of Alpha Phi Alpha to "The 
South's Role in World Leadership" to Atlanta's Hungry Club to "Racial, So-
cial, and Religious Tensions" to the International Conference on Liberal Re-
ligion and Religious Freedom at the University of Chicago.32 
What must have pleased his once skeptical colleagues, especially in the 
arts and sciences, was Young's modest but growing list of publications. Before 
coming to Atlanta University, Young had written privately printed pamphlets 
on black employment in retailing, racial barriers in public housing, and health 
conditions among blacks. After becoming dean, he contributed articles on 
his transition from the League to higher education and one on blacks and the 
social work profession. These essays were published in minor journals, but 
his article on "The Role of the Community Organizer in Desegregation" was 
published in the prestigious Journal of Orthopsychiatry. A decade earlier, W.E.B. 
DuBois had founded Phylon, a serious interdisciplinary journal on racial is-
sues. Young contributed an article and reviews and later joined the editorial 
board. His brief essay on urban renewal urged black participation. His re-
views summarized the 1954 Social WOrk Year Book and critically assessed a 
study on southern attitudes toward desegregation.33 
These achievements in social work education increasingly brought Young 
to the attention of influential leaders within his profession. In 1959, Joseph 
Golden, an able Ph.D. whom Young had hired a few years earlier, secretly 
nominated him for the coveted Florine Lasker Award for outstanding accom-
plishments in social work. He credited Young with enhancing the reputation 
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of his institution and encouraging faculty "to proceed with curriculum revi-
sion on bold lines." He cited Young's involvements with numerous national 
and local social welfare, social work, and civil rights organizations. Golden 
also lauded Young's "action research," which resulted in important publica-
tions on "pressing problems." Golden's sentiments obviously reflected those 
of the larger social work profession, since Young was named the 1959 recipi-
ent of the Lasker Award. He received the $1,000 prize at the San Francisco 
meeting of the National Conference on Social Work Young had now as-
cended to the top of his profession. Whites and blacks nationally recognized 
him as a preeminent social work administrator and educator. Nonetheless, he 
seemed to yearn for more.34 
President Clement. became increasingly aware that Young had been an 
effective dean and that other institutions might seek his services. Probably to 
preclude such possibilities, Clement granted Young yearly raises in salary. 
Between 1956 and 1959, his compensation rose from $6,800 to $8,300 an-
nually.35 Nonetheless, Clement's persistent reluctance to authorize leaves for 
Young to respond to numerous fellowship and consultant opportunities con-
strained his academic circumstances and perhaps increased his inclination to 
consider other offers. 
Since coming to Atlanta University, Young was probably sensitive about 
his lack of a Ph.D. During his regular sabbatical year, he considered return-
ing to the University of Minnesota for advanced work in administration and 
community organization. While Minnesota had few funds, ample money 
seemed available at the University of Kentucky. The Southern Education 
Foundation funded three fellowships for blacks to complete the Ph.D. Young, 
however, declined. He had not been at Atlanta University long enough to 
justify a leave. Moreover, Kentucky offered doctoral degrees in sociology, not 
in social work, his preferred field. 36 
Nevertheless, Young, with a terminal M.A., had become a respected 
social work educator. Increased demands for his expertise showed both na-
tional and global esteem for his Atlanta achievements. Notwithstanding these 
developments, Young refused two offers from the United Nations. Despite 
his interest in international social welfare problems, he rejected offers to serve 
as an overseas welfare adviser in 1956 and as a technical consultant in Syria.37 
He also turned his back on a full professorship at the University of Chicago 
and a visiting lectureship at UCLA.38 
Young was willing to leave Atlanta University. Inquiries about perma-
nent United Nations employment showed how unsettled he had become by 
1957. Moreover, Margaret, his wife, thoroughly detested Jim Crowed At-
98 Militant Mediator 
lanta and refused to adjust her attitudes and behavior to it. Their daughters, 
Marcia and Lauren, attended a private school run by Atlanta University, but 
they could expose them to only a few cultural amenities in a racially segre-
gated city. In 1958, Young himself acknowledged, "There are personal factors 
which make it difficult for me to live in the South with children."39 
Why did he stay? Various factors combined to keep him in Georgia, at 
least for a few more years. Clement's reluctance to grant Young any extended 
leaves of absence to work for the United Nations was one reason. Young was 
not tenured and did not want to jeopardize his Atlanta job in favor of seem-
ingly attractive offers elsewhere. Moreover, numerous administrative changes 
seemed to cause Clement to develop ulcers. Young felt obligated to stand by 
a Kentucky family friend during a time of administrative turnover.40 The 
principal reason why he remained in Atlanta related to his deepening in-
volvement in the burgeoning struggle for racial equality. His growing reputa-
tion as a race relations specialist stemmed from his civil rights activism. 
Young arrived in Atlanta a few months before the landmark Brown 
decision of 1954, and he remained in the South during a surge of black 
activism within the region. Young became a recognized expert on the bur-
geoning movement from two vantage points. First, as a writer, speaker, and 
consultant he developed a national reputation as an advocate for relating the 
social work profession to social change. Hence, he became an acknowledged 
scholar on desegregation. Second, Young evolved into a skilled strategist and 
activist during escalating black militancy in Atlanta. These involvements, which 
would eventually define Young's vocational direction, cemented his commit-
ment to remain at Atlanta University for a few more years. 
When Young received the Florine Lasker Award in social work, the 
citation commended him for "vigorous, wise and unafraid leadership in. the 
field of desegregation and civil rights." Drawing attention to this aspect of 
Young's efforts as a social work educator indicated how much he stressed the 
role of his profession in spearheading social change. At his school he told 
faculty and students to develop strategies to change conditions for blacks 
rather than push adjustments to inequitable circumstances. Young exhorted 
them to effect equality in services rendered to blacks, to analyze American 
society to understand how the unequal status of blacks evolved, and to inte-
grate these perspectives into whatever phase of social work they either taught 
or practiced.41 Young disseminated these views through numerous speeches, 
especially to fellow professionals. 
Young declared to the National Social Welfare Assembly that "social 
action, social reform, conscious efforts to promote better intergroup relations 
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[are] not an incidental extramural activity for social work. ... It is social 
work." He added, "If we fail to recognize this ... then we shall have done a 
tragic disservice to our profession." He then criticized fellow professionals 
because they had not taken "forthright and courageous positions" in favor of 
racial equality. "In fact, we have often lagged behind other professional groups 
which have been denied the benefit of our daily experiences with the results 
of racial discrimination." Young cited instances at national conventions when 
social workers ignored issues of concern to blacks. He was especially dis-
mayed that when the Democrats and Republicans received input from the 
National Association of Social Workers for their 1960 platforms, the organi-
zation excluded civil rights as a major concern. Young deplored this colossal 
oversight because he held that social workers should be the primary trouble-
shooters for fundamental changes in the condition of blacks. At another pro-
fessional meeting, Young challenged his colleagues to "reflect the basic con-
cepts in social work in our services as well as in administration." In categorical 
terms, Young declared, "The agency that discriminates on a racial basis in its 
admissions policies is no longer a legitimate social work agency, nor is its staff 
legitimate social workers." As a social work educator and as an activist in 
several national and regional professional groups, Young advanced the notion 
that social workers should effect social change, especially when the issues 
related to race. 42 
It was in the field of desegregation, however, that Young earned a repu-
tation as one of the nation's foremost experts. He did some writing on the 
subject, including a detailed review in Phylon of Desegregation: Resistance Readi-
ness, a book which surveyed opinions among whites in a typical North Caro-
lina county. The study discussed which groups would probably accept deseg-
regation and which would probably resist. Young was not surprised to learn 
that "the least educated, the least exposed to mass media, those in the lowest 
occupational class" would mount the most opposition. While Young gener-
ally agreed with these results, he questioned modestly the premises and meth-
odology of the researchers. He noted that, in not including blacks in the 
sample, the author wrongly assumed that "all Negroes are for desegregation 
and ... that they can play no significant role in the process." He also objected 
to the staff of white interviewers and "highly emotionally toned words ... 
which encouraged negative responses." He simply believed that questions 
were phrased badly. "Researchers have learned that regarding the public atti-
tude toward a Fair Employment Practices Law, for example, you get one re-
sponse when you ask the question, 'Should employers be forced to hire Ne-
groes?' and another, completely opposite response when you ask, 'Shouldn't 
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there be a law preventing an employer from refusing to hire a person solely on 
the basis of his color?'" Young wondered if the authors would have gotten 
different results if they had asked, "Do you believe that Negro tax-paying 
citizens of this community should have the right to use those public facilities 
that are tax-supported?"43 
Perhaps Young's clearest scholarly statement on dismantling Jim Crow 
appeared in the Journal of Orthopsychiatry to which he contributed an essay 
on "The Role of the Community Organizer in Desegregation." He stressed 
how those trained in social work could effectively function as catalysts for 
change in race relations. In five specific ways, contended Young, the commu-
nity organizer affected the desegregation process. First, as an enabler, the 
organizer gathers facts, interprets them, and facilitates their implementation 
through meetings, reports, and coordination of various groups concerned 
with the issue. Second, the organizer appreciates the uniqueness of his setting 
and approaches problems without prejudice. For example, he does not as-
sume that because a community is in the Deep South, its attitudes or tradi-
tions are necessarily like those of another southern community. Moreover, he 
would not assume that all southern white citizens oppose desegregation. Third, 
the status quo, since most are comfortable with it, should not be frontally 
attacked. Rather, "a suggestion or a review of another community's experi-
ence tactfully placed is helpful; but more important, praise where the slight-
est positive movement is shown and a careful avoidance of a condemning or 
self-righteous approach are mandatory." Fourth, while change is often pain-
ful, it is an attainable goal. "The community organizer," he wrote, "never 
forgets, then, the capacity and ability of all people for change." Finally, the 
community organizer must put together the genuine leaders and best groups 
to achieve desegregation. Young declared that the "organizer must be espe-
cially skillful in the process of interpretation and in the involvement of citi-
zens who are for and against segregation .... Compromise on method may 
be desirable, but never on principles or goals. He should attempt to set up a 
time schedule that is realistic, but not one that is obviously an effort to delay 
or postpone what the highest court in the land has proclaimed to be the 
I "44 aw. 
Young's practical understanding of how to implement desegregation 
strictly adhered to basic social work principles. These moderate tactics ap-
pealed to numerous activists eager to learn the best techniques to achieve 
their goals. Carlton B. Goodlett, a black physician and publisher of the San 
Francisco Sun-Reporter, sought Young's advice on methods for involving more 
blacks in the local schools. Bayard Rustin, a pacifist who emerged as a major 
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civil rights strategist, hitchhiked from New York City to Atlanta to elicit 
reactions from Young on initiating interracial civil rights workshops. A Co-
lumbia University social work professor also urged Rustin to consult with 
Young on whether sit-ins, mass protests, and other militant tactics were fea-
sible in the burgeoning civil rights struggle. Rustin had been told that Young 
was the nation's best sociologist with insight on this timely topic.45 
The Montgomery bus boycott in 1955 and 1956 greatly impressed 
Young. He went there and spoke with Reverend Martin Luther King Jr. and 
attended dozens of meetings. Young felt that this was "not mere boycott" but 
represented a watershed in the struggle against segregation and discrimina-
tion. Montgomery movement leaders respected Young as a knowledgeable 
observer with valuable advice to offer. Reverend Ralph D. Abernathy, King's 
chief lieutenant, knew Young when he studied for the M.A. in sociology at 
Atlanta University. When Abernathy returned to the campus to speak about 
the Montgomery movement, he spent time with the dean. Young admon-
ished Abernathy that communists might try to infiltrate the movement. He 
advised Abernathy to investigate all unknown volunteers to learn their iden-
tities and political motivations. Abernathy and Rustin were exposed to Young 
during the early stages of the civil rights movement, as was Kenneth B. Clark, 
the already famous black psychologist whose memoranda on the psychic im-
pact of racial segregation on black school children influenced the Brown de-
cision. On trips to Atlanta University where Clark visited faculty friends, he 
and Young discussed the impact and implementation of the seminal Supreme 
Court decree.46 
Young was also no stranger to the NAACP. He knew Roy Wilkins, who 
became executive secretary in 1955. Young was a veteran board membet of 
NAACP chapters in St. Paul and Omaha, and he continued on the board of the 
Atlanta branch and chaired its Labor and Industry Committee. When the 
NAACP branch at Atlanta University commemorated the first anniversary of 
the Brown decision with a forum on "The Meaning of Integration," Young 
agreed to participate on the panel. In 1958 he attended the NAACP national 
convention in Cleveland. While there he became increasingly concerned about 
the lack of democracy within the organization. On both the national and 
local boards there was a tendency "to perpetuate in office a small clique of 
people." That structure gave the impression that the NAACP was not a mass 
organization. That problem, contended Young, required Wilkins's attention. 
Young also believed that the group's traditional techniques needed to be supple-
mented. Young thought that the NAACP was "the foremost organization for 
the elimination oflegal barriers that remain toward securing citizenship." At 
102 Militant Mediator 
the same time, he argued, the group needed to develop initiatives "in com-
munity organization and skills other than legal, which are necessary to change 
community attitudes once the legal barriers are removed." Young was inter-
ested in helping the NAACP project itself as a relevant player in the broader 
area of civil rights activism. As a member of the planning committee for the 
1960 White House Conference on Children and Youth, Young worked with 
a subcommittee on studies. This group solicited suggestions for books, ar-
ticles, and other data related to the conference theme. Young asked Wilkins 
to submit a list of recommended readings. Young reasoned, "This will be an 
opportunity to show the NAACP's concern and activity in the broader areas of 
human relations."47 
Although Young was a full-time educator, his connections with the 
League grew stronger. Several graduates of the School of Social Work became 
League officials. The affiliates also sought his recommendations on persons 
they wished to hire. Moreover, Young maintained a heavy schedule of speeches 
to various League gatherings. In 1959, for example, he delivered addresses to 
affiliates in Memphis, Tennessee, and Massillon, Ohio. Young's speeches at 
national meetings, however, made him a familiar and influential voice within 
League circles. He spoke at meetings in 1955 in Milwaukee, in 1958 in Omaha, 
and in 1960 in Denver and San Diego.48 Additionally, Mahlon T. Puryear, 
vocational guidance secretary of the League's southern field division, per-
suaded Young to participate in career conferences in 1954 and 1955.49 
Other League officials involved Young in the organization's affairs. When 
Young addressed a national meeting in Omaha on "What the Urban League 
Is Not," numerous local executives became excited. John C. Dancy, executive 
director of the Detroit Urban League, told him that "the young fellows com-
ing into the organization should have some material such as you suggested 
which would give ... guidance and a perspective of what the Urban League 
is or is not." Dancy thought that affiliates should use Young's ideas on that 
matter. William E. Hill, race relations adviser in the Chicago office of the 
Federal Housing Authority, worked closely with the League's national office 
and the local affiliates. He asked Lester Granger for several copies of Young's 
speech for use in Urban League board discussions throughout his region.50 
Lester Granger deepened Young's involvement in the organization. He 
noted, "In a very real way we stand to gain by your Adanta experience more 
than we lose by your Omaha resignation. For the Adanta School provides 
you with an opportunity to see social work in-the-Iarge, as such, as very few 
Urban League posts would provide. You are too young to be 'encased' in an 
educational frame permanendy at this stage of your career, and so we expect 
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to see you back in League harness in the future." To ensure that Young would 
not become isolated while at Atlanta University, Granger extended invita-
tions to important League functions and pressed him for advice on organiza-
tion programs.51 
In 1958 Granger told Young about efforts of the Social Planning Council 
of Philadelphia to fund programs of the Armstrong Association, the League's 
affiliate in the Quaker City. He wanted Young to consider becoming the 
executive director of the Philadelphia agency. "My interest, convictions and 
dedication," wrote Young, "continue to remain very close to the Urban League 
program, and I would ... consider any challenging opportunities." Substan-
tial community conflict surrounding the Armstrong Association, however, 
compelled him to withdraw any interest in that affiliate. 52 In congratulating 
him in 1959 for getting the Lasker Award, Granger wished Young to know 
that he considered him "a good Urban Leaguer and a personal friend in whose 
development I have been deeply interested."53 
Young's interaction with Granger aimed at pushing the League and its 
aging executive director to the cutting edge of the surging civil rights struggle. 
While serving on the planning committee for the 1960 White House Con-
ference on Children and Youth, Young wrote to Warren Banner, the League's 
national research director, to solicit suggestions about studies on illegitimacy; 
divorce, values, and education. "I believe this is a good opportunity," de-
clared Young, "for the Urban League's role and function to be highlighted 
before an important national body."54 In 1960 Young asked Granger for ad-
vice on a Taconic Foundation project. Young was the only black on a com-
mittee working on recommendations to the foundation "for the most effec-
tive expenditure of its funds." Young was given "the almost impossible task of 
trying to cover the whole racial problem." He wanted Granger's input in 
order to "interpret the Urban League as a significant organization to be sup-
ported toward the amelioration of some of these [racial] problems."55 
By 1960 Young had become a keen observer and critic on race rela-
tions. Samuel Z. Westerfield, dean of the School of Business Administration 
at Atlanta University and a respected economist, shared ideas with Young on 
the lack of economic growth in the Southeast due to underutilization of"Ne-
gro manpower." He hoped that the 1960 White House Conference on Youth 
and Children would address that issue. Westerfield had developed enormous 
respect for Young. Hylan Lewis, a former sociology professor at Atlanta Uni-
versitywhowent on to the Health and Welfare Council in Washington, D.C., 
wanted his advice on a project to help low-income families. Lewis also wanted 
Young to be a consultant. Young critiqued the proposal and suggested better 
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training for teachers who would interact with poor families, better use of 
social agencies, and the need for blacks in policy and planning aspects of the 
project. 56 
Although invitations to serve as a consultant to the Taconic Foundation 
and to the 1960 White House Conference on Youth and Children were im-
pressive, Young's address to the United Steelworkers of America was perhaps 
the most unexpected request of all. Young had dealt with League board mem-
bers in St. Paul and Omaha who worked in labor unions, but he had never 
interacted with national union officials. That Young was asked to speak to 
the influential United Steelworkers of America was further evidence of his 
increased visibility as a race relations expert. It also meant that his ties with 
the National Urban League remained strong. Boyd Wilson, a black official in 
the steelworkers' union and a member of the National Urban League board, 
got the invitation for him. 57 
Young spoke on "Integration: The Role of Labor Education" to a na-
tional conference of steel union officials at Indiana University. He told his 
audience that because the union traced its origins to a time of social injustice 
and protest, it should "sympathize with those who now face the same fate." 
He added that the union should not "forfeit its historical mission of concern 
for the little guy." Since blacks, like militant workers in the previous genera-
tion, needed allies to assist in their uplift, Young called on the United Steel-
workers to implement antidiscrimination efforts within organized labor. He 
said that where there is a closed shop or an apprenticeship program, unions 
could clearly act to ensure the hiring of blacks. Young also pointed out the 
dismal absence of blacks in high-level positions within union hierarchies. 
Although Boyd Wilson's presence was evidence that the steelworkers' union 
had made some strides in this area, unions had to move beyond tokenism. 
Finally, Young urged union support of civil rights groups and other organiza-
tions fighting for black advancement. 58 
To Young such sentiments were more than just rhetoric. He genuinely 
wanted to see organized labor involved in the civil rights movement. He 
followed up his speech with personal appeals to officials of the steelworkers' 
union. When Emery Bacon, head of the education department, received a 
copy of the speech from Young, he acknowledged the legitimacy of black 
demands and the need for labor's support. Young told President David 
McDonald that the steelworkers had "a magnificent opportunity to be the 
labor union to stand out among all others as the leader in helping to bring 
about equal opportunities for the Negro."59 
Young was at his best when he discussed the emerging civil rights move-
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ment. Although he preferred the methodology of the League, he deeply un-
derstood and insightfully interpreted the new militancy of the black struggle. 
He knew that the southern civil rights movement was developing into an 
unprecedented grassroots phenomenon. Fundamentally, the movement rep-
resented attitude changes among black southerners. Young noted: 
Buses and lunch counter demonstrations are merely ... dramatic 
symbols to protest the institution of segregation and give tangible 
proof to the lie that the Southern Negro is satisfied with his con-
ditions .... The disturbances of the past few years are symptom-
atic not of regression, but of forward movement, bitterly con-
tested. The South's troubles are not caused by a resurgence of an 
old order; they are results of the last desperate rally of the old 
order against new forces. The old answers will not silence the new 
spokesmen. The old order neither understands nor can control 
these forces. The older Negro of the South was brought up in a 
rural area and soon learned that the white men had absolute con-
trol. Today's youth never had a chance to learn that fear. Raised in 
cities, having more contact with world conditions through travel 
and modern means of communication, he now demands the same 
dignity and respect for his person [that whites demand].60 
Young applauded civil rights militancy. To a San Diego audience he 
declared: 
Words like gradualism and moderation are phantom words, mean-
ingless .... You either hire a man or you don't. You either let him 
join your organization or you don't .... Gradualism results from 
some people taking the point of view that Negro citizens should 
have equal opportunity ... and be judged solely on their merit, 
while there are other citizens who insist that the Negro is by na-
ture inferior. . . . In between these two points of view we get 
gradual change. The person who insists on standing in the middle 
is much like the individual standing in the center of a rope during 
a tug-of-war with a hand on each side. In the final analysis he is 
more interested in keeping everybody happy than he is in effect-
ing change.61 
Although Young fully backed the burgeoning civil rights movement, he 
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felt that "too much leadership potential and ability among Negro citizens is 
spent fighting for first class citizenship, and too little spent preparing and 
helping a previously disadvantaged group from taking full advantage of it 
when it arrives." He became convinced that the League needed to maintain 
its social service orientation. In correspondence with a local League execu-
tive, he criticized "some Urban Leaguers who are more interested in the dra-
matic kind of protest action which gets into the newspapers, than in the day-
to-day important work which is so greatly needed today as we make efforts to 
become integrated in the total community, and which is not duplicated by 
many other organizations."62 
Young contended that no American agency had more experience than 
the League. He described it as a "social agency ... not a mass protest group or 
a direct Civil Rights organization, as important and necessary as these are." 
Moreover, the League did not possess "the dramatic tools of legal action." 
Instead, its "tools are facts logically presented to an intelligent community 
that cares." For these reasons the existence of League affiliates in racially 
troubled areas proved crucial. The League, he argued, was "one of the few 
instrumentalities in a community where intelligent communication takes place 
across raciallines."63 
Young would readily admit that militant mass action, legal and legisla-
tive remedies, and moderate social service solutions were indispensable to 
effective desegregation. Throughout his career, he promoted and participated 
in efforts that stressed all of these strategies. While he preferred the Urban 
League approach, he never eschewed protest and direct action pressure to 
achieve racial advancement. As in St. Paul and Omaha, Young combined 
protest activities and traditional League methods of fact-finding and behind-
the-scenes negotiation during burgeoning civil rights struggles in Atlanta. 
Despite Atlanta's recent history of active black political participation, 
the city still dragged its feet on obeying the Brown decision to desegregate 
schools and on ending separate but unequal practices in a host of other pub-
lic facilities. 64 Moreover, Atlanta joined such southern cities as Baton Rouge, 
Montgomery, Tallahassee, and later Greensboro as an early scene of civil rights 
activity. Backed by an increasingly militant black middle and working class 
closely connected to autonomous black churches, less timid black colleges, 
and other institutions, black urban southerners financed and courageously 
participated in direct action efforts to challenge economically and legally the 
faltering foundations of Jim Crow. Young was in the thick of the battle in 
Atlanta. 65 
In ways similar to his role in Omaha, Young, while occasionally visible 
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during direct action campaigns, participated behind the scenes as an impor-
tant but inconspicuous strategist and adviser. As in Baton Rouge in 1953, 
Montgomery in 1955, and Tallahassee in 1956, Atlanta confronted bus boy-
cotts by blacks disenchanted with transit segregation. In the summer of 1957, 
Atlanta's mayor, William Hartsfield, the head of the Atlanta Transit Com-
pany, and local black leaders met to discuss an "orderly transition" to inte-
grated buses. Atlanta Transit was willing to lose because the company wanted 
the judiciary to settle the issue. Militant blacks, especially students, were im-
patient with court cases because they usually took too long. Instead, some 
tried the sit-in approach on the city buses. Even with this tactic, the issue still 
had to be adjudicated in court. Although the state court supported the bus 
company, federal judges sided with the demonstrators. The Reverend Will-
iam Holmes Borders of Wheat Street Baptist Church and older black minis-
ters initially challenged bus segregation, and Young urged Atlanta University 
students to get involved in the effort. He also helped with research that showed 
how much the transit system depended on black patronage. Young joined the 
black delegation that tried to negotiate with transit officials on hiring black 
drivers and integrating passengers.66 
When Young worked with the St. Paul Urban League, he saw an occa-
sional need for alternative organizations consisting mainly of young black 
professionals to spearhead racial advancement. In Atlanta Young saw a simi-
lar and perhaps more urgent necessity for such a group to augment the activi-
ties of an older and more cautious oflocal black leaders. With the presence of 
several black economic, religious, and educational institutions, Atlanta's large 
and prosperous black professional and business elite provided a seemingly 
inexhaustible supply of community spokesmen. Concomitant with the rise 
in the 1940s of the racially liberal William Hartsfield as mayor of Atlanta, the 
Atlanta Negro Voters League, led by a bipartisan group of leading business-
men and professionals, functioned as influential spokesmen for black aspira-
tions and as liaisons between Hartsfield and the black community. The Vot-
ers League was proud ofits seemingly productive relationship with Hartsfield 
and its ability to negotiate concessions from him on public education, law 
enforcement, and minor desegregation. In light of these dubious achieve-
ments, the Voters League firmly forbade Martin Luther King Jr., the head of 
the new Atlanta-based Southern Christian Leadership Conference, to become 
involved with racial issues in "the city too busy to hate." 
Although respectful of his elders, Young was dissatisfied with the Voters 
League's cozy but sometimes slow and unproductive alliance with Mayor 
Hartsfield. In the mid-1950s, after Hartsfield won reelection, Young and 
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other black professionals wanted to press the mayor vigorously on desegrega-
tion. Young attended a meeting with some older black leaders in the Voters 
League to discuss several issues that Hartsfield should address. These veteran 
spokesmen had worked hard to elect the mayor, and some made excuses about 
why he could not act swiftly on issues of great concern to blacks. For ex-
ample, the city's weak mayor system, they claimed, restricted Hartsfield's au-
thority. Perhaps older blacks, accustomed to race-baiting politicians, were 
impressed with Hartsfield in 1955 when he refused to close municipal golf 
courses to prevent integration. He ordered removal of all racist remarks painted 
on benches and buildings and threatened to fire employees who insulted blacks 
using the golf courses. Such actions created a large reservoir of patience for 
the mayor among elders of the Voters League.67 
However, Young and his peers knew that civil rights activity through-
out the South had reached a point where such minor concessions as integrat-
ing a golf course would not suffice. "There is no such thing as painless change," 
he wrote to a fellow social worker. Integration could not occur only on the 
periphery. It also had to occur in fundamental areas of southern life such as 
public education. He argued, "Change will only take place when people are 
forced to by some tragedy." For example, when white southerners closed public 
schools to avoid desegregation, this created conflicts with federal courts that 
were ultimately desirable. Young believed that "the tensions while unfortu-
nate are ... positive in that they manifest a long suffering minority deter-
mined to change the status quo."68 
These attitudes clearly set Young and his peers apart from such stal-
warts as A.T. Walden, Martin Luther King Sr., c.A. Scott, and other elders of 
the black community. Although Young successfully interacted with older black 
leaders, he was not convinced that their patience with Hartsfield was war-
ranted. Their bipartisan Atlanta Voters League, while an important political 
organization, could not respond effectively to the new mood of southern 
black militancy. Young and his peers believed that another organization was 
required to reflect the impatience of younger blacks toward token desegrega-
tion. 
A new group was needed for another reason. Southern NAACP chapters 
were under sustained attack from state and local government officials. The 
attorneys general in Louisiana, Alabama, and Texas requested NAACP mem-
bership lists in 1956, hoping to harass and shut down the organization. Other 
southern states instituted legal action against the organization, and in Ala-
bama it was completely outlawed. The president of the Atlanta NAACP was 
jailed briefly for refusing to furnish chapter financial records to the state leg-
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islature. In fact, the attorney general of Georgia tried to outlaw the NAACP, but 
two Atlanta chapter officials filibustered on the witness stand until the case 
was dismissed. When Ruby Hurley, the NAACP southeastern director, moved 
from Alabama to Atlanta, Young and others believed that if Georgia followed 
Alabama's lead, they needed a strategy to preserve the NAACP. In that eventual-
ity, Young suggested to Hurley that they get support from Martin Luther 
King Sr., William Holmes Borders, and other leading ministers to form a 
surrogate group for the NAACP. 
The unsettled relationship between the Atlanta Voters League and Mayor 
Hartsfield and the attacks on the NAACP persuaded Young and other young 
black professionals to establish the Atlanta Committee for Cooperative Ac-
tion. Young's colleagues included M. Carl Holman, an English professor at 
Clark College, Samuel Z. Westerfield, dean of business administration at 
Atlanta University, and Jesse Hill, an insurance executive. The committee 
was neither a political organization like the Voters League nor a direct action 
group like SCLC. Rather, it pressed municipal agencies, businesses, and sports 
organizations to hire blacks in responsible positions. Discriminatory prac-
tices in the media and the professions also attracted committee attention. 
Threats to mobilize black economic resources through boycotts and black 
electoral strength to urge concessions from city government were the princi-
pal weapons in the committee's arsenal. 
As chairman of the business committee of ACCA, Young wrote to the 
Atlanta office of the National Biscuit Company (Nabisco) to inquire about 
the firm's practices and policies on hiring blacks. Young expressed concern 
"about the migration to the North of most of our talented young people 
because of the lack of economic opportunities here." The committee also 
tried to get the Los Angeles Dodgers, which was considering expansion to 
Atlanta, to employ black players and initiate integrated seating. Leroy Johnson, 
an attorney and future Georgia state senator, belonged to ACCA and pressed 
the Fulton County sheriff to hire more black deputies. The sheriff promised 
to appoint a black deputy within two months. Jesse Hill pledged ACCA to help 
black Atlanta nurses to persuade their national professional organization "to 
suspend or eject Georgia ... unless Negro nurses were accepted" in the state 
affiliate.70 
Perhaps ACCA'S boldest move concerned the Nat King Cole Show. Cole, 
the popular singer, became the first black entertainer to get a prime time 
series on NBC. When the series could not find a sponsor, the network and 
potential sponsors required "proof of strong interest and support" for the 
show. Young suggested that ACCA members ask college classmates, fraternity 
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brothers, and others to write NBC "expressing enjoyment of the Nat King 
Cole Show and the desire that the show be continued." The show was ulti-
mately canceled, but the letter writing campaign may have prolonged its run?l 
Atlantans took much pride in the racial liberalism that Mayor Hartsfield 
exemplified. Whites pointed to him as evidence that their city was a progres-
sive, cosmopolitan oasis in a backward region. Blacks, happy that the mayor 
eschewed the race-baiting that characterized many southern politicians, joined 
whites in touting Atlanta's seemingly liberal reputation. Members of the At-
lanta Committee for Cooperative Action, especially Young and Holman, knew 
better. They were already aware that the city's reputation for racial liberalism 
frequently belied reality. 
Young and Holman also wanted to expose Atlanta's undeserved reputa-
tion for racial liberalism. As a consultant to the Great Atlanta Council on 
Human Relations, Young did a study on the public library system. Blacks 
had access to only three "Negro branches," although the main library was 
closer to predominantly black neighborhoods. Several southern cities, in-
cluding Austin, Baton Rouge, Charlotte, and Norfolk, had quietly desegre-
gated their library facilities. But "the city too busy to hate" would not follow 
suit. Young noted that efforts by the interracial American Veterans' Commit-
tee and the Committee on Interracial Cooperation to integrate the library 
system received no response from the library board of trustees. Young de-
clared that blacks felt that some on the board and staff and racists who had 
deep prejudices were more influenced by the Klan and White Citizens Coun-
cil than by sound democratic practices. Such conditions were but one ex-
ample of how Atlanta's white and black boosters glossed over unpleasant ra-
cial realities in order to support an undeserved reputation for progressive race 
relations.72 
He and Holman discovered that within some elements of the local black 
leadership no one could say anything critical about Atlanta because it had a 
reputation of being "so good." Young urged the Southern Regional Council 
to commission Holman to write a pamphlet, "Toward a Balanced View," to 
reveal the hypocrisy of Atlanta's superficial advances in race relations and to 
advocate total desegregation. Young and Holman also brought these ideas to 
the Atlanta Committee for Cooperative Action and proposed that the group 
publish its own report on Atlanta race relations. Although Holman prepared 
the text, nearly all the ACCA members participated, with each assigned to 
research one aspect of the black condition. Young conceptualized the project 
and chose subjects that required study. The result was a well-researched pub-
lication, A Second Look: The Negro Citizen in Atlanta. 73 
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The report chronicled the unequal expenditures of funds in the state 
and city for public school and higher education for blacks. It noted the lack 
of health facilities, which produced higher death rates for blacks, while op-
portunities to enter or advance in the health professions were already re-
stricted. Housing was also limited with blacks "paying a proportionally higher 
percentage of income for rental and purchase of generally lower quality prop-
erty." Moreover, only two blacks worked at the regional FHA, and they had 
segregated offices. The same was true for the regional Public Housing Ad-
ministration. Perhaps the section on black employment prospects yielded the 
most dismal findings. For example, over 3,300 firms were located in the city, 
but "the prevailing pattern is to adopt discriminatory employment patterns 
and to exclude Negroes partially or wholly from the training programs." Blacks 
also had trouble making major advances in municipal justice and law en-
forcement agencies,?4 
Although Young disagreed with established black Atlanta leaders about 
Hartsfield and his effectiveness, he managed to maintain a respectful and 
trusting relationship with them. In fact, Young frequently functioned as the 
liaison between older black leaders and their younger and more militant col-
leagues. It became Young's responsibility to approach Norris B. Herndon, 
president of the Atlanta Life Insurance Company, to pay the printing costs of 
the report. Young frankly told Herndon that the pamphlet "discussed the 
gross discrimination that still remains in . . . health, housing, recreation, 
employment," and other areas. He also showed "the great hypocrisy on the 
part of the Democratic Party, which unlike the Republicans has absolutely no 
Negro representatives in the state organization." Hartsfield was a Democrat. 
When Herndon acquiesced, Young should have viewed it as a good barom-
eter on the reactions of Herndon's elite black peers.75 
Young, Holman, and other ACCA members anticipated anger from the 
old guard. They believed that the ACCA should meet with older black leaders 
to explain A Second Look. Their reaction surprised the entire ACCA. The re-
sponse of President James P. Brawley of Clark College, Holman's boss, was 
typical. In a letter to Young, he said, "No one should become angry or insensed 
[sic] by this careful and painstaking presentation of facts, but every respon-
sible citizen should be shamed by the ugly picture of inequality, injustice, and 
unfairness . . . and should be moved to join those who would make every 
sincere effort to correct these evils." The old guard urged the ACCA to do a 
second printing of the report and offered to pay the costs. Nearly 4,000 cop-
ies were distributed between January and April 1960,?6 
Even before the 1960 Greensboro sit-ins, Young urged students to play 
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important roles in direct action efforts. To President Albert Manley of Spelman 
College he wrote, "Schools like ours in the South have a particular responsi-
bility to do more than adjust young people to a maladjusted environment." 
Instead, educators should "intelligently sensitize them to social problems and 
inequities to the extent ... it becomes desirous of trying to effect change." As 
students at the six colleges in the Atlanta University Center became involved 
in a local bus boycott and in attempts to desegregate facilities at downtown 
department stores in 1957 and 1960, respectively; Young, Holman, and 
Howard Zinn, a white professor at Spelman College, advised them. During 
the sit-ins at Rich's Department Store, Young was quite pleased that students 
drew data from A Second Look to substantiate their claims against the firm. 
Young and the Reverend William Holmes Borders of Wheat Street Baptist 
Church formed a two member panel that discussed the 1960 Atlanta sit-ins. 
Young commended the students "for not involving unnecessary participants 
and for keeping protests directed and channeled." He said, "Their aim should 
be to dramatize injustice, prevent apathy and complacency; release hostility; 
and secure action." He advised students to select their leaders carefully and 
not lose sight of the motive for protest.?7 Concerning the Greensboro sit-ins, 
Young urged a colleague from Harvard University to go to North Carolina to 
meet two of the four people who had begun the sit-ins. Young's friend agreed 
with his assessment that "these students have shown an unusual degree of 
maturity and purposefulness in their actions."78 
Young also maintained his belief that whites should play an important 
role in the black struggle against segregation and discrimination. In St. Paul 
and Omaha, Young learned that there was a wide range of white opinion on 
the tactics and objectives of the black movement. In the South, Young con-
fronted another dimension of the problem. In Omaha, for example, persons 
as diverse as Alfred Kennedy, N. Phillips Dodge, and John Markoe espoused 
different methods for black advancement, but they all agreed that improve-
ments in race relations were paramount concerns. Although the same range 
of consensus existed within some elements of the southern white population, 
the number of such persons was small and their willingness to speak in behalf 
of black rights happened too infrequently. Although Young was not employed 
as a full-time agency head, he still worked to win white allies to the black 
struggle. 
Young contended that blacks would gain allies only if they expressed 
concern about the religious and ethnic oppression of other groups. That's 
why Young swiftly wrote to Rabbi Jacob M. Rothchild and enclosed a per-
sonal contribution to help rebuild his bombed Atlanta synagogue. Young 
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noted that five black churches in Montgomery a year earlier had been bombed 
in one night. "If the bombing in your Temple does nothing more than make 
the citizens aware that unless lawlessness is curbed everywhere," Young de-
clared, "it cannot be expected to be curbed anywhere." Rothchild thanked 
Young for his response and noted, "You and I think alike in these matters. "79 
Young, his wife, and two daughters attended the Unitarian Church, 
and he found allies within this important group. On occasion he addressed 
the morning worship at the United Liberal Church and cooperated with some 
of its members who worked with the Greater Atlanta Council on Human 
Relations. Young also lectured to the Thomas Jefferson Unitarian Southern 
Regional Conference.8o 
Although Young was impressed with Unitarian pastor Edward Cahill 
and his advocacy of equal rights for blacks,81 he had no patience with the vast 
majority of southern white ministers who either refused to endorse racial 
integration or explicitly spoke for segregation of the races. One white Atlanta 
minister, Roy McLain, preached on integration from his pulpit in 1956. Young 
criticized him for citing "disproportionate disease, immorality, and common 
law marriage among Negro citizens" without noting the undesirable social 
conditions that created them. He added that pointing out racial problems in 
the North did not excuse legalized southern segregation. While Young agreed 
that morality could not be legislated, the Supreme Court was certainly cor-
rect in invalidating "enforced segregation" in public schools. McLain was 
misguided, but Young commended him for at least discussing a crucial issue, 
an act that put him "ahead of practically all of his fellow ministers who appar-
entlyare more concerned with the safety of the pocketbook than the safety of 
the soul." Since McLain's racial attitudes were like those of most white clergy, 
Young was justifiably pessimistic about finding allies within this segment of 
the white population. The Reverend Charles L. Allen, an Atlanta Methodist 
pastor, however, surprised him. Allen spoke to the Hungry Club at the black 
Butler Street YMCA about his changed perspectives about segregation. Allen 
could no longer find any moral justification for Jim Crow. Young 
complimented him on his "forthright and honest answers." He also told Allen, 
"I hope you will continue to be a witness to the things you know are right." 
While Allen's new views were important and welcome, southern white clergy 
remained either hostile or ambivalent to civil rights struggles and lent little 
help to that moral crusade.82 
Young had never dealt with southern white liberals. His extensive par-
ticipation in the Southern Regional Council, the Greater Atlanta Council on 
Human Relations, and the Unitarian Church exposed him to the vast major-
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ity of such persons living in Atlanta. Practically anyone who eschewed the 
uglier aspects of racial segregation and expressed some willingness to counte-
nance gradual integration could gain admittance to this small circle of dis-
senters. Few were willing to go as far as federal judge J. Waites Waring of 
South Carolina, whose ruling presaged the Brown decision, or novelist Lillian 
Smith, who demanded full and immediate integration.83 Most southern white 
liberals probably resembled Mayor Hartsfield, whose rhetoric made him an 
ally of the evolving civil rights movement but whose actions seldom matched 
his lofty ideals. Southern white liberals like Hartsfield annoyed Whitney Young. 
When a Jewish synagogue was bombed, Hartsfield blamed "the rabble-rous-
ing of politicians on the state level." Young disagreed. He told Hartsfield that 
this was "the harvest from the many nice, respectable people who do not 
rabble-rouse but who do and say nothing." Young reminded Hartsfield that 
on several occasions he had asked for an official mayor's commission on hu-
man relations. Hartsfield claimed, however, that power figures in the com-
munity did not support the idea. Young advised that ifhe ever formed such a 
high-level committee, he hoped in his appointment of blacks that Hartsfield 
would not "as you have done in the past" name only blacks "who praise you 
and always agree with you but will consider those who have the respect of the 
Negro community" and "who will stand up for principle."84 
Ralph McGill of the Atlanta Constitution was the best-known southern 
white liberal with whom Young developed a relationship. McGill, a native of 
east Tennessee, had been a consistent advocate of black advancement. Young 
admired McGill's forthright defense of desegregation and other issues impor-
tant to black progress. When "extreme racist pressure" aimed to oust the 
Atlanta Urban League from the community chest, McGill denounced the 
effort. Young commended McGill and credited him with helping keep the 
community chest and the city out of the control of the Ku Klux Klan and the 
state's rights councils. McGill's progressive views persuaded the Pulitzer com-
mittee to award him the coveted journalism prize in 1959. "In light of your 
convictions," Young told McGill, "this award is quite significant and will 
certainly encourage other journalists in the South who all too often feel they 
must reflect rather than ... mold public opinion." Their relationship pro-
gressed to the point that Young sought McGill's response to some speeches he 
wrote.85 
By 1960 Young had developed ambivalent feelings about living in the 
South. He was an active participant in various struggles to achieve desegrega-
tion. Young noted that he along with other black professionals shouldered "a 
daily burden of financing all of the litigation now going on ... to acquire 
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elementary civil rights." Perhaps Young suffered burnout from his exacting 
positions as dean, social work educator, desegregation expert, and civil rights 
activist. While proud of these accomplishments, he seemed ready to leave the 
South.86 
Rearing his two daughters amid southern segregation and social tur-
moil weighed increasingly on his mind. Moreover, Margaret Young, though 
she taught at Spelman College, refused to submit to Atlanta's Jim Crow. To a 
friend in Lincoln, Nebraska, Whitney Young in 1958 confided that Atlanta 
was not a place "sufficiently far along in human relations to warrant our 
making this a permanent place of residence." He wondered if his continued 
presence in the city was inhibiting his daughters' growth and development. 
At the same time, he "never regretted coming to Atlanta during a period of 
great change." He added, "I have ... learned not to expect painless social 
change and to realize that tensions are often times more positive than nega-
tive, in that they suggest man's attempt to improve his status."87 
His opportunity came in 1960 when the General Education Board 
awarded him a fellowship for postgraduate study at Harvard. President Clement 
granted him a leave of absence from September 1, 1960, to September 1, 
1961. Clement probably knew that Young would never return.88 
6 
Crossroads 
Those who saw an animated Whimey Young deliver speeches, advise move-
ment activists, and counsel student protesters believed that he was ill-
suited for academia. Scholarly reflection and writing, while not beyond his 
intellectual grasp, were less satisfying than frontline involvements in the bur-
geoning civil rights movement. Although unsure of his vocational direction, 
Young wanted to join with an organization that pursued social change. 
While Young provided technical advice to scores of activists seeking to 
destroy southern segregation, he never forsook his first love, the Urban League. 
During the late 1950s his became a familiar voice at national and local League 
meetings as he exhorted the organization to stay abreast of the emerging civil 
rights movement. He wanted the League to reformulate a special role in the 
black fight for equality. If the League failed in this task, it would become a 
peripheral player among the other civil rights groups and lose an opportunity 
to influence the direction of the black struggle. 
As the main speaker at the 1959 annual conference of the National 
Urban League in Washington, D.C., Young spoke on "The Role of the 
Urban League in the Current American Scene." He noted that the group 
had an important place in the black struggle because any program which as-
serted that "judicial and legislative measures will in and of themselves qualify 
the mass of Negro citizens to compete equally ... is the most vicious type 
of chauvinism if espoused by Negroes, and blatant dishonesty or nalvete if 
argued by others." Despite the importance of the NAACP, SCLC, CORE, and 
other civil rights groups, only the League was equipped to help blacks in their 
social and economic aspirations. Young contended that League officials and 
supporters also should recognize that the organization's traditional role in 
addressing the health, housing, employment, and educational issues confront-
ing blacks had to be pursued under different circumstances than in the past. 
There were other organizations whose structure, personnel, and financing 
made them better suited to fight for black rights. Social planning, an unde-
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veloped League function, "is far more respectable than it was some years ago" 
and a service that "most communities are willing . . . to pay for." Finally, 
"human relations ... has become a profession requiring appropriate knowl-
edge, skills, and attitudes which can be tested." Young declared, "No longer 
shall kindness, personality, and racial identity be the main qualifications for 
practitioners. This is the day of specialists and specialized agencies." 
Young prodded the League to realize its special role and specific func-
tion in the black community at a time of escalating social upheaval. While 
direct action groups fought over turf and argued tactics, Young wanted the 
League to carve out particular areas of black life that neither the NAACP, SCLC, 
and CORE nor white social agencies could effectively address. The League would 
not be a "civil rights or civil liberties organization, nor a political, legal, or 
social mass movement," and neither would its staff be "'race leaders' who 
automatically become experts in human relations because of their particular 
racial or religious identity." Rather, the League as a professional social work 
agency with formally trained staff would carry out a program focused on 
research and communication. 
Young stressed research. He argued that the League "should be the one 
agency in the community where all facts regarding the health and welfare of 
the group or groups it serves should be found." He included information on 
population, education, employment, housing, and health. He stressed, "The 
day has long since passed when our facts secured from conversations on the 
street corner, or from observations at the railroad station will be accepted 
without question." 
Communication was the League's other crucial service. "The value of 
the League," Young declared, "lies in its having the kind of respect and con-
fidence which will encourage the policymaking bodies to consult regularly 
with them, if not actually include them in on their planning and decision-
making activities." He referred to city planning commissions, labor organiza-
tions, chambers of commerce, boards of education, and various governmen-
tal agencies. While interaction with these influential groups would help 
produce expanded services and opportunities to various black communities, 
such vertical communication with these powerful elements was not enough. 
The League also needed to have backing from its clients. Whether a neigh-
borhood organization, a ministerial group, a council of indigenous leaders, 
or a community newspaper, the League had to be certain that those served by 
the agency endorsed the programs, accepted the responses, and agreed with 
those issues that the organization communicated to the powers elite. More-
over, Young could have mentioned his own efforts to voice the integrationist 
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aspirations of middle- and working-class blacks in the Twin Cities, Omaha, 
and Atlanta. 
Actually, much of what Young said in his speech, while seemingly new, 
was conventional wisdom. In fact, Young cited numerous local Leagues that 
had already implemented some of these ideas. He pointed to the cooperative 
relationship between the Providence Urban League and the local Social Plan-
ning Council. He noted how a creative local executive persuaded the San 
Diego City Council to underwrite the League affiliate's budget for two years. 
He also cited the Chicago Urban League's "intensive and sound research pro-
gram." Perhaps Young can be credited with effectively synthesizing an emerg-
ing consensus among local League executives for more cooperation with vari-
ous social and governmental agencies for improved services to blacks. 1 
What was important about Young's speech was neither its creativity nor 
its intellectual depth but that Lindsley Kimball had heard him deliver it. 
Kimball was greatly impressed by Young's enthusiasm, his grasp of current 
issues confronting the League and blacks, and his personal magnetism. Kimball 
wanted to know more about Young and for good reason. He represented 
Rockefeller philanthropic interests of which the National Urban League was 
one. Whenever a promising talent emerged near or within League ranks, 
Kimball wanted to know that person.2 
Born in Brooklyn in 1894, Lindsley Fiske Kimball was graduated from 
Columbia University and earned a Ph.D. at New York University. He accu-
mulated vast experience in business, in the military, and in philanthropy. In 
1947 he became an associate to John D. Rockefeller Jr. He served as treasurer 
at Rockefeller University, executive vice president of the Rockefeller Founda-
tion, and vice president of the General Education Board. Kimball's involve-
ment in race relations commenced in 1947 when he became a director and 
an executive committee member of the United Negro College Fund. From 
1953 through 1955 he was the fund's national campaign chairman.3 
Winthrop Rockefeller drew Kimball into League affairs. A board mem-
ber of the National Urban League since the 1940s, Rockefeller developed a 
close relationship with Lester Granger, the executive director. Surreptitiously, 
Rockefeller assured Granger that whenever the League had a deficit at the 
close of any fiscal year, he would underwrite it.4 
Rockefeller's commitment to Granger was part of his family's general 
support of the League. Between 1919 and 1931 the League received $121,500 
from the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial. Most of the funds came to 
the organization during Granger's tenure between 1941 and 1961. The Gen-
eral Education Board gave the group $132,500 for various programs in race 
Crossroads 119 
relations between 1943 and 1948. Between 1941 and 1958 the Rockefeller 
Brothers Fund contributed $65,000 to the League. The biggest single contri-
butions came in 1954 and 1957 when two $25,000 donations helped put on 
an annual convention and meet a general financial emergency.5 
So Kimball's involvement with the League was another expression of 
Rockefeller interest in the group's affairs. First, Winthrop Rockefeller asked 
Kimball to join the board of the New York Urban League to help it with its 
financial crisis. The affiliate needed $200,000 and could not raise it. In 1958 
Kimball came onto the board of the national organization, "which was in 
equal difficulty."6 For the period between 1958 and 1961 Kimball noted that 
despite contributions from local affiliates, industry, community chests, and 
other public appeals, monies coming into the League treasury "has been re-
duced to a trickle." According to Kimball, the organization has "run down 
under the tottering administration" of Lester Granger. He met the payroll 
only by "hypothecating certain securities, by spending certain foundation 
grants a year in advance, by borrowing $17,000 as a personal loan from one 
of its trustees [and] finally by putting a mortgage on its National Headquar-
ters building." The League was clearly in trouble, and with Granger's manda-
tory retirement imminent, both Kimball and the Rockefeller interests wanted 
to find a dynamic and competent successor to a tired sexagenarian? Upon 
hearing Young's speech, Kimball knew he had found his man. 
Kimball heard three major addresses at the League conference and con-
cluded, "Whitney Young gave by far the best." While he was impressed with 
Young's "courageous vigor in dealing with difficult subjects before a mixed 
audience," Kimball was "even more struck" by the esteem which Young elic-
ited from both blacks and whites. As a social work dean, Kimball observed, 
"Young has at a rather young age reached the top in his own field not in terms 
of his own ability, but in terms of opportunities open to him. No Negro 
could head a school of social work unless it were either Negro or second rate 
white." Kimball knew that Young "could expect a professorship, but his real 
strength lies in the arena of action and he ought to make a very valuable 
person tg head a national social work agency or a college or university."8 
While still in Washington, D.C., Kimball asked Young to meet with 
him. They spent a couple of hours together. Young later noted that he had 
monopolized the conversation. Actually, Kimball preferred it that way. He 
wanted to know Young better and discuss his immediate career plans. Young 
said he did not know. He knew that a deanship in social work at a first-rank 
institution like Columbia University would elude him. He had hit the ceiling 
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of his advancement and was unsure where to go from there. Both agreed that 
they should meet again soon in New York City. 
When Young arrived in New York "to make some crucial personal and 
professional decisions," he was "shocked" and pleasantly surprised when 
Kimball suggested that he pursue a grant from the General Education Board 
for graduate study in the social sciences. At that point Young stated unequivo-
cally that he wanted to deepen his understanding of race relations. "With 
every fiber in me," he wrote, "I desire to see ... segregation and discrimina-
tion become 'obsolete practices' in the history of this potentially great coun-
try of ours." He conceded, perhaps prematurely, that "virtually all legal segre-
gation based on race has been eliminated." Although this was a necessary first 
step, it was not enough. Blacks had to attain economic and social opportuni-
ties commensurate with their newly won first-class legal and political rights. 
Toward this end Young proposed to explore numerous issues that would 
help achieve a racially integrated society. For example, he wanted to develop 
incentives to encourage and reward integrated businesses, schools, neighbor-
hoods, and professional and social organizations. He also wanted to devise 
strategies to prod and prepare blacks to be ready for fuller social and eco-
nomic opportunities. To attain these objectives Young wanted to tackle ad-
vanced courses in social work, sociology, and social psychology. He also wanted 
to audit those education courses which dealt with curriculum teaching tech-
niques for assisting the culturally deprived. Young did not desire a Ph.D., but 
he wanted to gain general knowledge from various subjects relevant to race 
relations.9 
Initially, Young preferred the University of Minnesota, his graduate alma 
mater, as a first choice. It was soon replaced by Harvard and then the Univer-
sity of California at Berkeley and the University of Chicago as descending 
alternatives. In Harvard's Department of Social Relations, Young felt that he 
could also establish contacts in the School of Public Health and the School of 
Business Administration. Additionally, he would have access to relevant de-
partments at Boston University and the Massachusetts Institute of Techno 1-
ogy. Kimball had strongly urged Young to rule out Berkeley and narrow his 
choices to Columbia University and New York University and to the big 
three institutions in Boston/Cambridge. Young also visited the University of 
Chicago. By February 1960 Young had made his Boston trip and decided to 
make Harvard his base. The university granted him a special auditor's status 
with full faculty privileges there and at the neighboring institutions. 10 
When Young submitted his application to the General Education Board, 
he knew it would be accepted. Despite this pro forma procedure, Kimball 
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solicited a recommendation from Lester Granger. Granger noted, "Mr. Young 
is one of the most capable men on the national scene carrying an executive 
responsibility in the field of social work." He added that Young was "one of 
the 'bright young men' of the Urban League movement." He further felt that 
Young's talents could be better utilized outside of academia "in the field of 
community organization rather than social work education." While he gave 
Young a glowing assessment, Granger stopped short of suggesting a national 
administrative post for his former subordinate. In any case, it made little 
difference because Kimball was already thinking in those terms. He observed 
in a confidential GEB memo that Young was the leading candidate to suc-
ceed Lester Granger as head of the National Urban League. In another inter-
nal foundation memo justifYing Young's fellowship request, Kimball noted 
that Young would spend a year "preparing himself for more effective leader-
ship in his own field, possibly in one of the national welfare agencies."ll 
While flattered by Kimball's unusual interest in him, Young remained 
unsure of his benefactor's ultimate goal. After submitting his application, 
Young told Kimball, "Other than very general encouragement you were never 
at all specific about what you would like for me to do .... You would not be 
making an investment of this type unless you had something in mind in 
terms of a substantial contribution which I might make." Young received 
formal notification around New Year's Day 1960 that a $15,000 GEB fellow-
ship was his. The grant commenced on September 1, 1960, and would last 
for a year. 
Although Young was uncertain about Kimball's ulterior motive, he was 
happy to receive the fellowship. First, it freed him from Atlanta. Unlike Mar-
tin Luther King Jr., who deliberately returned South from Boston University 
to participate in the fight for black rights, Young sought to escape the region. 
He had emphatically informed Kimball that he did not intend to return to 
Atlanta University after the year at Harvard. He was exhausted from his own 
involvement in civil rights activities, and he worried about the education his 
daughters received in segregated Atlanta. Young told the headmaster of the 
Cambridge School in Weston, Massachusetts, that he wanted his older daugh-
ter, Marcia, to enter the ninth grade. He felt that she could make the adjust-
ment, although she had had "limited and restricted educational opportuni-
ties in the South." 
The fellowship pleased Young for another reason. With Atlanta Univer-
sity behind him, he could use the year to prepare for his next position. Al-
though Kimball probably had not mentioned it, Young indicated the NUL 
post as a possibility as well as potential opportunities with the Unitarian Ser-
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vice Committee, "professorships at one or two universities," and a possible 
college presidency. The GEB fellowship became Young's springboard out of 
the South toward a broader range of vocational choices. 12 
Having settled on Harvard and the Boston/Cambridge area, Young had 
to focus on particular subjects and programs he wished to pursue. Kimball 
tried to lend him a hand. He suggested that Young talk with Donald Young 
of the Russell Sage Foundation and James Perkins of the Carnegie Corpora-
tion, who would help him choose the best curriculum for the year. Donald 
Young wanted him to narrow his general social welfare focus to something 
more specific. Young also turned to his former colleague, Garnet Larson of 
the School of Social Work at the University of Nebraska. She urged him to 
forego Ph.D. preparations because the degree was neither essential for him 
nor an imaginative way to use the grant. Rather, Larson encouraged Young to 
combine his interest in race relations with "a realistic plan" of exploring spe-
cific problems and issues within the classroom and the surrounding area. 
Larson's advice proved quite helpful once Young arrived in Cambridge. 13 
Initially, Young preferred to establish a base in Harvard's Department 
of Social Relations of which Gordon W. Allport was a prominent part. Allport, 
a pioneer scholar on the nature of race prejudice, asked to be Young's major 
adviser. Because Allport planned a leave during Young's first semester, he di-
rected him to another scholar of race relations, Thomas Pettigrew. However, 
Harold Isaacs, a research associate at MIT, and some other professors at the 
Boston/Cambridge institutions suggested that Young bypass Allport's Social 
Relations Department for the Joint Center for Urban Studies, which Harvard 
and MIT sponsored. Donald Young of the Russell Sage Foundation advised 
Young that the institute was more policy oriented than the Department of 
Social Relations, which stressed research. Moreover, the Center would nar-
row Young's focus onto urban affairs and augment his already solid back-
ground in race relations and community organization.14 
When Young arrived in Boston/Cambridge for the fall semester, he reg-
istered for six courses. He enrolled in three at Harvard and one course each at 
Boston University, MIT, and Brandeis. These courses covered theories of so-
cial change, decision making and policy formation, social administration, 
and international relations. In the following semester he planned to take an-
other four courses at Harvard and three during the summer of 1961. Kimball 
was pleased to learn that Young impressed his instructors at Harvard so much 
that they excused him from their courses and suggested that he randomly sit 
in on various classes according to his evolving interests. 15 
The advice of Donald Young, Harold Isaacs, and Max Milikan, an MIT 
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economist and director of international relations, that Young focus on the 
Harvard/MIT Joint Center for Urban Studies allowed him to spend an un-
usually productive year in Boston/Cambridge. Established in the 1950s, the 
Center focused on "the tangled problems of big city growth." The institute 
drew on the expertise of engineers, architects, lawyers, urban planners, soci-
ologists, economists, and numerous other professionals and scholars concerned 
with urban issues. At the time of Young's arrival, the Center supported schol-
ars of local government, comparative development of French cities, philo-
sophical perspectives on the city, urban traffic, the family, space utilization, 
and race relations. 16 
Martin Meyerson, an assertive and confident city planner, headed the 
Joint Center. Meyerson had been Frank Backus Williams Professor of City 
Planning and Urban Research and director of the Harvard Center of Urban 
Studies. Young had interacted with Meyerson in the early 1950s when the 
director taught at the University of Chicago and chaired a committee on 
planning and development for the Chicago Housing Authority. Young ap-
parently shared some perspectives with Meyerson in this project, which put 
up 10,000 new dwelling units for the predominantly black South Side. As 
Young seriously considered studying at the Joint Center, he told Meyerson 
that he was interested "in the problems of assisting Negro citizens in the 
movement from ... legal segregation to true and full integration." 
Young was interested in social planning and wanted to be brought "up-
to-date on the current trends and developments in the various social sciences 
as related to this problem." He also wrote to Harold Isaacs to inquire about 
the Urban Planning Center. Isaacs said that if Young wanted to study urban 
development, then the Urban Planning Center was where he should be. 
Meyerson, however, responded to Young and offered the facilities of the Joint 
Center to him. He suggested that he meet with MIT professor Lloyd Rodwin 
to explore possible research studies. That's what Young opted to do. The Joint 
Center became his link with inner-city problems in Boston, all of which 
helped to perfect his analytical skills in approaching race relations and the 
cityY 
Young's affiliation with the Joint Center was probably pivotal to his 
involvement with the Boston Community Development Program. With a 
special foundation grant, the organization was given three months in 1961 to 
devise ways to examine the impact of Boston's urban renewal effort on a wide 
range of social issues. Charles W. Liddell, an official in the program, hired 
Young as a consultant and asked him to comment on the social planning and 
urban mobility aspects of the renewal proposal. Young believed that the ex-
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clusion of blacks in the social planning initiative would lead to a continua-
tion of racially segregated communities and various forms of social disorgani-
zation in crime, welfare, delinquency, and other behavior with costly social 
and economic consequences. Since Young had been a local black leader who 
voiced the views of his constituents, he urged grassroots involvement and the 
identification of specific projects in health, recreation, and day care to help 
the beneficiaries of these social planning initiatives. 
On the issue of the urban mobility of blacks, Young condemned resi-
dential segregation and "the stigma of inferiority" it imposed. Moreover, seg-
regated housing patterns locked blacks into areas with "a minimum of ser-
vices from the city" in health, police and fire protection, street improvements, 
and enforcement of housing codes. Mobility out of such areas, however, car-
ried risks to blacks, including the fear of confronting higher living costs in 
another commvnity, fear of hostility from whites, and fear of isolation from 
other blacks. Young was pragmatic on these issues. He noted that stabiliza-
tion of existing black neighborhoods was one alternative. Improved housing 
and upgraded city services would obviate the need for an exodus from black 
enclaves. At the same time, he urged politicians, realtors, and mortgage bankers 
to enforce open occupancy for those blacks who wished to move beyond the 
ghetto community. He advised the Boston Community Development Pro-
gram to enlist help from a wide range of antidiscrimination groups to aid in 
the effort. IS 
Additionally, Young was invited to write a proposal for a social plan in 
Roxbury, where the majority of Boston blacks lived. He worked with the 
Community Organization Steering Group for Roxbury-North Dorchester, a 
subcommittee of the Boston Community Development Program. Young's 
task was to gather information that would help the agency prepare residents 
for the physical renewal of their area. The subcommittee chairman directed 
him to include in his recommendations provisions for neighborhood input 
so that special needs would not be ignored. Young was also reminded that 
"possibilities for implementation" should also influence his suggestions. 19 
No one needed to convince Young of the importance of consultations 
with residents of affected neighborhoods. He suggested meetings in Roxbury-
North Dorchester with community representatives in which explanations 
would be offered on the overall plans for urban renewal. As the same time, 
Young wanted discussions and questions from residents to stay focused on 
the social consequences of urban renewal, not the physical changes, although 
he advised community input on the latter issues at an appropriate time. Young 
also proposed that a special committee meet with the renewal agency to en-
Crossroads 125 
sure continued consultations with resident representatives. Additionally, he 
successfully sought involvement from the Boston Urban League to provide 
assistance in getting relevant information about Roxbury for his report. 
Liddell approved Young's procedural suggestions and allocated a budget up 
to $2,000 for the project. He would also earn $100 per day for his consult-
ant services. 20 
At the first community meeting Young urged neighborhood represen-
tatives to accept urban renewal as a fact of life. He invited them to indicate 
problems in the social realm that would likely result from urban renewal and 
the types of social services that would be needed to address the difficulties. 
Young stressed that now was the time to offer input into a new social plan for 
Roxbury-North Dorchester. The following week at another gathering Young 
said that Boston's effort to insert a social planning component in urban re-
newal was unprecedented. He noted that in bringing grassroots spokesmen 
together they had a chance to learn about other facets of their residential area. 
Perhaps Young hoped that these representatives would view the program as 
an opportunity to ponder a better future for Roxbury-North Dorchester now 
that they knew more about it. To another group Young specifically wanted 
feedback on social services in mental health, family and children's services, 
legal services, and other programs that needed improvements. Talking to a 
fourth gathering he said, "We are having urban renewal, but unless the people 
are frank [enough] to speak out forcibly and candidly about services needed, 
the job will not be satisfactory." Determined to get community perspectives 
to put in his written report, Young told Liddell that he would consult with 
delegates from the four sections of Roxbury-North Dorchester to elicit their 
final thoughts on the social plan.21 
Young's report, while discussing a section of the city with a majority 
immigrant population, focused much attention on the plight of blacks. Al-
though 45 percent of the area's population was black, 70 percent of all Bos-
ton blacks lived in Roxbury-North Dorchester. Hence much of the deficien-
cies in social services probably affected blacks more than others. Young noted 
a general breakdown in service delivery in this part of Boston. Poor rodent 
control, inadequate garbage collection, and dirty streets created unclean sur-
roundings. Overcrowded medical facilities and ineffective public health clin-
ics aggravated an already unhealthy environment. He suggested that munici-
pal officials correct these inadequacies. In some instances, this section lacked 
important agencies that could enhance the quality of life. For example, the 
family service agency closed its Roxbury office, an action that Young recom-
mended officials should reverse. Additionally, a reopened family service agency, 
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he argued, would be helped by the establishment of a family or domestic 
relations court. 
While he strongly urged physical improvements to school buildings, 
Young assertively advised that curricular innovations "to salvage talent" in the 
early grades would later keep black adolescents in school. He wanted more 
black principals to be hired and for teachers to take courses in intergroup 
relations. He further believed that policemen would also benefit from such 
training. Aside from suggesting better relations between the community and 
the police, Young urged law enforcement officers to crack down on the sale of 
liquor and narcotics to residents of Roxbury-North Dorchester. Furthermore, 
Young recommended more effort by municipal and private agencies to com-
bat employment discrimination. 
Prophetically, Young declared, "Boston's Negro population is now over 
63,000, an increase of over 50 percent in the last ten years .... This trend will 
continue at the same rate for almost the next two decades. In the absence of 
making the Roxbury-North Dorchester area a stable community racially, and 
through failure to insist on open occupancy in all other parts of the city and 
suburbs, Boston will find itself by 1980 possessing the kind of ghetto, with 
all of the resultant social problems, economic cost and waste, and breeding 
grounds for tension and violence, which other communities are now desper-
ately trying to correct. It need not happen here." He added that the area had 
numerous competent agencies and organizations to help implement a social 
plan that would transform Roxbury-North Dorchester into a desirable resi-
dential community.22 
With his participation in this urban renewal study, Young abandoned a 
principle that he inculcated to his Atlanta University students. Social work-
ers, he taught, must change unpleasant and unjust realities rather than assist 
blacks to adjust to them. Thus, Young's role in this project was somewhat 
worrisome. He knowingly entered a situation where the basic decisions had 
been made without early input from black Bostonians. Always the pragma-
tist, Young believed that even tardy participation by blacks was better than 
none at all. Although Young fell far short of his own standard, he fulfilled an 
important objective of his "think" year in Boston/Cambridge. While Young 
was up to date on developments in social work education and race relations, 
he knew little about social planning and the problems related to urban re-
newal. Affiliation with the Joint Center and the Boston Community Devel-
opment Program remedied that gap in his knowledge. He now saw firsthand 
how major decisions on urban issues developed without initial input from 
blacks and the difficulties which emanated from that. With these educational 
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experiences Young was far more knowledgeable and sophisticated about ur-
ban issues that he had never explored before. 
Young's report, however, did not satisfy all of those affiliated with the 
project. His principal critic thought that his stress on the "unrelieved misery 
and complaint" of Roxbury-North Dorchester residents gave "insufficient 
recognition of positives in certain services." For example, he criticized Young 
for not noting "the presence of good teachers here and there." The critic also 
said that he did not emphasize "the responsibility of citizens themselves." 
Although "trash and garbage collection," he wrote, "are handled by the city in 
a crummy way, how often did we also hear that some householders com-
pound the problem by their own mishandling of trash? This is an area for 
citizen to citizen education as well as pressure on the city."23 The critic missed 
the point of Young's report. Young stressed the consequences of institutional 
breakdown in social services in Roxbury-North Dorchester. No amount of 
voluntary effort could substitute for municipal failures to pick up trash, re-
pair decaying school buildings, or establish a family or domestic relations 
court. What Young did not realize fully was the futility of eliciting grassroots 
perspectives on a process on which citizen views would have a marginal im-
pact. Nonetheless, his participation in the project confirmed his long-held 
belief that effective leadership required the validation of rank-and-file resi-
dents of the black community. 
Young's matriculation at Harvard, Brandeis, MIT, and Boston Univer-
sity, his participation in the Joint Center for Urban Studies, and consultant 
work with the Boston Community Development Program probably con-
vinced Lindsley Kimball that his investment of foundation funds in Whitney 
Young had been a sound decision. The generous General Education Board 
fellowship also allowed Young to continue active participation in professional 
meetings and to venture beyond Boston/Cambridge to other metropolitan 
areas to study urban issues. He went off to Cincinnati to attend the National 
Association of Intergroup Relations and then to Minneapolis to deliver two 
papers at the National Conference of Social Welfare. Young's addresses were 
based on his experiences in Boston/Cambridge, and he looked forward to 
discussing what he had learned during his sabbatical year. Young also traveled 
to New York City and Chicago to observe groups involved in solving varied 
inner-city difficulties. The Horizons Unlimited Program in New York City 
tried "to increase the motivation and aspirations of children from lower so-
cioeconomic families." He came to confer with officials of that organization. 
In addition, Young went to Chicago to speak with municipal and school 
officials and with social workers about correcting problems in education, 
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housing, and among migrants. Young's sabbatical itinerary showed that the 
foundation funds were well spent. 24 
A crucial benefit that Young derived from his association with Lindsley 
Kimball was a broadened acquaintance with whites of national stature and 
influence. Although Young had become adept at dealing with elite whites 
whose principal sphere of activity was St. Paul, Omaha, or Atlanta, their 
importance was limited to these locales. He also knew persons of authority in 
national social work and social welfare groups, but their power seldom ex-
tended beyond their professional organizations. Kimball, however, gradually 
exposed Young to important whites who headed major foundations or who 
worked as brokers or liaisons for the nation's wealthiest families. Young ad-
vanced to another plateau of interaction with powerful whites he had never 
known before. Although his dealings with Donald Young of the Russell Sage 
Foundation had been brief and uneventful, his introduction to Dean Rusk 
was important and portended Young's eventual entry into the world of major 
national and international institutions of which foundations were a key part. 
Dean Rusk, born in Georgia in 1909 and a graduate from Davidson 
College, had been a Rhodes scholar. After several years as a government pro-
fessor and dean of the faculty at Mills College, Rusk served important stints 
in the State Department and at the United Nations. These experiences 
launched him into the presidency of the Rockefeller Foundation from 1952 
to 1960. In the spring of 1960 Kimball thought it important that Young 
meet Rusk, whose retirement from the foundation was imminent. He urged 
Young to plan his next trip to New York City at a time when the future 
secretary of state could see him. At his meeting with Rusk, as in his initial 
encounter with Kimball, Young dominated the conversation. He told Rusk, 
"I fear that I spent more time talking than asking the many questions I would 
have liked to ... someone of your great experience." It was just as well, since 
Kimball probably wanted Rusk to get to know more about Young. Young's 
garrulous nature actually helped to achieve that end.25 
Young maintained contact with Rusk and asked for a second meeting. 
He also sent Rusk a paper he had written for another foundation. Young 
wrote on "The Status of the Negro Community" with some analysis on how 
race relations have been enhanced through foundation grants. There were 
also suggestions for the most effective use of funds to encourage improved 
intergroup relations. Young wanted Rusk to review the essay and offer his 
reaction. Rusk read the paper and suggested that Young strengthen it with a 
section on self-help. While he agreed with Young's discussion of white pater-
nalism, he thought the phenomenon could be corrected by "a better under-
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standing by both whites and negroes of the efforts made by the negroes them-
selves to deal with some of the problems you discuss." He added that there 
may be "a better story than is generally known" about black self-help. Rusk's 
comment echoed the criticism of Young's paper on Roxbury where his critic 
decried Young's failure to point out ways that blacks could alleviate their own 
problems. He wanted large institutions such as the Boston municipal govern-
ment and the Rockefeller Foundation to play a greater role in addressing 
issues that hindered black advancement. But this was not the time to debate 
Dean Rusk about their differences. Besides, Rusk thought the essay impor-
tant enough to share with several of his Rockefeller Foundation colleagues. 
Young and Rusk, however, had the meeting that Young wanted. Afterwards, 
he urged Rusk to issue a publicity release about Young's GEB grant to black 
newspapers to acquaint their readers with the constructive efforts of the foun-
dation. 26 He hoped that would broaden the relationship between the 
Rockefeller philanthropies and the black community. Young could kill two 
birds with one stone. The foundation would become a more familiar source 
of assistance to blacks, and Whitney Young could become increasingly associ-
ated with this wealthy agency. 
Although Lindsley Kimball secured the fellowship to prepare Young to 
become the new NUL executive director, Young was not sure that he would 
definitely succeed Lester Granger. While he stated emphatically that what-
ever happened, he would not return to Atlanta University, Young had neither 
resigned his position as dean nor neglected minimal oversight of the School 
of Social Work during his sabbatical. He entrusted his duties to Frankie V. 
Adams, who had taught group work and community organization at the 
school since 1931. She and Young developed a good relationship, with Adams 
playing a crucial role in curriculum reform and in studying admissions poli-
cies during Young's tenure. They also coedited a student workbook, Some 
Pioneers in Social Work: Brief Sketches. 27 
Frankie Adams kept Young abreast of the happenings at the School of 
Social Work throughout the 1960-61 academic year. She shared with him her 
failed effort to get more scholarship money from President Clement and news 
about new faculty. Young planned to attend the 1961 Council on Social Work 
Education meeting in Montreal in his capacity as Atlanta's social work dean, 
but he could not persuade Adams to go along. "I called Dr. Clement ... 
saying in no uncertain terms that 1 did not want to compete with you," 
Adams said to Young. She added that whatever responsibilities needed to be 
covered at the Council, Young could handle. Although Young may have been 
mentally disengaged from Atlanta University, he still functioned as a dean.28 
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While dutiful in discharging occasional administrative duties for At-
lanta University during his leave, Young kept his options open. The Unitar-
ian Service Committee already had an interest in hiring him. Now that Young 
was in the area, Frank Z. Glick, the executive director of the Boston-based 
group, hoped to see more of his potential colleague.29 The degree of Young's 
interest in the denominational agency, however, was probably limited. Failed 
effort to work with the United Nations a few years earlier did not diminish 
his interest in foreign affairs. Two close friends, Arthur McCaw and Carl 
Rowan from Omaha and Minneapolis, respectively, worked in the State De-
partment at different times during the 1950s and 1960s and had broad con-
tacts in that field. In fact, he helped a social work colleague promote a Free-
dom Road Foreign Service Exchange Program through his friendship with 
Rowan. Additionally, Young told Dean Rusk, the nation's new secretary of 
state, that he would consider a position in the department.3o 
Part of Young's interest in foreign affairs stemmed from the increased 
attention that black American leaders gave to the emerging nations of Africa. 
In 1959 Young joined with Martin Luther King Jr.'s Southern Christian Lead-
ership Conference on an Africa freedom dinner committee, which planned to 
bring Tom Mboya, the Kenya nationalist, to Atlanta. In 1960 Horace Mann 
Bond, dean of the School of Education at Atlanta University and a noted ex-
pert on Africa, invited Young to join in a trip to the continent. He responded 
enthusiastically and told Bond that he had been matriculating in the African 
studies program at Boston University with his fellowship. Although all of these 
options were exciting prospects, Kimball and other supporters of the League 
reminded Young that his best work could be done in that organization.31 
The competition to succeed Lester Granger seemed wide open. Despite 
Whitney Young's formidable candidacy, he faced several tough rivals for the 
League position. The board of directors chose four of its members, two blacks 
and two whites, all New Yorkers, to constitute a search committee. They 
included NUL president Henry Steeger, a publisher, Regina Andrews, a librar-
ian, Mollie Moon, president of the NUL Guild, and Burns W. Roper, the 
League treasurer and president of Elmo Roper and Associates, the public 
opinion analysts. 32 
Several candidates from within the League wanted the job, including 
local executive directors Edwin "Bill" Berry of Chicago, M. Leo Bohanon of 
St. Louis, and Edward S. Lewis of New York. They believed in a more activist 
League involved in direct action protests to enhance the organization's em-
ployment and housing programs. As an executive in both Baltimore and New 
York, for example, Lewis became a noted labor organizer among black car-
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penters, painters, and brewers. Berry, Bohanon, and Lewis wanted the League 
to identify with the emerging national civil rights movement. The search 
committee ultimately interviewed thirteen persons including some members 
of the NUL staff. Two educators, Alonro G. Moron, president of Hampton 
Institute, and Whitney Young, also met with the committee.33 
After the search committee interviewed the thirteen candidates, Steeger 
asked Andrews, Moon, and Roper to join him in indicating a first choice. 
Alonro Moron received three votes, and Young drew his one vote from Burns 
Roper. Moron had been Roper's third choice. Steeger wanted to report a 
unanimous vote to the board of directors. Although Roper was willing to 
yield to the majority, the committee decided to put aside the 3: 1 vote and 
invite Moron and Young back for second interviews. 
Alonro G. Moron, the fifty-two-year-old president of Hampton Insti-
tute, was born in the Virgin Islands. He held the Ph.D. from Brown Univer-
sity, the M.A. from the University of Pittsburgh, and a law degree from 
Harvard. His tenure at Hampton began in 1947 when he became the busi-
ness manager, but culminated in the presidency two years later. He had ex-
tensive experience in social work administration. He had served as a commis-
sioner of public welfare in the Virgin Islands, and he spent eight years as an 
official in the Atlanta Housing Authority. Moron was also a member of the 
executive committee of the National Conference on Social Work. With such 
stunning credentials, Moron was surprised that the committee required an-
other interview. In fact, he was so visibly annoyed that his negative disposi-
tion harmed his candidacy. Moron was cool and reserved as he answered addi-
tional questions about his potential leadership of the National Urban League. 
Young's first interview received mixed reviews from the search commit-
tee. While Steeger thought that his talk was too "pat" and lacked feeling, 
Roper believed that Young had been "enthusiastic" and "full of fire." In sharp 
contrast to Moron, Young was still enthusiastic during his second interview, 
according to Roper, and gave an excellent presentation. This time Steeger, 
Andrews, and Moon concurred with Roper and unanimously recommended 
Young to the full board of directors as their choice to succeed Lester Granger. 
Steeger told Young, "You've got it." The board agreed and elected Whitney 
Young the new executive director.34 
Behind the scenes of these meetings of the search committee and the 
board of directors occurred a surreptitious tug-of-war between two sexage-
narians, Lester Granger and Lindsley Kimball. Granger was well aware of 
Kimball's preference for Young. Just before the search process began, Granger 
told Henry Steeger that Whitney Young was interested in the post. He added, 
132 Militant Mediator 
"I consider him to be one of the better prospects. He is receiving a General 
Education Board fellowship-very handsome proportions-that will enable 
him to put in the next year ... on study in the universities of Boston .... The 
fellowship was Lin Kimball's idea." At the same time, Granger encouraged 
the candidacy of Alonzo Moron. Granger belonged to Moron's trustee board 
at Hampton. His presidency was ending, and Granger tried to help him find 
another top-level position.35 
Lindsley Kimball had a different agenda. Privately, he blamed Granger 
for the faltering financial conditions of the national League. As a board mem-
ber and representative of the organization's principal benefactors, Kimball 
probably wanted to limit Granger's influence over the selection process. Al-
though Granger had been Young's boss and adviser for more than a decade, it 
was Kimball who whetted Young's appetite for a position of national respon-
sibility and provided him with the wherewithal to achieve it. Kimball per-
suaded him to apply for the job and muscled him in as the executive director. 
While Young also benefited from support given him by such board members 
as George o. Buder, a black official in the Labor Department, backing from 
Kimball was pivotal. Whether Granger had supported him or not proved 
unimportant. That Kimball was his staunch sponsor, however, made all the 
difference in the world.36 
How vigorously Granger advanced Moron's candidacy once the com-
petition yielded finalists is likewise unclear. He certainly had good reason to 
avoid a showdown with Lindsley Kimball because he simply could not win. 
Besides, Granger still had much to gain from continued favor from the 
Rockefeller philanthropies. As Granger retired from the National Urban 
League, he assumed the presidency of the International Conference of Social 
Work. To enable him to discharge his duties, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund 
gave him a $30,000 grant over two years. League president Henry Steeger 
consented to have his organization administer the funds to Granger. At the 
end of the period, Granger promised a publication discussing his travels and 
experiences. Steeger expected that Granger's new international perspectives 
would benefit the League. Kimball was more cynical. To help the League, 
Kimball stated, "The Rockefeller Brothers Fund has appropriated $30,000 to 
take Lester Granger off their hands for the next two years."37 
Granger preferred Alonzo Moron, but he did not deeply oppose Young. 
Moreover, he was unwilling to let an open disagreement with Kimball end 
his continued dependence and deference to Rockefeller benefactors and their 
agents. To Dana S. Creel, director of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Granger 
wrote, "I shall never forget the personal interest that you have shown in the 
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many problems which I have encountered during the years of my association, 
nor shall I ever forget the staunch support that the Rockefeller family has 
given to the Urban League almost from the first month of the League's estab-
lishment. It is no exaggeration to say that without the support of the Rockefeller 
family there may well have been an Urban League, but it could not have 
given anything like the extent and quality of service that we have been privi-
leged to provide." Creel responded, "It is difficult to think of the Urban 
League movement without you in the picture." In preferring Moron, how-
ever, Granger did not recognize that the League required a more activist leader 
in tune with the emerging civil rights movement. Ironically, the other key 
sexagenarian, Lindsley Kimball, wisely noted the increased militancy of the 
black struggle and engineered a change in the League's leadership to accom-
modate these new racial realities.38 
The most significant difference between Granger and Whitney Young 
was the latter's sophisticated critique of whites and their attitudes toward 
black advancement. From observing his father interact successfully with pa-
ternalistic whites in Kentucky to his own experiences drawing grudging sup-
port from conservative businessmen in Omaha, Young became adept at ana-
lyzing white perspectives and behavior toward blacks and their struggle for 
equality. His latest reflections on the subject enabled him to deliver a poi-
gnant speech to the Boston Urban League shortly after his election to succeed 
Lester Granger. In ''I'm Liberal, But ... ," Young frontally attacked the ex-
cuses and subterfuges that whites employed to justify opposition to black 
demands. For example, he noted that seemingly well-meaning whites often 
remarked, "You really can't change things overnight. The Negro has made a 
lot of progress and I am for him but if you go too fast it might antagonize 
even some of your friends." In his rejoinder Young pointed out that "after 
300 years of slavery and almost 100 years of technical freedom he [the Negro] 
hardly feels qualified to be called a revolutionist." He expressed amazement 
"at how good, educated, and church-going Americans can tell a well-pre-
pared Negro who has suffered all the indignities and pain of jobs, homes, and 
other normal needs being dosed to him that he must be patient, be philo-
sophical about these denials of civil and human rights." 
He cited another of the "I'm Liberal, But ... " syndrome. Whites some-
times said, "Prejudice begins in the hearts of men and it is there that it must 
be corrected. You just can't legislate attitudes and morality." Young observed, 
"We are talking about discrimination. Of all the laws proposed or passed, 
none has ever required that you like anybody. They have only asked that your 
dislike of another human being not deny to him such elementary rights as a 
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job or a house .... In practically every case, attitude changes in a positive 
direction usually follow changes in practice or behavior." He added, '''The 
I'm Liberal, But Routine' is focused on the student sit-ins. The reaction usu-
ally being, well, I am for the ends but am not so sure about the means. They 
are after all breaking the law. Here I think all should know there were no laws 
in most southern cities. These were hastily passed after the sit-ins began and 
even here not a law against a Negro sitting at a counter but a trespass law." He 
contended that blacks were doing no more than the American colonists throw-
ing tea overboard in Boston Harbor in 1773. "They sought a cup of untaxed 
tea," Young said. "The students seek a cup of unsegregated coffee."39 
Perhaps taking a cue from an earlier criticism by Dean Rusk, Young 
also addressed the issue of "The Negro and Self-Help." He cited black-owned 
"banks, insurance companies, and other businesses which not only provide 
employment, but also make personal and home loans, provide ... scholar-
ships and give substantial support to social welfare and educational institu-
tions." He included black churches as the principal purveyors of self-help. 
"While the NAACP and the Urban League were important organizations, "less 
publicized but effective efforts" of the Elks, Masons, sororities, and fraterni-
ties impacted greatly on black self-help, especially in making scholarships 
available to needy students. He noted the Frontiers, a national service club, 
and numerous black professional groups and their programs to improve the 
social and economic condition of blacks. Young observed, "Hardly a week 
passes that Negroes are not solicited for funds needed as defense against some 
miscarriage of justice or infringement of property and personal rights."40 
At the same time, Young contended that the major problems confronting 
blacks were too broad and deep to depend on black self-help to solve them. 
That's why he increasingly stressed the responsibility of powerful and influen-
tial whites to commit government, foundation, and corporate resources toward 
eliminating the incumbrances to black advancement. He was convinced that 
racial segregation, discrimination, and economic deprivation of blacks were 
issues that whites had to address. His speech, ''I'm Liberal, But ... ," was not 
meant as an exercise in sarcasm and satire. Rather, it was one of many attempts 
to emphasize the crucial impact of white attitudes and behavior in hindering 
black progress. Black self-help, while important, was not the answer. The devel-
opment of genuine racial and economic liberalism, he believed, would go fur-
ther to alleviate black social and economic distress than could the modest re-
sources of black institutions. Perhaps Kimball and Rusk did not detect this 
streak of bold, independent thought in Whitney Young. So impressed were 
they with his wit and dynamism, they may have missed Young's message. 
7 
Retooling the League 
Diverse elements of the civil rights struggle coalesced into a sustained and identifiable movement just as Whitney Young assumed his duties as 
executive director of the National Urban League. Starting with successful bus 
boycotts in 1953, 1955, and 1956 in Baton Rouge, Montgomery, and Talla-
hassee, respectively, southern blacks discovered the effectiveness of economic 
pressure and legal action as methods to destroy segregation in public trans-
portation. Demonstrations and sit-ins to protest exclusion from department 
store lunch counters in numerous southern cities beginning in 1957 and 
culminating in 1960 in Greensboro drew black college students to the van-
guard of civil rights activities. Black militancy was further buoyed by the 
Supreme Court's landmark Brown decision in 1954 and other federal initia-
tives including the 1957 and 1960 civil rights acts, the work of the newly 
established Civil Rights Commission, and the dramatic arrival of federal troops 
in Little Rock, Arkansas, to guard nine black students as they entered the 
formerly segregated Central High School. 
As civil rights activism escalated and intensified, the venerable NAACP, a 
revived CORE, and the recently founded SCLC gained greater visibility as front-
line organizations that articulated black demands and devised strategies to 
achieve integrationist objectives. The National Urban League, despite the 
militant involvement of some affiliates, acquired a reputation for conserva-
tism. Lester Granger, an Eisenhower Republican, did not identify with the 
grassroots activism of such groups as CORE and SCLC, which mobilized blacks 
to attack segregation in a broad range of public facilities. Although the League 
had a special and indispensable social service function, Young wanted the 
organization to become an integral part of the increasingly militant civil rights 
movement and to influence its direction. Before that could be accomplished, 
however, Young tried to resuscitate the League and retool it for the changed 
environment of civil rights activism. 
Unfortunately, Lester Granger passed on to his successor a nearly bank-
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rupt organization. When Young replaced him, he inherited a deficit of 
$125,000.1 Starting offwith such financial difficulties made it hard for Young 
to meet even routine operating expenses. For example, the National Urban 
League sponsored an annual conference for two to three hundred persons 
from its sixty-two affiliates. The 1961 meeting, planned for Dayton, Ohio, 
however, faced possible postponement because the national office was in such 
desperate financial straits that its staff needed to pay their own expenses to 
the gathering. Young told Henry Steeger and Lindsley Kimball about the 
emergency. They in turn asked the president of the Rockefeller Foundation, 
]. George Harrar, for $5,000 to enable at least nineteen persons on the na-
tional staff to attend the Dayton meeting. Harrar approved the grant in order 
to ensure a better return on the investment that the Rockefeller Board had 
made in sending Whitney Young to Harvard. "It is understandably impor-
tant," said foundation officials that as Young "takes the administrative reins 
of the agency ... that he be able to count on the presence and active partici-
pation of his headquarters staff at this Conference."2 
The Rockefeller donation was a small part of a larger effort that Lindsley 
Kimball spearheaded to restore financial integrity to the League's fiscal opera-
tions and to give Whitney Young a chance to succeed as the executive direc-
tor. Kimball engineered a major rescue operation for the League assisted by 
the Carnegie Corporation, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, the Taconic Foun-
dation, and the Field Foundation. By March 1962, Kimball drew contribu-
tions totaling $168,000 from these foundations. Additionally, David 
Rockefeller of Chase Manhattan Bank and A.L. Nickerson, president of Socony 
Mobil Oil, hosted a gathering of businessmen to attract their support for the 
League bailout. That effort yielded $55,000 in pledges by February 1962 and 
eventually over $90,000 in contributions before the end of the fiscal year. 
With assistance initially given by Kimball and the Rockefellers, Young made 
valuable contacts with foundations and corporations, raising League income, 
mainly from these sources, from $284,000 in 1961 to $4,100,000 in 1968, 
an increase of 1,374 percent.3 
As financial resources became increasingly available, the NUL staff grew 
from 30 to 110 between 1961 and 1965. Growth in personnel and programs 
severely taxed League facilities at 14 East 48th Street in New York City. The 
League rented two other premises to accommodate the additional staff. 
Lindsley Kimball, who had succeeded Henry Steeger as NUL president, found 
a solution. He proposed the purchase of the CBS building at 55-61 East 52d 
Street. Since the owner had recently put it on the market, numerous cash 
offers had been made already. Kimball moved quickly to put in a bid. 
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Although serving as league president, Kimball maintained a deep in-
volvement with the United Negro College Fund. Like the NUL, the UNCF had 
outgrown its building and rented additional office space to house its expanded 
operations. Kimball proposed that the NUL and UNCF jointly purchase the CBS 
building. He figured that since the two groups often solicited funds from the 
same sources, it was cheaper to put them together under one roof. He added, 
"Neither organization is likely ever to need more space than this new build-
ing provides .... Urban League expansion will now take place in the field 
rather than in the national staff." Most important to Kimball was that "these 
two organizations should be more closely associated." He criticized the mem-
ber colleges of UNCF for continuing "the old pattern of preparing young Ne-
gro men and women for teaching and for the ministry but not for the jobs 
that are open to them today." He believed that the National Urban League 
could help the UNCF to chart a new course. The League, Kimball observed, 
had a list of 37,000 jobs open to blacks, but they could not fill them because 
the blacks did not have the proper background education. Ifhoused together 
the League could provide important services to the United Negro College 
Fund. In October 1965, Kimball and William Gossett, a former Ford Motor 
Company executive and chairman of UNCF, signed a purchase contract and 
paid a $20,000 deposit to hold the CBS building until other funds were raised. 
Clearly, at this juncture, Young was not yet fully in charge of crucial 
fiscal matters pertaining to the League. Kimball played a visible role as liaison 
to the Rockefeller philanthropies and other foundations interested in sup-
porting the League. John D. Rockefeller III told Harrar that he "might rea-
sonably hope for financing by the family in an amount of $500,000." John 
III would contribute $200,000 and Laurence Rockefeller would give $300,000, 
"depending upon whether or not Winthrop 'chipped in.'" Kimball then asked 
Dana Creel of the Rockefeller Foundation to match the family money with a 
grant of $500,000. John III intervened again to urge J. George Harrar to put 
in $250,000 from the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. With the asking price for 
the building at $2 million, Kimball had gotten commitments for more than 
half of the amount.4 
Kimball then approached Henry Heald and the Ford Foundation to 
contribute the remaining $500,000. His proposal called for joint ownership 
of the building on a two-thirds to one-third basis in favor of the League. 
Several Ford officials, however, for unrelated reasons had grown sour on the 
United Negro College Fund. One commented that Kimball's attempt to re-
late the programs of the two organizations was "overdrawn, unconvincing, 
and unnecessary to justifY their joint use of the building." Points were also 
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raised about the greater space needs of the League and the reluctance of the 
UNCF president to put the proceeds of his building sale "into the pot for the 
new building."5 
Ultimately, Ford gave $600,000 to the League alone. Whitney Young 
had urged foundation officials "to proceed on a joint tenancy basis." Although 
Kimball agreed to cut out UNCF from its share of the Ford grant, he had put 
Whitney Young into a situation not of his making. In an attempt to draw 
together two untelated organizations, he precluded protest from Whitney 
Young because the latter could not afford to alienate his important link to the 
Rockefeller philanthropies. In that Kimball drew the NUL and the UNCF to-
gether, Ford decoupled them, revised Kimball's proposal, and helped Young 
by recognizing his organization as deserving of full support.6 
As with any new executive, Young had to deal with his predecessor and 
board members held over from the previous administration. Granger settled 
in New Orleans and became affiliated with Dillard University. He resumed 
his ties with the executive director of the New Orleans Urban League, a Young 
critic. On one occasion Granger explained to his New Orleans friend that a 
policy with which he disagreed actually had been in place before Young's 
arrival. Young thanked his predecessor for explaining matters to his critic. He 
interpreted Granger's intervention, however, as a plea for continued involve-
ment in NUL affairs. Young apologized to Granger for not contacting him 
more often and promised "to sit down ... for a talk" when Granger came to 
New York City again. Before two months elapsed, Young updated Granger 
on "how things are moving" in the national office. He told him about various 
staff matters, changes in personnel in regional offices, and efforts to increase 
League funds? 
Young had mixed results in dealing with holdovers from Granger's board 
of directors. Sophie Yarnall Jacobs, though devoted to Lester Granger, be-
lieved that Whitney Young was more forthright and courageous. She noted 
that Young was not one bit afraid of white people. Although Granger was also 
not intimidated by whites, he wanted them to be his friends. 8 Henry Steeger 
helped to facilitate acceptance of Whitney Young among some local League 
executives who were suspicious of his activism. Steeger himself had been un-
sure about Young's ability to step into Granger's shoes. Steeger and Young 
spent much time together, usually over evening cocktails. He tried to instruct 
Young, for example, on his diction. But he heard Young give a speech, and 
Steeger quickly noted that Young needed no advice either on speaking or on 
other important matters in the national office. Both Steeger and Jacobs be-
came staunch Young supporters.9 
Retooling the League 139 
Young and Burns Roper, however, had more to overcome in their devel-
oping relationship. Although he credited Young with giving the League a 
new direction, Roper wanted him to acknowledge that Granger's successes 
had been sharply limited by a less hospitable racial environment. Whenever 
Roper told business associates that he was on his way to a League meeting, 
they would taunt him about why he wanted to affiliate with a "nigger organi-
zation."With such attitudes rampant among monied whites during the 1950s, 
Granger had formidable odds to overcome. Consequently, Roper grew an-
noyed with Young as he preached that things were going to change in the 
League operation and no longer would it be a nickel-and-dime organization. 
Roper interpreted such remarks as a putdown of Lester Granger and dispar-
aging of the previous boatd of directors. In fact, Roper contended that Young's 
attitude created tension between boatd members elected during the Granger 
period and those chosen during Young's tenure. Because the bylaws of the 
National Urban League provided for the regular rotation of board members, 
Young had numerous opportunities to influence the selection of sympathetic 
new members. Moreover, Young was "able to shoot higher" for wealthier and 
more influential boatd members.lo 
Young, like Lester Granger, gained board support for nearly all of his 
major initiatives. The League's fifty-three elected boatd members and the six 
honorary members met four times each year. Each member also served on 
one of several committees that advised particulat League depattments on their 
programs and monitored important administrative and financial matters. Usu-
ally board members supported initiatives that Young proposed or assisted 
him in finding funds to implement them. II 
The League attempted geographical, occupational, and racial balance 
on the board. Labor leaders, corporate, government, and foundation officials 
along with black educators, doctors, and fraternal leaders found places in this 
influential body. Dr. Willa Player, president of Bennett College and a visible 
supporter of student sit-ins in Greensboro, North Carolina, represented a 
new breed of black southerners unafraid to challenge the racial status quo. 
Hobson R. Reynolds, the grand exalted ruler of a half million black Elks, a 
grassroots organization, helped the League identifY with a broader constitu-
ency. At the same time, Young wanted more whites of greater wealth and 
influence than those already on the board~ So Dwight Zook of North Ameri-
can Aviation, James Linen of Time-Life, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk 
joined the board. 12 
Normal attrition allowed Young to staff the national headquarters with 
persons who shared his activist outlook for the League. His greatest impact 
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occurred, however, with choosing personnel for new departments that the 
changing environment of the 1960s required. In 1967, for example, he wanted 
to help blacks in the military, especially those returning from the Vietnam 
War, to get League assistance in training and finding employment in civilian 
life. Young secured board approval for an office of veterans' affairs. A few 
years later, to deal with various social pathologies in major League affiliated 
cities, Young proposed a new department to address crime, criminal justice, 
delinquency, and police relations. Moreover, the establishment of a Washing-
ton bureau under Cernoria D. Johnson allowed him to stay abreast of federal 
legislation and programs relevant to the national office and to local affili-
ates. 13 
Despite his administrative experience, Young disliked the day-to-day 
office demands placed on him. As the League's principal fund-raiser and spokes-
man, Young was frequently away from his desk. Moreover, as his involvement 
with the civil rights movement intensified and his consultations with Presi-
dents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon became routine, Young's role in external 
affairs took up as much time as internal matters. Consequently, important 
administrative and personnel difficulties were left either unattended or inef-
fectively adjudicated. At his first staff conference, for example, he stressed the 
importance of the research department "as a basic program implementer." 
The departments of public relations, fund-raising, administration, programs, 
and field services would depend on it for "the kinds of facts and data useful 
for national program operations." Yet Young and the research director had 
problems that culminated in the latter's dismissal. Young performed this un-
pleasant task reluctantly and belatedly. His loose administrative style perme-
ated his tenure at the National Urban League. After eight years in office, 
management consultants suggested extensive improvements to enhance the 
functioning of Young's office. 14 
Couched between the headquarters staff and the local affiliates were 
five regional offices, each with a director, divided among the eastern, 
mideastern, midwestern, southern, and western areas. Semiannually the re-
gional directors monitored and evaluated the affiliates within their jurisdic-
tions and kept the national office informed about problems occurring within 
them. Whitney Young appointed new regional directors to serve as liaisons 
between the national office and the affiliates. In 1967, for example, a year of 
unusual urban unrest, fourteen of the twenty-one League cities in the eastern 
region experienced racial violence. The regional director delivered background 
data on these occurrences to the National League's administration, public 
relations, and program departments. In cooperation with the national office, 
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the regional director also cosponsored affiliate staff workshops. Moreover, 
these officials represented the region at various conferences on urban plan-
ning, social welfare, and urban tensions. 15 
While Young preferred to delegate responsibility to the headquarters 
staff, he could not always avoid direct involvement in the affairs of League 
affiliates. Problems with local programs and personnel often required Young's 
intervention to clarify the role of the League or discipline wayward local ex-
ecutives. Soon after Young succeeded Granger, program difficulties at the 
Urban League of Greater New York drew his attention. His administrative 
assistant briefed him on the perennial complaints directed to the national 
office from local employers and applicants about the industrial relations de-
partment of the New York affiliate. Persons seeking League services reported 
"indifference, rudeness, coldness, abruptness, and discourtesy." Employers 
observed similar unpleasantness in office staff. They also noted that applicant 
screening was "slipshoddy" and that follow-up on job referrals did not occur. 
The New York League gained "a very poor reputation in Harlem" and with 
such companies as CBS and Socony Mobil Oil. Furthermore, Julius A. Tho-
mas, the national industrial relations secretary, told Young that the local League 
"is not interested in servicing business and industry ... from whom [the] 
National receives contributions." He added, "It has taken a good many years 
of painstaking counsel and guidance to reach the point where we are regarded 
as 'experts' in the field." Consequently, Thomas did not want to see the ex-
panded industrial relations program jeopardized by the New York affiliate. 
The problem was that the New York organization became exclusively inter-
ested in special job fields in executive and technical areas. Firms in search of 
stenographers, secretaries, and other lower-level office jobs, according to Tho-
mas, received very little attention from the ULGNY office. 16 
Young noted a lack of consensus about the role of industrial relations in 
the national office and in the New York League. Young and his associate execu-
tive directors stressed to the affiliate that the national office was raising addi-
tional funds from numerous local corporations. They added that it was neces-
sary to discuss with local officials what services those firms expected from the 
New York League. The local executive believed that his agency would prefer to 
work on job orders that called for employees with skills at the sub managerial or 
management training level. He thought that other agencies could help firms 
find people at the secretarial, clerical, and semiskilled levels. He flippantly ob-
served that good secretaries were difficult to find, anyway. To resolve their prob-
lems, Young sent in his associate executive director, Mahlon T. Puryear, to teach 
the local League officials how to service the requests of all area businesses. 17 
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Young also developed a new fund-raising agreement to end competi-
tion between the National Urban League and the New York affiliate, 18 and he 
brought in Alexander J. Allen to lead the affiliate and to restore its fiscal 
integrity. Allen hired new staff, which resolved many of the conflicts that 
originally caused Young's intervention.19 
Young seldom hesitated to discipline affiliates that were financially de-
linquent or programmatically dysfunctional. He boasted wherever he spoke 
or solicited money that the League alone among black organizations had the 
actual capability and technical expertise to achieve the social and economic 
integration of blacks. If the League infrastructure faltered, then his argument 
lost credibility. The Buffalo Urban League, which Young deemed below stan-
dards, discovered how serious he had become about inefficient affiliates. 
Buffalo had a recalcitrant local executive during the Granger era. When 
Granger ordered a review of its programs in 1958, a board member said, 
"Lester should run his office and let us run ours." When Young scheduled his 
first national conference, the Buffalo executive complained about the date. 
Moreover, from 1958 to 1961 the Buffalo League remitted only 4 percent of 
its national dues, and in 1962 it paid nothing at all. A national official inves-
tigating the affiliate found that mandated programs in employment and job 
development, housing, education and youth incentives, and health and wel-
fare did not exist. The League functioned only as a job placement agency. 
Moreover, the affiliate's location, in the basement of a public housing project, 
was unacceptable.20 
Upon receiving the report, Young told the president of the Buffalo af-
filiate that the national office would recommend probation for the local. He 
complained that the affiliate executive was well past retirement age and could 
not function effectively with his health problems. He insisted on a new leader 
for the Buffalo League. The industrial relations secretary worked as a paid 
consultant to some local firms and was also employed as an insurance sales-
man. These activities hinted at a possible conflict of interest and certainly 
denied the affiliate a full-time person in that important department. Actually, 
Young was ready to suspend the Buffalo League. These threats, however, pro-
duced the result that Young wanted. The local executive resigned, and soon 
Alexander Allen sent names of six League officials for the Buffalo affiliate to 
consider for the vacant position.21 
On other occasions when internal dissension within local Leagues oc-
curred, Young, when possible, arranged personal visits to ameliorate prob-
lems. That's what drew him to New Haven, Connecticut, in the spring of 
1965. Richard S. Dowdy, the industrial relations secretary of the Pittsburgh 
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Urban League, came to work for the city of New Haven in 1959, but agreed 
to spearhead the founding of a League affiliate. Formal organization hap-
pened in 1962. A veteran executive from affiliates in the Midwest came to 
head the New Haven League. But trouble soon erupted. Two secretaries ac-
cused the executive of improper conduct toward them. Since their testimony 
did not convince the entire board of directors, disagreements occurred. Al-
though the black executive acknowledged these indiscretions and agreed to 
seek professional help, he protested the way in which the divided board handled 
his termination. To his dismay, the board had voted two months of vacation 
and four months of severance pay. 22 
At this point, the heated impasse required Young's presence. The chair-
man of the personnel committee hosted the meeting. Young eased tensions 
between board members who supported the executive and those who did 
not. He promised that the National Urban League would employ the execu-
tive for the time remaining on his local League contract. If the affiliate could 
not pay him the extra remuneration, Young volunteered the national office to 
fulfill the rest of the salary commitments. With those issues resolved, Young 
urged the New Haven League to start interviews for a new executive direc-
tor.23 
The attention that Young devoted to the New York, Buffalo, and New 
Haven Urban Leagues typified a general problem he continuously confronted 
in numerous other affiliates. The executive directors of all of these locals were 
veteran League officials. All were Granger contemporaries whose effective-
ness had been compromised by fatigue or burnout. Young wanted to replen-
ish the ranks of both local executives and national staff with new blood. In 
some instances, Young's personal persuasion and example drew trained social 
service personnel into the League. More important, Young preferred the sys-
tematic recruitment of fresh talent into the organization. 
Young's relationship with John W. Mack and Herman C. Ewing dem-
onstrated his commitment to young, new executives and his vigorous pro-
motion of their careers. Mack met Young while he was dean of the School of 
Social Work at Atlanta University. Young had come to North Carolina A&T 
in the spring of1958 to draw students including Mack to social work careers. 
After Mack won a scholarship to Atlanta University, a solid relationship de-
veloped between the two men. When students at the Atlanta University Cen-
ter participated in demonstrations to desegregate various public facilities in 
the city, Whitney Young and Martin Luther King Jr. served as advisers. Mack 
became one of the student leaders. Young encouraged him in this role and 
later hoped that he would bring that outlook to the League. A position in 
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psychiatric social work in California following graduation preceded Mack's 
employment with the League. In 1964, through Young's influence, he be-
came health, welfare, and housing secretary of the Flint affiliate. A year later, 
he became acting executive director. He served in the permanent position 
from 1965 to 1969. Young then assigned him to work in Washington on the 
national "New Thrust" initiative before urging the Los Angeles Urban League 
to hire him to revive that faltering affiliate. 24 
Although the executive director of the Little Rock Urban League drew 
Herman C. Ewing into the organization, Whitney Young introduced him to 
influential supporters and promoted his career. After his graduation from 
Lane College, Ewing worked in a federally funded program in Little Rock 
before he became head of the local League in 1965. Young put Ewing to-
gether with Winthrop Rockefeller, the governor of Arkansas and an active 
League supporter. Young helped Ewing get a $5,000 contribution from 
Jeannette Rockefeller, Winthrop's wife, for a Skills Bank. Young also helped 
him to persuade Mrs. Rockefeller to join the board of the Little Rock affili-
ate. In 1969 when Ewing wanted to become executive director of the Mem-
phis Urban League, he secured the promotion with Young's influential en-
dorsement.25 
Young knew, however, that occasional opportunities to attract new and 
talented personnel to the League would not fully meet his organizational 
needs. Of the sixty-five local executive directors, Young estimated that one-
third were good. Another third were adequate, but really needed to be much 
better. The rest were definitely below the standard, he said. He identified 
fifteen who were "not good enough to do their jobs, but not bad enough to 
be retired." Furthermore, broader opportunities for trained social service per-
sonnel in government, industry, and various other agencies siphoned off one-
fifth of the League's professional staff. 
In a proposal to the Rockefeller Foundation, Young requested funds to 
"crank up" ineffective executives and make them better leaders in their com-
munities. He wanted to send them to a retreat in Maine for a summer session 
for training in more effective administration and in intergroup relations. Others 
needed to attend social work school to take additional courses, and some 
would enroll in special training seminars. Other monies would be used for 
fellowships to induce social work students to choose curricula relevant to 
careers in the League. The foundation, however, gave Young "a gentle no" 
because it appeared that Rockefeller was being asked to staff the League.26 
Young took the same proposal to the Carnegie Corporation of New 
York. Although it mainly aimed to train graduate students for professional 
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careers in the League, Young also wanted to target college sophomores who 
were making decisions about graduate training, southern youth who were 
attracted to the civil rights struggle, and Peace Corps personnel returning 
from service abroad. Of course, current staff who needed entichment to en-
hance their competence were also included. 
Young acknowledged that the concept was not new, since the League 
initiated such a program in 1910. Before financial difficulties forced an end 
to the effort in 1960, 136 blacks received graduate degrees in various social 
work specialties. Although employment with the League was not required, 
one-fourth of the recipients eventually worked for the organization. None-
theless, Young wanted the reconstituted program specifically to channel re-
cipients into League careers. He argued that recent successes in the civil rights 
movement increased the need for local leaders trained in positive programs of 
social planning in education and training, employment, housing, and health 
and welfare. He stressed that such efforts "are absolutely necessary for an 
orderly change from the Negro's present state [of inequality] to one in which 
he has the opportunity to become equal with other citizens." Carnegie's help 
in solving the League's manpower deficiencies would ensure the concrete 
achievement and maintenance of racial equality.27 
The Carnegie Corporation granted the League $300,000 over three 
years to develop a fellowship program. The monies were paid to the organiza-
tion in three $100,000 installments. Seventy-five graduate fellowships in in-
tergroup relations at $3,000 each would be supported, and most fellows would 
complete their field assignments in various League affiliates across the coun-
try. The grant began on December 1, 1964.28 
During the first two years of operation, thirty-eight students received 
fellowships for full-time study, and fourteen staff persons in the League se-
cured support for part-time matriculation. In the third year, the organization 
wanted to award nineteen additional fellowships. The League reported that 
"virtually all those who completed their studies in the first year have been 
placed in NUL positions." Twelve fellows who were graduated in 1966, with 
one exception, did fieldwork with local Leagues in positions ranging from 
community organizer, job developer, to deputy executive director. Following 
graduation three of the twelve took League positions, one as associate execu-
tive director of the Richmond Urban League, another as director of health 
and welfare of the Essex County, New Jersey, affiliate, and a third as director 
of the summer fellowship program of the National Urban League. 
Of the fifteen who graduated in 1967 with two years of fellowship as-
sistance, eleven went on to full-time League employment. Three joined the 
national staff, and the others scattered among affiliates in Baltimore, Wash-
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ington, Fort Wayne, Miami, Boston, Pittsburgh, and Atlanta. One became 
acting executive director of the Seattle Urban League. Another four fellow-
ship recipients graduated in 1967, but held fellowships for only one year. 
Two of them took immediate League employment, one with the affiliate in 
Hartford and the other with the Urban League of Elkhart, Indiana.29 
Furthermore, fellowship recipients during the 1966-67 academic year 
at Catholic University, Howard University, and the University of Maryland 
joined to lead an experimental program in mental health at the Washington 
Urban League. Another group at Western Reserve University conducted an 
experiment with the Cleveland Urban League. Staff who benefited from sup-
port during 1966-67 included two from the national office and twenty-two 
from affiliates.3o 
In 1967 Young proudly reported to the Carnegie Corporation that the 
fellowships program proved itself as a major source of personnel for the League. 
The executive committee of the board of directors voted in 1966 to continue 
the program after the grant expired. The committee directed Young, how-
ever, to request a two-year extension from Carnegie to allow time to develop 
the financial base necessary to incorporate the program into ongoing opera-
tions. Swayed by the success of the effort and the League's promise to fund it 
fully in the future, the Carnegie Corporation allocated $200,000 to support 
the fellowships for another two years. The program received two payments of 
$100,000 for the 1967-68 and 1968-69 academic years.3! 
As in previous years, the fellows interned at various League affiliates 
and locals in Atlanta, Cleveland, Jacksonville, and New York City benefited 
from other students whose graduate schools assigned them to work there for 
general study. The League continued to hire fellows in highly visible and 
responsible positions within the organization. Affiliates in Seattle, Nashville, 
Tallahassee, and New Orleans drew their executive directors from the pro-
gram. Similarly, at least six affiliates attracted personnel from the 1969 fel-
10ws.32 
Despite programs to upgrade the quality of local executives and to ex-
pand the pool of trained staff for the entire League, Young had accomplished 
only a part of his retooling effort. He also wanted local Leagues to be effective 
agencies of social change especially in areas like employment for blacks in 
trade, technical, and white-collar jobs and in housing. To overcome intrac-
table problems in these fields, Young needed unprecedented sums of money 
to help his affiliates to break stubborn institutional practices that denied blacks 
equal access to jobs and housing. 
Drawing blacks into trade occupations as workers and contractors had 
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long been an objective of the National Urban League and its numerous affili-
ates. Constitutional restrictions in union bylaws and decades of informal but 
systematic racist practices, however, prevented blacks from becoming electri-
cians, plumbers, carpenters, and machinists and kept them from functioning 
as contractors. Young envisaged the League spearheading a national effort to 
draw together selected labor unions, federally supported apprenticeship pro-
grams, and League affiliates to increase the pool of skilled blacks, encourage 
their acceptance into unions, and provide opportunities for those who wished 
to try contracting. While some affiliates already operated the sort of pro-
grams that Young admired, they were confined to locals in Cleveland, New 
York City, Atlanta, and Anderson, Indiana. Greater orientation to these is-
sues required a broader implementation of these programs to many other 
League affiliates. Young asked the Ford Foundation for a three-year grant of 
$366,000 to staff and administer a nationwide program of projects to in-
crease black representation in special skill trades. 
Young proposed to establish a National Urban League Trade Union 
Advisory Council consisting of union leaders and some representatives from 
business and government. The council's principal role would entail assistance 
"in initiating working relationships between League staff and local labor union 
officers where such contact has not previously existed." The program would 
be coordinated from the League's five regional offices by special personnel. 
Their primary duties would include community education efforts about 
membership in labor unions and job opportunities in both business and blue-
collar fields. Most important, regional staffs would contact and persuade lo-
cal union authorities to relax restrictive measures discouraging or barring 
blacks. They would also advise those who operated job training centers, en-
courage black youth to pursue craft occupations, and help them find jobs 
once their training was finished. 33 
Young involved fifteen cities in the Labor Education Advancement Pro-
gram (LEAP). He pronounced "the acceptance of the program by both orga-
nized labor and the Negro community" as "excellent."34 Among Young's prin-
cipal achievements was strengthening some affiliates with funds and personnel 
to address and implement a visible and crucial initiative in black employ-
ment and entrepreneurship. In Hartford, for example, the local League put 
together black contractors and subcontractors with a downtown developer 
who for the first time received bids from this once excluded group. The Jack-
sonville, Florida, affiliate sponsored a housing project that employed con-
tractors organized by LEAP, and the affiliate in Colorado Springs planned 
similar efforts using LEAP funds to bring together minority contractors.35 
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Other affiliates concentrated on educating blacks about organized la-
bor. The St. Louis Urban League, the International Union of Electrical Work-
ers, and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union sponsored twenty semi-
nars in citizenship education. Moreover, the St. Louis affiliate reached 710 
students at four predominantly black high schools and provided counseling 
and guidance on the organized labor movement. Convocation sessions were 
also held. National and regional LEAP representatives extended similar ser-
vices to local Leagues in Milwaukee, Gary, Peoria, and Indianapolis.36 
When Young drew to the National Urban League a Ford Foundation 
grant of$I,500,000 in 1966, he pushed the organization into one of its most 
ambitious projects ever. Young wished to involve various affiliates in "dem-
onstration projects ... to improve the availability of housing for non-white 
families." The four-year grant for "Operation Equality" put in $340,000 for 
national office expenses and $177,000 for a special project in Cleveland. The 
remaining $983,000 was divided among cities where project officials prom-
ised to raise matching funds to meet the Ford allocation. Although the Na-
tional Urban League had been involved in housing issues long before Young 
assumed office, his new effort promised to pour into the organization major 
resources to enable local Leagues to effect significant reforms. Nine League 
cities mostly in New York state and New Jersey, but also including Pitts-
burgh, St. Louis, and Miami, participated. The grant embraced a few other 
affiliates as well. 37 
The Miami Urban League sponsored a housing conference and partici-
pated in efforts to get a fair housing ordinance passed in Dade County. The 
Bergen County, New Jersey, affiliate provided counselors to help clients find 
decent housing. In Philadelphia the local League put together black and white 
real estate brokers to encourage cooperation in promoting integrated hous-
ing. The Rochester Urban League advised clients on how to locate and pur-
chase a house. The affiliate in Seattle formed a housing corporation to broaden 
availability for black buyers.38 
While the League's grant application was under review by the Ford Foun-
dation, one evaluator, a regional official in the federal Housing and Home 
Finance Agency was "extremely dubious about the validity of the request." 
Except for affiliates in New York City and Atlanta, neither the national office 
nor most of the local Leagues had appreciable experience in providing hous-
ing and stabilizing neighborhoods. Since these were local matters that re-
quired knowledge of land, materials, mortgage finance, site selection, and 
appraising, the reviewer was skeptical of NUL involvement and competence. 
He was equally doubtful of the expertise of one of the two affiliates with 
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housing experience. He noted that the Atlanta Urban League shunned spon-
sorship of a housing project, citing threats to its tax-exempt status. Two NUL 
officers followed suit and expressed similar reservations about participation 
of the headquarters office. Yet a leading black Atlanta church and the local 
Prince Hall Masons became involved in federally funded housing without 
fears about their tax-exempt status. Ultimately, the reviewers believed that 
the League's impact would be negligible, since it would be "treating" only 
"the symptoms of what is wrong."39 
Although Young could not completely dispute the objective assessment 
of the federal housing official, he could still credibly challenge the assump-
tions that underlay the unflattering evaluation of the League. Young's pur-
pose in seeking the grant was to correct precisely what the observer viewed as 
a League weakness. Young wanted the organization to undertake bold initia-
tives to impact on the disadvantaged social conditions that afflicted urban 
blacks. The League had not been on the cutting edge of social activism. Young 
could only change that with the infusion of large sums of money to enable 
national and local officials to get the training and experience in housing is-
sues to address more effectively these concerns in local communities. He was 
trying to transform and retool the personnel and procedures of the League on 
all levels, and he felt that the Ford grant would help achieve those objectives. 
During his efforts to revamp the structure of the League, inaugurate 
expanded and better financed programs, and attract more trained personnel, 
Young also proved himself as an able bureaucratic strategist. With the found-
ing of numerous Leagues, Young introduced a bold initiative. Thirty new 
affiliates significantly enlarged the League's national presence and drew its 
programs to many black communities where locals never existed before. Young 
announced in 1964 that he wanted to organize three new Leagues in each of 
the five regions by the end of 196 5. That would bring the total of affiliates to 
eighty, nearly twenty more than he had inherited from Lester Granger. Young 
authorized the League's five regional directors and a special liaison, Charles 
E. Eason, to organize new Leagues. When information arrived about possi-
bilities for a new affiliate, Young directed the regional director to visit the 
area and then help form a sponsoring committee. At that point, Eason would 
intervene to aid the committee to bring about affiliation with the national 
organization. That meant funding from the local community chest and iden-
tifYing other fiscal resources.40 
Bringing new affiliates into the fold demanded better analysis and strat-
egy than most other innovations that Young attempted. The wise use of the 
regional directors, Charles Eason, and sometimes nearby local executives al-
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lowed the League to send in staffers to discover whether major community 
and fiscal support existed to sustain an affiliate. Often cities and metropoli-
tan areas failed to meet the tough criteria for serious NUL backing. 
Young dispatched Eason to Staten Island, one of the five boroughs of 
New York City, to determine whether a League was needed there. The pri-
mary issue was whether the borough could sustain an independent affiliate or 
if it needed to be a branch of the Urban League of Greater New York. Eason 
advised against an independent League on Staten Island. The community 
chest, the agency on which nearly all affiliates depended, was weak. Most of 
the social service organizations that the chest financed functioned on austere 
budgets. Moreover, Staten Island residents lacked an orientation toward sup-
port of social welfare efforts. Even the NAACP, the principal black group in 
that vicinity, was nonmilitant and specialized in holding public forums. At 
the same time, Eason believed that blacks in the borough needed a League. 
There were deficiencies in housing and little employment beyond the semi-
skilled level in the principal businesses. While there was no question that a 
League program was needed, Eason opposed an independent branch. Young 
adhered to the tough standard of substantive community and fiscal support 
for a local League. Because Staten Island failed those criteria, Young did not 
press for an affiliate there.41 
League investigators discovered that branch status would also be appro-
priate for Olympia, Washington. Three hundred paid members constituted 
the Thurston County Urban League Committee. They wanted an affiliate 
because a new state college had been established there with strong efforts 
toward recruiting minority students. Additionally, the conservative white 
community became aroused over the influx of black students and faculty. 
Nonetheless, with a black population of only 300, League officials believed 
that $50,000 from the United Good Neighbors agency for full League status 
would be ill spent for such a small constituency. Instead, the Thurston County 
Committee was urged to gain official NUL status as a branch of the Tacoma 
Urban League, thirty-six miles away. 
In Utah, a former League staff member attempted to interest local com-
munity and educational leaders in starting an affiliate to cover Salt Lake City, 
Ogden, and Provo. The director of the community chest in Salt Lake City, 
however, hesitated to offer support because the area's small black population 
did not "merit the kind of expenditure a UL affiliate would require." The 
presidents of five Utah universities cooperated in building a meaningful edu-
cational program. But the underrepresentation of top industries in Salt Lake 
City and vicinity with the affiliation effort and uncertain prospects in getting 
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professional staffing caused the national and regional offices to withhold rec-
ognition from the Utah Urban League Committee.42 
Requests to establish affiliates in Staten Island, Olympia, and Salt Lake 
City represented only a fraction of the inquiries flooding the League's na-
tional office. Charles Eason reported in February 1965 that organizing was 
already under way in eight cities, including Battle Creek and Saginaw, Michi-
gan, Madison, Wisconsin, Colorado Springs, and Sacramento. Lindsley 
Kimball noted in September 1965 that twenty such requests were then pend-
ing before the national board of directors. In 1967 League representatives 
explored nearly three dozen communities where affiliates were desired. They 
had also identified thirty areas that they assigned secondary priority status.43 
Sometimes it was a hard-hitting speech by Whitney Young to local busi-
ness leaders that stirred them to form a League committee. On other occa-
sions industry representatives made their own assessments of racial difficul-
ties and invited League officials in to consult with them. Whatever the impetus, 
the escalation of the national civil rights movement and the League's centrist 
reputation drew local white leaders to Whitney Young to urge his organiza-
tion to help ease racial tensions in their various communities. 
In 1967 in Stamford, Connecticut, for example, Joseph J. Morrow Sr., 
the vice president of Pitney-Bowes, and former members of the National 
Urban League's Commerce and Industry Council "convened" local business 
leaders to form an affiliate to serve southern Fairfield County. The formal 
invitation to the national office came from Milton Hosack of the American 
Cyanamid Company. In nearby Bridgeport, Connecticut, corporate repre-
sentatives and the director of the local United Fund laid the groundwork for 
a local League. They committed to a minimum budget of $50,000 annually 
and to hire two professional staff persons. Young also came to know M.R. 
Karrer, vice president of Electric Hose and Rubber Company, in Wilmington, 
Delaware. Karrer volunteered to form an affiliate in his city. The national 
office used this initiative to persuade DuPont officials, the United Fund, and 
local black spokesmen to cooperate. Also during this period, the director of 
the eastern region visited Poughkeepsie, New York, and Bucks County, Penn-
sylvania, at the request ofloeal industry leaders.44 
In the western region, Robert L. Jordan, the manager of a General Elec-
tric subsidiary in San Jose, California, expressed interest in bringing League 
services to his city. Henry A. Talbert, the regional director, informed Young 
that the stimulus came from the GE corporate offices in the East. Talbert and 
Percy Steele of the Bay Cities Urban League addressed thirty executives from 
Westinghouse, IBM, Lockheed, Continental Can, the United Fund, banks, 
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and various government agencies. That initiative probably resulted from 
Young's contacts with GE headquarters officials. In Lake County, Illinois, a 
locale served modestly by the Chicago Urban League, a marathon effort cul-
minated in an affiliate. The local group financed a study of conditions among 
the area's 15,000 blacks, set up an operating budget of $42,000 for a League, 
and secured a promise from the United Fund for inclusion in its annual allo-
cations. The midwestern regional director urged Young to address a gather-
ing sponsored by U.S. Steel, Sears, and Sara Lee Foods to bring the campaign 
for an affiliate to a successful conclusion.45 
New affiliates in the North and West gained quick approval from the 
board of directors. The board received both the Lansing, Michigan, and Syra-
cuse, New York, locals at the same October 20, 1964, meeting. Not long 
after this action, the Rochester, New York, affiliate, armed with an endorse-
ment from the Council of Social Agencies and a $52,130 community chest 
budget, was put into operation. Within another year, the Indianapolis Urban 
League was admitted with $50,000 held in escrow pending the issuance of a 
charter.46 
The growth of League affiliates in the North and West enabled the 
organization to play a leading role in addressing crucial issues in employ-
ment, housing, and education. While local chapters of the NAACP and CORE 
usually assumed leadership on the protest front, the nature of urban prob-
lems required the presence and participation of League officials. They devel-
oped strategy and cooperated on programs with government and business to 
end depressed social and economic conditions among blacks. A different chal-
lenge, however, faced the League in the South. The cutting edge of the black 
struggle concerned the exercise of basic civil rights in voting, public accom-
modations, and school desegregation. In these areas, the other civil rights 
organizations were better equipped than the League to deal effectively with 
these issues. Moreover, the near absence of League affiliates in southern lo-
cales where the struggle was most intense also contributed to the organization's 
marginal participation in the various grassroots efforts to desegregate the South. 
Nonetheless, Young believed that the scarcity oflocal Leagues in several 
major southern cities boded ill for the black population. Urban blacks, whether 
in the North, the West, or the South, faced the same range of difficulties in 
housing, vocational training, education, and health. Despite functioning af-
filiates in Little Rock, Memphis, Atlanta, New Orleans, Tampa, and a few 
other southern cities, Young knew that they required more funding for ex-
panded services. Moreover, he recognized that the national office needed to 
establish new affiliates in places where the League was notably absent. 
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Initially, Young had to sustain those affiliates already in existence. In-
creased pressures from the civil rights movement and higher expectations 
from the national office strained the modest budgets of these fragile organiza-
tions. Furthermore, as affiliate officials joined other blacks in supporting school 
desegregation, suffrage, and public accommodations for everyone, White 
Citizens Councils and a variety of other supremacist groups prevailed on 
nervous community chest boards to stop funding local Leagues. In Little 
Rock, Arkansas, in 1957, for example, George L. Henry, the executive direc-
tor of the League, publicly endorsed the efforts of nine black students to 
desegregate Central High School. White resistance and the obstructionist 
tactics of Governor Orval Faubus persuaded President Eisenhower to dis-
patch federal troops to Little Rock to protect the students and enforce feder-
ally mandated desegregation. Although the Little Rock Urban League had 
been in the community chest since 1937, whites did not like the forthright 
stand of George Henry and threatened to withhold donations if the League 
was not ousted from the group. Rather than allow the record to show that the 
League had been thrown out, Henry and his board of directors voluntarily 
withdrew. The League did not return to the chest until the mid-I960s when 
Herman C. Ewing succeeded Henry. Probably for similar reasons, affiliates in 
Fort Worth, Jacksonville, New Orleans, and Richmond also lost their com-
munity chest funding. The Fort Worth Urban League ceased to function 
altogether. There were only twelve affiliates, including two in Oklahoma, in 
the entire South. With one defunct and another four subsisting on meager 
and irregular contributions, Young had to devise a major rescue operation for 
his southern affiliatesY 
He drew help from the Taconic Foundation to sustain several southern 
Leagues. Shortly after Young took office, the Foundation responded quickly to 
an appeal for $10,000 for the Little Rock Urban League and $5,000 for the 
New Orleans Urban League. In 1964 Young requested $50,000 to bolster the 
southern Leagues. For the 1965-66 program year, Taconic gave the League two 
gifts of stock whose sale netted over $100,000. Grants ranging from $3,500 to 
$6,000 were extended to affiliates in New Orleans, Little Rock, Richmond, 
Tampa, Jacksonville, and Tulsa. The $6,000 grant to the New Orleans Urban 
League was used for a "program of family adjustment, health and welfare and 
youth development in areas of the city deprived of social service." The $5,000 
grant to the Tampa Urban League paid the salary of an associate executive 
director, and the $3,500 grant to the Tulsa afFIliate enabled the executive direc-
tor to hire a job development and employment specialist. Similarly, Little Rock's 
$5,000 Taconic gift established an education and youth incentive program.48 
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Despite success in finding money to strengthen southern Leagues, Young 
was not content with only twelve affiliates in the region. When he succeeded 
Lester Granger, no locals existed in Alabama, Mississippi, or South Carolina. 
Only one affiliate had been established in a single city in North Carolina, 
Tennessee, and Texas. In most instances, Whitney Young and other officials 
initiated inquiries, but sometimes racially tense cities such as Selma, Ala-
bama, requested a local affiliate.49 
Young wanted to organize twenty new Urban Leagues in the South. 
Toward that end the national board of directors authorized the establishment 
of a southwide advisory committee of the League in 1963. Headed by 
Winthrop Rockefeller, now an Arkansas resident and later governor, and Leon 
Davis, president of the Tulsa Urban League, the committee aimed to per-
suade leading southern white businessmen, civic leaders, and professionals to 
help start local Leagues. In the letter of invitation to "carefully selected lead-
ers of the South," Rockefeller said that the League had an unparalleled record 
"in organizing communities for orderly and stable interracial progress." He 
urged southern leaders to meet at his exclusive Winrock Farm in Morrilton, 
Arkansas, to explore the League's potential to facilitate social change in the 
region. 50 
The Southwide Advisory Committee was guided by Young's associate 
executive director, Nelson C. Jackson, and the southern regional director, 
Clarence D. Coleman. They solicited nominations from southern affiliates 
and from Coleman's staff for blacks and whites who "stand out as exceptional 
prospects" to help expand the League. While it was not difficult to get names 
of prominent southern black businessmen, educators, and professionals, iden-
tifYing influential and sympathetic whites was much harder. In several in-
stances, whites who already served on the boards of affiliates were nomi-
nated. The real task was to expand the League's base of support among persons 
in non-League cities and without connections to the League, the Southern 
Regional Council, or other groups involved in black advancement. 
Coleman and Heman Sweatt, his associate director, noted some prom-
ising candidates. In a state where no League existed, they thought that Charles 
E. Daniel, who owned a construction company in Greenville, South Caro-
lina, might assist. Daniel, who was "reported to be no liberal," was "a busi-
nessman of greatest possible influence" in his state. In 1963 he said, "The 
Negro manpower of South Carolina must be developed if the State is to 
develop to its fullest potential." Furthermore, in Tennessee, Alexander Heard, 
chancellor of Vanderbilt University in Nashville, was "reported to have been 
untried as a leader in the human relations field, but [was] an able and dedi-
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cated person." Also mentioned was David Vann, a white attorney in Bir-
mingham, Alabama. He helped to settle the conflict between the Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference and municipal authorities after nonviolent 
black demonstrators were set upon by Police Commissioner Bull Connor's 
police dog and fire hoses. Winthrop Rockefeller, Ben S. Gilmer, president of 
the Atlanta-based Southern Bell Telephone Company, and one or two others 
were the only nominees of broad corporate influence. The other whites were 
local business men, educators, and civic leaders who possessed some potential 
to persuade their communities to consider support for new League affili-
ates.51 
Generally, during the civil rights movement, some southern business-
men played moderating roles in cities where federal authorities clashed with 
local officeholders over school desegregation, suffrage, and public accommo-
dations for blacks. When compelled to choose between economic advance-
ments and racial segregation, many business owners preferred to swallow in-
tegration rather than risk embarrassment and ostracism from corporate leaders 
elsewhere in the nation. Although the Southwide Advisory Committee pro-
duced too few whites to spearhead the establishment of League affiliates, 
initiatives from Whitney Young and the growing intensity of the civil rights 
movement made numerous businessmen more receptive to a League pres-
ence rather than the continued agitation of the more militant SCLC, SNCC, and 
CORE organizations. Although Young noted in 1964 that many cities in the 
Deep South "are today begging for League affiliation," new locals came to 
fruition mainly because Young made the first move. 52 
Young wanted to hedge his bets. While local committees in southern 
cities often had good intentions, it was still difficult to get all the fiscal sup-
port necessary to start an affiliate. Although the League was the least visible 
and viewed as the least militant among black civil rights groups, it was by no 
means conservative or accommodationist. The League's forthright support of 
the general goals and tactics to achieve desegregation and enfranchisement of 
blacks was sufficient to cause alarm among whites wishing to maintain the 
racial status quo. Young knew he needed external funding to shore up local 
efforts to establish affiliates. Leon Davis, president of the Tulsa Urban League, 
understood the dilemma. Since he wanted twenty new affiliates in the South, 
he told Lindsley Kimball "that if sufficient funds were not immediately avail-
able locally to underwrite the establishment of these Leagues ... such funds 
should be obtained from national firms through the National Urban League." 
Since the Southwide Advisory Committee to which Davis belonged produced 
"lots of conversation on this program, but no action," he probably endorsed 
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Young's effort to find other monies to organize new Leagues. Kimball tried to 
get the assistance of Jake Froelich Jr., president of the Charlotte-based Caro-
linas United Community Services. He told Froelich that the League could 
perform useful services in North and South Carolina "in this time of tension 
and stress." Ultimately, Young's solicitation of foundation, government, and 
corporate funds and contacts enabled the League to expand into several south-
ern cities. Sympathetic southern white business leaders needed resources and 
vigorous prodding from Whitney Young to bring new Leagues into exist-
ence.53 
In July 1965 Young appealed successfully to the Alfred P. Sloan Foun-
dation for a $125,000 grant "for a crash program to organize Urban Leagues 
in ten high tension communities." Young noted that "the logjam of requests 
and inquiries for Urban League services that has poured in have been handled 
on a minimal level because of lack of funds to employ the necessary staff." 
Young went on to argue that "with industry expanding, especially in the South, 
and with demand for skilled manpower to meet the needs of this expansion, 
the necessity to assist in the development of human resources, especially within 
the Negro community, becomes increasingly important." Except for 
Wilmington, Delaware, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, and the Youngstown-To-
ledo, Ohio, metropolitan area, the other seven communities in which Young 
wished to organize affiliates were located in the South. They included Bir-
mingham, Huntsville, Knoxville, Nashville, Greensboro, and Corpus Christi. 
Young also targeted Fort Worth, where the White Citizens Council had caused 
the ouster of the affiliate from the community chest a few years earlier. Young 
wanted to reactivate this local League. 
Young observed that a few of the cities had already shown interest and 
were in some stage of organization. Although he did not want to preempt "a 
community's initiative in seeking a League," he wanted to "speed up the or-
ganizing procedure by subsidizing the cost of full-time professional staff." 
With the regular procedure, bringing a new League into existence could take 
years. He told foundation officials that "the job can be done in six months to 
a year with subsidized professional staff." He asked for $12,500 for each of 
the ten potential affiliates. That money would pay full-time salaries for an 
executive director and secretary. Young urged Sloan Foundation officers to 
help the League in taking immediate advantage of the favorable climate in 
those ten communities. 54 
In establishing affiliates in Birmingham, Alabama, Columbia, South 
Carolina, and Jackson, Mississippi, Young did not rely entirely on local sup-
porters. Efforts to start a Birmingham affiliate began between 1946 and 1950 
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when Nelson S. Jackson, then with the League's southern regional office, 
cooperated with white businessmen and a leading clergyman to raise $4,000 
in seed money. The 1948 Dixiecrat revolt against the strong civil rights plank 
in the Democratic Party platform, however, convinced whites in Birming-
ham that a League would be a disruptive outside force. Thus, business back-
ing for the affiliate disappeared. Young was heartened by the $5,000 that a 
local Birmingham committee raised for a League in 1966, but he knew that 
such an amount would hardly sustain the $47,000 annual budget needed for 
the affiliate. Consequently, Young pledged $25,000 from the national office 
to support the new Birmingham League during its first year. The new affiliate 
in Columbia, South Carolina, commenced in 1967 with more local support 
than its Birmingham counterpart. The $50,000 budget started with $25,000 
from local sources and $25,000 from the National Urban League.55 
The founding of an affiliate in Jackson, Mississippi, in 1966 had been a 
longtime objective of Whitney Young. He enlisted financial assistance from 
the Taconic Foundation. As in other southern cities, Jackson residents raised 
a token $2,500 and the national office provided $27,000 for the first annual 
budget. Although the community chest promised to take over the financing 
eventually, Young persuaded Mrs. Marshall Field III to induce the Field Foun-
dation to allocate $25,000 to underwrite the Jackson Urban League. Within 
a year the affiliate provided various services in job registration and place-
ment, adult enrichment, and agitation for a municipal youth and detention 
center and more day care facilities. The affiliate's salesmanship training pro-
gram resulted in the hiring of five blacks in sales at downtown stores and as 
clerical workers at some local banks. These were unprecedented accomplish-
ments in the capital city of Mississippi. 56 
Young received help from Hubert Crouch, an official in Frontiers In-
ternational, to start an affiliate in Nashville, Tennessee. Young had been ac-
tive in the black men's service organization in the Twin Cities. After Young 
visited Nashville in early 1965, Crouch and Stephen Wright, the president of 
Fisk University, presented the idea of founding an affiliate to the mayor and 
his human relations committee. The group included representatives from 
banks, large insurance companies, big merchandizing, big industry, and the 
chamber of commerce. Although they liked the idea of a League affiliate, 
Crouch became cautious and somewhat incredulous. He told Young, "We 
are faced with the job of selling these people on the matter of bringing an-
other organization to Nashville which would expect assistance from the Coun-
cil of Community Agencies for its on-going operations." Some Council mem-
bers also served on the human relations committee. Whether Nashville got a 
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League depended almost entirely on them. He asked Young for "any infor-
mation at hand which will aid in establishing that the League actually brings 
money into the community through its 'skills placement program.'" He added 
that he also needed proof that an affiliate would help in "upgrading the gen-
eral economy of Negroes by creating better opportunities in housing, better 
jobs, and better training." Crouch advised Young, "These people with whom 
we are dealing are hard-nosed business executives who count progress almost 
entirely in terms of dollars and cents that come into the community." 
Young responded quickly to Crouch's request. Although he had be-
come modestly pessimistic, Crouch happily reported to Young that the reac-
tions of the human relations committee "were quite favorable on inviting a 
League affiliate to Nashville." At that point they wanted "the names and 
occupations of national board members and some kind of documentation on 
how the work of the League has specifically benefited local communities where 
affiliates are located." Young sent the requested information to Crouch. His 
wise use of Crouch's advocacy paid off because soon the Nashville Urban 
League officially opened. Given that the city had been embroiled in down-
town sit-ins and an escalating controversy over public school desegregation, 
support for a League affiliate seemingly gave the city's "power structure" the 
vain hope that they could channel black energies into moderate and 
nonconfrontational League programs. Although Young shared the same civil 
rights objectives of more militant black leaders, he gave Nashville business-
men an organization through which they could conservatively participate in 
the important social changes occurring in their region. 57 
Young must have been elated when in December 1964 an official of the 
Human Relations Commission of Lexington, Kentucky, expressed interest in 
establishing a local League in the city closest to his birthplace. Previous at-
tempts to found an affiliate had failed, but Young's Brotherhood Week speech 
in Lexington apparently revived these efforts. To ensure strong backing for a 
potential affiliate, Young dispatched national staff persons to contact New 
York headquarters officials in IBM, Westinghouse, General Electric, and other 
firms with installations in Lexington. By December 1966, industry and busi-
ness in Lexington were "favorable towards the Urban League." Although this 
economic elite promised support, it resisted a forefront role because "busi-
ness does not wish to 'push its weight around.'" Nonetheless, a committee of 
three officials from IBM and Procter and Gamble agreed to contact other busi-
nesses to join the League's effort. Opposition mainly from the local newspa-
per editor was overcome, and the Lexington Urban League was finally 
launched. 58 
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Young told Dana S. Creel of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund in 1965 
that fourteen cities, mostly in the South, were seeking a League affiliate. Suc-
cess in St. Petersburg, Knoxville, Greensboro, Newport News, Norfolk, Sa-
vannah, and others would go a long way toward expanding the League's pres-
ence in the South.59 In several instances, however, skeptical businessmen and 
reluctant community chest officials ultimately feared that the League, like a 
Trojan horse, looked innocent, but once established in their cities could pur-
sue as militant a posture as either SNCC or SCLC. Hence, some promising south-
ern cities opted to avoid the League. 
Failed attempts to organize affiliates in Norfolk, Virginia, and Greens-
boro, North Carolina, typified these difficulties. An influential speech by 
Whitney Young inspired moves toward League affiliation in Norfolk in 1965. 
An earlier effort by a staff person in the southern regional office did not 
succeed. To avoid previous pitfalls, Young was advised to cultivate Sidney S. 
Kellam of Virginia Beach, Virginia. According to one experienced observed, 
Kellam was "the greatest single force in the entire EastTidewater Area--finan-
cially, politically, civicly, socially." Additionally, "he and his family and their 
multienterprises wield the greatest influence in that area. He was one of the 
first to move on the 'integration front' ... and influenced others to move in 
that direction." Moreover, Kellam was impressed with Whitney Young and 
concluded that the Norfolk area needed a League. Young was urged to send 
additional information about the League to Kellam and to encourage the 
chairman of the Norfolk Friends of the NUL Committee. Support from the 
Norfolk Links, an elite black women's group, also materialized. To reduce 
municipal rivalry among Norfolk, Portsmouth, Virginia Beach, and other 
area communities, Young was advised to call the potential affiliate the Urban 
League of Eastern Tidewater. The second attempt to found a League, how-
ever, succumbed to stiff opposition from the same community chest execu-
tive who foiled the first effort. Moreover, gaining an ally in Sidney Kellam 
was not enough. Weak support among his peers in business and in the com-
munity chest left the Norfolk area without a League until 1978.60 
The presence of a strong affiliate in Winston-Salem, North Carolina, 
emboldened efforts to start a League in neighboring Greensboro. Serious 
steps were taken by the southern regional office for fully exploring possibili-
ties for an affiliate. Meetings occurred in 1963 with the Greensboro Com-
munity Relations Commission, the Community Fellowship, the Commu-
nity Council, politicians, and faculty and students at North Carolina A&T 
College. Young and his colleagues hoped to transform the Greensboro Com-
munity Fellowship, a group sponsored by the Southern Regional Council, 
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into a League affiliate. Like in Norfolk, the business and community chest 
support did not materialize to make this a viable proposal.6J 
Although Young's vigorous program to expand affiliates to major cities 
throughout the South met with mixed success, he still wanted those munici-
palities to receive various League services. When in 1969 the all-black town 
of Mound Bayou, Mississippi, needed funds and advice on its human and 
industrial development, Mayor Earl S. Lucas turned to Whitney Young. The 
town wanted monies especially to upgrade its water and sewage system. Young 
promised to raise funds to enable Mound Bayou to match a federal grant to 
finance the project. Young mailed checks to Lucas which totalled $11,926 to 
assist the municipality.62 Furthermore, Young endorsed his southern regional 
office in accepting an invitation from the mayor of Augusta, Georgia, to 
conduct a socioeconomic study of that city's black population. Six blacks had 
been killed in recent racial disturbances, and the mayor wanted to explore 
programs to address housing, health, and criminal justice issues.63 
As executive director of the National Urban League, Young constantly 
introduced initiatives, programs, personnel, and physical changes to the 
League's infrastructure. He argued that if the organization was to be relevant 
and on the cutting edge of social and racial reform, its affiliates needed to be 
strengthened and expanded to underserved areas. Moreover, he needed to 
place new people in the national, regional, and local offices who believed that 
activism was fully compatible with the steady and methodical administration 
of social welfare. With the League retooled, Young felt confident that more 
visible and militant civil rights organizations could exclude neither him nor 
his group in influencing directions in the civil rights movement and in ar-
ticulating its objectives to powerful officials in government, business, and 
philanthropy. At the same time Young may not have realized that his growing 
identification with the national civil rights movement might have doomed 
efforts to start League affiliates in some sourhern cities. 
8 
Maintaining a 
Middle Ground 
"\V!hen Bayard Rustin learned that Whitney Young would succeed Lester 
W Granger as executive director of the National Urban League, he con-
fided his utter astonishment to A. Philip Randolph. Randolph wondered, 
"What has happened to Whitney Young?" Was he out of his mind? He de-
clared that the League would not be "on the cutting edge of any form of 
direct action," so why would Whitney affiliate with such a conservative or-
ganization? Rustin and Randolph, both veteran activists in civil rights, labor, 
and pacifist causes, admired Young for his work with student demonstrators 
in Atlanta and his advocacy of picketing, sit-ins, and boycotts as tactics to 
assault segregationist practices. They argued that Young was too militant to 
feel comfortable with a staid group like the National Urban League. Rustin, 
however, later conceded that Young had a workable perception about how to 
transform the League into a relevant and pivotal player in the evolving civil 
rights movement. 1 
Black journalist Louis E. Lomax understood Young's objectives much 
better than Rustin and Randolph. A decade earlier, while he served as executive 
director of the Omaha Urban League, Young learned that to achieve employ-
ment breakthroughs, improved housing, and better public education required 
more than exhortation and negotiation. When employers, public officials, and 
others in authority proved recalcitrant, Young knew that militant direct action 
groups would often help him win what skillful presentations could not. Young 
never forgot these instructive experiences, especially after he came to the Na-
tional Urban League. Although the League disclaimed descriptions classifYing 
it as a civil rights agency, it needed close affiliation with direct action groups to 
remind employers, politicians, federal bureaucrats, and other powerful officials 
that dealings with the moderate National Urban League were preferable to 
those with Young's more militant confrontational colleagues. 
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Lomax was perhaps the first observer of the civil rights movement to 
note this nuance in Young's leadership. In his insightful study, The Negro 
Revolt (1962), the journalist reported that Young "envisions close coopera-
tion between the League and other Negro leadership organizations on the 
local level." Moreover, "implicit in Young's program is the intention that the 
League will work with white businessmen in the hope that they will see the 
rightness and wisdom of hiring Negroes." If these conferences failed, then 
Young and his colleagues would tell CORE and the NAACP. (Lomax could have 
added SCLC and SNCC.) In any case, the "failed efforts" would lead to picket-
ing and demonstrations against the obdurate businessmen. In such circum-
stances the League would become the more reasonable and moderate organi-
zation with which to negotiate.2 
Although black activism between 1954 and 1961 in several southern 
locations coalesced into a civil rights movement, national leadership of the 
black struggle was not yet in place. Scholars Clayborne Carson, Aldon Mor-
ris, John Dittmer, and Charles M. Payne correctly argue that the civil rights 
drive must be understood essentially as local grassroots movements,3 but ar-
ticulation of objectives and efforts to win allies for federal legislation and 
important economic initiatives required national black spokesmen. Martin 
Luther King Jr. increasingly personified the civil rights movement. His lead-
ership of the successful Montgomery bus boycott won him international ac-
claim and put him on the cover of Time. Leadership of the black struggle, 
however, was not solely in his hands. With its founding in 1957, the South-
ern Christian Leadership Conference became one of five major groups in the 
national civil rights vanguard. King shared leadership with the heads of CORE, 
SNCC, the NAACP, and the NUL. Moreover, the national civil rights coalition 
had not coalesced until 1961. Because SCLC and SNCC were new organizations 
with fresh faces at the helm and the other three groups hired new executive 
directors between 1955 and 1961, it took awhile for the spokesmen to be-
come comfortable with each other and with their respective followers. In this 
uncertain setting, Young grasped the opportunity to carve out a place for 
himself as a major black leader and for his organization as an important player 
in the civil rights movement. 
Several discrete events that tested the 1954 Brown decision and other 
desegregation initiatives coalesced by the early 1960s to spearhead a coherent 
and carefully focused civil rights movement. The NAACP, adhering to its tradi-
tionallegal tactics, and CORE, SNCC, and SCLC with their commitment to ag-
gressive nonviolent direct action unwittingly combined to promote freedom 
rides. In this series of challenges to segregated interstate travel, the freedom 
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rides fixed national attention on racial inequities in transportation. The NAACP 
supported Bruce Boynton of Richmond, Virginia, in 1958 in objecting to 
segregation in a local bus terminal. NAACP lawyers eventually argued the case 
before the Supreme Court and gained its endorsement for desegregated bus 
stations and other travel facilities. To test whether the high court decision 
meant what it said, James Farmer and CORE planned freedom rides from 
Washington, D.C., to New Orleans. A group of six whites and seven blacks 
in 1961 boarded buses in the nation's capital to travel to Richmond, Danville, 
Rock Hill, South Carolina, and beyond to integrate bus terminals. Violent 
reactions from segregationist whites in Anniston and Birmingham, Alabama, 
drew federal officials to the area to end the confrontations. The injuries suf-
fered by the CORE contingent attracted SNCC, SCLC, and the Nashville Student 
Movement to the buses to bring the effort to its New Orleans destination. 
These actions, however, prompted Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy to 
seek a definitive ruling from the Interstate Commerce Commission, which 
ended segregation in bus terminals.4 
Also during this period, in February 1960, four black students from 
North CarolinaA&T in Greensboro, North Carolina, staged sit-ins at a local 
five-and-dime store to protest black exclusion from the lunch counter. These 
sit-ins mobilized the Greensboro black community in such an unprecedented 
way that they spread to numerous other southern cities and to Ohio, Illinois, 
and Nevada. The determination and dignity of the Greensboro students and 
their counterparts in other places attracted national notice and brought sup-
port to the civil rights cause.5 Despite mixed results, the Albany, Georgia, 
campaign of 1961-62 became another important episode in the coalescing of 
the movement. First the youth chapter of the NAACP, then SNCC, and ulti-
mately SCLC attempted to desegregate the bus terminal and other facilities in 
the south Georgia town. Although the presence of Martin Luther King Jr. 
brought some national attention to the events, the temperate response of 
Albany's police chief helped to maneuver the demonstrations and the eco-
nomic boycott into a stalemate. Nonetheless, all of these incidents were in-
creasingly associated as parts of a sustained movement for racial justice and 
put the NAACP, SNCC, CORE, and SCLC in the forefront of the black struggle.6 
Sometimes by design, but at other times unplanned, Whitney Young 
and the National Urban League became involved in several major civil rights 
events. Although he regularly told audiences that the League was not a civil 
rights agency, he conceded that his organization pursued the same objectives 
as the NAACP and CORE. Young's group wanted "to eliminate racial segregation 
and discrimination in American life, and to give guidance and help to Ne-
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groes so that they may share equally the responsibilities and rewards of citi-
zenship." Whatever distinctions Young drew between the League and the 
other activist groups, he wanted blacks and whites to associate his organiza-
tion with the civil rights struggle.7 
Within two years after the start of the Albany Movement, the direct 
action groups that participated in the campaign solicited advice from the 
National Urban League. Movement representatives wanted the League to 
investigate and make recommendations for action. Young did not move on 
this particular request, but he exploited another opportunity to involve the 
League in the south Georgia community. In the mid-I960s industrial devel-
opment in Albany expanded faster than any city in Georgia. There was more 
need for educated and trained labor. Moreover, as J. Harvey Kerns of the 
League's southern regional office reported, "The climate of race relations has 
changed since 1963. Negroes and whites are working together in increasing 
numbers to give Albany the image of a united city of work."8 
Black leaders in Albany invited the League to establish an affiliate. Kerns 
had also organized an Urban League Guild of fifty women. He urged Young 
to tell local white businessmen about leading monied and corporate white 
southerners already supporting the League, including Winthrop Rockefeller, 
James Haines, president of Haines Hosiery Mills and former president of the 
Winston-Salem Urban League, James Worthen, president of Worthen Bag 
and Textile Company and president of the Nashville Urban League. Kerns 
also reminded Young of the Albany Movement "in which SCLC and SNCC 
went into Albany and within a week or so tore the city asunder and left 
without any accomplishments. You may wish to contrast their coming with the 
Urban League approach." Apparently that strategy worked because in 1967 
the Albany, Georgia, Urban League came into being. Whites in Albany fa-
vored the League's stress on black self-help. The Albany Herald said, "Frankly 
we prefer the approach of the Urban League, as do many of the Negro leaders 
of Albany. By eschewing militantism, and stressing racial cooperation and 
harmony, the League opens the way for a racial dialogue in this community 
which the preferred preachings of the Reverend Martin Luther King, Junior 
could never achieve." Paradoxically, Young wanted League identification with 
the civil rights movement, but at the same time he contrasted the confronta-
tional tactics of civil rights groups with the League's emphasis on biracial 
consensus on jobs, housing, and education. Young stated, "We are not com-
petitive with nor rejecting of the legal and responsible methods of other orga-
nizations." But he surely wanted others to accept the legitimacy of League 
tactics as much as they did the techniques of CORE, SCLC, SNCC, and the NAACP. 9 
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On other occasions Young spoke out as a civil rights leader in ways and 
in forums that Lester Granger may have avoided. In 1962 Young cooperated 
with Ella Baker, a founder of the Student Non-violent Coordinating Com-
mittee, in defending SNCC and CORE activists from criminal anarchy charges 
in Louisiana. When the civil rights committee of the New York City Central 
Labor Council in 1963 sponsored a mass rally "to protest the treatment of the 
Negro-Americans fighting for equal rights in Birmingham," Young served as 
a speaker along with CORE'S James Farmer and SCLC'S Reverend Fred 
Shuttlesworth. Young also addressed a 1963 memorial meeting to condemn 
the murder of Medgar Evers, the Mississippi field director of the NAACP. A 
New York City NAACP leader had invited Young to substitute for Roy Wilkins. 
"Your knowledge of the NAACP and your identification with us," she wrote, 
"all helped to bolster our pride as NAACP workers."l0 
Beyond speaking out publicly on civil rights matters, Young affiliated 
the National Urban League with the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights. 
The group functioned as a congressional lobbying organization to press for 
civil rights legislation and to urge compliance and enforcement of existing 
laws on desegregation and antidiscrimination. The League made annual con-
tributions of $1,000 during the mid-I960s, but increased the donation to 
$1,500 in 1969. Young also served two terms on the executive committee. 
The League's legal counsel, Arthur Q. Funn, however, advised Young to with-
draw from the Leadership Conference. He thought that the group was "purely 
and simply a lobbying adjunct to the 'civil rights' movement." He added that 
"quite aside from the questions of whether the National Urban League is a 
'civil rights' organization, we are forbidden to engage in any substantial lob-
bying activities." Funn emphatically noted, "What we cannot do directly, we 
are equally unable to do indirectly." Young ignored Funn's advice and fos-
tered the public perception that the League was just as involved in civil rights 
activism as the NAACP, CORE, SNCC, and SCLC. ll 
Young developed a dual identity for the Urban League. One image por-
trayed it as a professional social service agency with trained staff to bring to 
fruition the integration of blacks into the American mainstream. The other 
image projected the League as involved in the civil rights movement and in 
the vanguard of its leadership. Some staff believed that the League and its 
services should be distinguished from the groups more actively identified 
with civil rights in structure and methodology. Young often drew such dis-
tinctions when discussing how League programs uniquely helped blacks. At 
the same time, Young and others in the League knew and welcomed the fact 
that the League was grouped with the civil rights organizations in the minds 
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of the general public. Young's pivotal and conspicuous involvement with the 
1963 March on Washington established before a national audience his key 
role as a leader in the civil rights movement. 12 
A massive March on Washington had long been the dream of A. Philip 
Randolph. He attempted such a demonstration in 1941 to compel President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt to bar racial discrimination in the nation's defense 
industries. The threat of a march of thousands caused Roosevelt to issue Ex-
ecutive Order 8802, which established the Fair Employment Practices Com-
mittee. In 1963, with comprehensive civil rights legislation pending before 
Congress, Randolph again believed that dramatic yet peaceful public pres-
sure was needed to convince President Kennedy and national legislators that 
many whites and blacks supported swift and definitive action to wipe out the 
vestiges of second-class citizenship.13 
In the early spring of 1963 Randolph contacted the leaders of the major 
civil rights organizations to enlist their support for the march. When Randolph 
broached the issue with Whitney Young, he indicated interest but with "cer-
tain limitations." Young explained that the League was a tax-exempt group 
and could not engage in lobbying. If the march was to pressure for specific 
legislation, the League could not participate. As long as the effort focused on 
"a general expression of our concern about the problems of unemployment 
and infringement of uses of civil rights," then Randolph could expect Young's 
cooperation. Although subsequent planning meetings excluded Young, he 
ultimately involved his organization with the march when representatives 
from the NUL, the NAACP, SCLC, SNCC, CORE, and Randolph's Negro American 
Labor Council met in May 1963 to discuss the project. 14 
Randolph and Bayard Rustin, the march organizer, attached great im-
portance to Young's agreement to participate. Rustin commended Young as 
the first among the civil rights leaders to back the march. Randolph and 
Rustin believed that Young's involvement would persuade Roy Wilkins of the 
NAACP to follow his lead. Both worried, however, about Martin Luther King 
Jr. of SCLC. King and Wilkins were intense rivals, with each believing that the 
other took credit for achievements that rightfully belonged to his counter-
part. Nonetheless, with Young and Wilkins supporting the march, King could 
not risk embarrassment by remaining aloof from the effort. So he signed on 
SCLC. Rustin also credited Young as the first civil rights leader to disburse 
funds to finance the march. SCLC, despite constant entreaties from Rustin, 
never followed through with its fiscal commitment. Without League and 
NAACP funds, contended Rustin, he would not have been able to organize the 
march because other groups put in their monies either too late or not at all. 15 
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Although Young encountered some doubtful board members at their 
1963 Los Angeles meeting, he convinced a majority that the League's in-
volvement in this cooperative civil rights endeavor was crucial to its credibil-
ity.16 Young himself began to play an important role in defining and plan-
ning the March on Washington. First, there was the matter of Bayard Rustin 
as national coordinator. Roy Wilkins opposed Rustin's appointment. Young 
acknowledged "Bayard's vulnerabilities, also ... his arrest, and some of his 
past problems." Nonetheless, Young thought that ifhis role were defined as a 
staff coordinator and organizer with the civil rights leaders making policy, 
Rustin's position would draw minimal criticism.17 
Despite suggestions that "this ought to be a demonstration by black 
people," Young insisted that this would be a mistake. Since Young's view 
prevailed, Walter Reuther of the United Auto Workers, Eugene Carson Blake 
of the National Council of Churches, Matthew Ahmann of the National 
Catholic Conference for Interracial Justice, and Rabbi Joachim Printz of the 
American Jewish Congress had visible roles as spokesmen in the march. While 
Young hoped to boost his organization's civil rights credentials through his 
connection with the March on Washington, he also tried to shape the event 
into a moderate, interracial endeavor. In this way, League supporters, despite 
Young's more activist stance, ultimately would view the group in its tradi-
tional role as a broker between whites and blacks. Perhaps in sensing Young's 
strategy, officials in the more militant Student Non-Violent Coordinating 
Committee approached the march skeptically and doubted whether it would 
be the independent, protest demonstration that they wanted it to be. Subse-
quent events seemed to confirm their suspicions. 18 
Young supported the freedom rides, lunch counter sit-ins, and other non-
violent tactics to dramatize racial segregation, but he was not convinced that 
such methods would be appropriate in the march. So he opposed any efforts 
aimed at civil disobedience. "The chaining of oneself to the desk[s] of the 
Senate" or a "sit-in on the Capitol or the White House steps" Young believed to 
be foolish. Rather, he wanted the march to demonstrate "a forthright and mili-
tant, but dignified, legal, nonviolent manifestation of our concerns of the prob-
lem." Although Young vigorously argued for a march whose tone and objec-
tives were quite moderate, he did not fear defections by CORE and SNCC, the 
most militant civil rights groups. Young concluded that they could choose to be 
on the outside of a very significant event and risk their credentials as bona fide 
civil rights leaders or they could participate in the march and try to project a 
militant posture in that context. Actually, that problem threatened to unravel the 
carefully constructed interracial and intergroup coalition that backed the march. 
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Young proposed three rules to govern participation in the march. First, 
no politicians would address the marchers. Some believed that Young en-
dorsed this regulation to prevent the flamboyant black congressman, Adam 
Clayton Powell, from upstaging the civil rights leadership. Second, no speak-
ers should make derogatory comments about Congress. The purpose of the 
march was to urge favorable consideration of civil rights legislation. Verbal 
barbs would undermine that objective. Third, no organization would attempt 
to speak for the entire movement. No one would try to use the march plat-
form to advance particular organizational interests. 
Fortuitously, this third rule developed into a problem for SNCC. Young 
insisted that speeches from each group representative would be discussed with 
the other leaders. Young noted, "We were not talking about censorship, but 
we were talking about the absolute necessity of having some basic similarity 
and objectives and goals so that the speeches would not be calling for differ-
ent things." According to Rustin's mistaken assessment, John Lewis of the 
Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee had written a bland speech. 
Tom Kahn, a Rustin assistant and a white alumnus of Howard University, 
worked with Lewis to enliven his remarks. Forgetting Young's third rule, Kahn 
inserted into the speech a controversial metaphor about Civil War general 
William T. Sherman's deadly and destructive Atlanta "March to the Sea." 
Kahn urged Lewis to state that if the president and Congress did not effec-
tively address the demands of the civil rights movement, then SNCC would 
"march through Dixie like Sherman, leaving a scorched earth with non-vio-
lence." This phrase merely amplified Lewis's general dissatisfaction with the 
federal government and its failure to protect SNCC workers in Georgia, Vir-
ginia, and Mississippi and its lackluster efforts to promote the voting rights 
and economic advancement of poor southern blacks. 19 
In violation of another march regulation, Rustin accused Stokely Carmichael, 
also of SNCC, of giving a copy of Lewis's revised speech to the press. An aide to 
Walter Reuther learned about the Sherman imagery, and the UAW president de-
manded that Lewis delete the offensive passage. At that point the Roman Catho-
lic archbishop of Washington, D.C., Patrick O'Boyle, threatened to boycott the 
march in order to hold a news conference to denounce Lewis's speech if changes 
were not made. Randolph strongly admonished Lewis and indicated that he 
would not calion the SNCC leader to speak if he did not capitulate to his elders. 
James Forman, another SNCC official, and Lewis, with such unrelenting pressure 
from Reuther, O'Boyle, Randolph, and others, acquiesced and dropped the 
Sherman metaphor.20 Ultimately; Whitney Young helped to fashion the sort of 
march that the League and its supporters could support. 
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Young also drew the League into funding the march and implementing 
plans to facilitate march operations. He noted that the League, the NAACP, 
and various labor unions were the key groups who financed the march. The 
League contributed $12,000. Of this amount, $9,000 was netted from the 
sale of we Shall Overcome, a portfolio of collages depicting the civil rights 
movement. Young gained the cooperation of two black Protestant Episcopal 
churches, St. Philip in New York City and St. Luke in Washington, D.C., to 
sell more than 10,000 copies. Even after the march was over, Young asked 
Martin Luther King Jr. and SCLC to help in selling the remaining 15,000 
copies so "we can assure the March committee a sizeable additional contribu-
tion towards its expenses." Young also wrote a detailed appeal to "Friends of 
the Urban League" to donate money to the march "to insure the success of 
this historic event." He admitted that the League was a cosponsor "and as 
such we have been interested in a peaceful and orderly demonstration. To this 
end, we have provided the committee with professional help in planning and 
coordinating the many details." He noted numerous religious groups back-
ing the march "financially and pledging participation." With these assur-
ances that the march had the support of such mainstream organizations as 
the League and Roman Catholic Archdioceses in New York City, Chicago, 
and Washington, D.C., "I do ask you now to extend yourself a bit further 
and help finance this important event."21 
As momentum and support coalesced for the march, meetings were 
held weekly at NUL headquarters. League officials Alexander Allen, Nelson C. 
Jackson, Guichard Parris, and Mahlon T. Puryear were involved in planning 
the march. Sterling Tucker, executive director of the Washington Urban 
League, functioned as Young's deputy. Tucker worked with SCLC'S Walter 
Fauntroy and others. Young assigned Tucker to develop emergency shelter for 
stranded persons and lodging for League officers from various affiliates. At 
the League's 1963 delegate assembly in Los Angeles, Young urged local execu-
tives and other staff to mobilize their respective communities to participate 
in the march. He knew that some would face difficulty in justifYing League 
involvement to local board members and contributors. So Young told them 
that the National YMCA, a United Fund agency, backed the march and en-
couraged "participation of each of its units." He also noted the endorsement 
of the National Council of Churches, which committed 40,000 marchers 
and whose World Service component promised to provide food to the par-
ticipants. Furthermore, he cited the planned attendance of several congress-
men as evidence that the march would be a moderate mainstream event.22 
Young also encouraged support from the New York State Association of the 
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Improved, Benevolent, and Protective Order of Elks of the World. The black 
Elks planned a civil rights rally at the Polo Grounds in New York City. The 
funds raised would go to the organizations, including the League, on the 
March on Washington committee. Earl Chapman, the Elks state financial 
secretary, invited Young to speak at the gathering in behalf of the League and 
the march committee.23 
At the march itself on August 28, 1968, Young who typically delivered 
compelling addresses, spoke in a lackluster manner during his allotted six 
minutes. He stressed that the League, though different in methods from the 
other civil rights agencies, was nonetheless a major player in the march lead-
ership. He castigated those who opposed black aspirations, especially mem-
bers of Congress who tried to weaken pending civil rights legislation by point-
ing out technical flaws in the bill. Emphatically, Young declared that in 1963, 
black civil rights were not negotiable. He ended by urging march participants 
to continue the protest by marching blacks off relief rolls to full employment; 
marching them from the cemeteries where black infants died too often and 
black adults too early and to better health care facilities. He lauded other 
symbolic marches that challenged the nation to improve specific social and 
economic conditions for America's largest racial minority.24 
Everyone was easily overshadowed by the last speaker on the program, 
Martin Luther King Jr. Tired and hot, the audience was suddenly and re-
markably resuscitated by the gifted Baptist preacher and leader of SCLC. King's 
"I Have a Dream" oration captured the mood of the occasion and made the 
Atlanta cleric a compelling symbol of the historic march. Although his role in 
planning it and contributing funds to it had been peripheral, King eclipsed 
Young, Randolph, Rustin, and Wilkins as the leader who defined the march 
and gave it meaning. 
When the march ended, President John F. Kennedy invited the leaders 
to the White House. Whitney Young, A. Philip Randolph and their col-
leagues from SCLC, SNCC, CORE, and the NAACP told a relieved Kennedy that 
his initial fear of a disorderly demonstration had been unfounded and his 
effort to get the march called off had been foolhardy. They also reminded 
him that the crowd of250,000 exceeded their expectations and demonstrated 
widespread support for the civil rights movement. The presence of white 
labor and religious leaders showed that the civil rights coalition was thor-
oughly interracial. Later, at a televised news conference, Young emphasized 
the moderation of the march and that it showed the faith of blacks in the 
nonviolent method of redress for their historic grievances. "I would hope," 
he said, "that in America today, witnessing this and seeing Negroes still react 
Maintaining a Middle Ground 171 
with dignity and pride, still sing the 'Star-Spangled Banner' and 'My Coun-
try 'Tis of Thee,' would say now we do owe it to these citizens to let them get 
in the mainstream." Some criticized Young and other march leaders for their 
conservative, cautious characterization of the march. What these critics did 
not appreciate, however, was how far Young had pushed the National Urban 
League toward involvement in such uncharacteristic activism. The problem 
lay not with Young's own militancy. He had shown in the Midwest and in 
Atlanta his belief in direct action protest. Instead, he had to maneuver his 
conservative constituency toward greater identification with the vanguard of 
the black struggle.25 
Neither Young nor anyone else in the League proposed that the organi-
zation abandon its function to find employment, job training, health, hous-
ing, and education for blacks. Nonetheless, many locals and their executives, 
challenged to join the NAACP or CORE in a boycott or picket line, had to pon-
der whether the League should participate in such activities. The group's usual 
tactics of negotiation and advocacy with facts and figures seemed to preclude 
protest and other tactics of direct action. Moreover, executives of some affili-
ates believed that recalcitrant employers, unions, and government agencies 
compelled the League to consider more militant methods to achieve its tradi-
tional objectives. 
The experience of the New York Urban League illustrated the dilemma. 
In 1961 at the affiliate's board/staffinstitute, League officials "recommended 
that the National Urban League alter its general policy to the effect [that] 
after all milder methods of negotiations have been found to be of no avail, 
the Urban League should consider the use of economic and social sanctions." 
Cautiously, Young asked if the League should use boycotting as a tactic. Al-
though he concluded that "a diversified approach" was best, he believed that 
Leagues should restrain themselves. He figured that when the "opposition .. 
. cannot deal directly with the people who are organizing and carrying out 
the boycotts," then it would turn to the League to resolve the matter.26 Ex-
ecutive director Edward S. Lewis, while cognizant of League restrictions of 
direct action, tried to keep the New York affiliate abreast of direct action 
movements in his area. In 1962, in cooperation with Philip Randolph, Lewis 
became involved with a local hospital strike. He told Young, "We have to 
take a position with references to the sweatshop wages of Negroes and Puerto 
Ricans in the hospitals and we will not hesitate on this." At the same time, he 
assured Young that neither he nor the affiliate would associate with any strike 
action.27 Ultimately, in 1966 the president of the New York Urban League 
vainly petitioned the national board to declare it an independent agency. He 
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argued that the New York affiliate was a part of the mainstream of the city's 
civil rights movement and performed a valuable function in the Council of 
Harlem Organizations. Because the affiliate should associate itself with many 
direct action efforts that the national board eschewed, an independent status 
would best serve the New York group.28 
Within the Chicago Urban League, board member N.O. Calloway, an 
influential black physician and civic leader, castigated the executive director, 
Edwin "Bill" Berry, for his activism. When Berry and his deputy were photo-
graphed while picketing, Calloway was outraged. "I do not doubt but what 
pickets, strikes and other types of more vigorous expressions of sociologic 
unrest are valuable," wrote the doctor. But he added, "I do not believe ... 
they are a part of the program of the Urban League." Calloway's effort to 
induce Young and the national board to intervene and discipline Berry pro-
duced no results. 29 
Nonetheless, Young had to clarify League policy on demonstrations 
and picketing in a 1963 memorandum to executive directors of all affiliates. 
He recognized that "a number of our affiliates are under considerable pres-
sure to participate in the current wave of demonstrations which are being 
used to dramatize racial inequities and press for corrective action." At the 
same time Young wanted local officials to understand the distinction he drew 
between demonstrations and picketing. A picket line affected a single em-
ployer or trade union by withholding manpower or purchasing power. A 
demonstration focused on the public in general by mobilizing public opin-
ion. Young judged that "picketing is not an Urban League technique and 
would violate established agency policy." A public demonstration, however, 
"under responsible leadership, is an expression of broad community concern 
in which the [League] both can and should be represented."30 
Young applied these principles to the Urban League in Portland, Or-
egon. E. Shelton Hill, the executive director, had written Young about whether 
the affiliate should publicly endorse a NAACP boycott against a grocery chain 
guilty of racial discrimination. Although the NAACP had not requested sup-
port, Hill wanted to know what the League's position should be "in the event 
that such a question is raised." Young clearly stated that the League did not 
engage in boycotts, although it was not critical of the method and sympa-
thized with the goal. As always, Young viewed such circumstances as oppor-
tunities for the League to play its usual role of mediation. "I would always 
remind the concerned persons," said Young to his Oregon colleague, "that 
the alternative to this ... method is for them to cooperate with the Urban 
League toward eliminating the injustice."3l Such activities also bolstered 
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Young's claim that he and his NUL colleagues spoke for middle- and working-
class blacks who wanted the League and other civil rights groups to fight hard 
for racial integration. 
League participation in the March on Washington and the greater will-
ingness of affiliates to endorse and at times promote direct action protest 
strengthened the group's identification with the civil rights movement. The 
Voter Education Project, however, drew the League even deeper into civil 
rights activism and unleashed a torrent of criticism that jeopardized some 
affiliates. In 1961 the Taconic and Field Foundations funded a major voter 
registration campaign among southern blacks. The NAACP, SCLC, CORE, SNCC, 
the Southern Regional Council, and the National Urban League signed on to 
implement individual efforts to increase the number of eligible black voters. 
Cognizant of proscriptions banning partisan advocacy, Young restricted League 
activity to voter education and citizenship training. In 1962 the League inau-
gurated successful programs administered by affiliates in Little Rock, Rich-
mond, and Fort Worth. The Winston-Salem Urban League worked nearby 
in eleven rural communities to educate blacks about the suffrage. In 1963 the 
New Orleans affiliate cooperated with other community groups to encourage 
voter registration. A lackluster Florida campaign in 1962 by the NAACP 
prompted the Jacksonville Urban League to assume full responsibility for the 
effort in 1963.32 
In 1964 the NUL launched a "March to the Ballot Box" campaign in 
sixty-eight League cities. After consulting with local executives, the NUL iden-
tified sixteen target areas. Although all sixty-eight of the affiliated cities par-
ticipated, the special sixteen received funds for staff and other expenses from 
the League's national office. The voter registration phase included various 
modes of communication such as leaflets, bumper stickers, radio tapes, and 
television slides. Additionally, volunteers canvassed door-to-door and held 
rallies and parades. They also distributed recordings of Whitney Young urg-
ing blacks to register and vote. In one target city, Los Angeles, registration 
increased by 30 percent. The Pittsburgh Urban League reported a 100 per-
cent increase in black voting. Similar results occurred in Atlanta, Cleveland, 
St. Louis, Chicago, Miami, and other target cities. Reports from twenty-four 
cities estimated that 250,000 blacks were either reinstated or added to the 
voters' lists. Of this number, 94 percent had never registered or voted before. 
In the twelve target cities, the League increased registration by 33 percent. 
The affiliates had deployed 57,414 volunteers and contacted 725,158 house-
holds.33 
The League's growing activism worried some members of the national 
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board. Ramon Scruggs, manager of personnel relations at AT&T and the firm's 
highest ranking black official, expressed some doubt about the voter educa-
tion program. Scruggs preferred the League "to go on public record as sup-
porting the principle of good citizenship" rather than direct involvement with 
voter registration. He feared that the League's difference with the other civil 
rights agencies would become blurred if the group continued in this activist 
direction. While most board members backed Young, they favored participa-
tion in the voter project "with reservations."32 
These minor instances of board discontent paled in comparison to op-
position that Young and several affiliates encountered in southern and border 
cities. Young's growing visibility as a civil rights spokesman and his vigorous 
advocacy of racial equality convinced unsympathetic whites that no differ-
ence existed between the League director and the more militant SNCC and 
CORE activists. Moreover, League involvement in the voter education project 
and alleged partisanship against conservative Republicans subjected Young 
and several affiliates to severe and sustained criticism that threatened funding 
for NUL locals. 
Dade County Republicans in 1965 accused the Miami Urban League 
and its executive director, T. Willard Fair, of using Voter Education Project 
funds to support political endeavors. A member of the board of both the 
Miami Urban League and the local United Fund, Karl Bishopric, tried to 
defend this activity in a meeting with local GOP representatives. He noted 
that "encouragement to exercise citizenship rights, which include[s] the ne-
cessity for registration to vote, is and always has been an accepted Urban 
League task." Still, Miami Republicans contended that the NUL Voter Educa-
tion Project was "tantamount to a purchase of votes rather than an education 
in citizenship." Clearly, they saw the effort as a benefit to the Democrats.35 
Young told Bishopric that another Miami GOP charge--that Lester 
Granger maintained communist connections--drew his "most dramatic refu-
tation." Young added that the League's financial support from the federal 
government, major corporations, and leading foundations showed the "re-
spectability, loyalty, and soundness" of its programs. ''At no time," Young 
added, "has the Urban League ever been considered anything but a respon-
sible patriotic organization by those in authority." Ultimately, Young agreed 
with Bishopric that "it is practically impossible to satisfY a group of this type." 
A few years later, in 1969, the Miami Urban League became embroiled in 
controversy again because of its participation in Young's "New Thrust" pro-
gram, which stressed empowering the poor through their own autonomous 
groups and initiatives. Maud K. Reid, Fair's successor, reported that "many of 
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the big givers to the U.E have threatened to withdraw their contributions to 
the U.E as they do not wish to support the Urban League as a United Fund 
Agency."36 These troubles at the Miami affiliate reminded Young that there 
was a price attached to League activism. 
Similar circumstances drew attacks on the Wichita Urban League. In 
1964, an official of the United Fund of Wichita and Sedgwick County, Paul 
Woods, asked Young to respond to local accusations that he and the NUL had 
entered the partisan political arena. At dispute were views printed in the Con-
gressional Record that quoted Young as saying, "The ultra-conservative faction 
of the Republican Party has no consideration or sympathy for Negroes," and 
"The election of Senator Goldwater as President would open the door to 
rioting and disorder." In his reply Young told the United Fund official that 
the accusations were another in a series of attacks by the Ku Klux Klan, White 
Citizens Councils, the American Fascist Party, and the John Birch Society 
against "anybody who stands for civil rights and equality of opportunity for 
Negro citizens." He reminded the official that the League enjoyed firm sup-
port from the United Funds and Councils of America and from the National 
Budget and Consultation Committee, a group closely tied to United Fund-
supported agencies. Woods, however, was not satisfied. He cited other state-
ments attributed to Young that appeared in other newspapers and demanded 
to know "if the Urban League and/or its representatives have engaged in 
political activity." 
An irritated Whitney Young told Woods that as the executive director 
of a tax-exempt nonpartisan agency he did not support any particular candi-
date or party. Nonetheless, he would respond to critics regardless of their 
party affiliation when attacks were "made upon me and other disadvantaged 
people." Specifically, Young contended, Barry Goldwater, the GOP 1964 
presidential candidate, had been endorsed by an unlikely pair of extremists, 
Malcolm X of the Black Muslims and the Ku Klux Klan. He also condemned 
Goldwater's vote against the 1964 civil rights bill and "his sending of his son 
to Philadelphia, Mississippi to campaign, arm in arm, with the local Mayor 
who ... has refused to urge indictment of the mutderers of the young people 
fighting for the right to vote." Young did not mention Goldwater's party 
affiliation, but stressed that his racially insensitive actions were unacceptable. 
Nevertheless, Young believed he "showed great restraint" in the face of 
Goldwater's determined effort to inhibit civil rights progressY 
Hugh Jackson, executive director of the Wichita Urban League, was 
pleased and relieved that Young was willing to undergo this interrogation 
from the local United Fund. Jackson had been informed "that there was [a] 
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general feeling [that] the local organization was without blame, but that prob-
ably there was something that could be criticized at the national level. " Owen 
C. McEwen, president of the Wichita United Fund, thanked Young for his 
willingness to respond, but observed that his "opinion" on the boundaries 
within which he could express himself on political matters "differs from the 
standards we observe locally." McEwen also instructed the president of the 
Wichita Urban League to prevent NUL officials from issuing partisan state-
ments. Young told McEwen that the Wichita affiliate could not "exert greater 
influence over their national executive," but instead urged the United Fund 
to "supplement your acquittal of the local League with ... greater financial 
support" to close the social and economic gap between the town's white and 
black citizens. Hugh Jackson was never really concerned about the issue and 
believed that it would fizzle out.38 Young was probably not as sanguine, since 
the Wichita incident had been a replay of the Miami controversy and another 
that brewed at the Tulsa Urban League. 
Since the 1950s the White Citizens Council harassed the Tulsa Urban 
League and tried to blame it for a failed fund-raising drive in 1961. More-
over, Young's critical comments about Barry Goldwater fueled a campaign to 
oust the affiliate from the community chest.39 Several ultra-rightist groups 
including the White Citizens Council, the Republic Minute Men, the John 
Birch chapter in Tulsa, and the Hargis group reiterated the charge that the 
League alienated potential donors to the community chest. Additionally, a 
retired oil company executive, probably a Goldwater supporter, resigned from 
the board of the Tulsa affiliate because "Whitney Young has put the Urban 
League in politics." Although Young promised emergency funds to the em-
battled affiliate, the fearful local executive wanted his boss to decline an invi-
tation to visit the city to speak at a League function.40 
Similar problems surfaced with affiliates in Cincinnati and Seattle.41 
Despite the troubles that these local Leagues suffered because of greater mili-
tancy and alleged partisan political involvement by the national executive 
director, Young remained convinced that his forthright stands against civil 
rights critics and his identification with King, Farmer, and his other activist 
colleagues helped the group to cement its claim to represent the integration-
ist objectives of a majority of the black population. 
Although reactionary whites exerted intense financial pressure on the 
League and its affiliates, Young thought the price worth paying. Unprec-
edented outspokenness and visible activism on the national and local levels 
put Young's organization on the frontline of the civil rights movement. Addi-
tionally, as a facilitator and moderator Young was an important force in coor-
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dinating important activities and initiatives involving CORE, SNCC, the NAACP, 
and other groups. 
Fiscal rather than fraternal concerns drew the major civil rights leaders 
together into a formal coalition called the Council for United Civil Rights 
Leadership. Although the initiative came from wealthy white supporters, Young 
played a large role in trying to use the organization to moderate the posture 
and pronouncements of his more militant colleagues. As long as money re-
mained in CUCRL coffers, Young managed modestly to influence the activities 
of the other civil rights groups. Ultimately; he succeeded in ameliorating con-
flicts among the organizations on their various tactics and objectives. 
Stephen Currier, a shy, young philanthropist, conceived of a formal 
coalition of civil rights leaders. He had been charted in this direction by his 
lawyer and adviser, Lloyd Garrison, a descendant of the famed nineteenth-
century abolitionist. Wealthy in his own right, Currier married Audrey Bruce, 
a granddaughter and heir of multimillionaire Andrew W. Mellon. When he 
expressed his desire for involvement in meaningful social causes, Garrison 
had suggested in 1958 that he establish the Taconic Foundation. Garrison's 
longtime association with the National Urban League, though at times inter-
mittent, had most recently placed him as president of the organization. Not 
surprisingly; Garrison advised Currier to deepen his understanding of blacks 
and their difficult struggle for racial equality.42 
In 1961 Currier established the Potomac Institute in Washington, D.C. 
With a youthful and idealistic new president in the White House, Currier 
believed that the federal government would have a need for expert assistance 
in race relations issues. Currier brought Harold Fleming, director of the South-
ern Regional Council (SRC), to the capital to run the Potomac Institute. The 
Voter Education Project with interlocking support from Potomac, Taconic, 
and the SRC became a major recipient of Currier's philanthropy. These in-
volvements drew Currier into closer contact with leading civil rights organi-
zations and eventually made him a significant influence within the council of 
black leaders.43 
In June 1963 when Currier learned of the assassination ofMedgar Evers, 
the field secretary of the Mississippi NAACP, he concluded that wealthy whites 
needed to rally behind the civil rights movement with their financial support. 
With help from Garrison, Currier drew about one hundred "leading citizens" 
from the major corporations and foundations to a breakfast gathering, at 
Currier's expense, at the elegant Carlyle Hotel in New York City. There Currier's 
guests met King of SCLC, Wilkins of the NAACP, Farmer of CORE, Lewis of 
SNCC, and Young. These monied whites learned firsthand about the needs 
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and objectives of the civil rights movement, and they were persuaded to con-
tribute $100,000 for distribution among the major civil rights groups.44 
To reduce competition for funds among the organizations and to pro-
mote cooperation on objectives, activities, and strategies, Currier proposed 
the creation of two separate but related groups. The Council for United Civil 
Rights Leadership would draw together King, Wilkins, Young, and others for 
regular discussions on the state and direction of the civil rights movement, 
and the Committee for Welfare, Education, and Legal Defense, a tax-exempt 
entity, would receive contributions to assist special civil rights projects and 
the organizations sponsoring them. CUCRL and WELD shared an interlocking 
board of directors. To serve as the executive director of the two organizations, 
Currier and the civil rights leaders chose Wiley Branton, a veteran civil rights 
attorney from Arkansas. Branton was already head of the Voter Education 
Project, and he had developed a good track record in working with Currier 
and civil rights leaders.45 
Even before the Carlyle gathering, Currier had met Young, Wilkins, 
and others. When he initially heeded Garrison's suggestion that he learn more 
about blacks, Currier, through the Taconic Foundation, arranged a series of 
lunches with selected black spokesmen to increase his knowledge of race rela-
tions. Although Currier did not meet with Martin Luther King Jr., he dined 
with another six leaders including Whitney Young. Currier had become ac-
quainted with Young when he consulted with the Potomac Institute on pro-
posals to inaugurate the Voter Education Project. At first, Young expressed 
doubts about the Taconic/Potomac intention to establish a separate organiza-
tion to function as a superstructure to spearhead voter registration programs 
with various civil rights groups. Young considered such an arrangement un-
necessary. He preferred that the participating civil rights organizations re-
ceive funds directly.46 In any case, Currier's genuine desire to draw together 
the civil rights leadership impressed the League leader. Perhaps Currier's em-
phasis on pecuniary support for the various groups gave Young, Farmer, King, 
Wilkins, and Lewis/Forman the impetus to commit valuable time and atten-
tion to this loose federation. 
Currier honored his commitment to raise funds for the major civil rights 
groups to help them sustain existing programs and in some instances to inau-
gurate new projects to advance the cause. Within two months after the Carlyle 
gathering, CUCRL received $800,000. George D. Pratt Jr., a wealthy farmer in 
Connecticut, was probably the most generous single contributor to the Coun-
cil. A 1921 graduate of Harvard University, Pratt had been affiliated with the 
American Friends Service Committee and had served on two important state 
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commissions. Between 1963 and 1965 Pratt donated $200,000 to the civil 
rights consortium. Young took note of Pratt's "exemplary support" and per-
sonally commended him for helping "the cause of human rights."47 
On September 11, 1963, Currier and Young appealed to foundations, 
wealthy individuals, and corporations to swell the $800,000 they had already 
collected to $1,500,000. The funds would be administered through WELD, 
the Council's tax-exempt arm. They fell far short of their goal, however. Be-
tween August 1963 and January 1964 CUCRL received a little over $123,500. 
Pratt's initial donation of $1 00,000 made up nearly all of the receipts. Cur-
rier gave $6,000, and the contributions of numerous other donors totaled 
over $17,500. An additional $26,000 boosted CUCRL income to $151,000, 
but those extra monies had come from the sale of March on Washington 
record albums, equality buttons, and various other projects.48 
Despite Currier's conspicuous presence as a fiscal resource and liaison 
with wealthy whites, blacks also made major donations to sustain CUCRL. In 
1964, for example, New York City's metropolitan chapter of Jack and Jill of 
America contributed $1,000 to WELD. When Martin Luther King Jr. won 
the Nobel Peace Prize in 1964, he gave all $54,000 to the civil rights move-
ment. King's own Southern Christian Leadership Conference received 
$12,000, and $25,000 was put into a special fund for education in nonvio-
lence. King donated the remaining $17,000 to CUCRL. Branton praised King 
as "extremely thoughtful and generous" and commended him for seeing "the 
necessity for continued unity." Whitney Young was "deeply impressed" with 
King and his willingness to decrease CUCRL'S large dependence on monied 
whites.49 
The assurance of monetary support for their organizations initially drew 
civil rights leaders to CUCRL and maintained their active participation as long 
as the funds lasted. At first, the monies were apportioned to the participating 
groups based on 10 percent of their respective operating budgets in 1962. 
Accordingly, $125,000 each went to the NAACP and the National Urban League, 
and CORE and the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund each received 
$100,000. An unusually successful fund-raising drive by SCLC trimmed its 
request to $50,000. The same amount went to the National Council ofNe-
gro Women. SNCC'S $15,000 share infuriated both John Lewis and James 
Forman, who believed that funds should be distributed on the basis of need. 
SNCC, however, was promised additional donations when its programs re-
quired urgent assistance. 50 
Friction over financial allotments was later allayed when specific grants 
to CUCRL stipulated equal distribution of funds. When a $50,000 installment 
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from Pratt's continuing grants arrived in 1965, the seven participating orga-
nizations each received $6,000. Moreover, Dr. King's $17,000 donation was 
evenly apportioned to the six other civil rights groups excluding SCLC in the 
amounts of $2,833 each. The civil rights groups also received funds to under-
write special projects. Such requests required the approval of other Council 
leaders. Thus, in 1965 an emergency grant for $6,000 went to CORE. Another 
$6,000 went to an effort in Mississippi sponsored by SNCC to aid a write-in 
campaign to elect Aaron Henry governor. Although it was a mock election, it 
would dramatize that "there are thousands of Negroes in Mississippi who 
would vote except for discriminatory laws and customs which deny them this 
right." SNCC also received a grant to finance the Student Voice, Inc. CUCRL 
wanted to enhance the position of the group's civil rights fight. 51 
In 1963 and 1965 CUCRL expanded its membership to include Jack 
Greenberg, the director-counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational 
Fund, and A. Philip Randolph, president of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car 
Porters. Greenberg's presence brought into the organization a major partici-
pant on the legal front of the southern civil rights struggle. Randolph, the 
venerable pioneer of nonviolent direct action, already knew about CUCRL. He 
asked Roy Wilkins in 1963 for an audience with the group to enlist its aid to 
develop a massive March on Washington. In 1966 Floyd McKissick, who 
succeeded James Farmer as executive director of CORE, replaced him as that 
organization's representative at CUCRL meetings. 52 
These leaders gathered to project unity among civil rights advocates, 
discuss pressing issues, and ameliorate tensions. In numerous instances CUCRL 
participants easily agreed on various approaches and actions to achieve civil 
rights objectives. Randolph, for example, speaking for CUCRL, noted that the 
major point of emphasis for the civil rights movement in 1965 would be the 
"maximum application of political power." He added, "It means pressing the 
issue of the right to vote and of Federal responsibility for guaranteeing that 
right where it is denied." This statement presaged demonstrations led by 
SNCC and SCLC to win passage of a federal voting rights act. Also in 1965, Jack 
Greenberg, in a letter to New York governor Nelson A. Rockefeller in behalf 
of CUCRL, urged him to sign a bill to abolish capital punishment. Since mi-
nority groups were disproportionately executed, civil rights leaders looked to 
the governor to lead in eliminating this "barbaric relic of the past."53 
Consensus rather than election conferred CUCRL'S "chairmanship" on 
Whitney Young. In that position Young, whom Farmer remembered as speak-
ing more than anyone else and commenting on nearly every issue, played the 
needed role of mediator. Turf wars between Roy Wilkins of the NAACP and 
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James Forman of SNCC drew Young in to soothe bruised feelings. Also, Young 
sometimes overruled Wiley Branton's parsimony toward various civil rights 
groups when the former inclined toward greater generosity in the distribu-
tion of CUCRL funds. Such a stance, Young believed, was necessary for sus-
tained unity among the organizations. 54 
Although he relished the role of moderator, compromiser, and media-
tor, Young still held to his cautious and conservative mien. Eschewing dem-
onstrations except as a last resort, Young tried to persuade his equally strong-
willed and able colleagues to appreciate the subtle methodologies of his 
National Urban League. Young felt more comfortable with Wilkins, whose 
NAACP painstakingly worked in the courts and in the Congress to win civil 
rights victories. Because they were skeptical of federal authority, King's SCLC, 
Farmer's CORE, and Lewis and Forman's SNCC relied on direct action methods, 
which made them unpredictable. The organizations that Young and Wilkins 
represented achieved social change because they cultivated establishment whites 
in the upper echelons of government, corporate, and foundation circles. These 
differences in strategies produced tension within CUCRL. As a facilitator of 
discussions Young had few equals. But as an opponent of insurgencies against 
friendly establishment benefactors, Young's militant colleagues parted ways 
with their "chairman." His interaction with SNCC was illustrative. 55 
James Forman recognized that Whitney Young's contacts in establish-
ment institutions were greater than those of other civil rights leaders, so when-
ever SNCC wanted assistance in getting scholarships for civil rights workers, 
Forman approached Young. The higher education of several SNCC activists 
had been handicapped by various factors. Young agreed to intercede with the 
Rockefeller Foundation in SNCC'S behalf. Whitney Young, who was at his best 
when dealing on this level of operation, interacted with an unusually solici-
tous SNCC. When that interaction involved basic approaches to social change, 
Young and his SNCC colleague behaved differently toward each other. SNCC, 
for example, relied a great deal on services provided to it by the National 
Lawyers Guild, a group of reputed radicals. Stephen Currier had warned SNCC 
about involvement with the Guild. Young echoed these sentiments when on 
two occasions he tried to prod CUCRL to bar communists from the civil rights 
movement and to repudiate any assistance that such persons wished to offer. 
Forman, sensing that these resolutions were aimed at the Guild, pronounced 
these statements as attempts at red-baiting and as violations of SNCC'S civil 
liberties. While SNCC recognized and probably appreciated the value ofYoung's 
establishment contacts, Forman rejected his attempts to hinder militant civil 
rights advocacy with unwarranted caution.56 Although the League reached 
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into local black communities, SNCC'S grassroots activities caused it to chal-
lenge the elites that Young tried to cultivate. 
Obviously, Young exercised only limited influence over other civil rights 
organizations. Nonetheless, he tried to steer CUCRL support to activities con-
sistent with NAACP and NUL approaches. Discussions on pending legislation in 
Congress and state legislatures and support for various social welfare and 
education initiatives crowded the agendas of CUCRL meetings. The same in-
centives, which brought together the civil rights leadership, however, also 
pulled them apart. When they met in February 1966, $67,000 remained in 
the treasury. Mter these funds were distributed to seven of the member groups 
and to some other organizations, no plans commenced to replenish CUCRL'S 
dwindling resources. This fiscal reality reduced the already minimal opportu-
nity that Young had to lead the Sanhedrin of civil rights leaders. 57 
As monies became scarce, it was increasingly difficult to get regular 
attendance at meetings. Jack Greenberg suggested to Whitney Young that 
CUCRL dissolve. With Young's assent, the General Counsel of the National 
Urban League inaugurated procedures for ending CUCRL'S existence. The 
Council died in 1967.58 
Young never denied his role as a mediator. He reveled in reconciling 
antagonists and their divergent points of view. The consensus that he ex-
pected to result seemingly justified his middle position. Such a stance, how-
ever, was almost always compromised by irreconcilable perspectives and his 
own deeply held beliefs. For example, he wanted the National Urban League 
and its affiliates to be identified with vanguard organizations of the civil rights 
movement. Yet, when the political right wing made no distinction between 
the negotiating League and its protesting counterparts in SNCC or SCLC, Young's 
middle position shifted to defenses of his militant colleagues and their direct 
action tactics. He could not negotiate with the right wing and reconcile their 
perspectives with those of the broad objectives of the civil rights crusade with-
out undermining the movement. So he abandoned the middle ground and 
stood with the civil rights coalition. 
Similarly, Young as a mediator among civil rights spokespersons tried to 
bring together the various elements within the coalition. He discovered that 
while he dispassionately attempted to referee and reconcile conflicts, it be-
came harder to suppress his own particular views and predilections. Increas-
ingly; CUCRL reflected his generally cautious and conservative posture in tac-
tics and programmatic thrust. In both instances, with right-wing whites and 
with militant blacks, Young discovered the limits of his combined roles of an 
interracial and intraracial mediator. Although sometimes useful in defusing 
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conflict and confrontation, such jockeying was ultimately unsatisfactory. Young 
was possessed of a point of view, and eventually he was compelled to state it 
and advance it. Whenever that happened, Young's advocacy of insider nego-
tiation with powerful whites and their institutions as a major means to achieve 
significant social change became apparent. Also, when reactionary whites 
challenged civil rights leaders on their tactics of protest, Young was pressed to 
defend such militancy even though he preferred other methods. 
Young's role as a mediator who often failed led to misunderstandings 
and groundless charges of "Uncle Tomism." A younger generation of black 
militants especially after 1966 cynically eclepted him "Whitey" Young. In 
1970 the New York Times Magazine published a provocative article, "Whitney 
Young: Black Leader or 'Oreo Cookie?'" Written by reporter Tom Buckley, 
the article acknowledged that Young believed that all black leaders were "mili-
tants in different ways." The theme of the essay, however, stressed Young's 
interactions with white establishment leaders and their solid financial back-
ing of the National Urban League. This reality, wrote Buckley, "puts Young in 
a difficult position with his own race." The article contended that younger 
black spokespersons considered Young and his organization the purchased 
property of their white backers. That Young dealt with President Richard 
Nixon seemed to prove that he would compromise the interests of blacks. 59 
Vernon Jordan, president of the United Negro College Fund, recalled 
that Whitney Young was quite hurt by the Buckley article. Randolph and 
other leading blacks jointly penned a biting letter of protest to the New York 
Times. Similarly, John A. Morsell, associate executive director of the NAACP, 
wrote to the Times and castigated Buckley on numerous factual errors. More-
over, Carl T. Rowan, the prominent black journalist, published a rebuttal 
essay on "White Liberals Who Pick Black Heroes."60 
Although patronizing and simplistic, Buckley's perception of Whitney 
Young illustrated the perils of the middle ground that the League leader sought 
to occupy. Missing the complex forces with which Young had to deal, Buckley, 
like so many others, failed to see the essence of his leadership, that of negoti-
ating and reconciling the perspectives of civil rights antagonists on the shift-
ing sands of social change and social justice. Moreover, Buckley missed the 
impressive support that middle- and working-class blacks gave to Young's 
integrationist objectives. All that Buckley and others noted were the limits of 
Young's approach rather than his genuine attempts to bring harmony out of 
the chaos of conflicting objectives and tactics of civil rights activists and crit-
ICS. 
9 
Humanizing the City 
"\V!hitney M. Young Jr., alone among the national leaders of the civil 
W rights movement, focused his efforts on urban issues. Whereas suc-
cessful assaults on legalized segregation in the South drew the attention of 
Young's colleagues in SCLC, SNCC, CORE, and the NAACP, only the National 
Urban League concerned itself exclusively with social and economic condi-
tions among blacks in the nation's cities. Young addressed issues in housing, 
unemployment, welfare, educational inequality, and numerous other matters 
that defined the urban crisis of the 1960s. Because these ills disproportion-
ately affected blacks, Whitney Young, an expert on urban affairs, joined with 
several public and private institutions to find solutions. 
Young's position as NUL executive director and his reputation as a na-
tionally acclaimed social work professional and administrator made him a 
major spokesman in urban affairs. As the only national black leader with 
such credentials, Young's views and recommendations became important to 
public and private officials worried about explosive conditions in the nation's 
ghettos. 
Consequently, several urban-related groups and institutions involved 
Young in their deliberations and initiatives. They included such public groups 
as the Advisory Committee on Urban Development of the federal Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development, the States Urban Action Center, 
and the Urban Design Council of New York City. Private organizations in-
cluded the Urban Institute, the National Committee Against Discrimination 
in Housing, the National Welfare Rights Organization, and Urban America. 
In all of these organizations Young functioned either as a board or committee 
member or as a consultant. Therefore, his ability to influence the direction of 
these agencies was limited. Through his presidency of the National Associa-
tion of Social Workers and the National Conference on Social Welfare, how-
ever, Young gained other platforms besides his NUL position to articulate his 
perspective on urban issues. 
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In most instances the groups with which Young affiliated were led by 
whites. Although he lauded such interest in urban issues from leaders in the 
majority population, he complained that the absence of experts from black 
communities would result in faulty strategies to improve ghetto areas. At the 
founding of the National Urban Coalition in 1967, he pressed vigorously 
and successfully for the appointment of a black official to head the new orga-
nization. 
For Young the intersection of race relations and urban affairs made him 
singularly important among national black leaders. His perspectives on ur-
ban issues were taken as authoritative even when Martin Luther King Jr. led 
grassroots campaigns in northern cities. Until the establishment of the Na-
tional Urban Coalition and the appointment of its first executive director, 
M. Carl Holman, only Young definitively spoke to major public and private 
institutions about the needs of black ghettos. That he mentored and spon-
sored Holman showed his desire for an additional spokesman for the nation's 
urban black population. Moreover, Young demonstrated a rare magnanimity 
in sharing leadership with a potential competitor who could argue eloquently 
for various proposals and programs in urban race relations. 
During the 1960s Whitney Young delivered innumerable addresses about 
how the fate of urban America lay in the social and economic development of 
its black population. For him the bottom line was the elimination of black 
ghettos. Young's comprehensive domestic Marshall Plan outlined in his 1964 
book, To Be Equal noted the broad range of inequities that the black people 
bore and the programs required to solve them. Key for Young was positive 
action to destroy the racial ghetto. He declared, "Too long the cancerous sore 
of the ghetto has festered in our urban communities, spewing forth human 
wreckage and the major portion of criminal offenders; draining our body 
politic of treasure; robbing us of the meaningful contributions of hundreds 
of thousands of citizens whose lives and ambitions have been thwarted and 
truncated." The absence of decent housing, a productive welfare system, ex-
cellent education, and gainful employment were all characteristics of the ghetto. 
If the premises, proposals, and programs of powerful public and private offi-
cials could envisage the black population beyond the ghetto, then progress 
could be made in solving those problems which that environment produced. 1 
Young elaborated thoughtfully on this theme in response to a 1967 
symposium paper about urban goals and urban action. "My central thesis is 
that the central cities of this increasingly urban nation are ... collapsing ... 
due to the fiscal drain of the ghetto." He added, "Such areas are utterly un-
able to make a satisfactory contribution to the city treasury in return for 
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services." Concerning the racial dimension of this urban dilemma, Young 
predicted that by 1970 ten major cities would be 50 percent black and many 
others would be 25-35 percent black. One way to ameliorate the urban crisis,he 
said, would be public and private institutional building in the ghettos. Such 
an initiative would be "a nationwide program oflocating new governmental, 
commercial, industrial, cultural, and educational buildings and developments 
in slum areas in order to spearhead the transformation of the ghettos into 
viable, integrated communities." 
Young cited examples from New York City where various blighted areas 
were improved when major institutions were built in the ghetto communi-
ties. Several "tangential and eminently desirable effects" resulted, such as the 
creation of new jobs. This occurrence would bring about a mixed working 
population and mixed neighborhoods. Ultimately, Young wanted to disperse 
the ghetto and end its isolation. Such a development would improve the lot 
of blacks and create a healthier urban America.2 
Young's visibility as NUL executive director drew him into numerous 
organizations and commissions related to urban issues. As he functioned as a 
board member, consultant, or adviser, Young seldom missed opportunities to 
tell those who served with him about the pivotal importance of race in un-
derstanding the problems of the cities. He thus influenced initiatives that 
groups, both public and private, devised to shape urban policies. 
Officials in New York City and New York State took full advantage of 
Whitney Young's presence in their region. Plagued by a broad range of con-
troversial issues Mayor John Lindsay, Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller, and 
other officeholders appointed Young to various committees to advise them 
about major urban initiatives. In 1967 Lindsay asked Young to join Mrs. W 
Vincent Astor, CBS network head William S. Paley, and others on the Urban 
Design Council of New York. This advisory council aimed to develop urban 
renewal objectives for the area around the city's Lincoln Center and devise 
proposals for other parts of the metropolis.3 Also in 1967, New York police 
commissioner H.R. Leary wanted Young on the board of a nonprofit corpo-
ration that tried to improve interactions between the police and the commu-
nities they served. Increased hostility toward the police from minorities, the 
poor, and some in the middle class prompted the commissioner to invite 
Young to participate in this endeavor. Young did not want to invade the turf 
of the executive director of the New York Urban League, Eugene Callender. 
If Callender could also attend the meetings, then Young promised to help in 
this determined effort to improve citizen-police relations. Commissioner Leary 
accepted this suggestion.4 
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In 1968, Mayor Lindsay drew Young into a tempestuous local dispute 
involving city schools. Two recent developments had plunged the New York 
City school system into unprecedented conflict: the unionization of teachers 
and the spread of decentralization or community governance of schools. A 
largely white corps of unionized teachers, many of them Jewish, were pitted 
against mainly minority parents who wanted more input in their children's 
education. In the Ocean Hill-Brownsville section of Brooklyn, a largely black 
and Puerto Rican school district, an experiment in community control re-
sulted in the dismissal of thirteen teachers and administrators whom parents 
accused of sabotaging attempts at decentralization. Backing Brooklyn teach-
ers in a strike was Albert Shanker, president of the United Federation offeach-
ers. Mayor Lindsay appointed a three-member panel that included Whitney 
Young to help resolve the strike. Later, Young, who was sympathetic to de-
centralization, resigned from the committee, accusing Shanker of exploiting 
the racial dimensions of the conflict. Later, he counselled blacks and Puerto 
Ricans to eschew anti-Semitic sentiments because they would "damage the 
cause of community control."5 
Efforts by New York State to address problems in its various cities 
prompted Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller in 1967 to create an Urban De-
velopment Corporation. The purpose of the agency, Rockefeller told Young, 
was "to transform the blighted core areas of our urban centers." In 1968 
Rockefeller asked Young to join the former president of the World Bank, 
George D. Woods, and other prestigious persons on uoc's board of directors. 
"I know of no more effective legal instrument anywhere in the United States 
than this new Corporation for dealing with the problems of housing and 
community development," observed Rockefeller in his appointment letter to 
Young.6 
Relevant staff at the National Urban League monitored how the uoc 
dealt with racial issues. Since their boss was the only black on the board, 
Young's aides informed him when uoc policies lacked input from the 
grassroots. In 1969 the agency planned a community development project in 
the Buffalo-Amherst area. A League staff person, however, warned that uoc 
had not gotten any testimony from blacks in the vicinity. That the chosen 
sites were far from inner-city communities was one complaint, and the other 
concerned the absence of black participation in uoc's Buffalo deliberations. 
National and local League officials wanted Young to take a stand on activat-
ing a citizens' advisory group to advise uoc. The onetime general counsel to 
the League also served as uoc secretary. He urged Young to warn whites on 
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the board of their racial myopia and to have them listen seriously to the NUL 
housing director. Otherwise, he said, "They're going to have a problem."7 
Increasingly, Young discovered that whites with whom he served on 
various urban affairs boards did not understand how ghettos and their black 
inhabitants were integral to any solutions to city problems. Some staff within 
the NUL wanted Young to resign from UDC. On one occasion a League official 
who went to UDC to represent Young inexplicably was escorted out of the 
meeting room while fifteen white observers were allowed to remain. This 
action, while possibly "a comedy of errors," also could have been an insult to 
the NUL. Whatever Young decided to do, some staff pushed him to conclude 
that "UDC has failed to have any significant impact on the need for low- and 
moderate-income housing in New York State." Another aide to Young sur-
mised that UDC prized amiable relations with municipal officials over those 
with grassroots blacks. That meant that Young's continued involvement could 
undermine League credibility with its low-income black constituents.8 
Whatever hesitancy the League staff noted in their boss, Young always 
used a double entry ledger to determine what gains or losses would accrue to 
him if he forsook UDC. In the Ocean Hill-Brownsville case, Young was not 
vulnerable to retaliation from either Mayor Lindsay or Albert Shanker over 
his dramatic resignation from the teacher strike arbitration committee. A 
potential snub to Nelson A. Rockefeller was another matter altogether. Not 
only was he governor but he was a member of a wealthy family that made 
substantial contributions to the National Urban League. Additionally, Young 
believed that his participation on such commissions allowed him to influ-
ence, albeit in peripheral ways, important initiatives that would benefit blacks. 
While associated with UDC, for example, Young was impressed with a report 
about economic development in Harlem. Young urged the head of UDC to 
discuss the findings with the consultants who authored the study. Young en-
dorsed their recommendations and gained a hearing for them within UDC.9 
In 1967, during his involvement with the Urban Development Corpo-
ration, Young became a board member of the States Urban Action Center. 
The group, which mainly consisted of governors and mayors, chose several 
areas of emphasis and then agreed to send consultants to various states to 
advise officials on implementation. These issues included crime control, po-
lice and community relations, jobs for the underprivileged, improved educa-
tional opportunities, and reconstruction. 1O Although Young often missed 
meetings, executive director Stanley R. Tupper maintained contact and se-
cured his advice by mail or telephone. When the Iowa state government pro-
posed a model regional office in metropolitan Cedar Rapids, Young wrote 
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Tupper to express his approval. Clearly, Young encouraged efforts "to make 
State agencies dealing with urban problems more responsive to the people 
through more efficient regional operations."!! 
The range of Young's involvements steadily broadened as racial untest in 
the nation's largest cities occurred with frightening frequency from 1964 through 
1968. Moreover, the need to study and understand urban affairs and their ra-
cial dimensions also demanded the expertise of black leaders like himself As 
Young moved among various public and private commissions, his judgment 
and advice became better known and greatly sought. Eventually, he became a 
part of an influential network of urban experts and a participant in interlocking 
directorates of various urban affairs organizations. His relationship to the States 
Urban Action Center and Urban America was illustrative. In 1968 Nelson 
Rockefeller in 1968 informed Young that the board had voted to merge with 
Urban America and continue its work within that group. Perhaps Rockefeller 
did not know that Young had already become involved with the larger and 
older organization and its programs to improve the urban environment.!2 Young's 
participation in one organization often drew him into others. 
Young's involvement with Urban America allowed him to have a greater 
impact than in the other groups. The assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. 
precipitated massive rioting in large cities across the country. An alarmed 
James W. Rouse, president of Urban America, told Whitney Young that an ad 
campaign would inform the citizenry of the nature of the urban crisis and 
what they could do about it in their communities. He did not want to stop 
there. Rouse encouraged Urban America to become the lead organization in 
defining issues and solutions to the nation's urban problems. In this endeavor 
he thought that Young's participation would be crucial. Rouse invited him to 
join several other members of the board in devising policy directions for Ur-
ban America. He wanted Young's views about employment, housing, educa-
tion, and community development. Rouse was certain that with Young's help 
this could become a major contribution by Urban America. As a part of this 
policy formation process, Young was also asked to respond in detail to Urban 
America proposals about family, welfare, youth initiatives, and other matters. 
An aide did the evaluations for Young. Additionally, William Slayton, execu-
tive vice president of the organization, impressed upon Young the impor-
tance of his visible participation in the group's 1968 meeting in Detroit. 
Slayton wanted him to chair a session about how the idea of community self-
determined action was interpreted differently by inner-city residents and fed-
eral officials in Housing and Urban Development and in the Office of Eco-
nomic Opportunity.13 
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Perhaps to Young's astonishment Slayton and others in Urban America 
increasingly realized the degree to which race relations and urban affairs were 
intricately intertwined. That realization meant that groups like Urban America 
needed more blacks to participate in organizations that affected urban policy 
and programs. Slayton asked Young to help the group find new black board 
members. 14 
Like the States Urban Action Center linked Young with Urban America, 
so did the latter organization enhance an already existing relationship that he 
had with HUD. While active in Urban America, Young served on the advisory 
committee of its nonprofit housing center. When Terry Sanford, former gov-
ernor of North Carolina, succeeded to the presidency of the parent organiza-
tion, he asked Young to continue his consultative role. Because the center 
offered technical assistance to nonprofit sponsors of lower-income housing, 
Sanford wanted to maintain Young's input in shaping program policy of the 
Center. An exacting schedule, however, ended his involvement with the agency 
in 1968. 15 
Young's consultations with federal officials about housing and other 
urban issues were the most fruitful of his organizational involvements. Al-
ways concerned about blacks making policy in urban affairs, Young was surely 
pleased that Robert C. Weaver served as administrator of the Housing and 
Home Finance Agency from 1961 to 1966, and then became the first secre-
tary of Housing and Urban Development. Weaver and Young disagreed about 
the relationship that black betterment organizations should have with the 
federal government, with Weaver arguing that federal funding of any Na-
tional Urban League projects would compromise the organization. 16 None-
theless, Weaver and others involved in housing and urban issues called on 
Young to share his perspectives on programs they planned for the cities. 
In 1965 as the Johnson administration was developing a Department 
of Housing and Urban Development, Young was tapped to serve on a secret 
task force to suggest an organizational structure. Officially known as the Task 
Force on Urban Problems, Young had an opportunity to shape the direction 
of this new cabinet department. He opposed proposals to put the Commu-
nity Action Program into HUD. He also asked his national staff to review a 
broad range of recommendations for the federal agency, including comments 
on mass transit, suggestion for the Home Loan Bank Board, duties for the 
four undersecretaries, and functions for regional officesY 
HUD Secretary Weaver invited Young to serve on an advisory committee 
to help implement the recently enacted Demonstration Cities and Metro-
politan Development Act. Particular communities would devise model projects 
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on how "to attack both the human and physical problems that affiict many of 
our cities."18 
At these meetings Young participated in broad discussions about HUD'S 
relationship to the states, model cities, and the need for a HUD undersecretary 
for research. Aside from offering these perspectives, Young enhanced League 
involvement with HUD. Despite Weaver's distaste for fiscal entanglements 
between black advancement organizations and the federal government, Young 
reported that the HUD secretary would be receptive to any League requests to 
work with Federal Housing Authority officials in Washington, Baltimore, 
Philadelphia, St. Louis, and Milwaukee. In those cities the FHA assisted the 
poor in finding housing whether by renting, purchasing, or building. Since 
local Leagues existed in each of these five cities, Weaver welcomed their help 
in educating the public about the program and in getting someone at NUL 
headquarters to coordinate this activity.19 
Young's extensive involvements in numerous urban affairs groups ulti-
mately gave him the opportunity to clone himself Fortuitously, an invitation 
from Andrew Heiskell of Urban America provided him with the chance for 
which he had been waiting. He valued his productive interaction with estab-
lishment whites who understood that urban and racial issues constituted a 
national emergency. Although their access to money and power proved cru-
cial for many urban initiatives, these resources did not substitute for the pau-
city of blacks who influenced urban policies. Moreover, Young impacted na-
tional urban affairs in helping to found a major organization whose stress on 
inner cities enormously benefited the black population. 
Widespread rioting in black communities from Rochester in 1964 to 
Newark in 1966 and Detroit in 1967 dramatically demonstrated that racial 
and urban issues had reached crisis proportions. Alarmed officers of Urban 
America resolved to respond in a major way to these dire events. During the 
fall of 1966, Stephen Currier, the group's president, expressed concern over 
an apparent trend of cutting back on programs to improve big cities. It was 
crucial to draw mayors and their various constituencies into a coalition to 
address these problems. In January 1967 an ad hoc group of mayors met 
twice with Urban America and then formed a prestigious steering committee 
consisting of Ivan Allen of Atlanta, Richard Daley of Chicago, John Lindsay 
of New York, Jerome Cavanagh of Detroit, and John Collins of Boston. In 
May 1967 Urban America and the mayors met with an influential group of 
corporate leaders including the heads of Litton Industries, ALCOA, General 
Electric, Allied Stores, and North Carolina Mutual Insurance Company, an 
important black business. At this point other national black leaders were 
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asked to join. In July 1967 A. Philip Randolph and Whitney Young received 
invitations to affiliate with this emerging coalition.2o 
Although he was brought into the process late, Young had compelling 
reasons to associate with the group. First, he already had interacted with these 
men in other settings. He surely knew the recently deceased Stephen Currier 
and his Taconic Foundation. Andrew Heiskell, the chairman of the board of 
Urban America, had been involved with urban issues since 1953 in Chicago. 
There he was affiliated with the American Council to Improve Our Neigh-
borhoods, an organization that developed into Urban America. 
When the emergency convocation occurred in August 1967, Randolph, 
King, Wilkins, and Young joined the national steering committee. Randolph 
served with Heiskell as cochairman, and Young played a pivotal role in defin-
ing the National Urban Coalition's mission. In a speech before an assembly of 
politicians, corporate leaders, union officials, clergy, and civil rights advo-
cates Young said, "Responsible leaders among the Negro community have 
not failed. We have been failed by responsible white leaders who have not 
responded to us." He cautioned whites against blaming racial rioting on mili-
tant Black Power spokespersons, such as the notorious H. Rap Brown. He 
said, "Rap Brown did not cause unemployment .... Rap Brown did not put 
Negroes in ghettos. Rap Brown did not perpetuate upon Negroes inferior 
education. This was done by other people in the society." Again, Young stressed 
the importance of jobs as a means to undermine the pathologies of the slums. 
"We got ten thousand jobs yesterday in Detroit," he exclaimed. "Those jobs 
were there before the riots. Are we going to have to wait for riots in other 
cities to find jobs?" Young endorsed a detailed document that articulated the 
Coalition's thrust. Government at all levels and the private sector were chal-
lenged to inaugurate massive efforts to bring good jobs to slum areas. More-
over, widespread endeavors to rehabilitate housing and education in ghetto 
communities were similarly endorsed. These objectives would be achieved 
through the collective and cooperative efforts of the political, economic, and 
social institutions represented at the convocation.21 
Before the August 1967 emergency convocation, the Coalition had little 
visibility. Young had thought that the movement was only temporary, al-
though it could develop into something more. Heiskell's involvement, how-
ever, changed his mind. As board chairman of Time and as brother-in-law to 
the publisher of the New York Times, Heiskell had an easy entry into circles 
beyond the reach of civil rights leaders. Heiskell simply called McGeorge 
Bundy, president of the Ford Foundation, for a meeting to discuss a grant to 
launch the National Urban Coalition. Bundy promised favorable action once 
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Heiskell secured an able administrator for the organization. In another in-
stance, Heiskell went to the head of Morgan Guaranty Trust to solicit a dona-
tion. When the banker offered $5,000, Heiskell refused to accept anything 
below $100,000. His demand was heeded.22 
At the same time, Heiskell's Time responsibilities interfered with his 
Coalition activities. So he asked the group to hire a full-time executive direc-
tor. He consulted with McGeorge Bundy and James Reston, the influential 
New York Times columnist. Reston told Heiskell that John Gardner, HEW 
secretary in the Johnson administration, would soon resign his position. Reston 
called Gardner and learned of his interest in urban issues. The call had come 
at the right moment. The National Urban Coalition had found its man.23 
Gardner had known Whitney Young since 1961. Lester Granger brought 
the two together because Gardner, who then headed the Carnegie Corpora-
tion, had been a League supporter.24 Gardner valued Young's presence as a 
member of the Coalition's executive committee and his active participation. 
Often, he and others in the Coalition tapped Young's expertise to aid their 
various programs. In 1968 Lisle C. Carter Jr., the deputy director, solicited 
Young's input for a meeting designed to help the Coalition's Task Force on 
Equal Housing Opportunity, especially on how to respond to newly enacted 
federal fair housing legislation. Carter also wanted Young's opinion on pos-
sible cooperation between the Coalition and the National Committee Against 
Discrimination in Housing. Moreover, in 1969 Young chaired the Coalition's 
Advisory Committee on Income Maintenance. He endorsed efforts broadly 
to inform potential beneficiaries about welfare reform and other income pro-
grams. 25 
Legislative lobbying and other purely political activities became the 
agenda of the Urban Coalition Action Council. Young often cosigned letters 
that Gardner wrote to urge passage of federal laws that would help cities. One 
senator thanked the group for testimony at a hearing about public service 
employment. In another instance Gardner wanted Young to accompany him 
to Capitol Hill to lobby two senators on a welfare reform bill. He gradually 
separated such activities from the nonprofit coalition. In 1970 Gardner 
founded Common Cause to replace the action council. As this new group 
claimed Gardner's energies, a successor was needed to fill his position at the 
National Urban Coalition.26 
A watchful Whitney Young was aware of this opportunity for increased 
black participation in the Coalition. In October 1969 Peter Libassi, execu-
tive vice president of the Coalition, informed Young that an influential of-
ficer at Urban America, William Slayton, had "precipitated very tentative 
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conversations concerning a possible merger." A month later Libassi told Young 
that "conversations on the merger ... have progressed to the point where 
consideration by the Executive Committee is now in order." Although prob-
lems of the cities would remain the principal priority of the merged organiza-
tion, the lack of black participation at the highest policymaking level would 
be exacerbated with the addition of more staff and board members from the 
two groups. The absorption of Urban America into the National Urban Coa-
lition in 1970 meant a larger organization and a greater necessity for black 
bureaucrats in the group. For Whitney Young, this matter had become ur-
gent.27 
Testimonies by blacks employed in the Coalition confirmed Young's 
analysis. John Gardner seemed sensitive to these matters. In 1968, for ex-
ample, he solicited Young's reactions to the nominating committee and its 
attempt to maintain board representation from women, Mexican Americans, 
Puerto Rican Americans, governors, educators, youth, labor and, "additional 
black leadership." Andrew Young, an aide to Martin Luther King Jr., and 
recently elected black mayors from Cleveland, Washington, D.C., and Gary, 
Indiana, were among those considered. Moreover, Patricia Roberts Harris, 
whom President Johnson appointed as ambassador to Luxembourg, and Dr. 
Vivian Henderson, president of Clark College, were blacks suggested to fill 
respective slots for women and educators.28 
These gestures, however, failed to allay frustrations felt by blacks in the 
organization. In February 1970 Young chaired an ad hoc meeting mostly of 
blacks to discuss "the continuing role to be played by blacks in shaping pri-
orities and designing goals and purposes of the Coalition." Consensus emerged 
on several matters including the importance of communication with the non-
white members of the group and the need for their active and effective par-
ticipation in decision making. Concerning the merger with Urban America, 
the ad hoc conferees urged consideration of "the racial composition of the 
staff" and "reiteration of an earlier request that the number two man in the 
organizations be black." These proceedings clearly had an impact because Sol 
Linowitz, the new chairman, told Young in October 1970 that M. Carl 
Holman, a black, had been designated senior vice president for policy and 
program development and would continue to serve as chairman of the policy 
committee.29 • 
Apparently; that change did not help matters very much. In November 
1970 Holman kept Young "abreast of morale and staff problems relating par-
ticularly to black staff." Holman noted that four blacks had resigned simulta-
neously. The resignations occurred because "black professionals especially have 
Humanizing the City 195 
felt that arbitraty decisions regarding them have been made by whites with-
out prior checking either with them or with black executives." Holman be-
lieved that his authority had been circumvented when two blacks on the 
health staff were fired while he was out of the office. This action was particu-
larly galling because Holman had recently circulated a memorandum lauding 
the Coalition's health program. 3D 
Young and Holman were very good friends. They had known each other 
since their teaching days in the Atlanta University Center. When Young went 
to the National Urban League, Holman came to Washington to work for the 
U.s. Commission on Civil Rights. Young was on the board of the National 
Urban Coalition when Holman joined the staff in 1968 and became vice 
president in 1970. JET, an influential national weekly, credited Young with 
Holman's rise in the organization. Similarly, he helped to catapult Holman 
into the presidency of the Coalition in 1971.3I 
Young's intimate involvement with the National Urban Coalition posed 
numerous challenges and problems for staff in the National Urban League 
and its affiliates. From the outset Young offered League resources and person-
nel to launch the new organization. In 1967 he informed an aide that the 
Coalition needed League staff members, national and local, to play an ex-
panded role in its operation. Young appointed a subordinate to the Coalition's 
Task Force on Private Employment. In 1968 John Gardner asked Young to 
help in establishing strong local coalitions. Gardner shared with him a list of 
twelve cities where the Coalition wanted to establish affiliates. He asked Young 
to share with him the names of persons with whom he was well acquainted to 
help expand the organization. With NUL affiliates in ninety-five cities, Gardner 
knew that Young's long list of contacts would be very helpful. In a joint 
communication in 1969 they told national and local staff in both groups that 
in several cities a League board member served on the Coalition's steering 
committee and that in some locales businessmen served on the boards of 
both organizations. In fact, Young suggested to Gardner that they should to 
promote interlocking directorships. Moreover, Gardner praised the Jackson-
ville, Florida, and Flint, Michigan, Urban Leagues for spearheading the found-
ing of local coalitions.32 
Some ofYoung's ablest advisers, however, did not share his zeal for helping 
the Coalition. These staff believed that the Coalition was developing pro-
grams, local chapters, and funding sources that overlapped with the League, 
duplicated many of its initiatives, and threatened to supplant it. By 1969 the 
director of field operations noted that the Coalition operated in twenty-six of 
the ninety-five League cities, and he wanted to know where else the group 
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would spread. Other League staff wondered why the Coalition pursued ini-
tiatives that the NUL had pioneered. For example, Young's domestic Marshall 
Plan had a counterpart in the Coalition's Alternative National Budget. The 
League's income maintenance, health manpower, housing, consumer educa-
tion, and other proposals had their titles adopted verbatim by Coalition pro-
grams. The annoyed director of the League's Labor Education Advancement 
Program declared that the two organizations were embarking on a collision 
course. This official was especially angered when the Coalition submitted a 
proposal to the Ford Foundation to fund a program to organize black con-
tractors and to increase minority apprentices and journeymen. He noted that 
the League was already working in this area. Moreover, this League staffer, 
while attending a black economic development conference, resented efforts 
by Coalition representatives to take exclusive control of the project nation-
wide. These persons gave the erroneous impression that the Coalition "was 
the only organization uniquely qualified to carry this responsibility." An-
other subordinate told Young that the Coalition was trying to take over NUL 
programs and was succeeding to a remarkable degree. Ultimately, this aide 
believed that continued duplication by the Coalition would lead to "the dis-
solution of the Urban League as a primary force in the civil rights and com-
munity service field. "33 
Perhaps John Gardner had sensed some hostility from League staff about 
the Coalition. Maybe that is what he had in mind when he spoke highly of 
Young and his group to a potential benefactor of the League. He observed 
that Young was "a great asset not only to the black community but to the 
whole nation. We must all support him." Gardner added that the National 
Urban Coalition and the National Urban League had similar names but that 
neither rivalry nor duplication existed between the two: "The Urban League 
has its own distinctive job to do and performs tasks that the Urban Coalition 
couldn't possibly tackle." At the same time Gardner agreed that the two staffs 
needed to meet. Both staffs felt an "utgency" for their bosses to talk. Gardner 
surely agreed.34 
Although the League and the Coalition proposed to convene the senior 
staff of the two organizations in August 1970, aides to Whitney Young met a 
few months earlier to produce a brief report, "The National Urban Coali-
tion: An Urban League View." League staff acknowledged the need for the 
Coalition, but they were not convinced that the organization had fulfilled its 
promise. Established in an atmosphere of widespread ghetto unrest, the group 
was meant to "mobilize and bring to bear new funds and resources" to solve 
urban problems. While the League eschewed direct involvement with politi-
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cians, the Coalition could cooperate openly with officeholders and draw in 
leaders from business, labor, and religion. League officials, however, concluded 
that the NUC had developed into "just another program operating agency, 
rather than a catalyst for joint community effort." 
Riots in numerous large cities gave urban problems an urgency that the 
Coalition failed to sustain. Moreover, the waning of commitments from those 
with political and economic power rendered the organization increasingly 
ineffective. As a result, local chapters did not tackle difficult issues in employ-
ment, housing, and education. Instead, they operated limited programs, which 
did not achieve "the joint solution of community problems." Additionally, 
the similarity of the names of the two groups frequently confused their re-
spective supporters. Coalition failures created difficulty for the NUL. Conse-
quently, League staff endorsed efforts to meet with its counterpart for "posi-
tive mutual action to ... clear up misunderstandings. "35 
'Whitney Young and John Gardner made opening statements at the 
August meeting of the NUL and NUC. Young indicated that he thought the 
Coalition would complement the efforts of the League. 'While his organiza-
tion did day-to-day programming, "the Coalition's main objective was to 
reinforce existing institutions, to lend what support [it] could to those that 
were effective and doing a job, and not be in the business of competing with 
... these institutions .... This we applauded and supported 100 percent." 
Young added, "We desperately need an Urban Coalition." He also observed 
that if the Coalition should make "modifications in the original objectives, 
we need to know about it." A defensive John Gardner said, "If we failed or if 
there is a better way to relate the two organizations, we ought to know about 
it." He declared that he came "solely to hear the various diagnoses" that will 
resolve the conflict between the League and the Coalition. 
Detailed discussions occurred about programs that each organization 
pursued, competition for funds from similar sources, and how each group 
could clarify its national and local objectives. Most important, participants 
recommended ways to reduce friction. These suggestions included better in-
tergroup communication, the recognition of possible duplication in national 
programming, and better coordination of local League and Coalition activi-
ties.36 
Even after the August 1970 meeting, Young and Gardner backed con-
tinuing efforts to link their two organizations. Liaisons were named "to iden-
tify joint activities and possible duplication," and another team would "re-
view specific cities where there seem to be problems and ... develop st~ategies 
... at corrective action." Other League and Coalition staff were assigned to 
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resolve conflicts. Three senior League officials-Cernoria D. Johnson, Dor-
othy K. Newman, and Betti S. Whaley-suggested ways to implement inter-
group cooperation. They wanted a Coalition person to work full time at 
maintaining contact with the League and at designating NUC initiatives ame-
nable to NUL participation. Furthermore, League staff should claim program 
initiatives in which the NUL would be singularly involved. 
Johnson, Newman, and Whaley urged Young in a direction that he 
wanted to go. Although they and other staff had reservations about the pro-
grammatic thrust of the Coalition and its negative impact on the League, 
they endorsed Young's continued involvement with the maturing organiza-
tion. They reminded him to emphasize the League's contributions to the 
CoalitionY None should forget that the development of the Coalition owed 
much to League magnanimity. 
Young's encouragement of M. Carl Holman and the National Urban 
Coalition was repeatedwith George A. Wiley and the National Welfare Rights 
Organization. Wiley, a black Ph.D. in chemistry and a CORE activist, estab-
lished the group in 1967. He designed NWRO to lobby government officials at 
every level to extend benefits to the needy, broaden programs, and prevent 
punitive measures against welfare recipients. Initially, Young criticized his 
objectives, arguing that getting jobs for people was better than improving the 
welfare system. Nonetheless, Young believed that NWRO was helpful to the 
urban poor, and he accepted Wiley's invitation for the NUL to be officially 
represented at the group's 1969 convention. Suggestions were also advanced 
concerning NWRO/NUL collaboration. In 1971 as Congress weighed passage of 
welfare legislation that Wiley deemed inimical to the interests of recipients, 
he conferred with Young about what could be done to stop that effort.38 
Although he sometimes differed with the tactics of the federal Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development, the National Urban Coalition, 
and the National Welfare Rights Organization, Young endorsed their efforts 
to improve urban life for the disadvantaged. Young was pleased when these 
institutions gained Robert C. Weaver, M. Carl Holman, and George A. Wiley 
as their executives. That he was not the only black of stature affecting how 
urban issues impacted on ghettos made his role in these groups worthwhile. 
His attempts to assist these spokesmen showed how much he cared about a 
broad presence of blacks making important decisions about American urban 
life. Moreover, his seeming lack of concern about the League sharing organi-
zational turf with other groups demonstrated how deeply he cared about 
urban issues. 
Whether he dealt with the States Urban Action Center, Urban America, 
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the National Urban Coalition, or any other public or private institution de-
voted to urban affairs, Young's influence remained important but peripheral. 
At times, he impacted these organizations in substantive ways, but he did not 
affect them as much as groups that he headed. As executive director of the 
National Urban League and simultaneously as president of the National As-
sociation of Social Workers and the National Conference on Social Welfare, 
Young had direct opportunities to articulate and implement his vision of 
urban America. 
Mindful that widespread ghetto unrest posed new challenges to the 
National Urban League, Whitney Young urged his national and local staff to 
reevaluate their programs and decide whether they effectively served resi-
dents in the inner cities. He spent much time discussing these matters with 
Sterling Tucker, the executive director of the Washington Urban League. They 
had known each other since the late 1940s when both served as industrial 
relations secretaries of midwestern affiliates. As the two discussed future di-
rections for the League, the idea of "New Thrust" emerged. They agreed that 
the urgency of grassroots grievances against slum conditions and their will-
ingness to express their dissatisfaction pushed the black freedom struggle to 
another plateau. These changed circumstances required a redefinition of the 
role and function of the League. Since its founding, League officials repre-
sented blacks to the white power structure. In their behalf the organization 
appealed to corporations, government, foundations, and other benefactors to 
provide resources to ameliorate the social and economic condition of these 
deprived persons. Young's conversations with Tucker convinced him that this 
methodology had become obsolete. 
Grassroots blacks in the southern civil rights movement and in north-
ern ghetto rebellions showed that they wanted to articulate their grievances 
and their demands without help or interpretation from such ambassadorial 
groups as the National Urban League. This new reality required a New Thrust 
from the League. It would now serve inner-city communities by helping to 
empower people to act and speak for themselves. Although the League would 
provide technical and organizational assistance, its goal would be to enable 
grassroots organizations to converse with the power structure on their own. 
The era of representing the inarticulate had come to an end.39 
Extensive racial rioting in the aftermath of the assassination of Martin 
Luther King Jr. in April 1968 moved Young to redefine the NUL mission. He 
called an emergency conference of local League executives to discuss new 
directions for the organization. Other meetings occurred and consensus 
emerged about what Young and Tucker originally envisaged as a "New Thrust." 
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One foundation correctly understood it as the League's shift away from serv-
ing black bourgeois interests "to a concentration on the priority problems of 
ghetto areas." For Young, New Thrust was a quest for "ghetto power." He 
wanted the League to concentrate its resources and energies in the ghetto to 
improve it and to maintain its commitment to integration. Eliminating the 
ghetto remained Young's ultimate objective, but the empowerment of its resi-
dents had become an important prerequisite for their entry into the Ameri-
can mainstream. 
Young projected a budget of $2 million for New Thrust. Approximately 
$1.5 million was designated for fifty affiliates, which would implement the 
program in their respective locales. He anticipated needing $500,000 for gen-
eral administration. In 1968, however, Young actually drew $1,395,000 to 
fund this ambitious project. Support came from the Ford Foundation 
($845,000), the Rockefeller Foundation ($300,000), and the Rockefeller 
Brothers Fund ($250,000).40 
Young conceptualized New Thrust in three programmatic components. 
First, he noted that whenever business, government, and other elements of 
the elite dealt with spokespersons representing inner cities, the latter had to 
be authentic leaders ratified by ghetto residents. If these representatives lacked 
grassroots support, then whatever agreements they made with the establish-
ment would be repudiated. Block organizations, Young contended, would 
remedy this problem. These neighborhood-based groups would "organize 
around an issue which motivates a community and on which relatively short-
term results are possible. "The local League would facilitate these efforts rather 
than lead them. The affiliate could provide data, reports, contacts with politi-
cal and corporate leaders, and other assistance. But initiative and leadership 
would come from grassroots block organizations, not from the League. 
A second aspect of Young's New Thrust thinking concerned the black 
middle class, "one of the most maligned groups in the United States." He 
argued that many of them wanted to address problems in the urban and race 
relations fields, but did not know how. He proposed to put more of them on 
local League boards of directors and in other positions where they could be 
useful. The development of grassroots leadership and expanded black middle-
class involvement in inner-city affairs would become complementary aims of 
New Thrust. 
Third, Young wanted the program to help in changing public opinion 
about integration. He believed that this well-known civil rights goal had be-
come a casualty of the major race riots and the rise of black separatism. He 
wanted to rehabilitate integration as a societal objective and make it the "'in' 
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rather than the 'out' thing to do" in housing and other social and economic 
spheres.41 
Young's musings about middle- and working-class blacks and 
integrationism had been the League's foci during an earlier phase of the 1960s 
civil rights struggle. He knew, however, that his current emphasis on ghetto 
empowerment and the development of grassroots leadership had supplanted 
his organization's previous programs. Although racial integration remained 
his goal, New Thrust and the promised development of ghetto power would 
also bring grassroots blacks into the American mainstream. Like Young, offi-
cials throughout the League infrastructure realized that their relevance as a 
black organization lay in deeper involvement with inner-city inhabitants. With 
New Thrust, Young proved his mettle as a versatile and insightful leader. 
Young articulated New Thrust to the Ford Foundation with greater 
clarity. He said that local League officials would establish "neighborhood 
outposts" in the inner city. These would be "community organization efforts 
providing service to people in the ghetto and mobilizing them for confronta-
tion and change." He added that the "efforts would emanate from an Urban 
League outpost offering advice, service, and action." Consequently, the League 
would be identified "with the problems and population of the ghetto; devel-
oping and working with indigenous neighborhood leadership to build ghetto 
power; [and] forming ghetto-professional coalitions to work toward specific 
social change objectives defined in terms of priority community needs."42 
New Thrust programs in Knoxville and San Diego fitted the model 
that Young identified in the Ford proposal. The League spearheaded a 
grassroots group in Knoxville's Lonsdale section which pressured the city coun-
cil to establish a recreation commission responsible to the community. More-
over, the affiliate deployed community organizers to open "two ghetto offices 
to assist neighborhood residents in pressing for more frequent garbage pick-
ups, regular street maintenance, the elimination of health hazards, and en-
forcement of laws pertaining to sewage." To fight employment discrimina-
tion, the League received complaints at one of its outpost offices and led a 
coalition of black organizations to press these grievances. 
Similar emphasis on grassroots initiatives characterized the League's New 
Thrust in San Diego. The affiliate's main office moved into the heart of the 
community. Moreover, all professional staff members were considered com-
munity workers first and specialists second. The League also organized sixty-
one block groups with more than one thousand members working on neigh-
borhood problems that concerned them most. Its membership goal was 
29,000. These efforts produced significant improvements in municipal ser-
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vices, and direct confrontations led to new hiring practices at San Diego 
hotels, motels, and restaurants.43 
Young singled out the Boston Urban League for special attention. Mel 
King, a former teacher, settlement house worker, and community organizer, 
became the executive director of the Boston affiliate in 1967. King found the 
League office in downtown Boston without a full-time professional staff. Its 
principal function was providing industry with a pool of trained workers 
whom employers pledged to hire. King described League activities "as fo-
cused on institutions-schools, health services, interagency councils, [and] 
the United Community Services." He wanted to reorient the affiliate to a 
"philosophy of community development through community control." With 
Mel King at the helm, the Boston Urban League was ripe for Young's New 
Thrust. He supported King's effort to create a "New Urban League."44 In 
proposals to the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations for New Thrust funding, 
Young made special financial appeals for the Boston affiliate.45 
King proposed a partnership between the local League and Boston 
College called the Joint Community-University Center for Inner City Change. 
Roxbury residents would be in charge, and the College would offer technical 
assistance in planning and programming for economic development, jobs, 
and housing. With funding from Ford, Rockefeller, and Boston College, King's 
"New Urban League" established a Neighborhood Development Corpora-
tion, organized tenants to restore an apartment building, and formed an ur-
ban renewal committee. King also initiated a Survival Fund with contribu-
tions from League staff to strengthen special projects in inner-city Boston.46 
Young drew from Ford, Rockefeller, Alfred Sloan, R.K. Mellon, and 
other foundations a total of $1.5 million for the 1969 fiscal year and $3 
million for the 1970 fiscal year. He told the Rockefeller Brothers Fund in 
1970 that he "hoped that by the end of the two-year period planned for the 
New Thrust, increases in local support, particularly from United Funds, would 
suffice to cover the expanded affiliate budgets." Although New Thrust would 
be phased out as a separate program, Young wanted to maintain funding for 
some projects at the reduced level of $1.75 million in fiscal 1971. That ex-
pectation, however, proved erroneous. Local United Funds did not respond 
by increasing their regular support of League affiliates. Young blamed the 
conservative political climate in some parts of the country for this unfortu-
nate result. His disappointment was allayed somewhat by the continued sup-
port of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund albeit at the reduced level of $150,000.41 
Originally a special project separate from the rest of National Urban 
League operations, New Thrust became for Whitney Young the principal 
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means for his organization to address inner-city problems and interact with 
ghetto residents. In the future it was going to be "a day-to-day way of doing 
business." Because of New Thrust the League was "refining and institutional-
izing its community action processes [and] changing its operational proce-
dures in order to achieve new kinds of results from institutions which serve 
black and other minority Americans." The program's success convinced Young 
that change in urban America, especially for blacks, depended on grassroots 
action. The League's ambassadorial role, he contended, was obsolete. Unless 
the organization continued its thrust toward ghetto empowerment and pro-
viding to inner-city residents the technical assistance to compel action from 
political and economic elites, the League would become a peripheral pres-
ence in the nation's black communities.48 
Young's visibility as the leader of the League and in urban affairs made 
him an attractive candidate to head two professional organizations in which 
he had been active. The National Conference on Social Welfare and the Na-
tional Association of Social Workers dealt with a range of issues affecting the 
urban environment. NCSW functioned mainly as a forum on all aspects of 
health and welfare, whereas NASW addressed matters relevant to the profes-
sional interests of social workers. Despite the difference in emphasis, both 
bodies participated in the national discourse about cities and how they af-
fected the disadvantaged. That such issues were intrinsically racial made 
Whitney Young an obvious choice to serve as president of the two organiza-
tions. 
In 1966 Young became the second black ever to head the 8,000-mem-
ber National Conference on Social Welfare. Quickly, he focused the organi-
zation on urban affairs and tried to affiliate it with government agencies work-
ing in that field. He tried to persuade HUD Secretary Robert C. Weaver to 
help fund a forum on social problems related to urban growth. Instead, Weaver 
suggested that Young and others in NCSW participate in HUD'S Consultation 
on Urban Development and Social Welfare. He invited Young to designate 
persons from his group to consult with HUD representatives and offer their 
expertise on social welfare matters. Their involvement with the Consultation 
proved useful and seemingly presaged "a closer working relationship between 
HUD and the social welfare field. "49 
Although Weaver eschewed any financial ties with Young's organiza-
tion, he permitted him to develop valuable contacts for NCSW within HUD. At 
the Consultation, for example, Young met Leonard Duhl, a special assistant 
to Weaver. He extended two significant invitations to Duhl, both of which 
the HUD official accepted. Duhl consented to serve on the U.S. Committee of 
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the International Conference on Social Welfare, and he agreed to address Young's 
1967 Dallas meeting on "Humanizing the City." He told Duhl that he was 
eminently qualified to address "Mental Health Aspects of Urbanization. " More-
over, Young invited guidance on methods to produce more humane cities. Al-
though Duhl preferred to speak on "The Shame of the Cities," Young had been 
successful in focusing his organization on urban issues and developing institu-
tional settings in which the expertise of his members could be shared. 50 
His ultimate impact on the National Conference on Social Welfare, 
however, seemed mixed. While the organization benefited from Young's promi-
nence and national influence, black members, especially those in the League, 
judged the group harshly. After Young relinquished the presidency, the League 
continued to send a program representative to the annual forum. In 1970 
one League official noted that black participants "found the experience lacked 
meaning for them." Unfocused discussions, seeming mistreatment of the 
NCSW'S Black Caucus and the National Welfare Rights Organization, and the 
use of the forum to maintain the status quo left blacks disappointed. Even 
some League personnel shunned involvement with the organization. Young's 
subordinate told him that if the NCSW was to continue, it should address 
relevant issues and become a force for "meaningful change."51 
Young had similar experiences with the National Association of Social 
Workers. Like the NCSW, the NASW benefited from Young's national promi-
nence. Predictably, when he assumed the presidency in 1969, congratula-
tions poured in from influential institutions, including the White House.52 
At the same time, his presidency did not prevent disenchantment among 
black members who wanted influence in the association and attention drawn 
to inner-city concerns. 
Those who hoped that Young's leadership would revive the NASW had 
their expectations fulfilled. One longtime participant had denigrated the group 
as "a sick, institutionalized organization in the terminal stages of develop-
ment." Moreover, it "refused to address itself to the real world."53 Many viewed 
Young's leadership as an antidote to these ills. Members counting on his es-
tablishment contacts to help resuscitate the group must have been greatly 
impressed. Immediately, he asked his friend Roger Wilkins, a program officer 
at the Ford Foundation, to aid in getting a $25,000 grant for this impecu-
nious 50,000-member organization. Later, he invited Mitchell Sviridoff, a 
Ford Foundation vice president, to participate in a crucial NASW board of 
directors conference. Wilkins, who came in his place, won Young's praise for 
the key ideas he presented. He also solicited cooperation from HEW Secre-
tary Elliott Richardson and his predecessor, John Gardner.54 
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Young succeeded in orienting the NASW toward numerous issues ger-
mane to ghetto residents. Police brutality, for example, became a concern for 
urban blacks. The NASW spoke out strongly against such practices and com-
municated this stand to its chapters. The president of the Philadelphia affili-
ate congratulated Young for a NASW statement that denounced police harass-
ment aimed at the militant Black Panthers. This chapter then formed a 
committee to focus on police behavior as it affected the rights of minority 
groups. When Congress in 1970 debated the infamous D.C. Crime Bill, 
whose provisions included pretrial detention, no-knock entries, expanded 
wiretapping, and other controversial procedures, the Washington chapter rose 
to oppose it. A chapter official thanked Young for putting the issue before the 
NASW executive board to inaugurate action of its own.55 
Forging relationships with other organizations interested in urban af-
fairs was another way that Young fitted the NASW to address matters relevant 
to the nation's cities. For example, he urged the American Bar Association to 
endorse a statement by the National Conference of Lawyers and Social Workers 
on "The Urban Crisis: Roles of the Lawyer and Social Worker." Young had 
gotten NSAW approval and now wanted to attract greater ABA involvement in 
pressing urban issues. Also, he bolstered cooperative endeavors among the 
National Welfare Rights Organization, the NUL, and the NASW. The three 
groups appeared together on the Today Show to oppose a family assistance 
plan that the Nixon administration advanced. Heated but productive meet-
ings also occurred between the NASW and NWRRO about possible contribu-
tions to various projects that the welfare rights group initiated. 56 
Despite Young's efforts, fellow blacks in the National Conference on 
Social Welfare and the National Association of Social Workers demanded 
that these organizations "repudiate the current welfare system which serves as 
a tool for oppression of black people as well as the social workers providing 
services." At a NASW meeting in April 1968 in Washington, blacks formed the 
National Association of Black Catalysts. A month later in San Francisco at 
the National Conference on Social Welfare, the Catalysts met with others 
and formed the National Association of Black Social Workers (NABSW). The 
new group challenged the National Conference on Social Welfare to grant 
membership to the National Welfare Rights Organization, denounced fed-
eral officials who supported laws that were racist, declared war on black AFDC 
mothers and their children, and requested greater involvement of black pro-
fessionals on committees that addressed the needs of inner-city communi-
ties. 57 
Again, Young occupied the familiar middle ground. Some whites in the 
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NASW could fathom neither the discontent which the NABSW expressed nor 
the remedies it offered to correct the oversight of racial issues. One Illinois 
member disagreed with efforts to guarantee black representation at a delegate 
assembly. "1 have always regarded NASWas a professional organization," she 
wrote, "and 1 cannot accept the implication that there are professional issues 
peculiar to black members which cannot be expressed by or negotiated by 
white members."58 Although Young took account of such views, he validated 
the concerns of the NABSW: At the San Francisco meeting of the National 
Conference on Social Welfare, Young brought in a protesting group of black 
social workers to discuss their manifesto. He also endorsed the recommenda-
tion of the Black Caucus to designate racism as a priority item for the NASW. 
"Our major problem," he noted, "is to get sufficient funds ... to make this 
resolution more than a statement of intent."59 
With varying degrees of effectiveness, Young reoriented the National 
Urban League, the National Conference on Social Welfare, and the National 
Association of Social Workers toward greater relevance to the urgent needs of 
the nation's cities. Although militant elements in all three organizations chal-
lenged his caution and racial diplomacy, Young ultimately understood that 
blacks in inner cities and within the social work professions wished to be 
involved in identifying pressing urban issues and in fashioning solutions to 
them. So he proposed initiatives, mobilized resources, and developed pro-
grams to enable these groups to improve the urban environment for blacks 
and the poor. 
10 
Corporate Philanthropy 
and Civil Rights 
During the 1960s Whitney M. Young Jr. drew from major corporations 
and foundations unprecedented financial support for black Americans. 
An atmosphere of urgency surrounding the civil rights movement surely played 
a pivotal role in opening corporation and foundation coffers, and the con-
tacts that Young cultivated and the arguments he advanced for aiding the 
civil rights cause persuaded wealthy benefactors to fund the black freedom 
struggle. 
When Young became executive director of the National Urban League 
in 1961, he inherited numerous corporate and philanthropic contributors 
from his predecessor, Lester Granger. 1 He increased donations from regular 
backers, and he solicited monies from previously untapped business and foun-
dation sources. Grants to the National Urban League during Granger's ten-
ure resulted from his gentle but persistent appeals to help blacks break social 
and economic barriers. Conversely; philanthropy for the League during the 
Young era occurred because blacks demanded massive programs to improve 
their status in American society. These circumstances emboldened Young to 
request and reach levels of funding that Granger may have considered unat-
tainable. 
The corporate and foundation officials from whom he solicited contri-
butions generally liked Young and considered him a fellow bon vivant.2 None 
of the other national civil rights leaders moved with such ease among the 
financial elite, and none mastered the rituals and etiquette of upper-class 
social and economic circles as effectively as Young. Consequently; the League 
leader gained unprecedented access to influential whites whom he vigorously 
pressed to release funds for an increasingly restive black population. Close 
friendships with Donald Kendall of Pepsico and Joseph Cullman III of Philip 
Morris also enhanced Young's entry into the corporate elite. For Young, a 
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cocktail party at a Rockefeller residence or a luncheon at a downtown private 
club were comfortable opportunities to explain the urgency of the black 
struggle and to secure monies to bring the racially disadvantaged into the 
American mainstream. 
Although Young thoroughly enjoyed these elite social interactions, 
grassroots activism kept him focused on movement goals. A decade earlier in 
Omaha, Young, as head of the League affiliate, positioned himself as both an 
activist and a mediator. In the latter role he sought out the middle ground to 
make himself the preferred negotiator when recalcitrant employers eschewed 
talks with more militant protesters. Young applied that successful tactic to his 
national dealings with corporate and foundation officials. 
Young was an integrationist. He believed that the exclusion of blacks 
from mainstream institutions was their essential disadvantage. If legalized 
segregation ended and other racial barriers actually fell, then blacks could 
become productive citizens and consumers. He stressed neither the distinc-
tiveness of the black experience nor the need for separate black communities 
when he sought improvements for this racial minority. Rather, he described 
blacks as just like other Americans with the same potential and aspirations. If 
only private resources would be mobilized to obliterate the ghettos and give 
blacks equal opportunities for education, employment, and housing, then 
the crippling legacies of slavery and segregation would disappear. Even as he 
appropriated the rhetoric of Black Power, he defined it in pluralist terms with 
integration as its ultimate objective. 
Several reasons account for Young's success in gaining establishment 
financing. The development of national support for the civil rights cause 
compelled donors to take note of the growing influence of black protests. 
Sometimes subtly and at other times overtly, Young shrewdly observed that 
powerful whites would have to negotiate with black leaders. Either they would 
deal with leaders with integrationist views and establishment ties like the 
head of the National Urban League or they would arbitrate matters with the 
moralistic Martin Luther KingJr., unmanageablesNcc spokespersons, or black 
nationalist Malcolm X. Clearly, Young understood the establishment mind 
much better than other black leaders and believed that he could function as a 
better broker between philanthropic whites and grassroots blacks. Moreover, 
most of the major civil rights organizations were geared toward protest activi-
ties, grassroots organizing and litigation. Only the National Urban League 
had the experience, personnel, and structure to handle programs aimed at the 
social and economic improvement of the black population. So, as the marches, 
demonstrations, and riots dramatized these issues, Young convinced white 
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benefactors that his organization was peculiarly and singularly suited to ad-
dress these matters. Because donors found that his integrationist perspectives 
matched theirs, Young was able to draw large and unprecedented contribu-
tions to the National Urban League. 
Once again Young had staked out a middle ground that was difficult to 
maintain. It was very important that he functioned as a broker for blacks to 
the nation's philanthropic elite. To become successful in that role, Young had 
to win the trust of some of American society's most influential persons and to 
be liked by these keepers of corporate and foundation coffers. That Young 
enjoyed these interactions is beyond question. At the same time he took his 
role as a mediator quite seriously, and he made no attempt to minimize or 
trivialize the seriousness of black discontent or the depth of black anger. Young 
assumed that blacks understood that he would represent their interests hon-
estly and effectively, and all of the evidence suggests that he did. Sometimes, 
he failed to get ratification of his efforts from black constituencies beyond the 
League. His occasional oversight in this area allowed some militant and mod-
erate blacks to dub him inaccurately as "Whitey" Young. His rubbing shoul-
ders with Henty Ford II or David Rockefeller convinced some that he had 
"sold out" to the establishment. That unhappy perception gained some ad-
herents as Young's fruitful work as a broker became wrongly characterized in 
pejorative terms. 
Young's influence extended to institutioils and issues in civil rights, ur-
ban affairs, and social welfare, but his most notable success came in corporate 
and foundation philanthropy. Two factors, however, limited his leverage with 
powerful whites in this field. First, these benefactors, though urgently re-
sponding to Young and the aggrieved black population, determined what 
initiatives would be funded and defined the parameters within which his 
leadership would be exercised. Second, Young naively believed that his access 
to these important institutions put him in line for a significant role or post in 
this upper stratum of American society. In both areas Young overrated his 
influence and ultimately discovered that blacks, whether they dealt in mili-
tant grassroots protest or in brokering their interests with the white establish-
ment, possessed too little power to change their social and economic condi-
tion. 
Young's introduction to the nation's corporate leaders came mainly 
through the National Urban League. He became acquainted with those who 
already contributed to the organization, and he met other executives through 
these original donors. Young also used various professional and social gather-
ings to educate potential benefactors about the League. Moreover, he invited 
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their participation on the boards of either the national body or a local affili-
ate. How Young came to know James Linen of Time-Life was illustrative. 
When Young met Linen, the latter served as president of Time, Inc., a 
post which he assumed in 1960. Linen had been the publisher of Time since 
1945, a board member since 1959, and chairman of the executive committee 
in 1969. Long active in various charitable organizations, the two men crossed 
paths at meetings of the United Community Funds and Councils of America, 
which Linen headed. As an agency which funded both the National Urban 
League and its affiliates, Young made a special effort to get acquainted with 
Linen. 
Linen greatly admired Young. Moreover, he endorsed the League's em-
phasis upon employment, education, and community development as the 
best means to improve the condition of blacks. As their friendship developed, 
Linen played a pivotal role in introducing Young to other corporate leaders. 
Annually, Time sponsored trips for leading business executives to important 
international locations. In 1966 the Time-News tour went to Eastern Eu-
rope. Linen included Young on this junket. 
The Time president put Young before a captive corporate audience. 
They included chairmen of the board and presidents of such firms as Eli Lilly, 
Honeywell, Armco Steel, Gillette Safety Razor, North American Aviation, 
Caterpillar Tractor, and Pan American World Airways. On the plane Linen 
deliberately seated Young next to Henry Ford II. Young was challenged to 
convert Ford's disinterest in race relations to active advocacy and financial 
support. Although the rhetorical sparring between Young and Ford produced 
no agreement about the direction that the black struggle should take, it con-
vinced the auto executive that the League deserved his personal backing. Ford 
started with a $100,000 donation to the National Urban League.3 
Upon his return from Eastern Europe, Young wrote to the business 
executives whom he had accompanied on the trip. Several had never given 
money to the National Urban League. What he wrote to Robert S. Oelman, 
chairman of the board of the National Cash Register Company, was typical. 
Jocularly, Young declared, "This letter comes to fulfill a promise: to stop 
discriminating against your company by denying it an opportunity to con-
tribute to the work of the National Urban League." He assured Oelman that 
his firm's financial neglect of the League did not necessarily mean "a lack of 
concern and respect for responsible leadership in the important field of civil 
rights." Nonetheless, Young expected him to donate to the League and to 
make "the most liberal contribution possible." With the letter Young en-
closed various reports on League activities, which would help Oelman "un-
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derstand the constructive role that we are playing in our effort to channel the 
understandable impatience of Negro citizens into productive, constructive 
activity, rather than permitting desperation and hopelessness to be reflected 
in disruptive violence." Young was giving the business community an oppor-
tunity to support the League. Similar correspondence went to Eugene S. 
Beesley of Eli Lilly, James H. Binger of Honeywell, William Blackie of Cater-
pillar Tractor, C. William Verity Jr. of Armco Steel, and others.4 
With Linen's assistance Young was introduced to leading corporate ex-
ecutives. Moreover, in 1966, after he participated in President Johnson's Plan-
ning Council for the Civil Rights Conference, Linen addressed the League's 
commerce and industry meeting in Philadelphia. In 1968 he became presi-
dent of the National Urban League. Linen's speeches across the nation gave 
credibility in corporate circles to Young and the League. Moreover, the per-
spectives and programs that Linen promoted suggested collaboration between 
him and Young. Linen continually stressed that corporations could not sit on 
the sidelines without offering solutions and substantive assistance in provid-
ing employment and job training to the disadvantaged. Both he and Young 
borrowed rhetoric from grassroots blacks and used it to emphasize the ur-
gency of the racial crisis. For example, Linen lauded Black Power because 
"only black political power, black economic power, black social power and 
black educational power can insure progress toward a truer democracy." Cor-
porate leaders, he contended, had special responsibilities. "It is clear that un-
less top management makes a full and complete commitment to the policy 
and practice of equal job opportunity, nothing much will happen." Young 
often made similar comments. Coming from Linen, these sentiments received 
a serious hearing from the nation's corporate elite.5 
In speeches to business groups, Young stressed that corporate involve-
ment would make the critical difference in resolving the nation's racial crisis. 
The observation that business executives should play a pivotal role was to 
some quite flattering and challenging. Others were convinced by Young's 
forceful arguments about how selfish corporate aims gave businesses an im-
portant stake in a well-trained and gainfully employed black population. He 
drew business backers because he articulated the needs and aspirations of 
blacks in ways that coincided with corporate interests. Moreover, the mili-
tancy of the civil rights movement and widespread ghetto rebellions caused 
corporate leaders to take notice of the peculiar and persistent problems of the 
black population. From their perspective only the National Urban League 
had in place an infrastructure and initiatives that allowed business executives 
to impact pressing racial issues. 
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In a 1968 speech to the American Iron and Steel Institute, Young re-
minded his listeners of a poignant point in the Kerner Commission report. 
"White society is deeply implicated in the ghetto. White institutions created 
it, white institutions maintain it, and white society condones it .... No one 
institution in America is better equipped to exercise effective leadership and 
turn America around than the business community." He told them that they 
were "status symbols, the role models, the community leaders, the image 
makers." Consequently, "You can't accept the plaudits for achievement with-
out, at the same time, accepting responsibilities in those areas in which this 
nation has failed." He blasted the iron and steel industry for its dismal record 
in equal employment opportunity. The industry had a vested interest in el-
evating the black population because "if you ignore the crisis, the slums and 
ghettos of this land will siphon off more and more of your profits. The erod-
ing tax base of the American city [will place] a larger and larger burden on the 
business community."6 
At the convention of the American Bankers Association Young told his 
audience, "The bank has a greater stake in the promotion of a stable and 
harmonious community than any other institution .... You as bankers have 
the responsibility to lead the way in making the Negro citizen a producer of 
goods and a consumer of products rather than a producer of violence and a 
consumer of taxes. You have the choice of whether to spend monies on pro-
grams of apprenticeship training and rehabilitation or on programs of crime 
and welfare." Young audaciously noted that in hiring blacks "particularly in 
the managerial and policy making levels, banks have a long way to go. You 
must not be afraid to use your imagination and to run some risks to raise 
these figures." With federal pressure for the employment of blacks and dis-
comfort from recent urban rioting, the American Bankers Association wel-
comed Young's comments. A bankers' blue ribbon committee on urban prob-
lems was established. Plans commenced to work with government and private 
agencies to help solve inner-city ills. Charles Walker, executive vice president 
of the ABA, told Young, "We would hope to concentrate on ... construction 
loans in slum areas, and loans to small businesses in the ghetto." He added 
that Young's appearance "made it a lot easier for us to get more banks active 
in solving these problems."7 
Similar reactions came from other business executives who heard Young 
speak. The president of the Michigan State Chamber of Commerce told him, 
"In all my years of experience in providing some leadership in the civil rights 
area, I have never experienced a deeper impact that anyone has made on a 
group than you did .... We are going to hold a series of meetings with our 
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industrial leaders to set up action programs to be certain that they become 
more active, by making special effort[s] for employment of minority work-
ers." An officer in the Associated Merchandising Corporation wrote, "Your 
talk had great impact on our Directors. A great part of that impact ... re-
sulted from the number of positive programs which you enumerated for 
meeting the problems which face us." The executive director of the National 
Association of Mutual Savings Banks wrote to Young and observed, "I have 
never heard an address that had greater impact on [an] audience." He added 
that Young was correct. "Savings banks do have the capability to help black 
people, and this capability has not been applied to any where near the extent 
it should." The businessman concluded that Young's speech had given him "a 
genuine determination to do away with the indifference and insensitivity of 
the past, in order ... to help black people." In agreement with the League 
leader, the banker declared that there was no problem in this nation more 
urgent. 8 Thus, Young's frank analysis of the issues facing the black popula-
tion and how businesses could help in solving them won him applause from 
corporate audiences. 
At the same time Young did not allow his commentaries to pull him 
toward positions that potential business benefactors deemed too "radical." 
Here again, he sought a middle ground that maintained his integrity as a 
black leader but preserved his credibility with corporate supporters. In 1968 
Young traveled to Monticello, Mississippi, to participate in the opening of 
new facilities of the St. Regis Paper Company. He also spoke to supporters of 
the newly launched Jackson, Mississippi, Urban League. Since the Black Power 
ideology now dominated national discourse about race relations, Young fo-
cused his comments on this subject. Although many Black Power advocates 
emphasized separatism and sometimes racial chauvinism, the League leader 
vowed "to channel Black Power efforts into a constructive force." He wanted 
to "eliminate feelings of ill will and separatism." He added, "Black racism as 
opposed to white racism is a reaction to lynchings, discrimination, and the 
like, and we must be careful not to confuse the two .... If you truly believe in 
equality, however, you must realize that black people have the same right to a 
few crackpots as white people. It is rather strange, in fact, that there are not 
more black crackpots than there are. You hear very few instances of a gang of 
black men staging a lynching."9 Young dismissed as racists and crackpots 
numerous Black Power advocates whose articulation of racial pride aroused 
in whites the specter of violence and racial militancy. Young wanted to disso-
ciate himself and the League from such views. In that effort he met with some 
success among his business backers. 
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Young had expressed similar sentiments in Mississippi in 1966. At that 
time James Meredith, whose efforts in 1962 opened the University of Miss is-
sippi to black students, staged a one-man march against fear. Mter he was 
shot, numerous black leaders including Young agreed to finish the Meredith 
march. At a rally in LeFlore County, Mississippi, SNCC spokesman Stokely 
Carmichael introduced Black Power into the lexicon of the black struggle. 
Immediately, Young denounced the term and the separatist and violent con-
notations to which it referred. Business executives to whom Young sent a 
report applauded him for his responsible leadership. The vice president of the 
F&M Schaefer Brewing Company was so impressed with Young's statement 
"that I circulated it among my colleagues who were equally impressed." The 
vice president for industrial relations at the Garrett Corporation was encour-
aged "to know that America has a man like you, and an organization like 'our' 
Urban League to help us 'keep our heads' in troubled times." The senior vice 
president at the Newark-based Prudential Insurance Company understood 
Young's posture the best. To Young he wrote, "The civil rights movement .. 
. is taking a most unfortunate direction. The voices of sanity and wisdom are 
in danger of being drowned out by radicals preaching a doctrine that is going 
to do a lot of harm before it's discredited. This couldn't come at a worse time 
for me. I'm trying to get a group of Newark's business leaders organized to 
work on Newark's social problems, and this present trend, if it continues, 
isn't going to help any." He added that "the extremism that threatens to alien-
ate so many people" had to be moderated. "If the negroes and whites get 
polarized into two hostile camps, we're in for serious trouble, and our efforts 
for real integration will be seriously set back."lD Young wanted to retain sup-
port from corporate leaders like the Prudential executive, and clearly he had 
to eschew Black Power in order to do it. 
Nonetheless, while he maintained business backing, Young found that 
this task was difficult. In 1968 the Shenango Valley Urban League, based in 
the Sharon-Farrell area of western Pennsylvania, sought support from the 
Westinghouse Electric Corporation. The vice president and general manager 
of the Sharon facility expressed skepticism about the League and refused spon-
sorship "without knowing more about it." A newspaper article about Young's 
speech at the convention of CORE simplistically noted that he espoused Black 
Power. In a clear reference to the League's "New Thrust," the article observed 
that Young's group was moving toward organizing blacks for political and 
social activity. The Westinghouse official wanted the executive director of the 
local United Fund to know that since "Mr. Young has embraced the concept 
of Black Power ... I then consider the application of any United Fund money 
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to foster that not only unwarranted but as undesirable." To eliminate the 
confusion Young forwarded a speech he gave in Denver to the United Com-
munity Funds and Councils of America. In it he said, "All Black Power is 
really saying is 'I want to participate in those decisions which affect the des-
tiny of my family and my community.'" He explained that the aim of "New 
Thrust" was to facilitate communication between inner-city residents and 
"the man downtown."ll Young's benign interpretation of Black Power made 
his adoption of the term palatable to the League's corporate benefactors and 
allowed for continued advocacy of business support of black aspirations. 
Young used numerous strategies to solicit funds from major corpora-
tions. Interaction with executives at various civic and social gatherings, con-
tacts with them at sites where he delivered speeches, and cultivation lun-
cheons gave Young many opportunities to persuade potential contributors to 
donate money to the National Urban League. His relationship with Charles 
E. Spahr, president of Standard Oil of Ohio, for example, derived from their 
participation in the federally sponsored Plans for Progress, an initiative to 
encourage minority hiring. Young used the occasion to tell Spahr about the 
importance of business support for the League. Without corporate backing, 
he said, "We could not have developed the Skills Bank, which has been so 
helpful to corporations seeking non-white personnel." Although Spahr's com-
pany aided the Cleveland Urban League through its local United Fund dona-
tions, Young urged him also to consider the National Urban League and its 
constituency of 21 million blacks. 12 Young had also developed ties with Stan-
dard Oil of New Jersey. That firm's annual gift doubled from $25,000 in 
1963 to $50,000 in 1966. He deepened that company's commitment to the 
League through his relationship with George M. Buckingham, executive sec-
retary of Standard Oil's Contributions Committee, and M.M. Brisco, the 
company vice president. One executive noted that the League's increased fund-
ing from Standard Oil resulted from Young's personal contact with Brisco.13 
Young's speaking engagements also provided him access to various cor-
porate leaders whom he lobbied for contributions to the League. His interac-
tion with a group of important insurance executives was illustrative. He ad-
dressed a meeting of theirs in 1966. His host introduced him to a vice president 
of the Continental Insurance Company. Both men believed that Young should 
also meet the chairman and chief executive officer of Continental, J. Victor 
Herd. At this point, an executive with Metropolitan Life Insurance Com-
pany suggested that Gilbert Fitzhugh, the firm's board chairman, should bring 
Young and Herd together. Fitzhugh consented. He arranged for Young to 
lunch with Herd and the new president of Metropolitan, Charles A. Siegfried. 
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Whitney Young thanked Fitzhugh for broadening his ties to other top execu-
tives in the insurance industry.14 Similar procedures brought Young to the 
attention of other corporate leaders, many of whom became key contributors 
to the National Urban League. 
Drawing business executives to the League's Corporate Support Com-
mittee was another way for Young to strengthen his financial appeals. At 
various times during the 1960s committee members included J.L. Atwood, 
president of North American Aviation, Kendrick R Wilson Jr., chairman 
and chief executive officer of the Avco Corporation, Edgar M. Bronfman, 
president of Joseph Seagram and Son, and Russell DeYoung, chairman and 
chief executive officer of Goodyear Tire and Rubber. The firms over which 
they presided donated in 1966, for example, sums that ranged between $7,500 
and $12,000. 15 
Moreover, these business leaders lent their names to the League's fund-
raising letters, and they sponsored and hosted social gatherings at which Young 
solicited financial support from their industry colleagues. Sometimes Young 
drew influential business executives with the hope that exposure to League 
programs would deepen their commitment to the organization. That was 
probably his expectation in 1966 when the president of the powerful Bank of 
America joined the Corporate Support Committee, although that firm's an-
nual donation had been a paltry $100.16 
Crucial to Young's fund-raising efforts were cultivation luncheons held 
in Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Akron, Atlanta, De-
troit, and numerous other cities. Either Young or William R. Simms, the 
head of the League's Fund Department, contacted a key business executive in 
the designated city. That person would host a luncheon to which colleagues 
from other major companies in the area would be invited. In some instances, 
letters to invitees would be sent over the signature of the host, whose affilia-
tion with the League gave the luncheon credibility. Henry Ford II played a 
pivotal role in 1969 in putting together a cultivation luncheon for Detroit. 
He sent invitations to a prestigious roster of corporate leaders including the 
chairs or presidents of American Motors, Chrysler, General Motors, S.S. 
Kresge, McLouth Steel, Bendix, Burroughs, and Detroit Edison. He told 
them that Young, James Linen, and William M. Batten, board chairman of 
J C Penney and national chairman of the League's 1968-1969 campaign, would 
be there for "an informal presentation of some major new directions they are 
mapping out for the League."I? 
In 1969 Simms laid the groundwork for the League's second cultiva-
tion luncheon in St. Louis. Because William Batten played an important role 
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behind the scenes, "a very top level group" came to meet Whitney Young. 
Batten persuaded Maurice Chambers, the chairman ofInterco, Inc., to host 
the occasion. Chambers's company was one of the big suppliers to JC Penney, 
Batten's firm. Chambers invited an impressive group of St. Louis's corporate 
elite. They included the top executives from Ralston Purina, Southwestern 
Bell, Falstaff Brewing, Monsanto, and other major companies. Simms told 
Young that Batten's contact with Chambers produced an audience that was 
"much more imposing than the group that we spoke to ... a couple of years 
ago."188 
Young had high hopes for the League's Atlanta gathering. Coca-Cola 
seemed to be the linchpin in Young's fund-raising in the South. A relation-
ship with J. Paul Austin, president of Coca-Cola, proved critical. He started 
to court Austin in 1968 when they met at an Equal Opportunity Day dinner 
sponsored by the Atlanta Urban League. A few months later Austin hosted a 
cultivation luncheon for the National Urban League. Although Coca-Cola 
had been a regular League contributor, Simms believed that the company 
"should be giving us more." He hoped that this involvement would nudge 
Austin to increase Coca-Cola's donations. Simms also wanted his boss to 
know about the Lette Pate Evans Foundation and the Emily and Ernest Woo-
druff Foundation, both of which grew out of fortunes made with the Coca-
Cola Company. He thought that Young and James Linen "should seek Mr. 
Austin's advice on the best approach to these foundations and who the best 
person might be." Austin also agreed to solicit contributions from the excel-
lent group of luncheon invitees. 19 
Young attached great importance to corporate solicitations. Through-
out the 1960s contributions from major firms constituted a lion's share of 
League income. His persistence in raising money among business executives 
caused corporate donations to rise steadily. When Young became executive 
director of the national organization in 1961, business gave $70,000 to the 
League. Corporate funding doubled to $153,000 in 1962 and reached 
$1,500,000 in 1969.20 
Corporate Donations to the National Urban League, 1961-1969 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
$ 70,000 
$ 153,000 
$ 527,000 
$ 657,000 
1965 
1966 
1968 
1969 
$ 848,000 
$ 888,000 
$1,200,000 
$1,500,000 
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Nonetheless, these seemingly stunning amounts left Young dissatisfied. 
Although major corporations were making unprecedented financial commit-
ments to aid the elevation of the black population, Young extended to them 
polite but restrained applause. Only seven companies in 1965, for example, 
contributed between $25,000 and $55,000. These included the Bell Sys-
tems, E.!. du Pont de Nemours, Ford, General Motors, IBM, Socony Mobil 
Oil, and Standard Oil of New Jersey. Another nineteen firms gave between 
$10,000 and $24,999, and thirty-two gave between $5,000 and $9,999. The 
other 119 corporations gave less than $5,000, with thirty-five giving less than 
$1,000.21 
What irritated Young and Simms was the parsimony of some well-heeled 
companies. In discussing the League's Akron cultivation luncheon, for ex-
ample, Simms remindedYoung that $1,000 came from the GeneralTire Foun-
dation and its parent company, Aerojet General Corporation in California. 
That amount, the two agreed, was far too small. When American Can cut its 
$5,000 donation in 1968 to $1,000, Young returned the check. Also, in 1968 
Crown Zellerbach gave the League only $1,500, a small increase from an-
earlier contribution of $1,000. "When other companies recognized our in-
creased needs," observed Simms, "this company did not."22 
Far worse than parsimony was the failure to give at all. In 1968, for 
example, Young went to Chicago to address the American Paper Institute-
Fibre Box Association Employee Relations Conference. This national group 
drew to its meeting 250 industrial relations officers from various pulp, paper, 
paperboard, and corrugated box companies. Although six important firms 
such as Scott Paper and St. Regis Paper regularly contributed, Young wanted 
to persuade another half dozen of the largest corporations to donate, includ-
ing International Paper, Weyerhaeuser, and Kimberly Clark. He continued 
this campaign in 1969 in a speech to the Fibre Box Association where he 
impressed Charles S. Wolf ofYork Container Company with his "impassionate 
tone" and "good sense" about the need for business leaders to "involve them-
selves more in the problem of the races."23 
Young's staff kept a careful tally on League donations by industries and 
cities. For example, he told the board chairman of the Dallas-based Dresser 
Industries that the NUL received very few contributions from the farm and 
construction machinery business. Moreover, other corporations in this Texas 
metropolis failed to follow Dresser in backing the League. Young urged the 
board chairman of the Hagger Company to consider a contribution and "join 
the Honor Roll of forward-looking companies that are supporting this work." 
He informed the head of Ling-Temco-Vought that the League already had 
Corporate Philanthropy and Civil Rights 219 
nine benefactors from the electronics industry, and he urged this Dallas firm 
to become the tenth. On the other hand, Young was pleased that in 1969 
Cincinnati yielded to the League a respectable $22,250 in contributions from 
Kroger, Federated Department Stores, Baldwin Piano and Organ, Western 
and Southern Life Insurance, and Procter and Gamble. Nonetheless, five con-
tributing companies were too few for a city the size of Cincinnati. Young and 
Simms wanted to add numerous other corporations to its list of donors and 
increase support by at least $15,000.24 
Young was correct in expecting greater support from the nation's For-
tune 500. Whenever he encountered a company that either donated nothing 
or allowed a token contribution to be noted next to its corporate name, he 
loudly denounced it as short-sighted stinginess toward the black struggle. 
But even he understood that annual corporate gifts amounting to $1,000,000 
were unprecedented. Such support argued for viewing the glass as half full 
rather than half empty. 
Moreover, Young brought the civil rights movement into corporate 
boardrooms and caused executives to understand that their attitude toward 
the black struggle truly mattered. By ignoring it, they would intensify the 
problems. By engaging issues relevant to blacks, they had a chance to effect 
significant social and economic change. He provided business leaders with 
programs and an organization through which the black population could be 
helped. Young articulated issues in ways that conveyed the depth of black 
unrest and at the same time drew support from corporate executives. So im-
pressive were his skills that the president of Standard Oil of Ohio offered 
Young a position in the company.25 
Young's ability to win grants from foundations proved more successful 
than his solicitations from corporations. He developed remunerative rela-
tionships for the National Urban League with the Rockefeller philanthropies, 
the Ford Foundation, the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, and the Carnegie Cor-
poration of New York. Although smaller in size and resources, the Taconic 
Foundation also played a pivotal role. Special programs gained financial sup-
port from such sundry sources as the Richard King Mellon, Field, and Stern 
Foundations. These and other philanthropies contributed $62,000 to the 
National Urban League in 1961 and $707,000 in 1966. Various foundations 
donated $2,900,000 in 1969, nearly twice as much as corporate contribu-
tions duting that year. 26 
Much of Young's success with foundation funding lay with the special 
ties between the League and the Rockefeller philanthropies. Although ongo-
ing relationships with these important foundations predated Young, he ex-
220 Militant Mediator 
tended them and drew to the League unprecedented financial support. Be-
tween 1941 and 1969 the Rockefeller Brothers Fund gave the NUL $1,518,184. 
Only $73,850 came to the organization between 1941 and 1961. Approxi-
mately $1,444,334 flowed into League coffers from 1961 through 1969.27 
A similarly productive relationship occurred with the Rockefeller Foun-
dation. For example, between 1964 and 1971 the League received $1,850,000 
for its Leadership Development Program and for New Thrust. Additional 
support from the philanthropy benefited another program for black veterans 
in 1969 in the amount of $500,000. The National Urban League received at 
least $3,794,334 from the Rockefeller Brothers Fund and the Rockefeller 
Foundation during the 1960s. While Young headed the National Urban 
League, these two philanthropies gave more than any other foundation. 28 
Lindsley F. Kimball, who sponsored Young's candidacy to head the 
National Urban League, remained an important liaison with the Rockefeller 
Foundation. He served as a trustee of the foundation from 1947 through 
1971 and its treasurer from 1959 through 1965. Kimball became a League 
trustee in 1959 and its president in 1964. Both terms ended in 1968.29 
At the same time Young's relationship with the Rockefeller Foundation 
extended further. John D. Rockefeller III informed the League leader in 1968 
that he had been elected to the Rockefeller Foundation board of trustees. In 
urging Young's acceptance, Rockefeller added, "It would mean much to me." 
He assured Young that "membership on the Board does not affect the finan-
cial relationship of the Trustee's institution with the Foundation." Whenever 
the League presented a request, Young would simply excuse himself from that 
part of the meeting. Surely, he was glad to have this new relationship with the 
Foundation.3o 
The Rockefeller philanthropies made a major financial commitment to 
the National Urban League. Moreover, with Young at the helm, it seemed 
that the organization finally had a leader who acted in sync with the burgeon-
ing civil rights movement. Nonetheless, Kimball took seriously the dual role 
of NUL president and liaison with the Rockefeller philanthropies. In 1964 
Young requested that the Rockefeller Foundation fund a leadership develop-
ment program. At that point, Young, who sometimes disregarded bureau-
cratic procedures and unilaterally advanced League initiatives, met resistance 
from Kimball. 
Leland C. De Vinney; deputy director in the humanities and social 
sciences at the Rockefeller Foundation, telephoned Kimball to determine 
whether he knew about Young's submission of a leadership development pro-
posal. Kimball noted that he had very limited information and thus was not 
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prepared to recommend it. According to De Vinney, Kimball criticized Young 
for becoming "foundation happy" and submitting large proposals to Ford, 
Carnegie, and Rockefeller without seeking approval from his own board or 
from Kimball. De Vinney learned that Kimball considered himself head of 
the national organization and Whitney Young merely head of the staff. Not 
surprisingly, De Vinney concluded that action would not proceed on a League 
proposal that its president opposed. Kimball replied that he was not oppos-
ing it. Rather, he expected to be consulted and allowed to approve Young's 
proposalsY 
De Vinney contacted J. George Harrar, president of the Rockefeller 
Foundation, and he agreed that Kimball's reservations mandated a postpone-
ment. Young, who heard from both De Vinney and Kimball, learned that the 
foundation awaited a resolution of this bureaucratic matter before the grant 
request could be reconsidered. De Vinney wanted the assurance that the re-
sponsible officials of the National Urban League were in agreement. Young 
said that he understood, and he promised to "move promptly to clear up any 
internal confusion." That he did. Within days Kimball told De Vinney, 
"Whitney Young has been duly authorized to act for the League in this in-
stance and I believe plans to resubmit the application .... It certainly has my 
blessing." The Rockefeller Foundation appropriated $450,000 to support the 
League initiative. 32 
This power play demonstrated that Young's importance as a black leader, 
while considerable, was nonetheless circumscribed. He proposed nothing radi-
cal in the leadership development program. Other than strengthening some 
of the specifics, Kimball asked for no major changes. In fact, he noted that 
the resubmitted proposal was substantially the same. What he wanted Young 
to know was that his access to the Rockefeller philanthropies depended on 
his assent.33 
This incident probably explained why Young carefully cultivated and 
sustained these beneficial ties with the League's principal benefactors. In 1969, 
for example, Young denounced James Forman when the latter sharply criti-
cized the Rockefeller family. Young knew the former spokesman for SNCC 
when Forman represented the organization on the Council for United Civil 
Rights Leadership (CUCRL). He was now involved with the Black Economic 
Development Conference, a group which demanded reparations for slavery 
and segregation. Toward this end Forman interrupted services at Riverside 
Church in New York City and declared to surprised worshippers that they 
bore responsibility for compensating blacks for their racial oppression. This 
congregation, an ecumenical venture which the Rockefellers started and sup-
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ported, seemed to Forman an appropriate site to tell white churches what 
they owed to blacks. An irritated Young told John D. Rockefeller III, ''Any 
time you want me to publicly explain to James Forman and his ilk ... that 
the Rockefeller Family has in fact given to black people as much, if not more, 
than they are now asking, I am ready to do so." To Young the Rockefellers' 
contributions to the League surely qualified him to make such a declaration. 
Despite the constraints that foundation officials imposed upon him, Young 
defended these benefactors to seemingly ungrateful or uninformed black ac-
tivists.34 That Young positioned himself as sympathetic to Rockefeller per-
spectives certainly helped whenever the League required emergency dona-
tions. In 1970, for example, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund contributed 
$25,000 to the League during a financial crisis. Young told Dana Creel, the 
head of the Fund, and his staff, "Your confidence ... lends much encourage-
ment to me."35 
The Rockefeller philanthropies also preferred Young's leadership for rea-
sons similar to those of major corporations. He advocated ordered social change 
of the sort which allowed significant input from the foundations. Leland C. 
De Vinney, for example, proved to be an influential proponent of the League 
within the Rockefeller Foundation. Despite Young's bureaucratic blunder with 
Kimball over the League's chain of command, De Vinney believed that the 
League was peculiarly fitted to playa moderating role in the civil rights move-
ment. That could be accomplished only with backing from the Rockefeller 
Foundation. De Vinney specifically referred to the leadership development 
proposal, which aimed "to identifY and provide first rate education for tal-
ented Negro youth" so as "to build up intelligent and responsible Negro lead-
ership."36 
Another example was the Rockefeller Brothers' endorsement of the 
National Skills Bank. With $100,000 in grants in 1963 and 1964 and $50,000 
in 1965, the Fund supported this practical program, which matched quali-
fied blacks with available employment opportunities. In 1965 fifty-seven of 
the League's seventy-two affiliates participated with a record 5,300 place-
ments. Kimball thought that the Fund had "bought the best eleemosynary 
bargain in the Skills Bank-no eyewash, good idea, capably carried out, and 
our money's worth in human betterment."37 
While deference to officials in the Rockefeller philanthropies sometimes 
characterized Young's conduct, he tried the same methods that occasionally 
worked with corporate executives. Citing the militancy of other black lead-
ers, Young appeared to coerce some foundation support for League propos-
als. In a 1964 proposal to the Rockefeller Foundation Young outlined an 
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Urban League fellowship program to improve staff training and performance. 
Additionally, Young wanted to finance the schooling of selected social work 
students to prepare them for careers with the League. One official did not 
want the Rockefeller Foundation to undertake the staffing of Young's organi-
zation. Apparently, Young contended that "beefing up" the League was "the 
only alternative to increased dominance of extremists in the civil rights con-
flict." Young's conclusion was soundly rejected. Moreover, the official noted 
in Young's rhetoric "a kind of threat implicit (and nearly explicit) in his pre-
sentation" which linked a failure to fund the project as tantamount to letting 
militants take over the black freedom struggle. Young's alleged ploy was char-
acterized as "distasteful" and his proposal drew from the foundation "a gentle 
no"P8 
Although Young could claim much credit for the large sums he drew to 
the League from the Rockefeller philanthropies, other factors also accounted 
for his success. First, the League had been the recipient of Rockefeller gener-
osity long before Young assumed national office. Second, he became the ex-
ecutive director because Kimball thought that he could revive the organiza-
tion. Kimball instructed a sometimes impetuous Whitney Young on how to 
apply for foundation grants from the Rockefeller philanthropies. 
A militant civil rights movement and a grassroots and seemingly hostile 
Black Power thrust alerted powerful white institutions to the depth of black 
discontent with discrimination and ghettoization. Officials in the Rockefeller 
charities supported proposals that stressed social and economic objectives in 
the hope that they would result in substantive racial progress. A well-equipped 
League, according to Rockefeller officials, seemed best suited to achieve such 
ends. As a result, Young had to say very little about the existence of a national 
racial crisis. Rather, the details of whatever proposal he advanced for funding 
became his primary emphasis in appealing for aid. 
That Whitney Young bore Lindsley Kimball's imprimatur eased his entry 
into the Rockefeller philanthropies. This advantage was not applicable, how-
ever, to the Ford Foundation, the other important philanthropy with which 
Young had dealings. His initial encounters with the Ford Foundation did not 
produce any easy successes. Painstakingly, Young and his staff had to make 
their case for Ford funding. 
Henry T. Heald, a civil engineer and former chancellor of New York 
University, served as president of the Ford Foundation from 1956 to 1966.39 
In October 1961 Lindsley Kimball reminded Heald that they had agreed to 
meet about a lifesaving operation for the National Urban League. Kimball 
wanted to include Young in a meeting with Heald and other Ford officials. 
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Young could be excluded if their need for candor required more privacy. 
Nonetheless, Heald received from Henry Steeger, then president of the Na-
tional Urban League, a financial appeal for its 1962 program. Specifically, 
Steeger wanted funds to establish a Washington bureau "to provide our local 
affiliates with complete and current analyses of those federal programs which 
have a particular relevance to the needs and problems faced by Negro citi-
zens." A potential Ford contribution would also "launch an effective action-
oriented program of objective fact-finding and the use of such facts in con-
structive social change." Steeger called attention to proposals pertaining to 
the several areas in which the League was active including housing, health 
and welfare, youth guidance, and training and employment. "It is our sincere 
hope that funds can be provided for these programs," noted Steeger. These 
omnibus proposals, however, were not well received at Ford. The foundation 
"took the position," observed one staff member, "that we could not consider 
general support for them." Instead, Ford met with local and national League 
staff to "explore some specific program activities which would harmonize 
with our overall objectives in the Youth Development Program."40 
The Ford Foundation solicited a League proposal on vocational guid-
ance for black youth, and the League planned a youth program "to steer them 
toward realistic careers and employment and toward opening new opportu-
nities." Six affiliates would share in a grant of $1.5 to $2 million over three 
years. The National Urban League would receive between 10 and 12 percent 
to administer the initiative. Young fashioned a proposal that reflected Ford 
preferences. For example, he was cognizant of foundation thinking concern-
ing youth in public service jobs, apprenticeships, and preparation for middle-
class leadership. Also, such consultants as Robert C. Weaver, then a federal 
housing official, and John Field of the President's Committee on Equal Em-
ployment Opportunities endorsed the capacity of the new National Urban 
League to implement this vocational program. Surprisingly, the Ford Foun-
dation refused the grant.41 
Henry Heald received a poignant letter from Young expressing his dis-
appointment. He suggested that Winthrop Rockefeller, a board member of 
the National Urban League, arrange a conference with Heald on this matter. 
Ultimately, Young wanted Heald to allow a resubmission of the request so 
that Ford could give it favorable consideration. Heald, however, would not 
budge. He assured Young, "This is not something that my colleagues took 
lightly. A lot of time and attention were given to this proposal." Young could 
send additional information and meet about the matter if he wished. Heald 
acknowledged the importance ofWinthrop Rockefeller in League affairs, but 
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he pointedly told Young that a visit from him to Ford would have little sig-
nificance in this case.42 
Despite these disappointments, neither Kimball nor Young abandoned 
efforts to win Ford for the League. Subsequently, in 1965 there was funding 
for the League's business orientation program for black educators and the 
trade union occupations project. Moreover, Kimball met with Heald to so-
licit funds to help buy another headquarters for the League. Ford acquiesced 
with a $600,000 grant. As a result, Ford staff became better acquainted with 
the League and its national leader. 
A memorandum that circulated within the Ford Foundation observed 
that the League, unlike other civil rights groups, had a singular capacity to 
deal with the social and economic issues confronting blacks. "It stands as the 
best example of a responsible organization with increasingly strong support 
throughout influential segments of the white community and excellent, up-
to-date credentials in the Negro community," the memo stated. In the com-
petition with more openly militant groups including the NAACP, CORE, and 
SNCC, "the League established anew its capacity to perform essential tasks in 
effecting social change." Because of the League's business and community 
chest funding, "its weapons therefore must be more subtle and professional 
than those of the civil rights organizations." To Young belonged much credit 
for ably leading the League. Ford officials who acknowledged that he was "an 
effective marcher when marching is called for" also liked his good sense in 
stating, "You can holler, protest, march, picket, demonstrate, but somebody 
must be able to sit in on the strategy conference and plot a course. There 
must be the strategists, the researchers and the professionals to carry out a 
program. That's our role." Ford staff liked these characteristics in a civil rights 
group and in its leader.43 
Two major developments had occurred since Young's initial encounter 
with Henry Heald. First, the civil rights movement had gained widespread 
biracial support throughout the country and significant federal backing, es-
pecially from the White House. Also, as a major civil rights leader, Young 
made the League a visible and influential part of the movement coalition. 
Second, Ford officials in 1965, figuring that the League could be important 
"for access into the Negro community," wanted Whitney Young and the 
National Urban League to play this role. Moreover, the prograrnmatic thrust 
of the League more easily fit Ford funding patterns, and less controversy 
would occur when foundation contributions poured into this business-backed 
organization.44 
The impact of the civil rights movement on Ford officers is best seen in 
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the growing influence of Paul N. Ylvisaker and Christopher F. Edley Sr. 
Ylvisaker, a Harvard Ph.D. and former professor, worked as assistant to the 
mayor of Philadelphia before he transferred to the Ford Foundation in 1955. 
He became the director of Ford's public affairs program. Already a racial lib-
eral, Ylvisaker was greatly affected by the growing momentum of the civil 
rights movement, and he wanted the Ford Foundation to respond in some 
way. His hiring of Edley in 1963 derived in part from these sentiments.45 
Edley and another staff member in the international affairs division 
were the first blacks to become program officers in the Ford Foundation. 
Prepared with a Harvard law degree, Edley served in Philadelphia as an assis-
tant district attorney and as a federal counsel with the U.S. Commission of 
Civil Rights and the Federal Housing and Home Finance Agency. Once 
Ylvisaker hired him in his public affairs division, Edley shared his boss's zeal 
to change the Ford Foundation. A black Philadelphia pastor, the Reverend 
Leon H. Sullivan, asked for monies to launch vocational training centers for 
inner-city residents. When the proposal arrived on Edley's desk, it had al-
ready elicited negative comments from other program officials. Edley's per-
suasive rebuttal to his colleagues helped to get the grant for Sullivan's success-
ful Opportunities Industrialization Centers (OIC).46 
Ylvisaker and Edley brought this same altruism to the civil rights move-
ment. Edley's first assignment was to write a report about whether Ford should 
do anything to help the various civil rights groups. Whitney Young and his 
National Urban League became his specific focus. He was particularly im-
pressed with Young's leadership, noting that "a major criticism of the Na-
tional Urban League has been its failure or inability to exercise central pro-
gram direction." He credited Young with eliminating that problem. 
In an intensive session Edley proposed two initiatives that he wanted 
Young to adopt for the League. First, Edley suggested an innovative way of 
strengthening the League infrastructure. He proposed that each division-
education, housing, industrial relations, and others-have.as its head a black 
who was the nation's foremost authority in that field. Young said, however, 
that he could not do it. Since League officials counted on promotion from 
within, such an initiative would undermine morale. Edley's second sugges-
tion proposed the development of a nonprofit housing development corpo-
ration that Ford could help to fund through the League. Despite a prior 
approval from Edley's superiors, Young rejected the idea. Notwithstanding 
Young's negative responses, Edley remained committed to involving the Ford 
funds in League activities. In late 1965 he told Ylvisaker, "We must continue 
to give top priority to the substance of Urban League programming."47 
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Also, during this period other Ford officials grew impressed with the 
League and endorsed Young's leadership style. One officer said, "Young ap-
pears to hold his own effectively in the Wilkins-Farmer-King-Lewis circle." It 
was conceded that the League's popularity with corporate executives and con-
servative labor leaders occurred because it "looks safer than the alternatives." 
Young and his organization had to compete not only with other civil rights 
spokespersons and their groups but also with a younger generation of mili-
tants. They represented disillusioned inner-city blacks who recently rioted in 
Watts in Los Angeles and other ghetto communities. This Ford official liked 
the League because it was "increasingly professional in the way it does busi-
ness." It resembled "those white community agencies with which any civic-
minded businessman or labor leader has learned to work." Despite this vis-
ible white support, "the League is holding its own in the midst of the more 
militant groups." Consequently; "the Urban League is an organization that 
deserves our strong support." He added, "This support should take both the 
obvious financial form and the less obvious form of promoting individual 
leaders' growth" in the organization."48 
When McGeorge Bundy succeeded Henry Heald in 1966, he inherited 
a foundation that already had important involvements with civil rights orga-
nizations. Bundy came to Ford with a distinguished background in academia 
and government. At Harvard University he was dean of the faculty of arts and 
sciences from 1953 through 1961. He then served as the president's special 
assistant for national security from 1961 through 1966.49 
The year that Bundy assumed his duties at Ford was a critical year for 
the black freedom struggle. The civil rights movement with its focus on de-
stroying legalized racial segregation with legislative and judicial remedies 
yielded to ghetto rebellions and the ugly social and economic inequities that 
they revealed. This shift in the black struggle challenged older establishment 
leaders and created angry, younger spokespersons who were cynical about the 
Lindsley Kimballs and McGeorge Bundys of the world. Whitney Young tried 
to stand in the breach. He believed that the League was well equipped to deal 
with the social and economic ills of inner cities. At the same time he had 
access to major foundations that could provide funding for such massive 
projects. Perhaps unwittingly Ylvisaker, Edley, and others had laid important 
groundwork for Young within the Ford Foundation. With extensive rioting 
in ghetto communities across the nation, Bundy wanted Ford to respond. 
Ironically; his predecessors had already prepared the way. 50 
Bundy announced a bold domestic initiative for the Ford Foundation 
on August 2, 1966. Speaking at a Philadelphia meeting of the National Ur-
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ban League, he said, "Full equality for all American Negroes is now the most 
urgent domestic concern of this country." The Ford Foundation, he observed, 
would focus its funding in crucial efforts to improve the condition of blacks. 
Bundy noted a "need for wider and stronger leadership, both among Negroes 
and among whites." The nation needed white leaders squarely to face the 
reality of racial issues while Negro leaders would be reinforced in their work 
for "peaceful progress." He also wanted to make real the legal rights of blacks 
"and all who are poor." Such talk of justice "calls for urgency, and priority, 
and preference for what helps to end injustice." Moreover, he wanted the 
Ford Foundation to be involved in that "special war on the special kind of 
Negro poverty" that uniquely afflicted this segment of the population. In 
keeping with his pledge to his League audience, Bundy received from his 
board of trustees approval in December 1966 to allocate $4,270,000 "for 
support of national organizations dedicated to the improvement of the status 
of Negroes through positive action programs."51 
The Ford Foundation pursued a multifaceted thrust into the nation's 
black communities. The development of grassroots institutions, local leader-
ship, and community rehabilitation like that in Brooklyn's Bedford Stuyvesant 
Redevelopment Corporation became Ford's primary emphasis. The founda-
tion also targeted its grants to legal groups who helped the disadvantaged. 
The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., and the Lawyers' Com-
mittee on Civil Rights Under Law benefited from this initiative. Addition-
ally, Ford officials supported national civil rights organizations and their leaders. 
Hence, the NAACP, CORE, SCLC, and NUL received funding. 52 
McGeorge Bundy proved serious in his commitment to deeper Ford 
involvement with civil rights groups. While all organizations were eligible for 
Ford grants, foundation officials surely preferred some groups over others. 
Consequently, the earliest deliberations about Ford funding resulted in "a 
pecking order" that favored the NAACP and the NUL. 53 
Ford staff correctly contended that "the explosive 'Black Power' cry" in 
1966 "effectively split the civil rights movement." While SNCC and CORE oc-
cupied one end of the spectrum, the NAACP, NUL, and to some extent SCLC 
positioned themselves as less militant alternatives. This polarization caused 
the black freedom struggle to lose "its former sense of direction" and to result 
in Uncle Tom labels for the NAACP and the League. To the credit of these 
organizations, believed the Ford staff, "they have not succumbed to pressures 
for a recklessly militant posture." Although the foundation would not eschew 
other groups, it was important to invest in a "centrist" leadership. Such sup-
port would encourage a "responsible, not conservative" direction for the black 
Corporate Philanthropy and Civil Rights 229 
freedom struggle. "Hold the center" was what Mitchell Sviridoff, the head of 
Ford's National Affairs Division, wished to do. 54 
The Ford Foundation also wanted to "invest" in Whitney Young. Bundy 
initially knew more about the NAACP. Once he had heard Walter White speak. 
He also became familiar with Roy Wilkins, whom he held in high regard. 
Upon meeting Young, however, Bundy carne away very impressed. When-
ever Wilkins came to the foundation offices, his staff would do the presenta-
tions. Young did his own presentations and often negotiated with Bundy for 
more funds. They dealt with each other with great ease, and Bundy appar-
ently knew he was interacting with a peer! His respect for Young resulted in 
consideration of the League leader for the foundation's board of trustees. It 
was well known that Henry Ford "was very high on Young." Ultimately, Bundy 
abandoned the idea. First, Young was already on the board of the Rockefeller 
Foundation and was therefore unavailable to Ford. Second, some directors 
saw a conflict of interest as long as the League received Ford funds. That 
Bundy considered a Young nomination said much about his laudatory evalu-
ation of the League leader. 55 
Sviridoff shared Bundy's high opinion ofYoung. Funding for the League, 
in Sviridoff's view, symbolized confidence in Young's leadership. He was sel-
dom impressed with the League staff and their seemingly deficient presenta-
tions. According to Sviridoff, if League proposals had arrived at the founda-
tion without the presence of Young as head of the organization they would 
not have been considered seriously. Young, while a centrist, was politically 
sophisticated and charismatic. Ford would be wise, according to Sviridoff, to 
uphold Young's leadership. 56 
In 1966, receptive Ford officials received a League proposal to finance 
several disparate projects. They included hiring additional staff, continuing 
education for League officials, improved public relations, "program-related 
research," and funds to establish new affiliates. In January 1967, Young learned 
that a $430,000 grant extending to January 1968 was approved. The League 
leader acknowledged that the Ford funds made a difference in League pro-
gramming. For example, salary increases for staff occurred, expanded public 
relations allowed the organization to use radio and television, and League 
officials explored expansion possibilities in seven southern cities. An interim 
report showed that affiliates had opened already in Birmingham, Alabama, 
and in Columbia, South Carolina. The research area was the only initiative 
that awaited further development. Young cited "serious difficulties in recruit-
ing a suitable director" as the main obstacle. 57 
Ford officials noted that except for research activities the League's in-
230 Militant Mediator 
tentions had been fulfilled. Consequently, foundation staff recommended a 
grant renewal of $400,000 "usable at their discretion." The Ford people rec-
ognized that the League "may seem conservative against today's racial back-
ground." Nonetheless, its centrist position remained important. These offi-
cials thought that the organization "commends itself because it has a large 
base of support and interest among those parts of the Negro and white com-
munities which still seek amicable accommodation between the races." For 
this reason the Ford Foundation pledged funding to the League for another 
three years for a sum up to $800,000.58 Young had clearly established himself 
as a spokesman for middle- and working-class blacks who remained commit-
ted to integrationism and those whites who shared this aspiration. 
While McGeorge Bundy and Mitchell Sviridoff sustained Young's cen-
trist leadership with major grants to the League, they and two black Ford 
officials wanted the group to stay "in step" with militant activists in the black 
freedom struggle. Christopher Edley did not abandon efforts to revamp the 
League and increase its effectiveness in inner cities. After Bundy announced 
bold initiatives to involve the Ford Foundation in the civil rights matters, 
Young submitted an omnibus proposal that included steps to upgrade the 
quality of League personnel. Edley commended Young for this capacity for 
self-criticism. Now that this subject was open for discussion, Edley frankly 
stated his worries about the professionalism of the League's national officers. 
"The Program division heads," he noted, "do not command the respect of 
the more experienced local directors and their staffs." Improvement in this 
sphere depended on whether the League wanted to respond to the challenges 
facing it. Edley also suggested placing two deputies under Young. The League 
leader was "obviously too busy to give personal attention" to every matter 
that came before him. Moreover, Young admitted and Edley concurred that 
"he has not significantly improved the performance of locals." The Ford offi-
cial observed that "a limited financial base, conservatism, lack of aggressive-
ness ... are the bane of the locals." Also, "many local executives remain 
conservative with impunity and NUL is powerless." To remedy this stagnation 
in the nation's dynamic racial environment, Edley invited discussion of 
affiliates's relationship to the national organization. Ultimately, he wanted 
the League "to set forth its strategy for change" and show how Ford funding 
would lead to greater effectiveness. That meant grants to strengthen infra-
structure and to ensure a relevant League presence in the nation's inner cit-
ies. 59 
Roger Wilkins, nephew of NAACP leader Roy Wilkins, joined Edley at 
the Ford Foundation in 1969. Like Bundy and Sviridoff, Wilkins wanted to 
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strengthen centrist civil rights leadership. While he served in the Justice De-
partment, he and other black Johnson administration officials sought the 
cooperation of leading foundations to fortify black moderates in their com-
petition with Black Power advocates. Moreover, they wanted civil rights lead-
ers to be better informed when they entered meetings with Johnson adminis-
tration cabinet and agency officers. Wilkins, M. Carl Holman, Ed Sylvester, 
Lisle Carter, and a few others went to New York City to discuss with officials 
from several foundations a proposal to establish a joint civil rights center in 
Washington, D.C. As a headquarters for all the major civil rights groups, the 
center would support lobbying and research activities. This consortium would 
allow the organizations to learn firsthand about federal initiatives and would 
enable them to use the information more effectively. Roger Wilkins was espe-
cially concerned about civil rights groups knowing where to target their pro-
tests, proposals, and requests. Young, Roy Wilkins, Martin Luther King Jr., 
and Kenneth B. Clark participated in the discussions. When the idea of the 
civil rights headquarters was raised, Young, Roy Wilkins, and King turned 
them down cold. Both Young and Roy Wilkins feared a compromised role 
for Cernoria D. Johnson and Clarence Mitchell, their respective Washing-
ton, D.C. representatives. Roger Wilkins regretted the missed opportunity to 
push issues within the federal government that would aid civil rights groups 
and enhance their effectiveness and creativity as centrist organizations. At 
Ford he had a better chance to influence and support Young and other mod-
erate civil rights leaders. 60 
Wilkins served as a special assistant to Bundy, and he supervised experi-
mental human-service programs in Sviridoff's national affairs division. Thus, 
he had responsibility for some proposals that Young sent to the foundation. 
Wilkins was bothered less than Edley about projects without detailed plans 
of execution. What Wilkins stressed were innovative ideas that needed fund-
ing. Edley wanted some indication that proposals would work, whereas Wilkins 
had fewer apprehensions about experimental endeavors. Consequently, Young's 
"New Thrust" program gained Wilkins's support. He claimed credit for com-
mitting $3 million in Ford funds to the League initiative. While operating 
differently from Edley, Wilkins, like his colleague, wanted for the League a 
new direction and response to black urban violence and grassroots chants of 
"Black Power." Surely, "New Thrust" would enable the League to remain 
relevant to this important constituency. Edley and Wilkins apparently agreed 
that the Ford Foundation could help Young and the League maintain their 
credibility in the inner cities.61 
Young desperately wanted a relevant League just as much as Edley and 
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Wilkins. He realized that his group needed strong ties with urban blacks and 
with restive black students on the nation's campuses. Young, for example, 
resolved to get student representation on the NUL board of trustees. Wendell 
Freeland, a black Pittsburgh attorney, nominated Charles J. Hamilton Jr., a 
native of the Smoky City and a black student leader at Harvard University. In 
1968 he joined the board, where he was expected to share his activist perspec-
tives with his older colleagues. Young secured from the Henry Luce Founda-
tion a $35,000 grant to operate a summer program in 1968 that would draw 
members of the black student associations from black and white campuses to 
inner cities. To supplement the Luce grant, Young solicited $30,000 from the 
Ford Foundation.62 
Young wanted to help "black student leaders . . . to move from the 
rhetoric of revolution to the relevance of constructive community effort." 
Thirty-six undergraduates from twenty-five institutions received assignments 
to various League affiliates to work with inner-city residents. Between June 1 
and September 30, 1968, the students conducted black heritage classes, ad-
ministered youth recreational programs, strengthened ties between the League 
and the Black Panthers, and discussed economic and political developments 
with the residents. Supervision by local League executives showed the "mili-
tant" students the depth of NUL interest and involvement in ghetto commu-
nities. Again, the Ford Foundation supported a reorientation of League pro-
grams and objectives and helped to enhance its credibility in inner cities.63 
Young's relationship with Stephen Currier and the Taconic Foundation 
differed from his interactions with Lindsley Kimball of the Rockefeller phi-
lanthropies and McGeorge Bundy of the Ford Foundation. Kimball and Bundy 
represented established bureaucratic institutions in which numerous officials 
participated in grant decisions. The Taconic Foundation belonged to Stephen 
Currier, and he exercised direct control over its philanthropies. 
Established in 1958, the foundation supported social causes important 
to Stephen and Audrey Currier. The National Urban League received contri-
butions from both the Taconic Foundation and the Curriers themselves in 
the 1960s. Young regularly interacted with Stephen Currier, since they served 
as chairmen of the Council for United Civil Rights Leadership. Young also 
communicated frequently with Jane Lee J. Eddy, Taconic's executive director. 
Thus, he enjoyed an intimacy with the institution and its officials different 
from his dealings with the bureaucratic Rockefeller and Ford philanthropies. 
Moreover, Taconic's modest $7,770,397 assets, while small if compared with 
those oflarger foundations, provided crucial funding to the National Urban 
League.64 
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Young's relationship with Lindsley Kimball resembled his interaction 
with Stephen Currier. While functioning as Young's liaison with the Rockefeller 
philanthropies, Kimball also served as an officer in the National Urban League. 
Similarly, Currier, an active League benefactor, shared involvement in CUCRL 
with Young. Each introduced Young to other powerful whites who donated 
to the League and to other black betterment groups. Kimball often repre-
sented Young to Rockefeller benefactors, and he tried to help him develop 
ties with Henry Heald of the Ford Foundation. Currier introduced Young 
and his civil rights colleagues to wealthy donors like George Pratt, a Con-
necticut businessman who gave large sums to CUCRL. In some respects, Kimball 
and Currier were different, and Young knew it. Kimball was almost thirty 
years older than Young, and he had as much experience with black organiza-
tions like the League and the United Negro College Fund as his younger 
protege. Currier, however, lacked Kimball's sophisticated understanding about 
civil rights groups. Young's discussions with Kimball occurred between peers. 
His interaction with Currier, however, was educative. 
While the Taconic Foundation contributed to general support programs 
of the National Urban League, Young argued that some monies should go to 
affiliates, especially in the South. Most of a $50,000 grant in 1962 went to 
the national organization, but $10,000 was earmarked for the Little Rock 
Urban League and $5,000 for the New Orleans Urban League. Taconic sup-
port helped with the founding of the Jackson, Mississippi, affiliate in 1966. 
Enid C. Baird, Young's office administrator, told a Taconic official, "It would 
have been impossible without the support (moral as well as financial) of per-
sons such as yourself and the Curriers." Special interest also developed in the 
innovative but militant leadership of Edwin C. "Bill" Berry at the Chicago 
Urban League. In 1965 and 1966 the foundation transferred to the League 
stock whose sale yielded $100,882.90. The national organization kept over 
$34,000 and the Chicago affiliate gained nearly $36,000. Six southern affili-
ates shared the remainder, with most receiving $5,000 or $6,000. The $6,000 
designated for the Jacksonville Urban League, for example, financed most of 
this affiliate's budget. The $3,500 for the Tulsa affiliate permitted the reten-
tion of an employment officer.65 
Currier's involvement in CUCRL was unusual. Few benefactors became 
intimately involved with the routine fiscal affairs of the organizations they 
supported. Although he attended the meetings and for a time mailed out 
checks to the participating groups, Currier was unfamiliar with the civil rights 
movement. Currier was moved by his outrage over the 1963 Medgar Evers 
murder in Mississippi. He relied on Young to brief him on the broader mean-
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ing of the black struggle. Although Currier resigned from CUCRL in 1964, he 
maintained an active interest. Just before he died in an airplane crash in 1967, 
he gave the organization $43,500 for its national programs and for its Chi-
cago affiliate. While the Rockefeller philanthropies and the Ford Foundation 
gave large sums to the League, the smaller donations of the Taconic Founda-
tion strengthened several southern affiliates and supplemented the income of 
the national organization.66 
The relationships that Young developed with John Gardner and Everett 
N. Case, the respective presidents of the Carnegie Corporation of New York 
and the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, were unlike his close interactions with 
Kimball, Bundy, and Currier. Young would become Gardner's peer when the 
latter assumed leadership of the National Urban Coalition, but their contacts 
in the Carnegie context were formal and procedural.67 Young could not as 
easily trade on his personal affability to produce funding for the League. 
Rather, the solid reputation of the League and objective evaluations ofYoung's 
leadership drew support from the two foundations. One Carnegie official 
noted that the League "is unquestionably one of the most effective agencies 
in the field of equal opportunity." Another Carnegie officer said that Young 
"has done much to give the NUL new life and [in making] it a powerful mod-
erating influence in a period of controversy over civil rights."68 
Young inherited ties with Carnegie that Lester B. Granger had estab-
lished. When the foundation approved in 1962 a $215,000 grant for "educa-
tional motivation and guidance for Negro youth," Young was benefiting from 
Granger's groundwork. In 1964 Granger's track record helped Young again. 
He proposed "to reinstate a fellowship and training program which had been 
in operation prior to 1960." This program would assist students in inter-
group relations, especially those wishing to work for the National Urban 
League." Carnegie authorized $300,000 to be paid in $100,000 installments 
over three years in 1964, 1965, and 1966. A $200,000 renewal came in 1967 
for another two years in 1968 and 1969.69 
Although the Carnegie Corporation remained impressed with the League 
as the strongest of the moderate civil rights organizations (along with the 
NAACP), badly planned and poorly implemented programs did not receive 
foundation support. Until 1969 the Carnegie Corporation put $500,000 in 
League initiatives that drew upon Granger precedents. Young thought his 
"New Thrust" effort would win similar support, so he proposed an executive 
development program to put in place better trained officials in the affiliates 
to reorient the League at the grassroots. The aim was to recruit and train 
twenty-five new executives and to retrain twenty-five current executives over 
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two years. Young wanted $38,000 for planning and recruiting and $350,000 
for the actual training. Carnegie granted the requested $38,000, but reduced 
the second request to $142,000. 
Although Carnegie officials believed that the League deserved support, 
they were not impressed by the proposal. Funding had been approved, but 
Carnegie refused in 1970 to renew the grant. One officer noted that during 
the initial consideration of the appeal, "we were . . . simply trying to be 
responsive to the League." Once the funds had been disbursed, poor commu-
nications from the League official responsible for the program and limited 
results disappointed Carnegie officers. "They had been able to recruit only 
eight trainees," observed a Carnegie official, "of whom two dropped out." 
The foundation lost faith in the effort. "This was not an easy decision for us," 
wrote one official to Young. 
The Carnegie Corporation, however, did not close the door on the 
League altogether. In the official letter of rejection, Young was invited to 
return to the foundation "to discuss the general question of leadership re-
cruitment and training in the League and the group's role as a supplier of 
qualified black leadership for other organizations." Alan Pifer, Gardner's suc-
cessor as president, told Young that Carnegie would continue funding the 
leadership program. Boldly, he asked Pifer for an immediate allocation of 
$30,000 to prevent discontinuity between the Executive Development Pro-
gram and a future initiative aimed at similar goals.7° 
While Young benefited from Carnegie's previous relationship with Lester 
B. Granger, he had no such advantage in establishing ties with the Alfred P. 
Sloan Foundation. Sloan involvement with the League began in 1965 with a 
$10,000 grant to finance extension of NUL educational activities. Although 
another $10,000 in 1967 went for general support programs, Young's suc-
cessful solicitations derived mainly from his emergency appeals. He told Everett 
N. Case, Sloan's president, in 1965 that he needed $125,000 for "a crash 
program to organize Urban Leagues in ten high tension communities" within 
a six-month period. A 1968 request for $10,000 followed the assassination of 
Martin Luther King]r. This tragedy precipitated inner-city rioting across the 
nation, and that, noted Young, "has placed upon the Urban League unusual 
and fantastic demands." He added that "the non-violent approach has admit-
tedly suffered a serious blow ... necessitating an even greater effort by those 
of us who remain committed to constructive leadership." It was incumbent 
upon Sloan in view of these new pressures to continue its contributions to 
the League. Ultimately, Sloan's donation of $250,000 to the group's "New 
Thrust" brought its support to over $280,000 between 1965 and 1970.71 
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By 1970, when the National Urban League received $5,054,000 from 
foundations, it was clear that Young had outdistanced his civil rights col-
leagues in attracting philanthropic support. While the League attracted foun-
dation funds during the early 1960s, these contributions rose sharply after 
1966. At that time calls for "Black Power" and widespread rioting in numer-
ous inner cities caused philanthropies to put more money into the League. 
These foundation funding patterns adhered to Mitchell Sviridoff's admoni-
tion to "hold the center." Since Whitney Young and the National Urban 
League occupied that terrain, major philanthropies disbursed large sums to 
the organization.72 
While other black leaders were better known within the general public, 
Young was a familiar figure in foundation circles. That he became a trustee of 
the Rockefeller Foundation seemingly ratified his insider status. Nonetheless, 
Young inferred too much from his access to the foundation world. In 1961 
he and J. George Harrar became executives of the National Urban League 
and the Rockefeller Foundation, respectively. Mter a decade, Harrar sought 
retirement and Young considered changing jobs. Casual comments from fel-
low Rockefeller trustees convinced Young that he could succeed Harrar as 
president of the foundation. Although Young was never seriously considered 
for the post, his name may have been mentioned at a preliminary stage of the 
presidential search. Surely, he wanted the position desperately. When he failed, 
Young was deeply disappointed. Never mind that the Rockefeller Founda-
tion funded projects mainly in the sciences and medicine and that Harrar 
was a botanist and John Knowles, his successor, was a physician. The League's 
moderation in the midst of black militancy accounted for Young's growing 
influence among corporate philanthropists. He was a racial ambassador to 
powerful whites for the black population. Most elite whites viewed him as 
nothing more than that,?3 
11 
Washington Insider 
Young's easy access to the White House where he advised three successive 
presidential administrations had little to do with his savvy political skills. 
Rather, the enormous importance of the black freedom struggle put pressing 
issues before Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon that required meet-
ings with Young and his NAACP, CORE, SCLC, and SNCC colleagues. Although 
Kennedy usually conferred with groups of black spokespersons, which often 
included Young, Johnson and Nixon often preferred the League leader when-
ever they wanted intimate consultations about race relations. Moreover, Young 
accepted appointments to crucial federal commissions and drew contracts for 
the National Urban League with various governmental agencies. His prag-
matic leadership of an organization singularly suited to address racial and 
urban issues enhanced his influence with these three presidents. 
League officials in December 1960 sent Kennedy a document entitled 
"TheTime Is Now." It dealt with urgent race relations problems. They wanted 
Kennedy to note crucial issues in "employment, housing, education and public 
welfare which are the areas in which the Urban League movement has ... 
accumulated fifty years of seasoned experience." In a reminder to Kennedy 
about the report, League president Henry Steeger asked whether a small com-
mittee from his organization could come to the White House to discuss the 
memorandum with him. 1 
Louis E. Martin, a black journalist who served as deputy chairman of 
the Democratic National Committee, played a pivotal role in getting an au-
dience for the League with Kennedy. Martin belonged to the NUL board of 
directors during the Granger years. Although Young became executive direc-
tor during Martin's absence in Nigeria, the veteran reporter remained inter-
ested in the League. It was Martin's responsibility to introduce Kennedy to 
major black leaders. While Harris Wofford, a civil rights veteran, served as 
Kennedy's liaison with Martin Luther King Jr., Martin focused on interac-
tions with Young and the League. On January 23, 1962, he helped to arrange 
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a meeting for Steeger, Young, and Kennedy in the president's private living 
quarters in the White House. 
Young used this opportunity to educate Kennedy about the League and 
to outline plans to retool the National Urban League with new programs. He 
also urged Kennedy to add to the cabinet a Department of Urban Affairs and 
to support voting rights legislation. That Kennedy already had appointed 
Robert C. Weaver as administrator of the Housing and Home Finance Agency 
showed his awareness of urban and housing issues. Moreover, this action moved 
the president toward his ultimate plan to upgrade HHFA into a cabinet de-
partment and to appoint Weaver as secretary. Young argued strongly for the 
protection of black suffrage and, later with Stephen R. Currier, persuaded the 
Kennedy administration to make the issue an important part of JFK's civil 
rights thrust.2 
Young viewed the development of closer ties between the League and 
the federal government as the principal objective of this White House meet-
ing. He asked Kennedy to allow his cabinet and agency administrators to 
meet with the League's national and affiliate officers to discuss how their 
cooperative efforts could benefit the black population. Specifically, Young 
wanted the president to order relevant departments and agencies "to make 
use of Urban League resources ... and to invite League personnel to help in 
planning and implementing these programs." So, in May 1962 the federal 
government brought League officials from across the nation "to confer with 
staff leadership in the Departments of Labor, HEW and the Housing and Home 
Finance Agency to make certain what programs of these agencies are known 
and understood by the people who need them most." The meeting lasted 
three days. Moreover, the establishment of the NUL'S Washington bureau gave 
Young an agency through which the League learned about federal programs 
and sought involvement in them. 3 
While Young knew various government officials, he realized that he 
needed someone in Washington to keep him apprised of federal programs 
and legislation. Initially, Sterling Tucker, the executive director of the Wash-
ington Urban League, functioned in that capacity. To sustain him in this 
assignment, the national office annually contributed $7,500 to the D.C. af-
filiate. During the fall of 1961, when Tucker declined an offer to become the 
full-time head of a Washington bureau, Young hired Cernoria D. Johnson, 
the executive director of the Oklahoma City Urban League and former head 
of the Fort Worth affiliate. Now the national office depended on a special 
Washington representative to keep "the entire League movement informed 
on developments important to us."4 
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Young assigned Johnson to follow up on President Kennedy's commit-
ment to promote League participation in various federal programs. In Janu-
ary 1963, for example, Johnson solicited Louis E. Martin's assistance in get-
ting government grants for the League to curb juvenile delinquency. 
Additionally, she and two NUL officials met in all-day conferences with several 
officials in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and in the 
U.S. Office of Education. The League staff learned about "the many facets of 
higher education that need improvement and expansion." One League of-
ficer discussed how his group could help combat adult illiteracy. Lisle Carter, 
a black lawyer who served as deputy assistant secretary of HEW, helped Johnson 
and her colleagues assess their various meetings within the department, ad-
vised them "regarding the development of proposals," and suggested meet-
ings with additional HEW staff. 5 
Young also wanted Johnson to tell him about other HEW and Labor 
Department programs and whether involvement would be advantageous for 
the League. For example, Johnson told Young in May 1963, "We are begin-
ning to develop the kind of relationship with Labor that can be of mutual 
benefit." As Congress considered a youth employment bill, Johnson informed 
Sam Merrick of the Labor Department of "the importance of Urban League 
inclusion at the program planning level." To Young she declared, "This has 
begun to payoff." Merrick "has called three times in the past ten days stress-
ing that he is willing to meet with our Urban League personnel" to develop 
programs for the anticipated youth employment act. Young reviewed for HEW 
Secretary Anthony Celebrezze the League's "cooperative venture" with his 
cabinet department, and he lauded Lisle Carter for his assistance. Moreover, 
when the League convened a regional workshop in Chicago, several HEW 
officials attended and "offered advice and guidance" on family and children's 
services, welfare, and community health.6 
The League's early contact with the Kennedy administration identified 
Young as a crucial consultant on race relations. While Martin Luther King 
Jr., James Farmer, John Lewis, and James Forman were busy with grassroots 
activism through mass marches, freedom rides, and sit-ins, Young engaged in 
the slow, methodical work of advising federal agencies about racial issues. His 
proficiency in bureaucratic and programmatic assessments gave Young a sin-
gular distinction among his civil rights colleagues. As a result, Young became 
involved with the Kennedy administration on these matters. 
To the president's advisers, however, belonged substantial credit for de-
veloping contacts with black leaders and strengthening ties between them 
and the administration.7 Young's relationship with the Department of Labor 
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was illustrative. In November 1961 Secretary of Labor Arthur J. Goldberg 
told Young that he and the president were both "gratified" that he would 
attend a meeting of the Youth Employment Committee. W. Willard Wirtz, 
Goldberg's successor, asked Young in 1963 "to serve on an Implementation 
Subcommittee to plan follow-up action on the recommendations of the 
President's Committee on Youth Employment." Lack of time, however, com-
pelled Young to say no. Assistant Labor Secretary Esther Peterson similarly 
drew upon Young's expertise. Since she was responsible for the minority rights 
aspects oflabor standards, Peterson wanted Young's advice. At the same time, 
neither Young nor his staff were ever hesitant to criticize the Labor Depart-
ment whenever racial discrimination appeared in its agencies and programs. 
CernoriaJohnson told officials in the U.S. Employment Service of bias within 
the bureau, and she offered to gather the documentation. Young expressed 
concern to Willard Wirtz about reports of a "segregated retraining ptogram 
in Mississippi." He asked the secretary to "protect" the interests of blacks. 8 
Young also became an adviser to the surgeon general, Luther L. Terry. 
In 1961 Terry appointed him to the Consultant Group on Nursing. This 
HEW initiative dealt with "shortages of well-trained personnel for health care." 
Not surprisingly, Young contacted the American Nurses' Association to get 
an extensive list of Negro nurses. He wanted to choose three of them to 
represent fellow black nurses before this special committee. Additionally, as 
the Kennedy administration launched Volunteers in Service to America 
(VISTA), the attorney general, Robert F. Kennedy, asked Young to offer ad-
vice on what that agency should do "in addressing pressing human prob-
lems."9 
In 1962 President Kennedy invited Young to serve on the Committee 
on Equality of Opportunity in the Armed Forces. This assignment provided 
him with a major chance to affect government policy in race relations. Since 
the Truman and Eisenhower administrations made only minimal progress 
toward racial integration in the military, Kennedy wanted to determine what 
further measures would be required to ensure full equaliry. He outlined to 
Young and other committee members what areas needed exploration. Spe-
cifically, Kennedy asked for information on whether military policy and pro-
cedures on equal opportunity required any improvements. His second con-
cern focused on the treatment of black military families off base. The president 
wanted to know whether they had access to social amenities in neighboring 
civilian communities. 10 
Young participated fully in his committee assignments. In March 1963, 
for example, he toured Fort Gordon in Augusta, Georgia, and the Pensacola 
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Naval Air Station in Pensacola, Florida. At Fort Gordon he met with black 
officers, NCOs, and enlisted men. A meeting at Tabernacle Baptist Church 
in Augusta brought him together with local civil rights leaders, many of them 
affiliated with the NAACP. A similar group conferred with him in Pensacola. At 
both places he heard complaints from blacks in the military, and he was briefed 
by local leaders about race relations in the nearby cities. I I 
Young also served as a referee for racial complaints against the military. 
He received many letters chronicling instances of discrimination. When one 
complainant allowed his name to be used and provided documentation, Young 
told Gerhard Gesell, his chairman, that they should look into the army's 
nonofficer promotion practices. In another instance Young urged action by 
the committee's counsel, Laurence I. Hewes. The matter concerned a black 
in the air force. His grievance convinced Young that an examination was 
needed of the good faith of the air force in retaining and promoting black 
officers. Segregated off base housing caused Young to interact with the 
President's Committee on Equal Opportunity in Housing. Claude Organ Jr., 
a black surgeon and president of the Nebraska Urban League, called upon his 
longtime friendship with Young to adjudicate a housing matter. At the Stra-
tegic Air Command near Omaha, nonsegregated housing was not available 
near the base. After an unsatisfactory encounter with the base commander, 
Organ notified Young, whose contacts on the housing commission helped to 
end that discriminatory practice. 12 
Whenever Young was involved with the federal government, he peren-
nially agitated for black hiring. His service with the President's Committee 
on Equal Opportunity in the Armed Forces was no exception. He pushed the 
air force, for example, to consider an acquaintance for a post as an intergroup 
relations specialist. Young believed that, as a manager of a large public hous-
ing project, this applicant was an obvious choice. 13 
These experiences influenced the initial report that the committee sub-
mitted to President Kennedy. A commitment was stressed by all officials in 
the Defense Department and armed forces to eliminate racial discrimination 
at military installations and at off base facilities. The committee recommended 
that job performance ratings for base commanders should include how well 
they dealt with issues of racial fairness. Commanders also would move against 
racial discrimination off base with such actions as litigation. Additionally, the 
committee believed that race relations officers should be employed through-
out the Defense Department and armed forces. 14 
Apparently, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara was impressed with 
Young's input on the committee. He invited the League leader to participate 
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in a joint civilian orientation conference to get a firsthand view of U.S. armed 
forces. The invitation, while flattering, could tell Young little beyond what he 
already had seen on his Georgia and Florida tours. Besides, the daily pressures 
of the racial situation prevented his participation. Nonetheless, what was 
important for him and McNamara was that the League leader had become a 
familiar adviser to the Kennedy administration on civil rights and other re-
lated matters. 15 
These military matters drew at least a year's commitment from Young, 
but housing discrimination seemed a more urgent concern. During his 1960 
campaign, Kennedy observed that this injustice could be ended "by the stroke 
of a presidential pen." Kennedy's commitment to handle this issue through 
an executive order buoyed civil rights advocates and motivated the National 
Urban League to push the president-elect in this direction. In "The TIme Is 
Now" memorandum, League officials reminded Kennedy that blacks contin-
ued to face obstacles in federally sponsored housing. Moreover, Young told 
officers in the League's sixty-two affiliates to ask local groups to lobby the 
president for the promised executive order. In 1962 in meetings with Kennedy 
and the federal housing administrator Young, Steeger, and other League offi-
cials challenged the chief executive to act. 16 
President Kennedy issued the long-awaited edict on "Equal Opportu-
nity in Housing" on November 20, 1962. A few days after signing it, he 
wrote Young to praise him and the League for their contributions in connec-
tion with the executive order. Such flattery, however, did not eliminate the 
doubts of many League officials. NUL president Henry Steeger recognized 
that the executive order did not "embrace all that might be desired," but he 
called it "an important first step." He also hoped for "corrective refinements 
to increase [the] effectiveness of the Order." Irritated League officials poignantly 
criticized those areas that the order did not cover. For example, it did not 
apply to housing, urban renewal, and other government actions that were 
signed and agreed on before Kennedy issued the regulation. Moreover, own-
ers of single and duplex homes were exempt from the order. Also, Kennedy 
provided for no personnel to enforce this nondiscrimination statute. 17 
Young expressed his reservations to Robert C. Weaver, the administra-
tor of the Housing and Home Finance Agency. Weaver believed that Young 
and the League exaggerated the ineffectiveness of the housing edict. For ex-
ample, the ban on discrimination, despite Young's accusation, included "Fed-
erally assisted housing, regardless of whether the Federal aid was provided 
before or after the issuance of the Executive Order." Weaver also observed 
that the order allowed for sanctions against mortgagors who discriminated. 
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Additionally, he noted that urban renewal programs, while they displaced 
some blacks, still drew many of them into racially integrated developments. 
Young maintained, however, that gaps in the administrative machinery 
of HHFA and vagueness in the executive order would allow discriminatory 
housing practices to continue. With respect to low rent housing subsidies, for 
example, the agency could only use its "good offices" to pursue nondiscrimi-
nation policies on units built before the Kennedy edict. Moreover, a loophole 
for such housing seemed unclear on whether the Public Housing Authority, 
an administrative component of HHFA, would still support projects that 
continued to segregate. Unless these uncertainties were clarified, argued Young, 
the executive order would be limited to selected sources of federal finance 
due to commitments negotiated before Kennedy issued the antidiscrimina-
tion ban. 
While Weaver disagreed with Young, he assured him that the govern-
ment would make every effort to implement all of the Executive Order's 
provisions. He wanted it to be "a forceful instrument for achieving true equality 
of housing opportunity." Always the pragmatist, Young suggested that Weaver 
nominate Reginald Johnson to Kennedy's White House Conference on Com-
munity Development. Young thought that Johnson would be an ideal ap-
pointee because he did national programming for the League in housing. "I 
can think of no better way," said Young to Weaver, "for you and the president 
to indicate your desire to effectively improve the housing situation ... than 
to make this appointment."18 
Participation on the National Committee Against Discrimination in 
Housing was another way Young expressed his views about Kennedy's execu-
tive order. With Roy Wilkins of the NAACP, James Farmer of CORE, and the 
committee's chairman, Algernon D. Black, the leaders contended that the 
decree was conceptualized too narrowly to end bias in housing. Five months 
after Kennedy signed the edict, the committee noted some "critical deficien-
cies" in the order. They included criticism of Kennedy for slowness in orga-
nizing the President's Committee on Equal Opportunity in Housing. More-
over, too little information had been directed either to the public or to those 
in housing construction and finance concerning specific provisions in the 
act. Also, those agencies charged with enforcement had not seriously explored 
ways for the edict to be used to fight discrimination. Finally, the Kennedy 
administration did not appoint any intergroup relations specialists to advise 
public and private institutions about housing bias and how to combat it. 
Some of these complaints echoed Young's earlier criticisms. 19 
The principal interaction between the Kennedy administration and the 
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League occurred in the programmatic sphere. Consequently; Young and other 
NUL officials pressed for League involvement in numerous federal initiatives. 
Additionally; Young's participation on various federal advisory committees 
extended the League's presence in the Kennedy administration. Although 
urban affairs, job training, and other social and economic matters claimed 
League energies, Young, in an unprecedented move, cooperated with a 
Kennedy-backed coalition on southern black voter registration. 
Although President Kennedy dispatched U.S. marshals to Alabama to 
protect participants in the 1961 freedom rides, he and his aides preferred to 
avoid such displays of federal authority. Instead, a campaign to register southern 
black voters would yield political benefits for the Kennedy administration 
and shift civil rights activism to less controversial activities. Independently; 
Stephen R. Currier, benefactor of both the Taconic Foundation and the 
Potomac Institute, became interested in this initiative. Meetings that included 
Burke Marshall and Harris Wofford, both Kennedy officials, drew to the 
voter registration effort major foundation and federal support. Although the 
Southern Regional Council administered the Voter Education Project, the 
program involved the major civil rights organizations. As long as the initia-
tive emphasized "voter education," Young believed that the League's tax-ex-
empt status would not be jeopardized by NUL involvement. 20 
Soon after Wiley Branton became director of the Voter Education 
Project, he and Leslie Dunbar of the Southern Regional Council met in Young's 
office to discuss the participation of the National Urban League. Young ap-
pointed Heman Sweatt as coordinator of the League's Voter Education Pro-
gram. A budget of $17,666 was approved as well as monies for involved local 
affiliates. The Jefferson County (Alabama) Voters Campaign learned of the 
League's civic education program and requested its assistance for a registra-
tion effort in October 1962. Such efforts drew the League into frontline 
activism that the group usually bypassed.21 
The National Urban League and the Kennedy administration also in-
teracted on social and economic issues. Moreover, Young served President 
Kennedy on various panels and as an adviser to several departments and agen-
cies. The growing importance of the civil rights movement caused the White 
House to turn to the League leader for consultation. Although Young played 
a significant role as a race relations expert, he did not impact policy in a 
major way. He became closer to Lyndon B. Johnson than to Kennedy. 
They met during the 1950s when Johnson was the Democratic major-
ity leader in the Senate. Young occasionally came to Capitol Hill to testify 
about various bills, including the proposed Civil Rights Act of 1957. He 
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spoke with Senator Johnson about these matters. Theodore W Kheel, the 
League president during the Granger years, reintroduced Young to the new 
vice president in 1961. As chairman of the President's Committee on Equal 
Employment Opportunity, Johnson had come to New York City to discuss 
commission business with Kheel. Roy and Aminda Wilkins of the NAACP 
were sponsoring a reception that same day for Whitney and Margaret Young, 
and Kheel, still a member of the League's national board, invited Johnson to 
accompany him to the event. Although pressed for time, Johnson reluctantly 
agreed to go. What he intended as a brief appearance became a long discus-
sion of race relations with the new NUL leader.22 
When Kennedy chose Johnson as his running mate in 1960, some black 
leaders doubted the Texas politician on civil rights matters. Although sur-
prised that Kennedy picked his major competitor in the Democratic prima-
ries, Young kept an open mind about LBJ, saying, "Some of the best liberals 
I know are reconstructed southerners." Cooperation with Johnson through 
the PCEEO ultimately convinced Young that his assessment was correct.23 
Young and Johnson followed through on plans to meet. Young recalled, 
"We visited on the phone at least once a week and in person at least once a 
month." In Februaty 1962, for example, Young proposed that LB J and other 
PCEEO officials explore with him how the NUL might cooperate with the com-
mittee. Johnson agreed, and a meeting was set up to discuss League perspec-
tives on employment and job training for blacks. At an April 9, 1962, confer-
ence, League officials specifically outlined for Johnson "the bottlenecks and 
barriers to equal job opportunity." They included failures in the u.s. Em-
ployment Service, lack of scrutiny of various programs funded by the Man-
power Development and Training Act of 1962, and the poor results from the 
President's Plans for Progress. This flawed effort meant that recalcitrant cor-
porations could be trusted to pursue nondiscrimination policies. To avoid 
this serious lapse, Young suggested that the National Urban League through 
its experienced staff, its Commerce and Industry Council, and its Trade Union 
Advisory Council could provide the PCEEO with resources not available else-
where. He wanted Johnson to use the League in a major way in the operation 
of this important federal panel.24 
Young argued against voluntary compliance for corporations and urged 
Johnson to take strong action against discriminatory companies. Within two 
weeks after the League meeting with the vice president, Young congratulated 
Johnson and the PCEEO for rebukes of two firms guilty of biased hiring prac-
tices. Moreover, Young repeatedly told Johnson that policies aimed at ending 
employment discrimination should stress compulsory compliance for corpo-
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rations rather than voluntary action. The vice president wanted to use any 
method that promised results. He believed that "a combination of the com-
pliance program and a voluntary program holds forth the best hope for achiev-
ing our goal."25 
The relationship between Young and Johnson solidified as the National 
Urban League participated in various PCEEO initiatives. When the Plans for 
Progress program gave federal contracts to several firms, Johnson's aide gave 
Young a list of these companies and urged him to inform his League affiliates 
that these corporations "will employ all without regard to race, creed or color." 
Moreover, Young was invited to join Johnson, Secretary of Labor Willard 
Wirtz, and executives from 150 firms at a Plans for Progress gathering.26 
The close ties between Young and Johnson resulted in the vice presi-
dent coming in 1962 to address the League's Equal Opportunity Day dinner. 
Johnson highlighted ten PCEEO achievements, including mandates for the 
building of a missile facility in the South on a basis of racial equality and 
tougher standards on employment equity for companies trying to get gov-
ernment contracts. Young lauded the vice president's speech and credited 
him with making the event "one of the very best we have ever had."27 
The vice president liked Young because he seemed sensitive to LBJ's 
frustrations and limitations as a Kennedy subordinate. Young believed that 
Johnson possessed greater understanding and empathy for civil rights than 
the president and many of his advisers. Plans for a massive march on Wash-
ington in 1963 bothered President Kennedy. If violence occurred, JFK opined, 
civil rights legislation would never get through Congress. Johnson had simi-
lar reservations, but Young and others "convinced him before we did Mr. 
Kennedy-that this would be a very healthy sort of way of expressing the 
pent-up emotions" of black activists. Immediately after the march, Kennedy 
invited its leaders to the White House. Johnson, whom Young regarded as a 
close ally, spoke to the group about pending civil rights legislation. He noted, 
"No one can predict what Congress will do." He also observed that the 
Kennedy administration "has exercised all of the power that lies within its 
reach" to safeguard civil rights for blacks. At the same time LBJ privately 
advanced arguments in favor of stronger provisions that some Kennedy aides 
opposed. Young remembered that efforts to drop a section of public accom-
modations and a stipulation to withhold federal funds from discriminatory 
recipients met with Johnson's opposition. Thus, when he succeeded Kennedy, 
Johnson already had credibility with Whitney M. Young Jr.28 
Although tragic circumstances thrust Johnson into the White House, 
he used his ebullient personality to charm black leaders and convince them of 
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his serious commitment to the civil rights cause. LBJ was so quick to estab-
lish contact with black leaders right after the Kennedy assassination that they 
disagreed about whom the president called first. Roy Wilkins of the NAACP 
remembered that he was the first person with whom LBJ conferred, whereas 
James Farmer of CORE claimed that distinction for himself. Within a week 
after John F. Kennedy's funeral, Whitney Young met with the new president 
at the White House.29 
James Farmer recalled that Lyndon B. Johnson adored Whitney Young. 
LB J also respected Roy Wilkins. The independence and activism of Farmer 
and King, however, proved bothersome. Moreover, the uncontrollable young 
men and women atSNCC also produced for the president a low comfort level. 
He preferred to deal with Young.30 
Clearly, Roy Wilkins became an important adviser as pending civil rights 
legislation lay before Congress in 1964 and 1965. His organization effec-
tively lobbied the House and Senate to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Young joined Wilkins as a major consultant 
on White House civil rights initiatives.31 
In numerous instances Young gave significant input on the handling of 
major civil rights matters. As northern students prepared for the Mississippi 
Freedom Summer of 1964, Young called White House aide Hobart Taylor Jr. 
to suggest a meeting between Johnson and civil rights leaders. Young believed 
that LBJ needed their advice and their cooperation in holding the situation 
in balance. Before Johnson delivered his 1965 State of the Union address, he 
asked Young for his thoughts on the proposed speech. The League leader 
criticized the administration for calling civil rights legislation "something revo-
lutionary." He believed that such measures were neither extreme nor radical. 
Rather, "it calls for the elementary rights which all other Americans accept as 
routine."32 
While the activism of Martin Luther King Jr. and the Southern Chris-
tian Leadership Conference focused the nation's attention on racial abuses in 
such southern locales as Selma, Alabama, less visible spokesmen such as Young, 
Wilkins, and Thurgood Marshall played important roles behind the scenes to 
advance the civil rights cause. For example, Young who participated in the 
Selma to Montgomery March, challenged John Doar, the acting assistant 
attorney general in the Civil Rights Division, to maintain pressure on offi-
cials in Selma and Dallas County, Alabama, who prevented blacks from vot-
ing. Doar informed Young about a successful suit against the Dallas County 
Board of Registrars that resulted in a court order in favor of black complain-
ants. Doar also told the League leader that the Justice Department had filed a 
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voting suit against all sixty-seven counties of Alabama. That suit charged that 
Alabama's very difficult voting test had the effect of discriminating against 
Negro voting applicants.33 
When President Johnson signed the landmark Voting Rights Act on 
August 5, 1965 in a televised ceremony, he thought that Young's civil rights 
contributions were important enough to include him on the guest list with 
other movement activists. Others in the Johnson administration also believed 
that Young's counsel was key in implementing LBJ's civil rights agenda. Within 
five months after the Voting Rights kt was enacted, for example, Solicitor 
General Thurgood Marshall noted the need for a more intensive voter regis-
tration drive in the South. At LBJ's insistence, he traveled to NAACP headquar-
ters to confer with Wilkins and Young. Marshall, a former NAACP attorney, 
wanted to find private monies to increase the number of southern black vot-
ers. Wilkins told Marshall, "The NAACP is just about broke." Young had al-
ready approached various foundations to aid this effort. In fact, Marshall had 
been sanguine about Young's probable success in getting funds to assist voter 
registration projects. "The Urban League," Marshall thought, "has always 
had a more direct line to foundations than the NAACP. " Unfortunately, Young 
reported that he could not get any foundation money for this purpose. Marshall 
told President Johnson, "Whitney explained in detail the very excellent pre-
sentations which had been prepared, submitted and turned down." Although 
Young's attempt to find private funds to enfranchise southern blacks did not 
succeed, both Johnson and Marshall viewed him as one who could provide 
practical assistance to the civil rights cause.34 
Although Young appreciated Johnson's racial liberalism, he monitored 
the effectiveness of administration civil rights efforts. The implementation of 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for example, was a concern. This 
proviso denied or withdrew federal funding from any institution or program 
that practiced discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, or national 
origin. Concerned that federal officials might miss or ignore violations of this 
statute, Young mobilized the entire League to determine what federally fi-
nanced efforts in urban renewal, housing, vocational education, health care, 
and other initiatives discriminated against blacks.35 
In 1964 Young backed LB J on the need to enact the civil rights bill. On 
July 2, 1964, President Johnson signed it into law. On July 6 Young ordered 
executive directors of every League affiliate to investigate federal programs in 
their locales that violatedTitle VI of the new civil rights act. He noted, "The 
National Urban League has agreed to submit to the White House THIS WEEK 
a documented list of cities and their Federally supported or aided institutions 
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and programs where Negroes are excluded, segregated or face other participa-
tion limitations." Concerning examples of racial discrimination in League 
communities, Young told his colleagues to "just name them and tell me what 
the practices are. THIS IS URGENT!"36 
Speedily, local League leaders informed Young about racial discrimina-
tion in several federal programs including the Hill-Burton Act, programs in 
vocational training, apprenticeship and manpower retraining, various educa-
tional initiatives, and public housing. The Hill-Burton Act, for example, fi-
nanced hospital construction. Approximately 6,810 hospitals received fed-
eral funding, but 104 facilities functioned on a segregated basis. Eighty-four 
hospitals served only whites and twenty admitted only blacks. Moreover, such 
facilities as Morton Plant Hospital in Clearwater, Florida, segregated black 
patients in the basement. Cleveland Clinic permitted no black physicians on 
its staff, and St. Vincent's Infirmary in Little Rock barred black nurses from 
assisting in births. League investigators found similar racial patterns in other 
federally funded programs. 37 
Young sent the report to the White House. He conceded that the Johnson 
administration was already working to put an end to Title VI violations. 
Young told the president that he hoped areas which may have been over-
looked would receive needed attention. He added, "We must put an end to a 
situation in which the tax-dollars of some citizens are of little or no use to 
them because of segregation and discrimination." Lee White, a Johnson aide, 
forwarded the report to LeRoy Collins, director of the Community Relations 
Service in the Department of Commerce. Young met with Collins and his 
staffin "a most informative and productive exchange."38 
That this crucial issue remained active among high-level Johnson ap-
pointees showed the significance ofYoung's civil rights advocacy. Two succes-
sive HEW secretaries, for example, interacted with Young on Title VI matters. 
In 1965 Anthony J. Celebrezze boasted of the progress made in relation to 
health and welfare programs, hospitals, and schools. He invited Young to 
meet with him and HEW officials. To sustain the momentum Young chal-
lenged Celebrezze's successor, John W. Gardner, to ponder with him some 
unforeseen consequences of Title VI enforcement. Young worried about the 
role of southern black hospitals after hospitals were fully integrated. Specifi-
cally, Young wondered, "If these Negro hospitals are allowed to remain open, 
there is a good chance that integration in the hospitals will not proceed 
quickly." The problem, Young believed, rested with some black physicians, 
who when rejected from hospital staffs would remain in black hospitals and 
push for their survival. Such issues, contended Young, were important enough 
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for Gardner, selected League officials, and various experts to meet to formu-
late national guidelines by which HEW could address these difficulties.39 
When Young learned that the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights found 
discriminatory practices within agencies of the Agriculture Department, he 
complained to President Johnson. As a result Secretary Orville Freeman as-
sured Young that no effort would be spared to achieve equal services for black 
farmers. Freeman asked Young to help him bring the Agriculture Depart-
ment into compliance with Title VI. He sent him newly developed rules and 
regulations that demonstrated Freeman's seriousness in ending racial discrimi-
nation. Various state programs that operated with federal monies were re-
quired to sign assurances that demonstrated their obedience to Title VI. Like 
Wilkins, King, and other black spokespersons, Young agitated for the passage 
oflandmark civil rights laws. At the same time, he was one of the few leaders 
who monitored specific statues and determined whether they actually helped 
their intended beneficiaries.40 
Although the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 gave Johnson 
a Lincolnesque reputation, he believed that his contributions to black ad-
vancement were incomplete. To the 1965 graduating class at Howard Uni-
versity Johnson declared that "the next and the more profound stage of the 
battle for civil rights" would require "equality as a fact and equality as a re-
sult."To achieve those goals LBJ announced a 1966White House conference 
that would focus on the theme "To Fulfill These Rights." He envisaged for 
blacks a societal effort to bring them to actual social, political, and economic 
equality.41 
In September 1965 Vice President Hubert Humphrey, Attorney Gen-
eral Nicholas Katzenbach, and several presidential aides discussed how to 
implement Johnson's pledge. They concluded that a planning conference of 
400 persons should gather in November 1965. This group would propose 
topics for in-depth studies for presentation to a larger gathering of 4,000 in 
the spring of 1966. They chose A. Philip Randolph as the honorary chairman 
and two leading lawyers, Morris B. Abrams and William T. Coleman, as the 
cochairs of the November planning conference. They developed the agenda 
and polled several groups about their expectations for the proposed White 
House meetings. Those who attended the November planning sessions cited 
seven subjects on which to focus: welfare and health, the dynamics of the 
ghetto, administration of justice, legal guarantees, housing, employment, and 
education.42 
Clifford Alexander Jr., a presidential aide, frequently reminded his White 
House superiors that they needed to keep civil rights leaders informed about 
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unfolding plans for the November planning session and the spring confer-
ence. Toward that end Roy Wilkins, Whitney Young, James Farmer, Dorothy 
Height, and other representatives from the major civil rights organizations 
came to the White House to meet with several high-ranking administration 
officials. Alexander and his colleague, Joseph Califano, told Johnson that sup-
port for the conference from civil rights leaders was crucial. The two aides 
were disturbed by reports of slow progress in southern black voter registra-
tion and lax enforcement of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. It was 
important that President Johnson deflect criticism through the full involve-
ment of civil rights leaders in planning the conference.43 
Actually, Johnson did not need to worry about the civil rights spokes-
persons. They neither criticized him nor tried to take control of the confer-
ence. Abrams and Coleman told the Council for United Civil Rights Leader-
ship (CUCRL) that its recommendations for the planning conference had been 
communicated to the president's advisers. CUCRL and other relevant groups 
could suggest planning session participants and could discuss the unfinished 
business of civil rights, including further implementation of the 1964 and 1965 
Civil Rights Acts. CUCRL also agreed with the president on the importance of 
jobs and economic security as a basis for black advancement. In a meeting with 
presidential aides, Roy Wilkins "was of great assistance in establishing a total 
atmosphere of cooperation and understanding." Bayard Rustin, who repre-
sented A. Philip Randolph, was "quite cooperative" despite his earlier criticisms 
of Abrams, Coleman, and the spring conference agenda. Young was already 
involved in the detailed planning of the two White House conferences.44 
Not long after LBJ delivered his Howard University address, Young and 
Lee C. White, the special assistant to the president, met to discuss the No-
vember planning conference. They agreed that Young should write a memo-
randum. While Young liked the theme, "To FulfillThese Rights," he wanted 
it understood that the Negro problem was the white man's problem. He also 
noted that "in no way should this conference suggest that the primary re-
sponsibility for the plight of the Negro American lies within the Negro com-
munity rather than at the feet of the majority community." Additionally, he 
wanted the Johnson administration to recognize "the essential role which 
Negro leadership and the Negro community must play" in efforts to advance 
the black population. Young also wanted the participation of inner-city lead-
ers like those involved in National Urban League Community Action Assem-
bly and in various antipoverty groups. In other ways Young observed that the 
League could be helpful by providing conference delegates with information 
about particular black communities. 45 
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Young had only modest success in determining how the White House 
conference would be conceptualized. Rather, his influence lay in two other 
spheres. He was named cochairman of the health and welfare section, which 
shaped an agenda for the spring 1966 plenary sessions on "To Fulfill These 
Rights." Lisle C. Carter, another black presidential aide, wrote the report, 
and it was sent to Young for his comments. Moreover, Young recommended 
Mahlon T. Puryear, his deputy executive director, and two national board 
members, John S. Hayes and Ramon S. Scruggs, to represent the League at 
this November planning meeting, and he persuaded LBJ's aides to include 
other League staff as consultants. Cernoria Johnson, director of the League's 
Washington bureau, for example, "carried a great responsibility for the devel-
opment of the ideas" in Young's health and welfare group. Additionally, Ster-
ling Tucker prepared a paper for the voting and citizen participation section. 
Young also tried to get invitations for two League workers, Isabel C. Clark, 
associate director of special programs, and Walter K. Dancy, president of the 
Youth Community.46 
After the November gathering, M. Carl Holman announced a Decem-
ber meeting to review the findings and proposals from eight November work-
shops. His most important comments concerned participation in the spring 
conference. He especially wanted "some indigenous community representa-
tives." Such persons "in their daily experience are in contact with the victims 
of poverty and discrimination." This suggestion was implemented. Young 
also thought that official government participation should be minimized, 
and for the most part invisible."47 
Young wanted a cross section of American society to become involved 
in this conference. Although League participation mattered, Young believed 
that delegates ranging from grassroots black community leaders to corporate 
executives should talk about how the condition of blacks could be improved. 
Louis Martin, a DNC official, suggested that this idea should be tried if 
Young would agree to a prominent role for corporate executives. Clifford 
Alexander reported that Young appeared to be enthusiastic and had forwarded 
a list of names. Young figured that many of these corporate board chairmen 
and presidents of IBM, CBS, AT&r, Inland Steel, and other Fortune 500 firms 
already supported the National Urban League. Their involvement with the 
League could easily be parlayed toward direct identification with LBJ's broader 
civil rights agenda.48 
With two friends, M. Carl Holman and Arthur C. McCaw, on the 
1966 White House conference staff Young hoped to maximize League par-
ticipation.49 Berl r. Bernhard, a White House special counsel, projected 2,000 
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invitees apportioned among fourteen categories including labor, religion, 
education, foundations, and civil rights organizations. He asked Young for "a 
carefully evaluated list of individuals" for each of the categories. At the same 
time Bernhard reminded Young, "We have more names than could ever be 
invited." "Frankly, I am not happy with the allocation breakdown," replied 
the League leader. He repeated his objection to federal officeholders attend-
ing the conference as official delegates. "It is a serious mistake," he noted. For 
a "how-to-do conference," Young further asserted, too many "education 
people" were on the list. Also, the number of business and industry people 
whose presence he greatly favored as well as state and local officials were simi-
larly too many. Young strongly objected to the allotment of 200 persons for 
the major civil rights organizations. 
Although Young pressed for scores of League professionals and board 
members from the national, regional, and local levels, he knew that they 
would take practically all of the allotted 200 places for civil rights organiza-
tions. The Johnson administration permitted him to send forty-five League 
participants, which filled nearly one-fourth of the civil rights slots. Young 
succeeded in showing his League colleagues the extent of his influence in 
Johnson's White House.50 
The League leader maintained a middle ground in an increasingly mili-
tant national black leadership. Disenchantment from SCLC, SNCC, and CORE 
spokespersons over growing American involvement in Vietnam War and criti-
cism of poor federal enforcement of civil rights laws drew opposition to LB J. 
To prevent these criticisms from embarrassing the Johnson administration, 
strict procedures were adopted for "To Fulfill These Rights." Presidential aides, 
for example, did not want any votes on prearranged resolutions by the 2,000-
2,500 delegates in attendance at the June 1-2, 1966 conference. Only after 
the protests against this rule by Floyd McKissick, successor to James Farmer 
at CORE, did the Johnson administration reverse itsel£51 
Young's support ofLBJ greatly aided the White House. In contrast to 
SNCC'S boycott and the Vietnam War criticisms of King and McKissick, Young 
said that the Vietnam issue was not germane to the civil rights movement. 
Such sentiments helped LB J to maintain credibility with blacks, and Johnson 
owed Young a large political debt. He and Roy Wilkins were credited with a 
"behind-the-scenes strategy ... to keep the problem of Vietnam from sabo-
taging the potential of the White House Conference." Instead, recommenda-
tions to the federal government and the private sector to spend more money 
to improve the condition of blacks, home rule for the District of Columbia, 
federal prodding for civilian review boards to investigate police brutality, and 
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other such measures dominated conference discussions. Young's involvement 
produced concrete benefits for him and the League. He introduced several 
League staff and officers to important federal officials, and he demonstrated 
to LB J that he could be a valuable adviser and a trusted operative. 52 
The controversies that arose at the White House presaged further frac-
tures in the national consensus on civil rights. Although Young remained an 
important adviser to President Johnson, both realized that Congress and the 
public had become uncertain about the future of the civil rights movement. 
Despite major legislative victories in 1964 and 1965, LBJ proposed in 1966 
an omnibus civil rights bill to end racial discrimination in federal and state 
jury systems, strengthen federal intervention in school desegregation, and 
establish a national fair housing law. When Young and other civil rights lead-
ers came to the White House to meet with the president, they received con-
firmation of what they already suspected. It would be difficult to move civil 
rights legislation through Congress. Rioters in Los Angeles's Watts section in 
August 1965 and attacks on Martin Luther King's open housing march through 
a Chicago suburb in July 1966 showed that the civil rights coalition was 
falling apart. Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach reminded LBJ to tell 
Young and others that "even [congressional] supporters of civil rights are apa-
thetic and none of the proposals have the sense of urgency which accompa-
nied prior legislation." The fair housing section drew fatal opposition from 
Senate Minority Leader Everett M. Dirksen, an Illinois Republican. Addi-
tionally, Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, a Montana Democrat, 
blamed Negro rioters in Watts and rock throwers in the Chicago area for 
creating an unfavorable atmosphere for the bill's passage. Young attributed 
the defeat to "northern liberals" who "weakened as the programs began to hit 
segregation" in the states they represented. Undaunted, LBJ made a second 
attempt in 1967 to push the bill through Congress. He brought Young and 
other civil rights leaders to the White House to discuss his plans. Young and 
Wilkins aided the effort by agreeing to a breakfast meeting with House Mi-
nority Leader Gerald R. Ford and twenty of his Republican colleagues. A 
GOP congressman from New York, Charles E. Goodell, told Young, "It was 
a pleasure to cooperate with the Urban League in this worthwhile endeavor." 
After the passage of this bill in the House of Representatives, there was a 
compromise with Senator Dirksen on gradual fair housing coverage of 80 
percent of the nation's dwellings rather than 91 percent, which the Demo-
crats had proposed. With GOP support the Civil Rights Act of 1968 became 
law. Young's efforts in both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations to 
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elicit federal intervention against racial bias in housing finally reached frui-
tion.53 
Advice on civil rights was not the only major issue on which Young 
shared his views with President Johnson. LBJ's Great Society and its massive 
War on Poverty drew upon ideas and proposals that Young developed as ex-
ecutive director of the National Urban League. In his 1964 book, To Be Equal 
Young called for an unprecedented domestic Marshall Plan to address a broad 
range of social and economic inequities that maintained black inequality with 
whites. "We urgently recommend," he wrote, "cooperative SPECIAL EFFORTS 
by private, public, and voluntary organizations in a massive 'crash' attack" on 
racial inequalities in employment, education, housing, and health. In his ten-
point program to improve schools, provide job opportunities, "destroy the 
racial ghetto," "rehabilitate urban Negro families," and other efforts, Young 
argued, "This crash program should be seen as an investment rather than a 
give-away program. It constitutes an investment in human resources, and it 
will pay off just as the Marshall Plan paid offin a prosperous Western Europe 
of strong and friendly allies." His call for this "special effort" stimulated dis-
cussions about whether adherents of the American free enterprise system would 
support such massive expenditures. One observer hinted that Young's belief 
in capitalism could not be reconciled with this noncapitalist solution. Young's 
early support of a form of affirmative action anticipated later debates on the 
issue. In the 1960s, however, President Johnson saw merit in Young's ideas. 54 
Young discussed these ideas with LBJ. He shared with the president a 
memorandum that his board had worked on for several months before the 
announcement of the domestic Marshall Plan. As planning began on the War 
on Poverty, Young noted many similarities with his own plan. In Young's 
opinion, Johnson's War on Poverty derived from his League proposal.55 
When Johnson told Congress in his 1964 State of the Union address 
that he would submit a billion dollar Economic Opportunity Act, Young 
already claimed ownership of this initiative. The League leader claimed, "I 
was involved in the Poverty Program, the planning of it, from the very start-
even when John Kennedy was in, and more so when President Johnson came 
in." Thus, he announced his immediate support of the president's proposal 
and his group's cooperation. Andrew T. Hatcher, Johnson's associate press 
secretary, observed that the president was pleased to know that such organi-
zations as the National Urban League were eager to participate in such a 
program. Moreover, Young went to Capitol Hill to support Johnsons proposal. 
A black presidential aide told him there had never been any finer testimony 
given before a congressional committee than Young's on the Poverty Bill.56 
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When Congress passed the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 with 
an initial appropriation of $800 million, a national war on poverty officially 
began. Fearful that blacks would not playa crucial role in running the various 
programs that the act created, Young aggressively lobbied R. Sargent Shriver, 
the probable OEO director, to involve high-level black government officials. 
Young specifically mentioned black Johnson appointees inHEw, Commerce, 
Labor, Agriculture, and the President's Committee on Equal Employment 
Opportunity. 57 
Later, Young told Shriver, "The staffing of your program will be ex-
tremely critical in determining its success or failure. 1 am concerned not only 
about your top policy-makers and their experiences and attitudes with regard 
to race relations, but also with those persons who will play key roles in major 
cities." Young tried to show Shriver that his wide contacts could aid in staff-
ing OEO. He knew persons both outside and within the League whose exper-
tise would prove crucial to the fight against poverty. For example, Edwin C. 
Berry, executive director of the Chicago Urban League, told Young about 
Ray Hilliard, director of the Cook County Department of Public Aid. Cook 
was a "battler for civil rights and has never failed in his efforts to ptotect the 
poor," Berry declared. Young repeated Berry's high praise for Hilliard to Shriver. 
This public official, Young observed, "has the confidence of the people who 
stand to benefit most from the poverty program." A grateful Shriver invited 
the League leader to keep recommending participants in the antipoverty ef-
fort. "I am going to continue leaning on you," Shriver added.58 
Aside from Hilliard and many others whom he recommended, Young 
wanted to be sure that his organization would be a major player in the federal 
antipoverty program. His regular correspondence with Shriver and a con-
tinuous flow of information from Cernoria Johnson of the League's Wash-
ington bureau kept Young well informed about the evolving poverty pro-
gram. Johnson met with Hyman Bookbinder, Shriver's assistant, about League 
involvement withoEO. ''Always we were pointing up the Urban League's unique 
qualifications and the contribution it could make," Johnson noted. Since 
fifty selected cities were rumored to be the inaugural sites of the antipoverty 
effort, Bookbinder and his associate promised that the League would be in-
formed immediately about which municipalities would actually receive fed-
eral funds. She also obtained a commitment to hold a conference between 
League officials and OEO staff. Shriver asked Young to appoint a liaison com-
mittee of League members to assist the OEO as the situation might require. 59 
Young's persistent prodding about black involvement in the OEO bu-
reaucracy and League participation in antipoverty programs yielded some 
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positive results. Young became a member of the OEO advisory committee. 
Moreover, Cernoria Johnson kept Young informed about the employment of 
blacks in importantoEo positions. She concluded, however, that these efforts 
were still not enough. Shriver, who was mindful of these criticisms, told Young 
about Samuel R Yette, whom he appointed as special assistant to coordinate 
the civil rights matters to ensure fair employment and contract compliance. 
Also, in response to Young, Shriver hired Theodore A. Jones to direct the 
Chicago regional office. He thanked Young for his support offheodore Brown, 
a consultant to VISTA, whom Shriver was considering for an OEO position. 
Overall, Young's agitation produced only modest results. Cernoria 
Johnson happily reported that the Washington bureau helped OEO in pro-
moting several state poverty workshops through the League's southern re-
gional office. OEO provided speakers and literature to the program. On the 
other hand, Johnson complained that OEO hesitated to share with her the 
status of proposals submitted by League cities. Moreover, officials in the af-
filiates claimed that in their communities blacks were not included as repre-
sentatives on the policymaking and program development level. Young learned 
from her about other examples of OEO'S "failure to adequately involve the 
Negro. "60 
Young knew that Cernoria Johnson was right! Some presidential aides 
did not want the War on Poverty ro be viewed as a program primarily for 
blacks. They believed that such an image would threaten congressional fund-
ing. Thus, it was possible that the paucity of blacks in OEO derived from these 
apprehensions. Moreover, Young's experience with OEO, despite his member-
ship on its national advisory committee, showed that problems in getting 
OEO cooperation were real. The agency received in July 1966 an NUL proposal 
to train 500 home health aides through the League's western regional office. 
Six months had passed, and no action had been taken on the proposal. 61 
Nonetheless, the League remained the black betterment group that the 
Johnson administration trusted the most. In 1968 OEO and HEW reluctantly 
considered funding Youth Organizations United (yOU), a group that worked 
with gangs. Their support, however, was contingent upon a reputable organi-
zation such as the Urban League or the Urban Coalition overseeing YOU. 
When Young and Sterling Tucker offered the League as the grantee for YOU, 
Joseph Califano responded positively. Califano told the president that he and 
another aide agreed that "it is far easier" to entrust federal funds to the Urban 
League. 62 
Young's insider status during the Johnson years was manifested in sev-
eral other ways. He interacted with numerous cabinet departments and agen-
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cies. He offered League expertise, sought the inclusion of himself and other 
League personnel on various commissions, and tried to affect the direction of 
policies that mainly impacted the black population. The Department of De-
fense, for example, confronted numerous racial equality issues that required 
Young's perspectives and assistance. The assistant secretary of defense for 
manpower in 1966 drew him to Washington as the principal speaker at its 
civil rights conference. The Navy Department needed his help to expand the 
number of black midshipmen at the Naval Academy. Young cooperated with 
Navy Secretary Paul Nitze and Defense Secretary Robert McNamara in pro-
moting The Navy Challenge: Future of the Negro in the United States Navy> a 
publication aimed at the recruitment of black officers and noncommissioned 
personne1.63 Some of the contacts that Young established with cabinet de-
partments resulted in NUL contracts. In 1965, for example, the Labor Depart-
ment disbursed $44,648 to the League for an on-the-job training and devel-
opment program. Focused on eight cities, League affiliates were asked to 
cooperate with the local U.S. Employment Service and employers to expand 
job opportunities for inner-city blacks.64 
President Johnson also appointed Young to several federal commissions 
dealing with urban affairs, education, and law enforcement. Young's presence 
on these panels sometimes yielded useful suggestions that impacted federal 
policy. Harry C. McPherson, Johnson's special assistant, thanked the League 
leader for his membership on LBJ's task force on urban problems. "The presi-
dent," noted McPherson, "appreciates your assistance and your efforts to help 
us develop creative proposals for a better urban America." Mindful of the 
recent riots in Watts in August 1965, LBJ wanted Young's input on how to 
handle the nation's escalating urban crisis. On other occasions Young, as a 
moderate black leader, gave legitimacy to commissions that would otherwise 
consist only of whites. He consented to be on an advisory committee on the 
Vocational Education Act of 1963. Always interested in the involvement of 
other League officials, Young wanted Otis Finley to substitute for him when-
ever he failed to make a meeting. As a member of the President's Commission 
on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Young persuaded the 
associate director of the panel to allow Arthur Q. Funn, the NUL general 
counsel, to represent him whenever he could not attend.65 
Although Young believed that LBJ's civil rights achievements entitled 
him to a Lincolnesque reputation, the League leader would not accept a for-
mal position in the Johnson administration. When the War on Poverty com-
menced in 1964, Young was offered the deputy directorship. One newspaper 
speculated that if Shriver, the OEO director, returned to the Peace Corps or 
Washington Insider 259 
ran for the 1964 Democratic vice presidential nomination, Young could suc-
ceed him as head of the antipoverty agency. In January 1965 Johnson learned 
from an aide that Young wanted to be a cabinet officer, preferably HEW, but 
might be interested in an ambassadorial assignment. About a week later Mar-
tin Luther King Jr. asked President Johnson to appoint Young as HEW secre-
tary. In September 1965 an Atlanta admirer in an unsolicited letter recom-
mended Young as secretary of HUD. 66 
Robert C. Weaver, who actually obtained the HUD secretaryship, con-
firmed that Johnson had spoken to Young about HEW and HUD. Moreover, 
Young himself acknowledged that he had been offered the OEO position and 
several other positions by President Johnson. Some presidential aides, while 
they noted that theoEo post had been offered to Young, criticized the League 
leader for lobbying for membership in the cabinet. "Nobody in a position of 
authority has indicated to Whitney," said one aide, "or to anyone else for that 
matter that he is being considered for a Cabinet post. Obviously all who 
know him have a high regard for his ability." The aide added, "We will con-
tinue to consider Whitney for any other vacancies for which he is qualified, 
but his cause is not helped in the slightest by any efforts to mount a cam-
paign."67 
Apparently, some within the Johnson administration had less enthusi-
asm for Young as a high-level presidential appointee than LB J himself. Clearly, 
Johnson had spoken to Young about key positions that his aides apparently 
knew little or nothing about. Whether LBJ seriously considered him for a 
cabinet position is unclear. Surely, Young would not resign as NUL head to 
serve as an assistant in a subcabinet agency such as OEO. Perhaps he would 
have accepted a cabinet job if it had been offered. In any case, the aides were 
wrong to conclude that the lobbying emanated from Young. 
It seems that Young valued his access to the White House and liked to 
be called to Washington to give advice. That he wanted to be LBJ's employee 
seems doubtful. When rumors circulated in 1965 that an offer to serve in the 
cabinet was forthcoming, Young told the NUL'S board of directors executive 
committee that he had received no official offer. He added that he would 
have to do much soul-searching if such an offer was made. He noted that his 
best service to the country and the cause of civil rights could be accomplished 
best at the National Urban League. In a later recollection Young added that 
his NUL position allowed him to exercise a maximum of influence and con-
trol, which a Johnson administration post would preclude. He added, "I 
thought it would be unwise if all of the black leadership that had talent or 
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abilities were to leave and go with the administration .... Some of us needed 
to be outside."68 
Although Young wanted to maintain his independence from LBJ, his 
admiration for the president's sincerity on civil rights made the League leader 
reluctant to criticize him. For example, widespread rioting in ghetto commu-
nities throughout the nation moved Johnson ro establish the National Advi-
sory Commission on Civil Disorders in 1967. Chaired by Illinois governor 
Otto Kerner, the panel concluded, "Our nation is moving toward two societ-
ies, one black, one separate and unequal .... Discrimination and segregation 
have long permeated much of American life; they now threaten the future of 
every American." Young quoted these excerpts from the Kerner Commission 
report in his second book, Beyond Racism. Yet, President Johnson embraced 
the panel's findings with only a tepid endorsement. "I think that was a mis-
take on the part of Mr. Johnson," Young remarked. LBJ was offended, he 
said, because the Kerner Report did not seem to acknowledge the many things 
that had been accomplished under his administration in the domestic area. 
Young contended that the president took the report as a personal criticism. 
While Young believed that the Kerner panel accurately diagnosed the nation's 
racial dilemma, Johnson had his doubts. Young commended the commission 
because "they listened to witnesses; they went into the ghettos; they climbed 
the broken stairways of decaying tenements; they saw the rat bites on chil-
dren with bellies swollen with hunger; they heard the frustration of men who 
couldn't get jobs. They saw firsthand what America does to its poor." These 
realities Young recounted in Beyond Racism. Yet Johnson's reluctance to coun-
tenance these simple truths did not tear Young away from him. In his opin-
ion, the president had accomplished too much for blacks and had changed 
their condition too dramatically to merit any harsh criticisms from the leader 
of the National Urban League.69 
The esteem that Presidents Kennedy and Johnson held for Young prob-
ably shielded him from the same ruthless scrutiny that the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation imposed upon Martin Luther King Jr. Starting in 1961, FBI 
director J. Edgar Hoover authorized continuous surveillance of King because 
of alleged Communist connections. Hoover's disdain for King drove him to 
threaten the civil rights leader with incriminating personal material gotten from 
wiretaps and informants. Kennedy and Johnson acquiesced to Hoover's cru-
sade to uncover King's suspected shortcomings. Except for routine background 
checks for clearance to serve on various presidential commissions, Hoover seemed 
uninterested in Young's personal or professional activities. Even when the FBI 
investigated him on its own, no damaging information seemed to surface.l° 
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Young's sophistication in dealing with Hoover and the FBI partially 
explained why the bureau made no major attempt to discredit him. During 
the Kennedy administration Young signaled approval of the FBI when he 
"expressed a desire to maintain [a] dose liaison" between the FBI and the 
National Urban League. Moreover, Young welcomed FBI interest in attract-
ing black applicants for bureau positions, and he promised the cooperation 
of the League. When three slain civil rights workers-Schwerner, Goodman, 
and Chaney-were found near Philadelphia, Mississippi, Young commended 
Hoover and the FBI for their efforts in recovering and identifying the bodies. 
Hoover thanked Young for his "complimentary remarks" and called them "a 
source of encouragement." Additionally, Hoover in 1967 commended Young 
as "one stripe above Martin Luther King" and as "a very expedient person." A 
Hoover aide further observed that the League leader "has had a cooperative 
attitude toward the Bureau."71 
Supposed missteps by Young were overlooked while similar suspicions 
may have been damaging to King. Although FBI officials remembered that 
Young had called Hoover's criticism of King "unfortunate," they still approved 
of the League as one of the more conservative civil rights groups and as one 
that opposed the black militants. When an informant saw Young on an air-
plane reading a letter from someone in the leftist W.E.B. DuBois Club, this 
seeming infraction required no action but was received at the FBI as "infor-
mation."72 
Despite Young's high regard for President Johnson, he maintained a 
political neutrality that freed him to cooperate with both Democrats and 
Republicans. That Young did not serve in the Johnson administration may 
have enhanced his credibility with Republicans in Congress and with Rich-
ard Nixon. Even before Johnson left office, Young endorsed the Human Re-
newal Fund proposed by the Urban Affairs Task Force of House Republicans. 
They wanted to put $6.6 billion of "non-essential Federal expenditures ... 
into programs to meet urgent human needs." When these House Republi-
cans asked Young for his "candid assessment," he agreed to come to Washing-
ton to consult with them. Young also appeared before both the 1968 plat-
form committees of the Republican Party on July 29 and the Democratic 
Party on August 23. He told each group that better coordination of poverty 
programs was needed, that there should be major public and private con-
struction in Negro ghettos to eliminate the slums, provide jobs, and act vig-
orously on Kerner Commission recommendations on race, housing, and so-
cial welfare. Finally, Young noted that presidential candidates should "abstain 
from appeals to the backlash vote through use of racial code terms such as 
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'crime in the streets' and 'neighborhood schools.'" Although addressed to all 
three presidential candidates, Young's admonitions mainly applied to the 
Republican nominee, Richard M. Nixon, and the American Independent 
Party candidate, George C. Wallace.73 
The nonpartisan Whitney M. Young Jr. did not declare for the Demo-
cratic nominee, Hubert H. Humphrey. Maintaining such neutrality must 
have been hard for the League leader, who admired Humphrey as a longtime 
civil rights champion. Young's aloofness from party politics was a wise strat-
egy, since Nixon won a narrow victory over Humphrey. Despite Young's pri-. 
vate disappointment with the election results and notwithstanding Nixon's 
appeals to the backlash vote and rumors about a "southern strategy," he wanted 
to work with the new president on civil rights and poverty issues. Nixon also 
wanted to interact with Young. Right after the election, the two met to dis-
cuss whether Young would accept an appointment as secretary of HUD. In 
declining the position, Young repeated to Nixon what he had told President 
Johnson, that he could accomplish more outside government than inside. 
Despite his refusal, Young wanted to keep the lines of communication open 
between him and Nixon and between the new president and black leaders. 
Hence, he joined with other board members of the National Urban Coali-
tion in meeting with President-elect Nixon about the urban crisis. Further-
more, Young urged James Farmer, the former executive director of CORE, to 
accept Nixon's offer to become an assistant secretary of Health, Education, 
and Welfare. 74 
On inauguration day, January 20, 1969, Young submitted to President 
Nixon ''A Call to Action: Recommendations on the Urban and Racial Cri-
sis." Young assumed that the new president would be responsive to the needs 
of the cities. The NUL document cited the rise in black unemployment as a 
pressing problem along with the other pathologies of ghetto life-overcrowded 
housing, poor education, and woefully inadequate social services. He urged 
Nixon to build on the recommendations of the Kerner Commission (the 
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders), the Kaiser Commission 
Report (the President's Committee on Urban Housing), and other panels 
that LBJ established to deal with urban issues. The report also reviewed a 
long list of federal programs that impacted the poor and assessed how well 
they helped the recipients. Young urged the Nixon administration to use 
existing volunteer agencies to supplement federal efforts in addressing pov-
erty and discrimination. He also called for a White House conference on 
police and justice. Although most law enforcement officers were "decent, 
hard-working men," police lawlessness still needed to be curbed. Moreover, 
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this White House initiative could encourage police to become more respon-
sive to blacks. This League document signaled to Nixon that Young wanted 
to do business with the new GOP administration.75 
Since Young wanted to give Nixon a chance to demonstrate friendship 
to blacks, he supported, whenever possible, presidential initiatives to address 
the plight of the disadvantaged. In 1969, for example, Young applauded Nixon's 
efforts to overhaul the welfare system. He told the president about particular 
aspects of his proposals that the League could endorse. Young agreed with 
Nixon's premise that "a simple declaration of need ... which includes the 
working poor ... and which would place a floor below which no one need 
fall" entitled such persons to welfare assistance. Young suggested that the 
Nixon initiative should assure federal administration of the entire welfare 
system, increased payments within five years, and deletion of compulsory 
work provisions. Young offered to Nixon the expertise of the League staff to 
help him draft the best possible measure for the Congress to consider.l6 
Nonetheless, Nixon's "southern strategy" distressed Young and other 
leaders. This agreement was a quid pro quo arrangement with Strom 
Thurmond, the GOP senator from South Carolina. Southerners would help 
Nixon to win the Republican presidential nomination and the election. If 
elected, Nixon would reduce federal pressure for school desegregation and 
appoint conservative southerners to the Supreme Court. Nixon kept his prom-
ises. His presidential predecessors pursued school desegregation by threaten-
ing to cut off HEW funds to offending school districts. The Nixon administra-
tion used the slower approach of individual lawsuits as the best strategy to 
achieve this objective. This policy shift, however, resulted in less emphasis on 
busing and a decline in the numbers of students who attended integrated 
schools.77 
Moreover, in 1969 and 1970 Nixon successively nominated Clement F. 
Haynsworth of South Carolina and G. Harold Carswell of Florida to a Su-
preme Court vacancy created by the resignation of Associate Justice Abe Fortas. 
Both men were hostile to recent civil rights gains. Hence, the Leadership 
Conference on Civil Rights played a pivotal role in lobbying the Senate to 
defeat both nominations. Young, who belonged to the executive committee 
of the Leadership Conference, supported these efforts.78 
Sharp criticism of the Nixon administration came from the NAACP board 
chairman, Bishop Stephen G. Spottswood of the Mrican Methodist Episco-
pal Zion Church. Speaking at the organization's 1970 annual convention, 
Bishop Spottswood said, "This is the first time since Woodrow Wilson, we 
have a national administration that can be rightly characterized as anti-Ne-
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gro." He added, "This is the first time since 1920 that the national adminis-
tration has made it a matter of calculated policy to work against the needs 
and aspirations of the largest minority of its citizens." Bishop Spottswood 
cited the Haynsworth and Carswell Supreme Court nominations, "the pull-
back on school desegregation," federal contracts with racially discriminatory 
defense companies, and attempts to weaken the voting rights act as evidence 
of Nixon's hostility to blacks.?9 
Bishop Spottswood's charge created a predicament for Whitney Young. 
He shared these same concerns. At the same time Young did not want to close 
the door to any possible cooperation between the National Urban League 
and the Nixon administration. Concerning Spottswood's remarks, Young 
noted at the 1970 annual NUL convention, "I don't think I would have used 
just that language." He did not believe that there was a deliberate policy of 
hating black people. Young admitted that the Nixon administration "faces a 
credibility gap of enormous proportions. The record is sometimes muddled." 
He also observed, "There are some signs that elements of this administration 
are moving forward to bring about change." He cited the removal of tax 
exemptions for segregated private academies, positive moves toward school 
desegregation, action against job discrimination, and possible OEO and HEW 
grants through black organizations to aid inner cities. Young's optimism had 
been stirred by the presence of that other "element" within the Nixon admin-
istration who wanted a rapprochement with civil rights leaders.so 
Young preferred to believe that Nixon had repaid his debt to Senator 
Thurmond and would abandon the racial insensitivity that the "southern 
strategy" represented. Moreover, administration officials had also made over-
tures to him. For example, in early 1969 Young agreed to serve on the Eco-
nomic Development Council to the Small Business Administration. The ad-
ministrator, Howard J. Samuels, urged the League leader to advise him on 
Project Own. This initiative aimed to increase black business ownership. 
Moreover, Secretary of Commerce Maurice H. Stans in 1970 invited Young 
to Atlanta to meet with federal officials and local leaders about minority busi-
nesses. Most important, the presence of Leonard Garment in the Nixon ad-
ministration gave Young reasons to remain open-minded about Nixon. Gar-
ment, Nixon's law partner in New York City, came to Washington at the 
president's invitation to open a branch of their firm. During Nixon's presi-
dential campaign, Garment oversaw minority affairs that included blacks, 
Jews, Hispanics, and Native Americans. He eventually joined the administra-
tion as a special consultant to the president with the same minority affairs 
portfolio.81 
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Obviously, Garment cared a great deal about how blacks perceived the 
Nixon presidency. Stunned by Bishop Spottswood's NAACP speech, Garment 
wired the prelate and declared that his comments were "an unfair and dis-
heartening attack." He cited the "Philadelphia Plan," an effort to put blacks 
in the construction trades, a $1.5 billion proposal for school desegregation, a 
family assistance plan, and other Nixon initiatives that would positively im-
pact civil rights efforts. When Young said at the 1970 NUL convention that 
the Nixon administration was not anti-Negro, his comments apparently gar-
nered grateful responses from Garment and other Nixon loyalists.82 
In some ways, the Spottswood speech was a wake-up call for the Nixon 
administration. The bishop expressed what many believed about the presi-
dent. Clearly, Garment and others had to develop closer ties with black lead-
ers and publicize those Nixon initiatives which aided civil rights. Increas-
ingly, Young and the National Urban League figured into Nixon administration 
plans to discredit Spottswood's accusations. While Nixon's treasury under-
secretary commended Garment for his response to the bishop, he suggested 
that a developing relationship between the National Urban League's summer 
fellowship program and the federal government should be encouraged. A 
Treasury Department official had worked with the League to spearhead this 
program. Professors from black institutions pursued internships in various 
federal departments and agencies, which resulted in increasing the numbers 
of their students who chose majors in business administration, accounting, 
and economics. Garment's colleague suggested greater cooperation between 
this League program and the Nixon administration.83 
Additionally, serious consideration was given to Young's appointment 
as civil rights consultant to the president. A GOP supporter in Indianapolis 
told John Ehrlichman, assistant to the president for domestic affairs, that 
Young's 1969 speech to the American Bar Association left "an indelible im-
pression upon me." Although the appointment did not materialize, Young 
had become the black leader with whom the Nixon administration preferred 
to interact. Those who wanted to enhance President Nixon's reputation among 
blacks were sure that Young and the National Urban League were the best 
means to attain that end. If Garment and other Nixon Republicans wanted a 
special relationship with Young, then the League leader had no objection. 
What mattered most to Young was access to the administration. Strong ties 
with Garment and others could position the League to handle federal funds 
directed toward the nation's inner cities.84 
Young asked Ehrlichman to schedule him for an appearance before the 
Domestic Affairs Council. He wanted to inform the Council about ''the present 
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status of black Americans, changing moods and attitudes, as well as what I 
feel to be some immediate and long-range steps which the administration 
and Federal Government can and must take." Both Ehrlichman and Gar-
ment responded with unusual enthusiasm to the proposal.85 
Aside from letting the Nixon administration know about trends in the 
black community, Young's core concern related to the League. Nixon learned 
that the organization faced acute difficulties and needed assistance. An aide 
noted, "Young feels it will be to the Government's advantage not to let the 
Urban League go under." A meeting between the president and his cabinet 
with Young and his colleagues would be mutually beneficial. Young probably 
would commend the Nixon administration on its efforts in behalf of blacks, 
and the League would secure substantial federal funds, which would enhance 
its importance and visibility within the black population.86 
On December 22, 1970, Whitney Young, Betti Whaley, and Sterling 
Tucker arrived at the White House to meet with President Nixon and the 
secretaries of Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, HEW, HUD, andTransportation. 
Also included were the deputy attorney general, the director-designate of the 
Office of Economic Opportunity, and the assistant secretary of defense for 
manpower. Sam Simmons, Sam Jackson, and Arthur Fletcher, three black 
appointees, also attended the session. Seated next to Nixon, Young told offi-
cials that human resources agencies in the federal government should "make 
more use of the unique capabilities of private, non-profit local organizations 
like the Urban League." His charts illustrated programs that totaled $70 mil-
lion, which the League could administer and evaluate. Nixon agreed with 
Young and instructed the cabinet members to see what could be done. Spe-
cifically, Nixon wanted someone in each agency to "explore the ways in which 
the League and its network of local affiliates can, under contract, help the 
Departments carry out their human resources programs." Leonard Garment 
and George Shultz of the Office of Management and Budget served as liai-
sons with the League's Sterling Tucker. Nixon required a follow-up report 
about these efforts within a month after the December meeting. 87 
As a result, the Nixon administration extended to the League the larg-
est package of federal funds ever offered to the organization. Young drew 
$21.24 million in contracts from eight departments for the 1971 and 1972 
fiscal years. The Department of Commerce, for example, earmarked a 
$310,000 million contract plus another $140,000 for assistance in the cen-
sus. Housing and Urban Development offered $1 million, "a promise" to 
give speedy attention to the applications of minority sponsors of Section 236 
housing, and a commitment to persuade city governments to include the 
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League in urban renewal programs. The Department ofTransportation found 
$1.25 million in its budget for partnership with League. Even the Depart-
ment of Agriculture developed a $430,000 proposal for rural housing loans 
and guarantees for applicants whom the League identified.88 
Mter the White House meeting, an elated Whitney Young quoted Presi-
dent Nixon to reporters at a press conference as saying, "What is good for the 
Urban League is good for the country." Young commended Nixon on his 
leadership, noting, "Before I could even get to make my appeal ... he grabbed 
the ball and ran with it."The president "really called this meeting because he, 
first, respected the organization, he respected me, and that he really meant 
business about it." Moreover, Nixon reminded Young and his cabinet that he 
had gone to NUL headquarters right after the 1968 election to consult with 
the League leader. Then he "told every Cabinet member, the next time they 
are in New York to go visit the Urban League offices so they could get a 
firsthand look at the quality of this mechanism. "89 
Young and the Nixon administration gained what each had sought. 
The League obtained greater federal support for its programs than what ei-
ther the Kennedy or Johnson administrations had offered. Nixon officials 
thought they now had a good chance to create a positive image of the presi-
dent among blacks. Garment informed Nixon, "Whitney was so pleased with 
your favorable reaction that he went out and told the press ... that this was 
'a new start, a new day. "'90 
Young generated such a good press for the Nixon administration that 
Garment and Ehrlichman revived efforts to attract him into the federal gov-
ernment. Garment advised President Nixon to "inquire-quite informally 
and privately-about his willingness to take an Ambassadorial appointment." 
In the meantime Ehrlichman would explore such possibilities with Secretary 
of State William P. Rogers. Sterling Tucker probably told Garment that Young 
had plans to retire from the League. Both men felt emboldened to spend an 
entire Saturday at Young's home in New Rochelle, New York, to discuss an 
appointment in the Nixon administration. While a significant ambassador-
ship was on the table, the three men had substantive exchanges about Young 
going to the White House as assistant to the president for civil rights. The 
daylong discussion explored the potential problems of how a person ofYoung's 
stature would handle a rebuff on a major policy matter. At the end of the 
Garment and Tucker visit, Young still had not decided whether he wanted to 
be considered.91 
Young valued his deepening relationship with the Nixon administra-
tion. Although a White House position did not develop, he had already be-
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come a member of the Advisory Council on Social Security in May 1969. 
Robert Finch, the HEW secretary, gave Young the appointment and invited his 
views on several issues related to the trust fund, benefits policy, and public 
assistance programs. Young took the assignment so seriously that he asked 
Cernoria D. Johnson, his Washington bureau director, about NUL positions 
on social security issues. Young's service on the committee broadened his 
familiarity and influence with Nixon appointees and holdovers from the 
Kennedy/Johnson administrations. Additionally, in December 1970 Presi-
dent Nixon put Young on as a director of the Federal Reserve Bank in New 
York. 92 
Although Young realized that he and Nixon mutually benefited from 
their dealings with each other, he did not allow the president to exploit him 
politically or damage his credibility among blacks. An attempt to draw Young's 
support to an Honor America Day celebration on July 4, 1970, was illustra-
tive. Headed by Nixon's close friends Billy Graham and Bob Hope, Honor 
America Day was planned as a patriotic event to respond to escalating criti-
cism of Nixon's handling of the Vietnam War. J. Willard Marriott Sr., the 
hotel tycoon, invited Young to join the Honor America Day executive com-
mittee. Young, who objected to symbolic activities, told Marriott that he 
preferred "those movements that clearly focus on concrete issues or programs 
and lead to some constructive action." He added, "The most creditable way 
to honor America is to struggle daily in a sane, positive and constructive way 
to make its creed, its ideals and its traditional promise a reality for all citizens . 
. . . At this crucial time, given the high level of unemployment among the 
young and inner-city black residents, the serious housing crisis and the gen-
eral unrest within our communities, my participation in Honor America Day 
might well detract from my efforts and abilities to provide leadership at a 
time when it is so badly needed." Young declined Marriott's invitation. He 
sent President Nixon a copy of his response to Marriott and noted that he 
hoped Nixon understood the validity of his position.93 
Young's access to the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations 
often resulted in his input into major policy initiatives, influence over the 
appointments of black officeholders, and federal involvement with the Na-
tional Urban League. More than any other national black leader, Young con-
sistently visited the White House over three presidencies to press for federal 
programs to benefit blacks. Richard Nixon recalled, "He was not a patient 
man, but he understood the uses of patience. And he was not a moderate 
man in terms of his goals, but he knew the uses of moderation in achieving 
those goals."94 
12 
On the War Front 
"\Vlhen Congress overwhelmingly passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution in 
W 1964, U.S. military involvement in Vietnam sharply escalated from 
troop levels of 16,000 in 1963 to 184,000 in 1965, to 200,000 in 1966, and 
to 460,000 in 1967. Policies formulated by President Lyndon B. Johnson 
and the advisers he inherited from the Kennedy administration entangled the 
United States in a seemingly intractable war to help South Vietnam fight off 
invaders from communist North Vietnam. k a result, the Vietnam War deeply 
divided the nation's black leaders. Before 1965, James Forman, Robert Moses, 
and other members of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee 
became the first civil rights activists to oppose the war. In 1966 SNCC offi-
cially denounced American foreign policy in Southeast kia. Resentment over 
the military draft, distrust of the federal government, and sympathy for Third 
World liberation movements motivated SNCC'S opposition. Members of the 
Black Panther Party developed a similar perspective on the war. Huey New-
ton, for example, criticized the United States as an "imperialistic" and "capi-
talistic" power that had no right to be in Vietnam. He added that the Black 
Panther Party supported "any people who are struggling to determine their 
destiny." He said, "The Vietnamese say Vietnam should be able to determine 
its own destiny. Power [to] the Vietnamese people." When Martin Luther 
King Jr. announced in 1967 at Riverside Church in New York City that he 
opposed the war, the Vietnam issue grew into a major concern that black 
leaders could not ignore. Speaking to Clergy and Laymen Concerned about 
Vietnam, King stated that when the United States deepened its involvement 
in Southeast kia, he knew that resources required for ending American pov-
erty would be siphoned off into military spending. Moreover, "We were tak-
ing the black young men who had been crippled by our society and sending 
them eight thousand miles away to guarantee liberties in Southeast kia which 
they had not found in southwest Georgia and East Harlem." Repulsed by the 
violence of the war, King noted that his 1964 Nobel Peace Prize compelled 
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him to seek peace. "This calling takes me beyond national allegiances," he 
said. His commitment to the ministry of Jesus Christ caused him to speak 
out for the victims of American violence in Vietnam. The views of Whitney 
M. Young Jr., however, sharply differed from other black leaders who op-
posed the war. 1 
Despite his initial neutrality, Young's relationship with President Johnson 
shaped his perspectives on the war and its impact on the black freedom struggle. 
His position on the Vietnam War moved through three overlapping phases. 
In 1966, while remaining noncommittal, he embarked on a League-funded 
trip to Vietnam to investigate the condition of blacks in the military. His 
friendship with Johnson, however, undermined his neutrality. LBJ was a civil 
rights champion whose racial liberalism Young greatly valued. Moreover, 
Young, himself a World War II veteran, believed that he and other black 
leaders should not criticize their presidential ally. Rather than taking sides in 
acrimonious debates concerning the war, Young established in the National 
Urban League an office of veterans' affairs to help black servicemen readjust 
to civilian life. 
In 1967, Young could no longer maintain his neutrality. He accepted 
President Johnson's invitation to become an observer of the South Vietnam-
ese elections. When he and others returned to the United States, they re-
ported that the elections had been fair. This 1967 trip seemed to justify Ameri-
can involvement in the war against North Vietnam. The United States was 
fighting for an emergent democratic state in Southeast Asia, and the Ameri-
can military was required to protect South Vietnam from Communist ag-
gressors. Young parlayed his enthusiasm for President Johnson's civil rights 
record into an endorsement of his controversial policies in Vietnam. 
In 1968, after the Tet Offensive exposed the vulnerability of the Ameri-
can military, President Johnson decided against a reelection bid. Months later, 
Young announced his opposition to the Vietnam War. The wrongness of the 
war seemed a lesser motivation than the substantial pressure exerted upon the 
League leader by antiwar blacks and whites whom he could not ignore. Al-
though he finally counseled an American withdrawal from Vietnam, Young 
did not explicitly criticize either President Johnson or his heir apparent, Hubert 
H. Humphrey. 
Overall, Johnson's policies in Vietnam troubled Young less than the 
denunciations made against the president by other black leaders. They be-
lieved that the war harmed the black struggle and drew funds away from 
Great Society programs that benefited blacks. He contended that black lead-
ers should not juxtapose civil rights issues with Vietnam War policies. These 
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were mutually exclusive matters which should not have been linked. Johnson, 
he believed, deserved their support or at least their silence on the Vietnam 
War. 
Maintaining a middle ground between Lyndon B. Johnson and antiwar 
black leaders became increasingly difficult for Young. Despite disagreement 
with Roy Wilkins and Young, SNCC counseled those in the civil rights move-
ment to view their service as a "valid alternative to the draft." Clifford L. 
Alexander, a black official in the Johnson administration, told his boss that 
Roy Wilkins was distressed and planned to consult Young on this matter. 
Alexander further noted that some members of the Big Six would publicly 
dissociate themselves from the SNCC statement because of its negative conse-
quences for the civil rights movement. Additionally, one militant black activ-
ist planned to picket the 1966 White House conference, "To Fulfill These 
Rights," and challenge the Johnson administration to spend as much money 
to relieve the problems of the ghettos as it was spending on the war. Despite 
these growing fissures among black leaders, Wilkins and Young tried to keep 
the problem of Vietnam from sabotaging the White House conference. Even 
though SNCC sent no representatives to the gathering, Young opposed efforts 
to bar the organization's participation in the meeting. King attended, but his 
antiwar posture put him in a marginal role in the proceedings. With SNCC, 
SCLC, and CORE'S Floyd B. McKissick critical of the Vietnam War, Young had 
no more middle ground to occupy. When he observed that "the people are 
more concerned about the rat tonight and the job tomorrow than they are 
about Vietnam," he became an unwitting apologist for Johnson's foreign 
policy.2 
It was Young's intention, however, to approach the Vietnam War prag-
matically. There was no need to emulate Dr. King's moralism. Instead, Young 
would act responsibly by avoiding criticism ofJohnson and at the same time 
he would gain administration support for helping blacks in the military. In 
1966 he toured Vietnam on a mission financed by the National Urban League. 
The trip was an expression of the League's interest and concern for the 45,000 
to 60,000 black troops. He boasted that he was the first civil rights leader to 
go to Vietnam to assess the welfare of black personnel. As a result he spent 
five days visiting black servicemen in all sectors and in many types of opera-
tions. He also observed them in Saigon restaurants, bars, the PX, and billets. 
Although his trip was nongovernmental, Young told President Johnson 
that he enjoyed "the hearty cooperation of the civilian and military personnel 
who are there under your command." He extended special commendations 
to Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and General William Westmoreland. 
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Moreover, his presence drew the keen interest of the American and foreign 
press. Not surprisingly; American embassy officials telegrammed back to Wash-
ington, D.C., what Young told journalists about his findings. He testified 
that morale among black soldiers was high. Despite the complexity of the 
conflict, black servicemen understood why they were in Vietnam. Young also 
discovered a surprising amount of interracial teamwork. It seemed that color 
was irrelevant. "Heroes and cowards come in all colors," he said. He added 
that it was "a sad commentary on the life of the Negro in civilian life" that 
greater dignity was afforded to black servicemen in Vietnam than what they 
experienced in the United States. Young contended that this reality explained 
why blacks reenlisted in the armed forces in such large numbers. 
Conversely; Young observed that the promotion of blacks into officer 
ranks remained rare. Although General Westmoreland populated his head-
quarters with black officers, there were no black generals and only one black 
navy pilot. Additionally, Young believed that field commanders had a respon-
sibility to discourage soldiers from "this natural tendency to segregate." He 
regretted that in the bars during off-duty hours blacks engaged in a "volun-
tary and self-imposed" separation from their fellow servicemen. Moreover, 
white officers seemed "to go colorblind" when asked about the numbers of 
blacks under their command. To boost black representation in positions of 
authority, Young recommended "more color consciousness to overcome the 
years of limited opportunity." 
Ultimately; Young emphasized to the press exactly why he had come to 
Southeast Asia. "We made it clear we would make no policy judgements." 
Rather, he wanted "to assist Negro veterans returning to the states." He added 
that the numerous affiliates of the National Urban League wanted to ensure a 
smooth transition from military to civilian life for thousands of black Viet-
nam vets.3 
Johnson aides in Saigon and Washington believed that Young's findings 
reflected favorably on the president's conduct of the Vietnam War. Before 
Young returned to the United States, Ambassador Lodge cabled the White 
House about the press conference in which the League leader appeared. The 
ambassador liked his comment on the sense of pride of many Negroes serv-
ing in Vietnam. Young said that this sentiment was one "which he shared and 
hoped to convey to Negroes and other Americans back home." The fact that 
blacks received an equal break in military service also was a favorable com-
mentary on today's armed forces. Lodge noted that in spite of Young's sharp 
questioning of General Westmoreland about the paucity of black officers, his 
"warts-and-all" observations "appeared to make [a] favorable impression on 
On the War Front 273 
Saigon's hard-boiled press corps." As a result, Ambassador Lodge "strongly 
recommended" that President Johnson and Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus 
Vance meet with Young as a "suitable capstone" to his "constructive and use-
ful trip."4 
Young did not need Lodge's intercession with the White House. Joseph 
Califano, a Johnson aide, reported that the League leader wanted to brief the 
president about his Vietnam trip. "From all indications" said Califano to 
Johnson, Young's "impressions should be quite positive." Before the meeting, 
Califano summarized for the president what Young had said at his Saigon 
news conference, including the references to high troop morale among blacks 
and interracial teamwork within the military. Johnson only needed to ad-
dress Young's concerns about "why we have so few Negroes in the higher 
ranks." 
Present in the meeting with Johnson and Young were Cyrus Vance, 
Walt Rostow, and Clifford Alexander. Young stressed the importance of get-
ting black generals in high-level offices. Alexander recalled Young's observa-
tion that it was great that both Benjamin O. Davis Sr. and Benjamin O. 
Davis Jr. were generals. "Now, unfortunately," said Young to President Johnson, 
"B.O. Davis Jr. doesn't have any sons, so it looks like there aren't going to be 
any black generals unless you reach out and find one." Young hoped that 
Johnson would pay "careful attention" to this issue. Apparently, Young had 
not spoken in vain. He persuaded Johnson to push the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
on the matter of black generals. He also had in mind a new League program 
to help returning black Vietnam veterans to readjust to civilian life. Johnson 
endorsed that initiative as well. "I am happy you and the National Urban 
League undertook a mission to Vietnam," said Johnson to Young. He was 
pleased that his findings would be developed into positive programs for black 
servicemen.5 
In the ensuing months after his trip to Vietnam, controversy stirred for 
Young. He noted that some in the press and public wondered why he shifted 
his focus away from civil rights matters to "some far-flung, war torn land." 
Additionally, blacks who opposed American involvement in Vietnam criti-
cized Young for his support of President Johnson's controversial Southeast 
Asia policies. War expenditures, they argued, diminished resources that would 
have gone to fight poverty within black ghettoes. Cecil B. Moore, the mili-
tant president of the Philadelphia NAACP, claimed not to oppose the Vietnam 
War. Nonetheless, he accused Young of "being used as an instrument to white-
wash discriminatory treatment in Vietnam." Although he apologized for 
wrongly calling Young a "draft dodger," Moore picketed the NUL convention 
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and dubbed it an "Uncle Tom" meeting. Gloster Current, director of branches 
and field administration in the national NAACP, supported Young's visit to 
Vietnam. He denounced Moore for his "silly protest against a brother organi-
zation."6 
The fissure between Young and King over Vietnam, however, was a far 
more serious matter. On one occasion their argument about the Vietnam 
War reached such intensity that King, an antiwar activist, hurled a hurtful 
comment at Young. "Whitney, what you're saying may get you a foundation 
grant, but it won't get you into the kingdom of truth." He later apologized to 
Young for this personal attack. Still, no agreement about the Vietnam War 
emerged between the two. In April 1967 Young further explained his per-
spectives. "The urgent domestic problem of civil rights and the issue of the 
war in Vietnam should remain separate. The masses of Negro citizens who 
are committed to serve and who have given Negro leaders ... influence, have 
as their first priority the immediate problem of survival in this country." He 
added, "The limited resources and personnel available to civil rights agencies 
for work in their behalf should not be diverted into other channels." Young 
stated his disagreement with "the ultra-conservative who says that we must 
sacrifice domestic anti-poverty programs for the war effort." Without men-
tioning King by name, he dissented from "the opposite view that we cannot 
support massive domestic programs without an immediate cessation of the 
war in Vietnam. I am convinced that we do not have to face the choice be-
tween national security and internal chaos."7 
In his syndicated column, "To Be Equal," Young observed that the be-
lief of King and others that "the costs of war automatically stop further civil 
rights progress" was false. "Our nation can advance civil rights in some areas 
without spending money. Open housing legislation would not cost money. 
Whatever our personal feelings about the war in Vietnam, we have to recog-
nize reality. It does no good to say to the nation: "civil rights or international 
security-choose." That's why civil rights should be kept separate and apart 
from questions like Vietnam."8 Young suggested that he and other main-
stream black leaders singlemindedly pursue a civil rights agenda and avoid 
entangling it with Vietnam issues because he viewed participation in the an-
tiwar movement as a distraction. He was also wary of those who opposed 
American policies in Vietnam, because they stirred resentment in President 
Johnson, an important civil rights ally. Rather than alienate Johnson byasso-
ciating with antiwar advocates, Young used the Vietnam War as a pressure 
point to maintain presidential support for black advancement. Young trans-
formed the debate about black involvement in the Vietnam War into a civil 
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rights issue. How were blacks being treated in the army? Were they dying in 
disproportionate numbers? How many blacks would be promoted, especially 
to general? How would civilian whites behave toward returning black service-
men? Whether the war was just or unjust was not the important issue. The 
issue was whether Vietnam would improve or undermine the condition of 
blacks. Although the war consumed more and more ofJohnson's time, Young, 
who approached Vietnam as a civil rights matter, prevented the president and 
other powerful whites from neglecting the black struggle. 
Young explained his perspective in a widely read Harper's article, "When 
the Negroes in Vietnam Come Home." The desegregation of the armed forces 
in 1948 set the context for his discussion of blacks in the Vietnam War. 
Integration as a matter of military policy created opportunities for blacks and 
discouraged discrimination from resentful whites. Demographic circumstances 
in the Vietnam War also encouraged interracialism in the military. White 
servicemen were in a nonwhite country. Their success depended on coopera-
tion from Vietnamese civilians and fellow black soldiers. Although blacks 
seemed to die in larger proportions than whites, Young attributed this to 
higher black reenlistments. Even though the navy lagged behind the army in 
the numbers of black officers, "multiracial teamwork" still prevailed on the 
carriers that Young visited on his trip in 1966. Because the armed forces 
offered a better chance of meritorious advancement than the civilian sector, 
racial inequities in American society needed to be addressed. He reiterated 
that his purpose for going to Vietnam "was not to make any moral judge-
ment, or any military or political analysis of the war. No sane man would 
champion the horrendous phenomenon of war, with its unspeakable atroci-
ties, terrible human suffering, and tragic loss of life." Instead, his rationale 
was "to voice the concern of the Negro community for the men fighting and 
dying in Vietnam and to let Negroes know the fight was continuing at home 
to assure them equality for opportunity upon their return." Young drew sup-
port from President Johnson, the Department of Defense, and the Veterans' 
Administration to initiate a program to aid the return of black veterans to 
civilian life. The administration preferred that Young's interest in Vietnam 
focus on the status of blacks rather than their deployment with nearly a half 
million other soldiers to a distant war thousands of miles away from Ameri-
can shores.9 
When Martin Luther King Jr. derisively told Young that he cared more 
about a foundation grant than whether the Vietnam War was right or wrong, 
he went to the core of their disagreement. King probably referred to a $150,000 
grant that the League would receive over two years from the Rockefeller Broth-
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ers Fund. These funds along with donations from General Foods, Union 
Carbide, Johnson & Johnson, New York Community Trust, PPG Industries, 
and Joseph M. Kirchheimer launched an office of veterans' affairs in the Na-
tional Urban League in September 1967. With 100,000 black veterans re-
turning from Vietnam, the League planned to help them to find employ-
ment, to enroll in job training programs, and to locate adequate housing. 
The U.S. Department of Defense provided information on all black service-
men honorably discharged from the military. The charitable contributions 
allowed Young to hire a national veterans' affairs director with supporting 
staff. Moreover, foundation funds paid salaries for veterans' affairs coordina-
tors at League affiliates in New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, 
Atlanta, New Orleans, Detroit, Washington, and Pittsburgh. NUL officials 
also sent information about black veterans to numerous other League affili-
ates. 
From September 1967 through September 1968, Joseph F. Cannon, 
the League's national veterans' affairs director, reported that his office sent to 
the nine designated affiliates data on nearly 4,000 black servicemen. Eighty-
three affiliates with limited services received information for over 7,000 black 
veterans. Leagues in Dallas, Richmond, and Philadelphia each logged over 
500 referrals. Later, the General Foods Corporation funded for the Dallas, 
Richmond, Jacksonville, Winston-Salem, and Newark affiliates full-time vet-
erans' affairs staff. Other corporate contributions enabled the Pittsburgh, New 
York, and Atlanta affiliates either to establish or to upgrade their Vietnam 
veterans' programs. These and other local Leagues provided employment, 
housing, job training, education, health and welfare, and legal counseling 
services to blacks recently discharged from the military. Approximately 9,143 
received assistance. During the first year monies from individuals, corpora-
tions, and foundations totaled $195,015, and expenditures amounted to 
$192,074.10 
On an annual budget of nearly $200,000, most of which the Rockefeller 
Brothers Fund provided, the veterans' affairs program continued its assis-
tance to blacks honorably discharged from the military. Between 1967 and 
1970, for example, the League received 42,293 requests and resolved 27,225. 
This promising start moved Young to approach the Rockefeller Foundation 
for funds to expand this effort. He had vowed not to ask the Rockefeller 
Brothers Fund for any more money because he wanted the program to be-
come self-supporting. The increased numbers of black Vietnam veterans, 
however, caused Young to rethink this position. Moreover, J. George Harrar, 
president of the Rockefeller Foundation, agreed about expanding the project 
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activities and he advocated recruiting in Vietnam even before veterans were 
released. So Young asked his staff to prepare a fresh three-year proposal for 
the Rockefeller Foundation to consider. 11 
Dealing with a new Defense Department estimate of 120,000 minority 
veterans becoming citizens again attached greater urgency to the veterans' 
affairs programs. Young told Harrar, "The increased unemployment-with 
its more serious impact on black people-and the increased rate of release of 
black servicemen are contributing to a more serious problem in the black 
community. The Veterans Affairs Program is more desperately needed now 
than ever before." Although the new proposal argued for an expanded out-
reach in the nine League affiliates, more cities could be included if the foun-
dation allowed for some flexibility in the budget request. The League pro-
posal raised several new concerns. Forty League affiliates rather than nine 
needed to have veterans' affairs coordinators. Moreover, the League had to be 
able to deal with Executive Order 11521, which addressed Vietnam Era Vet-
erans Readjustment Appointments. The League also planned several initia-
tives to enhance employment, educational, and housing opportunities for 
black Vietnam servicemen. Young also hoped that disabled veterans would be 
helped and that more blacks would be encouraged to attend college. The 
League required $1,143,746, of which $387,935 would go to the national 
office for staff and other administrative expenses and $755,811 would be 
disbursed to the affiliates. With the u~derstanding that Young would seek 
funding from other sources, the Rockefeller Foundation on December 17, 
1970, gave a grant for $500,000 to support the program for three to five 
years. 12 
Young's embrace of the Vietnam War as an issue of fairness to blacks 
allowed him a veneer of neutrality on whether American involvement was 
right or wrong. Nevertheless, the League's veterans' affairs program, which 
Young launched with crucial cooperation from the Defense Department and 
the Veterans' Administration, implicated him and his organization in the 
president's Southeast Asia policies. Although Young preferred to avoid an 
unequivocal public stand on the war, Johnson made it increasingly difficult 
for him to adhere to this stance. When the president asked Young to become 
an observer at the 1967 South Vietnamese elections, he could not distance 
himself from the Johnson administration. 
The United States sent nearly a half million troops to Southeast Asia to 
protect a developing democracy in South Vietnam. That justification was 
threatened when Buddhist critics mounted sustained opposition to the Nguyen 
Cao Ky military regime. Pressure from the Johnson administration compelled 
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Ky and his partner, Nguyen Van Thieu, to call for elections to the presidency 
and to the national assembly. To ensure fairness President Johnson convened 
a distinguished team of American observers to watch the election process 
throughout South Vietnam. He asked Young to join three U.S. senators, 
three governors, mayors, churchmen, businessmen, and labor leaders in this 
endeavor. 13 
When Young accepted Johnson's appointment, he became involved in a 
substantive policy matter. Pressure groups that wanted to influence his views 
on the South Vietnamese elections and ultimately his findings shared their 
unsolicited ideas with Young. A Quaker at the New York Center for Warl 
Peace Studies sent him a proposal to assist in the development of representa-
tive government in South Vietnam. An official from the General Board of 
Christian Concern of the Methodist Episcopal Church sent four documents 
to Young, "which we hope will help you in adding perspectives to your [elec-
tion] observations." An interfaith group of clergy wanted Young to learn 
whether "the election process has already been distorted as to make a mock-
ery of the goal of self-determination for which our young men are dying 
every day." They asked him to determine if antiwar candidates had been barred 
from the election and if the U.S. embassy had already stated a preference for 
the Ky/Thieu military regime. A representative of the Republican Vietnam 
Fair Elections Project mailed Young fifty questions on the course of the elec-
tions "which suggest at least as many possible ways in which the elections 
could be rigged." Now Young had become a significant participant in a major 
foreign policy matter. No longer could he restrict his involvement to military 
race relations. Whether the war was wise or not was an issue that Young had 
to face head-on. 14 
While in Vietnam, Young was impressed by Vietnamese enthusiasm for 
the electoral process. In Phanthiet, for example, rockets had just landed, yet 
there were people parading to the polls. He dismissed concerns about govern-
ment pressure on the voters. Young observed that he was "more concerned 
about the fairness of the press than the fairness of the election." He became 
convinced that American reporters were not providing accurate coverage of 
the elections. At a reception at the ambassador's Saigon residence, Young 
blasted the press for bias in reporting on the campaign and on the election 
preparations. A telegram to Secretary of State Dean Rusk noted, "Young 
pointed out that from their reporting he had not been aware of all the cam-
paign activity by opposition candidates. He had not realized the extent of the 
VC [Vietcong] pressures against the elections and thought that 'I would only 
see Thieu/Ky posters everywhere.'" According to another cable to Secretary 
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Rusk, "Whitney Young has said that unless he sees some indications of elec-
tion rigging or pressure he is going to start asking reporters why they haven't 
been reporting elections correctly." Walt Rostow seemed sufficiently impressed 
with the criticism of the press by Young and other election observers that he 
suggested to President Johnson that the New York Times and the Associated 
Press should be told "that their representatives are not objective reporters but 
political operatives."15 
Although Thieu and Ky claimed victory with 35 percent of the votes, 
they faced charges that their regime either prevented major opponents from 
running or jailed them. Voter intimidation, repeat voting by soldiers, fraudu-
lent tallies, and stuffed ballot boxes were also alleged. Nonetheless, Young 
and the other observers pronounced the elections as "reasonably efficient, 
free, and honest." Young apparently agreed with another observer who com-
mended the "progress" in Vietnam "as a result of the elections we were privi-
leged to witness."16 
Because of his participation on the team of election observers, Young's 
views on the Vietnam War were now important to whites and blacks alike. 
Moreover, he became identified with the Johnson administration and its South-
east Asia policies. A member of the National Association of Social Workers 
criticized him for going to Vietnam, saying, "I am ashamed of your support 
of the USA Vietnam War by participating in that 'white wash' commission." 
Young's NASW colleague accused him and the team of "contributing to the 
spurious and illegal election in South Vietnam." Moreover, "you and your 
organization do not gain support from your giving in to Johnson and his 
white power structure, and in my view, your trip to Vietnam betrayed your 
stated principles. You certainly permitted yourself to be exploited through 
pictures and words in press releases." Theodore E. Brown of the American 
Negro Leadership Conference on Mrica, however, agreed that Young's civil 
rights angle concerning the war was defensible. In an NBC telecast, Young 
commented on why he consented to serve on the team. Brown liked his 
answer. "You are correct," he said. ''American Negroes would have been most 
vociferous in their complaints . . . if a distinguished Negro had not been 
included in such a delegation." Brown congratulated him for undertaking 
"that important and rather dangerous assignment." Whether Young pleased 
or displeased supporters and critics of the Johnson administration, he was 
now a major participant in the national debate about the Vietnam War. 17 
Those who suspected that Young was becoming cozier with Johnson's 
Vietnam policy were proven correct. The Chicago Sun- Times published a pho-
tograph of Young and Henry Cabot Lodge, the former U.S. ambassador to 
280 Militant Mediator 
South Vietnam, swimming together on Waikiki in Hawaii during their re-
turn trip from the elections. Moreover, Young told General William C. 
Westmoreland, "I came away . . . deeply impressed with the sterling role 
which you are playing in this national effort." The State Department now 
kept Young informed about administration policy in Vietnam. One official 
updated him about tallies in South Vietnam's presidential and senatorial con-
tests. Another noted that in his upcoming speaking engagements Young might 
refer to his recent experience in Vietnam. A speech written by a presidential 
adviser was sent to help the League leader "in gaining a better understanding 
of the Government's position and the steps that led to our present involve-
ment in Vietnam."18 
Although White House officials briefed Young on their nation-build-
ing efforts in Vietnam, they were aware of his ongoing concerns about black 
servicemen. If they expected him to defend the president's foreign policy, 
they had to provide him with information about blacks in Vietnam. Right 
after his return from the South Vietnam elections, administration officials 
prepared statistics for Young on blacks who were fighting in the war, those 
who had reenlisted, and the disproportionate number of them who had been 
killed. While in Vietnam, he met with black civilian personnel in the U.S. 
Agency for International Development. After Young learned how one of them 
faced difficulty in getting a promotion, he promised to look into the matter 
when he returned to the United States.19 White House officials understood 
that Young preferred to talk about the Vietnam War in terms of its impact on 
blacks. Since the president usually escaped Young's criticism on this matter, 
Johnson could comfortably view him as an administration ally on the Viet-
nam issue. 
Whatever doubts Young harbored about American involvement, he kept 
them to himself His loyalty to Lyndon B. Johnson, the second great emanci-
pator, prevented him from bolting administration policy in Southeast Asia. 
Similar sentiments caused him to prefer, albeit tacitly, the presidential candi-
dacy of Vice President Humphrey, another civil rights champion. After his 
loss to Richard Nixon, Humphrey responded to Young's consoling telegram: 
"It is good to know I have your friendship and support."20 
Johnson's decision on March 31, 1968, to forego a reelection bid and 
Humphrey's subsequent defeat in the general election freed Young to reassess 
his position on the Vietnam War. When Nixon took the oath of office on 
January 20, 1969, there were 536,000 troops in Vietnam and the war was 
costing $30 billion annually. Although Nixon instituted a Vietnamization 
effort whereby South Vietnamese troops replaced departing American sol-
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diers, the war seemed fat from over. The Vietnam Moratorium Committee, 
organized on June 30, 1969, planned nationwide demonstrations on Octo-
ber 15, 1969, to protest the continuation of the war. Endorsements from the 
Teamsters, the United Auto Workers, former Supreme Court justice Arthur 
Goldberg, former ambassador W. Averell Hatriman, New York mayor John 
V. Lindsay, and members of Congress gave needed credibility to this antiwar 
effort. Millions across the United States participated in the Moratorium. In 
Boston, for example, 100,000 nonviolent antiwar demonstrators filled a down-
town site.21 
On October 7, 1969, Young told NUL trustees about the "terrific pres-
sure from the black community, the youth community and the white liberal, 
intellectual community for the National Urban League to take some position 
on the wat. This pressure has increased with the approaching October 15th 
Vietnam Moratorium." Although he would not commit the League, Young 
himself endorsed the demonstrations. To what extent Young actually backed 
the Moratorium is unclear. He surely wanted to explain publicly what mean-
ing should be attached to his endorsement rather than allow Moratorium 
activists to interpret his stand. When Susan Werbe of the Moratorium re-
ceived the news about his opposition to the Vietnam War, Young told her he 
would not speak at any rallies nor should she announce his statement of 
support. He would issue his own press release.22 
Young declared, "I am totally convinced that Vietnam is tragically di-
verting America's attention from its primary problem-the urban and racial 
crisis-at the very time that crisis is at [a] flash point." He deplored the divi-
siveness that was caused within the military where "racial teamwork" once 
prevailed and within already tense black communities. The Vietnam Wat 
had "an extra dimension for black people." He said, "We ate suffering dou-
bly. We are dying for something abroad that we do not have at home." More-
over, blacks bore the brunt of white backlash growing out of frustration with 
the Vietnam problem. Despite high death rates for soldiers from the working 
class of whites and blacks, the two groups were locked in conflict. "Because of 
hunger, the wasteland in the black ghettos, and the revolt of young people 
both black and white," Young advised the American government to "turn 
away from Vietnam." He added that "we must terminate this Wat immedi-
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
cities, our own people." Now Young had joined the antiwar movement.23 
Young's opposition to the Vietnam War produced some division within 
the National Urban League. The board of the Youngstown, Ohio, Urban 
League voted 16 to 3 in favor of Young's statement. One board member 
282 Militant Mediator 
resigned in protest. One NUL supporter told Young that he understood the 
pressure Young was under to issue a statement. He agreed that the war was 
destructive, but Young's support for American withdrawal from Vietnam would 
cause repercussions. Young was a reluctant antiwar hero, and he declined 
invitations to speak at rallies.24 
Young was less interested in activism against the nation's Vietnam in-
volvement than in examining the war's impact on the black population. Al-
though he changed positions on whether or not the war should be pursued, 
he remained consistent in his paramount concern about blacks and how they 
fared in military and civilian life. Because the Nixon administration prom-
ised an eventual withdrawal from Vietnam, talk about a "peace dividend" 
stimulated a national debate about how it would be spent. Savings from ex-
penditures in Vietnam would yield $8 billion for social spending, argued 
Arthur F. Burns, a Nixon adviser. The president, however, thought that few 
funds would be available if the war ended soon. In September 1969 Young 
contended in his weekly column that Burns and Nixon missed the point. 
''Actually, the will to tackle poverty is all that's needed." Moreover, citizens 
should "tell their leaders that they're fed up with doubletalk about how poor 
the government is and demand that war savings become peace spending to 
build an open society."25 
Young's vacillating positions on Vietnam derived from his primary com-
mitment to black advancement. He believed that blacks would benefit from 
federal protection and programs if they withheld criticism of Johnson ad-
ministration policies in Vietnam. After Johnson ended his term and Humphrey 
failed in his presidential bid, Young yielded to mounting pressure to oppose 
the Vietnam War. Because Nixon lacked Johnson's stature in civil rights, Young 
had few compelling reasons to resist whites and blacks who declared that the 
war was morally wrong and damaging to black people. 
13 
The Ties That Bind 
"'\Vlhitney M. Young Jr. recognized that his effectiveness with powerful 
W whites depended on his credibility with the black population. Moder-
ate blacks shared his integrationist ideology and lauded his success as execu-
tive director of the National Urban League. Invitations to address black 
churches, fraternities, women's dubs, civil rights organizations, and other 
mainstream groups continuously flowed into Young's New York City office. 
These requests reached such volume that the League leader vowed to "accept 
only those invitations extended by national groups-or at the most regional 
bodies with significant and influential participation."! These were the indi-
viduals and institutions who believed in his leadership and wanted to hear 
him speak. Similarly, Black Power advocates asked him to help with their 
projects and to address their gatherings. Despite their ideological disagree-
ments, Young showed that he could interact and cooperate with the militant 
and sometimes separatist wing of the black freedom movement. Already, he 
had demonstrated that his moderate leadership would draw support from 
influential whites in the federal government, corporations, and foundations. 
That he played the same role within the black population validated lessons he 
learned as a local League official in St. Paul and in Omaha. In those commu-
nities Young's temperate posture and his skillful use of white allies persuaded 
midwestern elites to yield to black demands for jobs, education, and housing. 
At the same time blacks whom Young served through these League affiliates 
believed that he persistently advocated their cause and supported direct ac-
tion tactics to win concessions from resistant white employers and politi-
cians. As a national black leader Young successfully pursued these strategies 
in the civil rights movement. Powerful whites responded to his call to im-
prove race relations because his support within the black population extended 
beyond the interracial National Urban League. 
Thomas G. Shirreffs, vice president of the Standard Oil Company and 
a board member of the Cleveland Urban League, understood the relationship 
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between Young and black institutions. In 1968 Young agreed to speak at the 
75th anniversary banquet of the Antioch Baptist Church. Because the pastor, 
the Reverend Emanuel Branch Jr., presided over the Cleveland Urban League, 
both Young and Shirreffs agreed to come. Moreover, Shirreffs, an executive 
committee member of the Greater Cleveland Plans for Progress, wanted to 
discuss with Young a report on black employment. However, Shirreffs had to 
go to an inner city church to meet him. His Standard Oil connection was 
important to Young, but so was Branch's Antioch Baptist Church. Young's 
staff reminded him that this 2,700-member black congregation was one of 
the largest and most prestigious in the country. Antioch's promised contribu-
tion to the League's New Thrust and possibly to other programs also con-
vinced Young that the congregation deserved to be cultivated like white insti-
tutions. Although Standard Oil gave far more money to the League than 
Antioch, Shirreffs knew that the support of Emanuel Branch was as impor-
tant to Young as that of any corporate executive.2 
The League leader had long recognized that black clergy and their con-
gregations staunchly supported local Leagues. Many of them thought that 
Young was better acquainted than other national black leaders with the social 
and economic issues that confronted their communities. Reverend Wyatt Tee 
Walker, an aide to Martin Luther King Jr. and a special assistant on urban 
affairs to New York governor Nelson A. Rockefeller, invited Young to speak 
to his congregation, Canaan Baptist Church in Harlem in 1967. "I am con-
vinced," he said, "that there is much good that can be realized from your 
public appearance in the ghetto community." Similarly, the Reverend Ulysses 
B. Blakeley, associate executive of the Synod of New Jersey of the Presbyte-
rian Church, U.S.A., wrote to Young in behalf of the Caucus of Caucuses, an 
interdenominational group of black clergy. They wanted the League leader to 
participate in their "Emergency Meeting on Urban Distress." Francis A. 
Kornegay, executive director of the Detroit Urban League, reported anticipa-
tion among "people of the community" about Young's upcoming trip to ad-
dress the General Conference of the African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church 
on its Human Relations Night. Young and Bishop Herbert Bell Shaw had 
agreed in 1967 that the National Urban League and the AME Zion Church 
would work together.3 
Black clergy in the West also admired Young's leadership. The Reverend 
Joseph L. Griffin of Macedonia Baptist Church in Denver asked Sebastian C. 
Owens, executive director of the local League, to persuade Young to visit 
Colorado. "Because you have not been to Denver since you became Execu-
tive Director of the Urban League," said Griffin to Young, "it would be an 
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opportunity for us to present you to the Denver community and for the 
community to hear from one of the National leaders in the Civil Rights 
struggle." The Reverend John Hurst Adams, pastor of First African Method-
ist Episcopal Church in Seattle, also invited Young to the Pacific Northwest. 
"National leadership is seldom in this area," Adams observed. He arranged 
for Young to meet the local press, employers who had signed equal opportu-
nity pledges, and faculty and students on area campuses.4 
Young believed that black middle-class and working-class congregations 
could spearhead concrete improvements in their communities. In fact, nu-
merous preachers and parishioners drew Young to their churches because they 
knew he endorsed these objectives. After he consented to speak at Main Street 
Baptist Church of Aurora, Illinois, Frank L. Patterson, president of the Men's 
Club, informed the League leader that blacks, who constituted 6 percent of 
Aurora's 70,000 people, faced continued de facto housing segregation due to 
past patterns. A similar group within St. Catherine African Methodist Epis-
copal Zion Church in New Rochelle, New York, also drew Young's support. 
He spoke in 1966 at the congregation's business and professional night. Be-
cause Reverend Andrew E. Whitted and his members planned to build a 
community center and a middle-income apartment complex, they won Young's 
hearty commendation. When St. Philip Protestant Episcopal Church in 
Harlem pushed into the final phases of building a community center for day 
care, afterschool programs, and other services, Young, who gave a speech to 
the congregation, contributed his honorarium to this million-dollar under-
taking. 5 
Young's appearance, especially at national religious gatherings, validated 
his leadership among blacks and strengthened his network of colleagues in 
the civil rights struggle. Numerous persons with whom Young cooperated in 
the "movement" also participated in black denominational affairs. Bishop 
Stephen G. Spottswood, chairman of the NAACP board of directors, extended 
to Young a formal invitation to speak to the 1968 General Conference of the 
African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church. "Looking forward to your com-
ing to us with a large degree of pleasurable expectancy," said Spottswood to 
Young. The Reverend Sandy F. Ray, a colleague and confidant of Martin 
Luther King Jr. and his father, asked Young in 1969 to address for a second 
time the National Sunday School and BaptistTraining Union Congress. These 
invitations were significant because Ray urged the National Baptist Conven-
tion, U.S.A., toward greater civil rights involvement. In 1970 Bishop Norris 
S. Curry invited Young to Memphis for the Centennial General Conference 
of the Christian Methodist Episcopal Church. Herman Ewing, executive di-
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rector of the Memphis Urban League and a CME member, was pleased that 
Young agreed to come. He advised him to press the denomination to do 
more in the area of nonprofit housing.6 
As Young sought ratification from black churches, he wrestled with his 
Unitarianism. Occasionally he and his wife, Margaret, accompanied their 
friends to St. Catherine Mrican Methodist Episcopal Zion Church in New 
Rochelle. Young, however, remained a member of the White Plains Commu-
nity Church, a Unitarian congregation which his wife attended but declined 
to join. Young, an active participant in congregational affairs, frequently de-
livered Sunday morning sermons, especially on social and civil rights con-
cerns. Moreover, denominational officials involved him in the national Uni-
tarian Service Committee, the Laymen's League, and the Commission on 
Religion and Race. Nonetheless, Young became increasingly dissatisfied with 
his congregation's aloofness from social activism. In December 1970, while 
maintaining his membership in the White Plains Church, Young decided 
that he and his wife should visit other churches, particularly in the black 
community. Such an act would be "an indication of our respect for them and 
[our] desire to support them." Young realized that his leadership required 
validation from black churches. Eventually, he concluded that his relation-
ship with black congregations mandated a fuller commitment'? 
Young, like Martin Luther King Jr., realized that when black clergy and 
congregations ratified his leadership, his claim to represent the Mrican Ameri-
can population was strengthened. Surely, Young's influence with powerful 
whites derived from his persuasive arguments for social change and from his 
moderate leadership and integrationist ideology. But Young always spoke to 
influential whites as a leader of blacks. 
Fraternal organizations drew extensively from the black professional and 
working classes. Young, a member of Alpha Phi Alpha, reflected that fraternity's 
integrationist beliefs, and he challenged his fraternity to contribute finan-
cially to the National Urban League. The Masons and the Elks also sup-
ported the interracialism of the civil rights movement and endorsed Young's 
eloquent espousal of this perspective.8 
Alpha Phi Alpha's Gamma Iota Lambda chapter of Brooklyn and Long 
Island asked Young to speak at a 1963 public meeting at Reverend Sandy F. 
Ray's Cornerstone Baptist Church. Despite a successful scholarship program 
for high school students, Young was needed "to spur Alpha men to greater 
activity in the community." An Alpha official noted, "Our community has 
not heard you for a long time and would welcome any message you might 
give." So, in front of this integrationist fraternity crowd, Young strongly de-
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nounced racial separatism. According to this view, Young noted, "The an-
swer to the problem of race discrimination ... for the Negro is to separate 
and to withdraw from any association with non-Negro citizens .... This 
approach indicts all non-Negroes as evil, and implies honesty and virtue as 
qualities possessed only by Negroes." He blamed black Muslims and Repre-
sentative Adam Clayton Powell of Harlem for promoting these ideas. Young 
defended the NAACP, CORE, SCLC, and his own "vilified" National Urban League 
against these black nationist attacks. These groups were wrongly called "mean-
ingless organizations controlled by evil white citizens and administered by 
'Uncle Toms.'" To approving fellow Alphas, Young declared, "We are an inte-
gral part of the fabric of America .... Our blood, sweat and tears have gone 
into the wars to save this country, and into the business, educational and 
cultural life of this nation. We cannot give up what our forefathers helped to 
develop .... The Negro's destiny in this country is not to identifY himself as 
a bloc against all white citizens. It is rather to ally himself with decent people 
of good will of every race, color and creed, in a coalition against evil and 
prejudiced people of whatever race."9 
Agreement with Young's integrationist ideology and pride in his Alpha 
allegiance motivated fraternity members to support NUL initiatives. Frank W. 
Morris, eastern regional vice president, urged more than forty chapters in his 
jurisdiction to aid the League's program in "Strengthening Negro Family Life." 
Moreover, he asked Young to advise his public policy committee. "When you 
think Alpha should speak on something, just give me the word," he told 
Young. lO 
Although Young was pleased that Alpha members agreed with his inte-
grationist perspectives, he also wanted their monetary support for NUL pro-
grams. "We would greatly appreciate some financial help," he declared to 
Alpha presidentT. Winston Cole in 1963. After he addressed the fraternity's 
1967 annual convention in Los Angeles, Cole's successor, Lionel Newsom, 
told Young, "In private conversation with the brothers I wish you would 
sneak in a word for upping the allotment to the League." He sent Young his 
personal contribution and promised to enlist the help of the Alpha board of 
directors to persuade the general body to increase the fraternity's NUL dona-
tions. 11 
Although the Masons existed in several autonomous groups, they were 
united in their commitment to interracialism. Young, who maintained his 
membership in Omaha's Prince Hall Rescue Lodge #4, pressed these Ma-
sonic groups to donate to the League. He also enlisted League subordinates 
to maintain contact with the Masons and remind them of the NUL'S fiscal 
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needs. Clarence Coleman, the League's southern regional director, interacted 
in Tulsa with Amos Hall, president of the Conference of Grand Masters of 
the Prince Hall Masons. Hall, who was already involved with the Tulsa Ur-
ban League, had recently gone to Europe to visit Masons in the American 
military. Hall noted that the servicemen had made a substantial contribution 
to the NAACP. He told Coleman that, "if convincingly approached," these 
Masonic members might do the same for the National Urban League. Coleman 
told Young's associate executive director, Nelson Jackson, to contact the Ma-
sons' military liaison in New York City to accomplish this goal. Hall also told 
Coleman that he hoped someone from the League's national headquarters 
would attend the Masons' 1962 meeting in Jackson, Mississippi. NUL contri-
butions could be discussed at this meeting. 12 
That Young and other League officials belonged to the Masons ensured 
them a hearing before fraternity bursars. Moreover, John G. Lewis, the sover-
eign grand commander of the Prince Hall Masons, southern division, joined 
the NUL board. He then persuaded Young to attend the conference of Grand 
Masters where Lewis "received nothing but praise for having been the one to 
see that [the League leader] appeared." When Lewis challenged the Grand 
Masters to deepen their NUL involvement, he "found that about five of them 
claim[ed] to be the backbone of the League in their cities." He told Young 
that he hoped that the southern division Masons would "make a good show-
ing on the national level" with their donations. He sent his own check to 
Young as a down payment. Similar support came to the League from the 
Prince Hall Masons in the northern division. In 1965 Young addressed the 
Most Excellent Prince Hall Grand Chapter Royal Arch Masons of the State 
of New York. Arthur Swaby, chairman of the national charity committee, 
informed Young that a financial contribution to the National Urban League 
would await him when he arrived at the event. 13 Similarly, the ArIcient Egyp-
tian Arabic Order Nobles of the Mystic Shrine of North and South America 
and Its Jurisdictions [Shriners] was another black Masonic group with which 
Young developed a relationship. Charles A. Dargan, the Imperial High Priest 
and Prophet, informed Young that his speech to the Shriners' 1963 awards 
banquet did a lot to create a new image for the League. Moreover, Young 
ingratiated himself with those who heard the address. Dargan suggested that 
Young also attend the group's Imperial Council meeting in Pittsburgh be-
cause "every conceivable effort" would be made to get a contribution for the 
League. 14 
Young also identified the Improved Benevolent and Protective Order of 
the Elks of the World as a potential NUL benefactor. The success of this under-
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taking depended on how well Young could cultivate Hobson R Reynolds, 
the Grand Exalted Ruler of 500,000 black Elks. A Philadelphia mortician 
and a former housing appointee in the Eisenhower administration, Reynolds 
possessed exemplary civil rights credentials. During his 1934-38 term in the 
Pennsylvania legislature, he successfully pushed the passage of an equal rights 
bill. As the Elks grand director of civil liberties from 1938 through 1960, 
Reynolds brought such prominent black leaders as Walter White of the NAACP 
to speak to IBPOEW audiences. His department also supported the efforts of 
various civil rights groups to win legislative and judicial victories over racial 
segregation and discrimination. These Elks activities continued through 
Reynolds's tenure as Grand Exalted Ruler from 1960 until his retirement in 
1982.15 
Reynolds's reputation resulted in his nomination in 1962 to the NUL 
board of directors. Reynolds reminded Young that he already had served on 
the NUL board. "No one knows better than I the job the National Urban 
League has done," Reynolds noted. "Now that I am Grand Exalted Ruler," he 
continued, "I shall ... strive zealously to help promote the great program 
that I am sure you will sponsor during your tenure of office." Toward that 
end Reynolds invited Young to Detroit to speak to the 1962 Elks Grand 
Lodge convention. 16 
Although Young's speech at the convention was well received, his re-
quest for a national roster of Elks lodges was not granted. "I am prohibited by 
our Grand Lodge law to send out these directories since this is a secret orga-
nization," said Grand Secretary Joseph F. Simmons to Young. Nonetheless, 
Young pressed Reynolds to acknowledge publicly his NUL affiliation. In an 
interview with the Norfolk Journal and Guide, a black newspaper, Reynolds, 
while lauding the NAACP, failed to mention the National Urban League. Young 
brought the omission to Reynold's attention. The Grand Exalted Ruler re-
sponded by offering the cooperation of the Elks Public Relations Depart-
ment to promote League programs. Young was pleased because he believed 
that the Elks' support was vital. 17 
In 1965 he received the Elks' Lovejoy Award. Named for the martyred 
abolitionist Elijah Lovejoy, the award honored Americans who had made a 
great contribution toward the advancement of minority groups. The interra-
cial roster of recipients included Eisenhower attorney general William P. 
Rogers, Ralph J. Bunche, Mary McLeod Bethune, Thurgood Marshall, Gov-
ernor Alfred E. Driscoll, Martin Luther King Jr., A. Philip Randolph, and 
Young's predecessor, Lester B. Granger. Young was pleased that his 
interracialism had the endorsement of the nation's largest black fraternity. IS 
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Within days after Young received the Lovejoy award, a race riot erupted 
in the Watts community of Los Angeles. Similar outbreaks of racial violence 
occurred in 1966, 1967, and 1968 in other black ghettoes across the nation. 
These riots, along with the growing visibility of Black Power advocates and 
the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr., fractured the civil rights move-
ment and put integrationist leaders on the defensive. These circumstances 
increased Young's reliance on the Elks and other grassroots black organiza-
tions who espoused integrationist objectives. As a result, Reynolds's willing-
ness to sign a joint proclamation with Young on cooperation between the 
Elks and the League gave a significant boost to Young's interracialism. 
Addressed to the 1968 Elks Grand Lodge Convention, the open letter 
to the delegates acknowledged that blacks had not attained social and eco-
nomic equality despite the passage of several civil rights laws. ''At the present 
rate of improvement it will take black people until 1975 to catch up to where 
the average white person was in 1950 or 1960," Reynolds and Young as-
serted. They proposed that blacks respond in three ways. First, leaders of 
black organizations should denounce the race riots because they "accelerate 
racial polarization and unify the racists in opposition to progress by black 
people." Second, black organizations should maintain their financial com-
mitment to ghetto communities even though such contributions "are grossly 
inadequate in light of the task we now face." Third, the Elks and other groups 
should support NUL'S New Thrust plan by inviting League representatives to 
attend the Elks' local and district meetings. 19 The impact of these appeals was 
uncertain. That Young gained Elks endorsement of the League strengthened 
his credibility as an important black leader at a time when highly visible and 
publicized separatist spokesmen assailed him as an "Uncle Tom." 
Reynolds's embrace of Young also translated into grassroots Elks back-
ing for the League. The Ohio State Elks association, for example, selected 
Young as its 1966 man of the year "for your Liberal and Humane outlook on 
the problems of our times and your courage and ability to do something 
about them." Frank Huntley, a convention committee member, lived in Young-
stown and belonged to the local Buckeye Elks Lodge #73. He included in his 
letter to Young "editorials on a need for an Urban League in Youngstown[,] a 
city of 200,000." Huntley hoped that "maybe we can work something out" 
to bring a League affiliate to the area.20 
Whereas the Elks were largely working class, the Frontiers and the Links 
were service organizations that drew primarily from the educated and profes-
sional elite. The Frontiers identified with Yokefellow Whitney Young, a mem-
ber, and shared his integrationist views. In 1963 he was invited to address the 
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annual meeting. Although Young could not attend, he suggested that Edwin 
C. "Bill" Berry, the head of the Chicago affiliate, should substitute for him. 
He hoped that Berry's presence would prod the Frontiers to give to the League 
"strong moral support and a substantial financial contribution."21 
As with the Frontiers, Young initiated an ongoing effort to attract funds 
from the Links, an organization with 2,500 women in ninety chapters in 
forty states. In 1962 Young addressed gatherings of the Links, including the 
eastern area meeting in Williamsburg, Virginia, and a gathering of the Greater 
New York chapter. A subsequent invitation to speak to the Links' thirteenth 
national assembly in French Lick, Indiana, probably resulted from his previ-
ous two appearances. Although the organization could not pay his expenses 
to the Indiana meeting, the national chairperson, Dr. Helen G. Edmonds, 
hoped that Young could interpret his program to women community leaders. 
Young's positive response must have surprised Edmonds. Although he wanted 
to discuss NUL efforts to aid the black population, his larger objective was to 
persuade the Links to contribute significantly to the League. 22 
Young's careful cultivation of the Links illustrated how much impor-
tance he attached to black organizations and the credibility they conferred on 
his integrationist leadership. In 1966, for example, the group put him on the 
program of its southern area meeting in New Orleans. Young told the na-
tional president, Vivian Beamon, that he hoped his remarks concerning fi-
nancial support from the Links "made an impression." He added that fund-
ing of the League "would indicate that as an intelligent group of outstanding 
Negro women, the Links recognize the true nature of the civil rights struggle 
and the important role of the Urban League in that struggle. "23 
Ultimately, Young's appeals to the Links paid off. In 1969 the organiza-
tion donated $50,000 to a League sponsored student summer program. 
Moreover, President Beamon informed Young that on June 26, 1970 the 
League would receive a second $50,000 contribution. A total of $100,000 
from an influential black women's group legitimized Young's contention that 
his leadership and integrationist perspectives enjoyed strong support within 
the black population.24 
Young's experience with the Links paralleled his interaction with the 
National Urban League Guild. This group, which pharmacist and social worker 
Mollie Moon founded in 1942, sponsored an annual Beaux-Arts Ball to raise 
funds for the League. Moon, a NUL board member, also spearheaded local 
guilds to support affiliates across the United States. As a result the Council of 
Urban League Guilds was established and grew to eighty-three chapters. 
Aleathia H. Mayo, who headed the council, worked with Moon during Young's 
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term as the NUL executive director. Over time Moon, Mayo, and other black 
women collected over $3.4 million for the League. Because Young was accus-
tomed to working with educated black women who opted for supportive 
roles, he was stunned by the sharp criticism of Pauli Murray, who accused 
him and other civil rights leaders of sexism. 25 In 1963 Murray, a black lawyer 
and educator, challenged the claim of Young and his colleagues that they 
represented black women. She criticized A. Philip Randolph, the convener of 
the 1963 March on Washington, when he spoke at the all-male National 
Press Club, despite protests from female journalists. Moreover, she excoriated 
civil rights leaders for excluding women from their March meeting with Presi-
dent Kennedy. In a last-minute response, however, Dorothy Height of the 
National Council of Negro Women was included. When, in a speech to 
Height's organization, Murray repeated her denunciation of sexism among 
the civil rights leaders, Young responded. He saw nothing to inhibit "compe-
tent Negro women" from attaining leadership positions in civil rights organi-
zations. He cited the League as an example. Four of the seven "top profes-
sionals" on his staff were black women. Young also reminded Murray of his 
personal efforts in behalf of Miss Dorothy Height's inclusion as a peer mem-
ber of the Council of United Civil Rights Leadership. Additionally, Height's 
NCNW received funds and participated in CUCRL policymaking. 
Although Young disavowed "any prejudice against women," he believed 
that "the goal of Negro women ... should be somewhat different from that of 
white women." He said, "In the case of white women, whose men already 
occupy positions of high status, security and a much greater level of educa-
tional attainment than their women, just the reverse is true of Negroes." He 
noted, "For the purposes of improving the stability of our Negro family life, 
providing adequate role models for our sons and daughters, as well as increas-
ing the number of available Negro women who can offer both economic 
security and intellectual compatibility, I would think that Negro women leaders 
... should make their primary goal the lifting of the social, economic, and 
educational status of their men." 
Despite Young's traditional views on gender roles, he conceded that 
Murray validly criticized him and his colleagues for gender exclusion. He 
asked her "to identify ... those Negro women whom other Negro women 
will generally accept as their official spokesmen such as now happens with 
Negro men through their civil rights leaders." He promised that black leaders 
would draw these persons into their ranks "as future opportunities come."26 
Young defended himself against Murray's charge by citing gender equality 
within his own organization, but the League had a blemished record. Cernoria 
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D. Johnson, for example, appealed to Young when her authority as the Wash-
ington bureau chief was challenged by Sterling Tucker, the executive director 
of the local League. Before Johnson's arrival, Tucker usually represented Young 
at important meetings with federal officials. Johnson rightly believed that her 
appointment to the bureau position relieved Tucker of his previous role. None-
theless, he represented Young at a crucial meeting with G. Mennen Williams, 
an adviser to President Kennedy. Tucker and other gu~sts, including a repre-
sentative from the National Women's Committee on Civil Rights, discussed 
with Williams what civil rights issues Kennedy should include in his legisla-
tive package. Although Tucker told Young that "any official follow-up" was in 
Johnson's domain, they had undercut her. Johnson fumed and expressed her 
"profound indignation" over her exclusion from the meeting. She told Young, 
"This is the way he has operated ever since I assumed this responsibility." 
Johnson asked Young to tell Tucker to inform her about these important 
invitations and to remind G. Mennen Williams that he should communicate 
with her. Young conferred major responsibility upon Johnson, but he was 
slow in signaling to other League officials that she was his designated spokes-
person in the nation's capital. Although she and other female staff acknowl-
edged Young as their leader on racial matters, they knew that gender issues 
still ranked a distant second to the fight for racial equality. The large infusion 
of funds that the Links and the Guilds poured into the National Urban League 
showed that thousands of black women esteemed Young's pursuit of 
in terracialism. 27 
Black business and professional associations also ratified Young as a major 
spokesman. Some were all-black organizations, and others were subgroups 
within larger white associations. In any case these separate groups argued for 
their fuller inclusion in the American mainstream. In their opinion Whitney 
M. Young Jr. made that case better than any other civil rights leader. In 1961 
Young urged black businessmen to revive the National Negro Business League. 
In 1969 the National Bankers Association, a group of twenty black financial 
institutions, cooperated with the Urban Affairs Committee of the American 
Bankers Association to sponsor a conference on inner-city problems and how 
banks should address them. Originally called the Black Bankers Conference, 
these black officials believed that a speech by Young on how the League viewed 
employment, lending, and housing would aid their cause.28 
Blacks in the insurance industry drew special attention from Young and 
the League. Clarence Coleman, the NUL southern regional director, urged 
Young to deepen the League's relationship with Norris Herndon, president of 
the Atlanta Life Insurance Company and a potential benefactor. Herndon's 
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firm had given the NAACP $10,000 in 1962, and Young wanted similar sup-
port for the National Urban League. Jesse Hill, Young's friend from his At-
lanta days, asked him to speak to the 1962 convention of the National Insur-
ance Association. The organization consisted of fifty black-managed life and 
disability companies. Young told Hill and Norman B. Houston, president of 
the Los Angeles-based Golden State Mutual Life Insurance Company, that 
he thought the NIA was "an important facet in community relations and a key 
group to be brought into greater understanding of the work of the National 
Urban League."29 
Young was already mindful that black insurance leaders were involved 
with the League. Asa T. Spaulding, president of the North Carolina Mutual 
Life Insurance Company, served on the NUL board. In New Orleans where 
racist detractors forced the local League affiliate out of the United Fund (com-
munity chest), black insurance officials helped to replace the withdrawn do-
nations. Young challenged the NIA to redouble its tangible financial support. 
"We not only need your money, but we also need to have these contributions 
to show our present contributors-largely white and many of them insur-
ance companies-that we as Negro citizens in general, and Negro business in 
particular, have grown not only in wealth but also in the kind of maturity 
that will reflect itself in support of its organizations."3o 
Carlton B. Goodlett, publisher of the Sun-Reporter in San Francisco, 
wanted to broaden Young's involvement with black insurance companies. He 
and Earl B. Dickerson wanted to put Young on the board of two of their 
companies. The Supreme Life Insurance Company was organizing a New 
York company as Supreme Life of New York. Goodlett said, "You are the type 
of man who we must have on the team of younger men which Earl is select-
ing to give new vision, new impetus, and dynamic leadership as Supreme Life 
attempts to become an integrated national insurance company." Young agreed 
because involvement in the insurance field would enable him to promote 
black business interests and to generate funding for the League.31 
While the League leader welcomed contributions from black health 
care organizations, he emphasized efforts to end the racial exclusion of black 
hospitals, physicians, and administrators. That Young understood crucial is-
sues which this constituency confronted gave him a wide following within 
this important stratum of the black population. In 1962 the National Urban 
League joined the NAACP and the National Medical Association (NMA) in spon-
soring the Sixth Imhotep National Conference on Hospital Integration. Young 
appeared on the program to discuss efforts to integrate formerly all-white 
hospitals, to put black doctors on their staffs, and to prepare more blacks for 
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the nation's medical schools. He pledged the active participation of the League 
in attaining these objectives. In 1965 he agreed to be a part of the NMA'S 
Council on Talent Recruitment. Moreover, when the American Hospital As-
sociation in 1968 invited Young to speak, Haynes Rice, the administrator of 
the all-black Norfolk Community Hospital, was enormously pleased. "This 
is, to my knowledge, the first opportunity a black man had ... to address this 
group." Rice believed that integration threatened black medical institutions 
and personnel. He asked Young to encourage federal officials to allocate funds 
for facilities that served blacks and the poor. Whether affiliated with Imhotep, 
the NMA, or black hospitals, black professionals viewed Young as an advocate 
who would protect their interests as they integrated into the medical main-
stream.32 
Although Young was a fervent integrationist, his views fitted a pluralist 
perspective. He wanted blacks to participate fully in mainstream political, 
social, and economic affairs, but he had no quarrel with the continued exist-
ence of black institutions. As long as African American organizations rejected 
separatism and promoted broad involvement of blacks in American society, 
their racial identity was not worrisome to Young. 
Young's conspicuous support of black colleges and universities stemmed 
from three principal sources. First, he was a loyal alumnus of Kentucky State 
College. Moreover, Rufus B. Atwood, president of Kentucky State, believed 
that Young's well-known advocacy of racial integration was a message that his 
students needed to hear. So he invited the League leader to deliver the com-
mencement address to the 1962 graduates.33 Second, as a dean at the School 
of Social Work at Adanta University, Young joined with President Rufus E. 
Clement to build AU into a first-rate institution. He constandy pressed Clem-
ent to upgrade the school so that its graduates would be competitive partici-
pants in various social welfare occupations (see chapter 5). 
Third, Young maintained close personal ties with two presidents of the 
United Negro College Fund, William J. Trent Jr. and Vernon Jordan. Through 
his friendship with both men Young recognized that the UNCF emphasized 
efforts to move black graduates into the American mainstream. Trent, who 
became head of UNCF in 1944, met Young at Adanta University. After Young 
became the NUL executive director, he and Trent became neighbors in New 
Rochelle, New York. They were closely involved in each other's organization. 
Trent often invited Young to speak at UNCF institutions. Young pushed Trent 
to become the NUL treasurer. Their common integrationist perspectives were 
best expressed in a letter that Young wrote to Trent in 1963. He congratu-
.lated Trent on the role of the United Negro College Fund "in supplementing 
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all of our efforts" in the National Urban League. Without black colleges, 
Young observed, "our goal of first class citizenship would be severely handi-
capped." Moreover, "the predominantly Negro college" referred to spokes-
persons who advocated integrationist objectives. Young's friendship with 
Vernon Jordan, Trent's UNCF successor, also was close. In 1965 they moved 
their respective organizations into the same New York City office building, 
and the proximity of their offices allowed Young and Jordan to advise and 
confide in each other.34 
Similar relationships evolved between Young and various black college 
executives. Jerome Holland, the president of Hampton Institute in Virginia 
and a former NUL board member, invited his onetime colleague to address the 
1967 graduates of his institution. Predictably, Young challenged the senior 
class to reject separatism. "Our forefathers have fought and died and given 
free labor in the building of this country. We have a claim to every inch of it." 
He emphasized their obligation to move into the mainstream, and he con-
gratulated the Hampton faculty for teaching students how to compete in the 
modern world. Young also offered technical assistance to black college lead-
ers. Rembert E. Stokes, the president of Wilberforce University in Ohio, 
hosted the League leader as a special lecturer in 1967. Young reciprocated 
with an invitation to Stokes to visit the League's national headquarters. Be-
cause this AME-supported institution operated a successful cooperative learn-
ing program in which students gained work experience, Stokes was eager to 
confer with Young and his staff and to benefit from their observations about 
Wilberforce.35 
Young developed a formal commitment to Miles College in Birming-
ham, Alabama. He had become familiar with the CME-affiliated school be-
cause of Mahlon T. Puryear, a League official who had sponsored three jobs 
conferences on the Miles campus. This cooperative experience with the League 
caused Bishop E.P. Murchison, the Miles board chairman, to invite Young to 
become a trustee.36 
Clearly, Bishop Murchison and President L.H. Pitts knew of Young's 
broad contacts with corporate and philanthropic leaders, and they hoped 
that he would help them with fund-raising. In 1964, for example, Pitts asked 
Young to solicit support from Roger Blough, chairman of the United States 
Steel Corporation, to help fund the construction of a new Miles science build-
ing. ''A word from you to Roger Blough," said Pitts to Young, "might be the 
difference between Miles College's immediate acceptance in the Southern 
Association and another long year of struggle for us." Because a new science 
building was crucial to Pitts's accreditation effort, Young wrote to Blough 
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and urged his "fullest consideration" of the Miles request. On another occa-
sion Young spoke at some length with the chief education officer at the Ford 
Foundation in behalf of Miles College. '~range an appointment to explore 
this further," Young advised Pitts, and "do not mention my name in this 
connection."3? 
Through his extensive interactions with black churches, colleges, fra-
ternities, professional associations, and other social groups, Young mobilized 
support for the integrationist objectives of the civil rights movement. In gaining 
the endorsement of the many institutions which formed the infrastructure of 
the black population, Young credibly claimed that his views mirrored those 
of most Mrican Americans. Even when Black Power in the late 1960s seem-
ingly displaced integrationism as the ascendant philosophy of the black free-
dom struggle, the Elks, Masons, Links, Alphas, Baptists and Methodists backed 
the interracialism that Young articulated. Clearly, he spoke for a large and 
significant segment of the nation's black communities. 
Young must have been gratified in 1965 when an official in the activist 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference requested his picture to hang in 
the organization's main office "as one of a group of Distinguished Civil Rights 
Leaders."38 The more militant leaders of CORE and SNCC and the more mod-
erate spokespersons in the NAACP also acknowledged Young as a leader who 
articulated their perspectives about race in American society. Invitations to 
speak at national and local meetings of these civil rights groups and initiatives 
for cooperative activities with the League also strengthened Young's conten-
tion that he spoke for black people. 
Speeches to various civil rights organizations demonstrated that Young 
and other officials formed a leadership vanguard in which each played dis-
tinct but complementary roles. Soon after Young became the NUL executive 
director, he invited Martin Luther King Jr. to speak at a League gathering. 
King reciprocated in 1962 when Young came to Birmingham to address SCLC'S 
sixth annual convention. In fact, Wyatt Tee Walker, SCLC'S executive director, 
referred to the League as a "buddy organization." Conceptually, Young ac-
cepted Walker's characterization, but he noted the groups' different tactics in 
pursuing racial equality. Young also observed that SCLC and the League needed 
to recognize that they confronted the same segregationist foes. 39 
Young thought the support that each civil rights leader extended to the 
organizations of his or her colleague was crucial to the success of the black 
struggle. In 1964, for example, he asked King to participate in the League's 
Community Action Assembly in Washington, D.C. "I am most anxious," 
said Young to King, "that this conference reflect the high degree of unity 
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which exists within the civil rights movement." Although King's Nobel Peace 
Prize acceptance prevented his attendance, he promised that the Reverend 
Walter Fauntroy would come in his place.40 
Participants in local affiliates of various civil rights organizations also 
viewed Young favorably. Both in 1963 and 1969, for example, the Far 
Rockaway-Inwood, New York, branch of the NAACP made vain attempts to 
commit Young to speaking engagements. These NAACP members thought that 
Young could best articulate their integrationist perspectives to a gathering of 
five hundred people of all races and religions. Similarly, the Stockton, Cali-
fornia, branch of the NAACP, which recognized Young as "a prominent repre-
sentative of our race," wanted him to praise its membership drive and honor 
the chapter's life members. The Las Vegas branch of the NAACP twice invited 
Young to speak. In 1969 he was needed for the Freedom Fund Banquet at 
which a pioneer civil rights lawyer and former associate of Lester Granger 
would be honored. Later in the year Charles L. Kellar, the branch president, 
asked Young to give a memorial address on Martin Luther King Jr.41 
That national and local officers in the NAACP, CORE, and SCLC sought 
cooperation and assistance from the National Urban League and its affiliates 
testified to Young's broad appeal among civil rights leaders. Although Roy 
Wilkins, A. Philip Randolph, Martin Luther KingJr., and other leaders headed 
their own organizations, they often relied on Young for contacts, personnel, 
and resources. In 1966, for example, in a meeting with two Ford Foundation 
officials Young learned of their willingness to recommend grants to the Na-
tional Urban League and the NAACP. Young informed Roy Wilkins about this 
possibility, and their two organizations submitted proposals to the founda-
tion. Ultimately, the League and the NAACP received grants to underwrite staff 
salaries.42 In 1967, at Young's suggestion, Wilkins agreed to a meeting be-
tween national officials of both organizations to discuss "ways in which we 
can supplement and complement each other." The two leaders agreed on an 
agenda that enunciated their positions on separatism vs. integration, looked 
at how to monitor progress in desegregation, and examined the Washington 
bureaus of both groups, among other issues.43 
The Freedom Budget, which A. Philip Randolph and Bayard Rustin 
developed through the Randolph Institute, benefited from Young's endorse-
ment and the critical evaluation that he compelled it to undergo. The Free-
dom Budget, which was similar to Young's domestic Marshall Plan, aimed to 
end poverty in the United States. Randolph and Rustin recommended the 
public expenditure of $180 billion over ten years to achieve this objective. 
They wanted to provide full employment, good wages, a minimum standard 
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of living for the unemployed, adequate medical care, and education. They 
also wished to obliterate the nation's slums.44 
Young's endorsement of the Randolph/Rustin Freedom Budget gave it 
credibility to some prominent whites and blacks who would have otherwise 
dismissed it. In 1966 in the wake of race riots in several cities Young praised 
the Freedom Budget and said that it would help put the civil rights move-
ment "back in perspective." Although he persuaded the board and staff at the 
National Urban League to endorse the principle and the concept of the Bud-
get, he worried about concerns that the idea was economically unsound. He 
asked Andrew F. Brimmer, a black economist and a member of the board of 
governors of the Federal Reserve System, William F. Butler, the vice president 
of Chase Manhattan Bank, and other financial analysts to review the Randolph/ 
Rustin initiative.45 Despite some criticisms, the initiative seemed promis-
ing.46 
Although Martin Luther King Jr. seldom needed Young's advice and 
assistance, his successor, Ralph D. Abernathy, sometimes depended on the 
League to rescue SCLC'S faltering programs. Young often appeared in sCLc-Ied 
marches in the early 1960s, but he functioned in a supportive role far away 
from King's inner circle of advisersYThese circumstances changed after King's 
1968 assassination. 
King planned to bring thousands of poor people to Washington to dra-
matize the scourge of poverty in the United States. His murder in Memphis 
left Abernathy to carry out the Poor People's March. Bayard Rustin, the coor-
dinator of the 1963 March on Washington, agreed to play the same role in 
SCLC'S Solidarity Day demonstration. Disagreements between Rustin and SCLC 
officials on policy matters caused him to resign. Young allowed Sterling Tucker, 
already the vice coordinator of the June 19, 1968, mobilization, to succeed 
Rustin.48 
That Young acquiesced to Tucker's participation in the Poor People's 
campaign was one way that he helped SCLC. Tucker, the executive director of 
the Washington Urban League, had recently become coordinator of the 
League's ambitious New Thrust program. Although Young worried that the 
SCLC assignment might distract Tucker from his NUL responsibilities, he viewed 
the Poor People's mobilization as an example of what New Thrust was trying 
to accomplish in inner cities throughout the nation.49 
Young's authorization of other League personnel to participate in the 
Poor People's project and his efforts to exclude critics of nonviolence from 
any involvement with the march showed how much he had impacted 
Abernathy's plans. Within a few weeks after Dr. King's death, Young defined 
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NUL involvement with the Poor People's campaign. He noted that it was the 
League's intention to cooperate where requested to ensure that it would be a 
"peaceful, nonviolent, and effective pilgrimage." He added that many League 
supporters would take part in the march. Two weeks later Young told 
Abernathy, "You need to know that I am available if you need me to keep this 
an effective nonviolent effort." He added that League staff in several affiliate 
cities would help to feed, house, and transport marchers on their way to 
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Young's efforts helped to salvage the march. He encouraged Abernathy 
to stress nonviolence and integrationism. Some march supporters, especially 
some labor and Jewish group representatives, feared that the mobilization 
would be taken over by Stokely Carmichael or black militants. They believed 
that Black Power advocates would inject violence into the effort. At a meet-
ing called by Rustin at NAACP headquarters in New York City, John Morsell, 
Roy Wilkins's assistant, a National Council of Churches representative, and 
Layhmond Robinson, Whitney Young's spokesman, "made clear that our 
groups would not be involved if we KNEW that violence was in the making." 
This stand enabled the labor and Jewish groups to remain in the coalition as 
long as the NAACP, the NCC, and the League kept Carmichael and others out. 
A reassured YWCA representative said, "There is no more danger of violence 
than there was at the beginning. If we pull out now, we will create the disaster 
we all seek to avert." "Your position carried the day," Robinson told Young. 51 
In his speech "The Power of the Poor," Young said, "Once again, blacks 
and whites together have come to Washington to ask for justice .... America 
is the richest country the world has ever known-but the spirits of children 
are crushed in the school systems of New York; they starve in the Mississippi 
Delta; they are bitten by rats in the ghettos of this, the nation's capital, and 
they waste away in the grape fields of California .... The poor know they 
don't have to starve; they don't have to live in shacks; they don't have to be 
shunted into a dark corner of the American conscience, unseen, unheard, 
unthought of .... Poverty is not God-given, but man-made. Poverty is cre-
ated by discrimination and by blindness of our political and economic lead-
ers. This nation is rich enough to end poverty today, and that's why we are 
here now." Again. Young, though quite comfortable mingling with powerful 
whites, spoke as a leader of grassroots blacks and the several organizations 
who articulated their desire for inclusion in the American mainstream. 52 
Young, a pragmatic integrationist and a proponent of ordered social 
change, believed that most Mrican Americans preferred his leadership over 
what Black Power advocates offered. Mter 1964, however, sustained racial 
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violence in inner cities and the growing influence of black nationalists put 
Young on the defensive. Although mainstream black organizations continu-
ally ratified his integrationism, Young reassured nervous and skeptical white 
allies that his perspectives remained dominant among blacks. Despite his 
criticisms of Black Power spokespersons, Young approved of some of their 
efforts, and he offered resources and advice to his ideological adversaries. 
Some militant blacks pejoratively called the League leader "Whitey" Young, 
but he became a pivotal person upon whom other Black Power advocates 
depended and openly acknowledged as a legitimate spokesman for black 
people. 
When Young became the executive director of the National Urban 
League in 1961, he knew that issues of poverty, education, housing, and 
police brutality stirred unrest and impatience, especially among blacks in 
urban areas. Although he believed that pulling them into the mainstream of 
American society was the ultimate solution, he acknowledged that the ra-
cially charged rhetoric of Malcolm X and his separatist successors appealed to 
inhabitants of the nation's ghettos. In 1963 the black Muslim minister told 
Young, "The present racial crisis in this country carries within it powerful 
destructive ingredients that may soon erupt into an uncontrollable explo-
sion." He added that steps should be taken before "the racial powder keg 
explodes." Although Young eschewed any public association with Malcolm 
X, he surely agreed with his analysis. In a telegram to Robert F. Kennedy, 
Young warned, "New York City is [a] racial tinderbox. We face [a] most haz-
ardous and difficult summer." He said that the New York Urban League was 
making every effort to ameliorate the growing tension. Young understood 
that these circumstances made it hard for many blacks to wait patiently for 
nonviolent solutions offered by the civil rights movement. To provide instant 
relief to the raw racial problems of the inner cities was a difficult challenge for 
mainstream black leaders. 53 
Young never compromised his advocacy for ordered social change and 
for racial integration. Overall, Black Power was a flawed plan for black ad-
vancement. But Young supported those elements of the doctrine which con-
formed to existing League practices and objectives. Those aspects of Black 
Power which emphasized "violence or a retreat into separatism" drew Young's 
strenuous denunciation. When it aimed toward development of pride and 
self-respect and encouraged participation in community affairs and control 
of one's own destiny, then Young enthusiastically endorsed it. He observed 
that "the ghetto suffers from the results of white power." As a result, "positive, 
constructive programs formulated and run by black people can help to undo 
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the damage." Nevertheless, "no responsible Negro leader wants to keep the 
ghetto a black reservation .... Our goal is a truly open society with all men 
benefitting from and participating in American democracy."54 
Although the Black Power movement inherited Malcolm X's militant 
black nationalism, it also grew out of the disillusionment of former civil rights 
activists who rejected the interracial cooperation and the integrationist ob-
jectives of mainstream black leaders. The James Meredith March in Missis-
sippi in 1966, for example, exposed the growing fissure between such "estab-
lishment" spokesmen as Roy Wilkins and Whitney M. Young Jr. and such 
SNCC officials as Stokely Carmichael. Meredith had been shot on June 4, 
1966, during an attempted march through Mississippi to show blacks that 
they should be free from fear and should exercise their right to vote. Leaders 
of all the major civil rights organizations agreed that they should complete 
Meredith's march. Wilkins and Young, however, withdrew from the coalition 
when they learned that Carmichael wanted to bar whites from the march and 
invite the Deacons for Defense, an armed black organization from Louisiana, 
to guard the marchers. Although Carmichael previously had used the term 
Black Power at various rallies, his unnecessary arrest in Greenwood, Missis-
sippi, for trespassing on public property provided a ripe setting for the an-
gered SNCC leader to utter these provocative words. Out on bail Carmichael 
shouted at the Greenwood rally, "We want Black Power!" Repetitively, the 
crowd echoed, "We want Black Power!"55 
The disenchantment that some black militants felt toward Young and 
Wilkins escalated to threats of violence. The most extreme belonged to the 
Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM), which was sympathetic to Red 
China and advocated the violent overthrow of the U.S. government. In 1967 
twelve men and four women, all RAM members, were arrested for plotting 
the assassination of moderate black leaders. All but one were arraigned in 
New York City, where police confiscated 1,000 rounds of ammunition, rifles, 
shotguns, and carbines. Two were charged with planning to kill Young and 
Roy Wilkins. They said that any black spokesman who did not "believe" in 
machine guns was an "Uncle Tom."56 
Black Power, this seemingly undefined term, clearly conveyed sentiments 
different from what the civil rights movement espoused. Solidarity with white 
allies, trust in the federal government to protect the rights of blacks, and a 
belief in racial integration now appeared to be foolish. Those who preached 
racial separatism, distrusted white liberalism, and moved to defend against 
white violence challenged the leadership of Young, Wilkins, and others. 
Despite the rise of Black Power, Young seemed secure in his claim to 
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speak for a majority of the black population. When a National Conference 
on Black Power was called in 1967, he said that it represented a black minor-
ity.57 Nonetheless, he could not ignore the increased visibility of Stokely 
Carmichael, H. Rap Brown, Floyd B. McKissick, Imamu Amiri Baraka, 
Eldridge and Kathleen Cleaver, Bobby Seale, Huey Newton, Maulena Ron 
Karenga, and other Black Power advocates. They appeared on television, ra-
dio, and other media, they wrote books, they gave interviews to reporters, 
and they lectured widely. Whites paid attention to their views. They seemed 
to understand and interpret the feelings and perspectives of ghetto blacks, 
who turned to riots rather than to nonviolent protest to articulate their griev-
ances. Although Young credibly claimed to represent the millions of blacks 
who populated the churches, fraternal groups, service organizations, and other 
institutions, he encountered the growing influence of Black Power propo-
nents. 
The media coverage that Carmichael, McKissick, the Cleavers, and others 
received greatly irritated Young. He was disappointed that "militant blacks 
got publicity while moderate blacks did not." He added, "Dissidents have 
managed to dominate public attention and draw it away from the quiet, 
constructive work of the Negro in his struggle for equality." Young was par-
ticularly irked that delegates were outnumbered by reporters at the 1966 CORE 
convention in Baltimore whereas the National Urban League convention had 
1,500 delegates and less than thirty reporters.58 
How did Young retain his relevance as a major black leader during the 
Black Power ascendancy? Although he denounced as "facetious" plans to di-
vide the United States racially and to promote "paramilitary training of Ne-
gro youth," he endorsed those pragmatic Black Power proposals which could 
tangibly improve the social and economic condition of blacks. 59 Young also 
understood that the desire for self-determination and racial autonomy, while 
sometimes at odds with interracialism, were legitimate objectives that main-
stream civil rights organizations could embrace. In fact, the League's 1967 
New Thrust program was premised upon grassroots initiative and empower-
ment. Moreover, Young believed that his selective assistance to Black Power 
leaders and their organizations would encourage them to soften their rhetoric 
and move closer to his centrist posture. Unlike Roy Wilkins who castigated 
Carmichael, Cleaver, and others, Young left open the door to dialogue and 
cooperation with these potential antagonists. His evolving relationship with 
the Congress of Racial Equality, a group which moved from interracialism to 
racial nationalism, demonstrated how he tried to pull the group away from 
its separatist tendencies. 
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CORE started in 1942 as a pacifist, pro-civil rights fellowship. Its com-
mitment to nonviolent direct action proved effective in opening public ac-
commodations to blacks and in bringing national notice to segregation in 
interstate travel during freedom rides through the South.60 Although CORE 
was far more confrontational than the League, their leader, James Farmer, 
like Young, believed strongly in integration and often cooperated to achieve 
this objective. In 1962, for example, Farmer initiated the Freedom Highways 
project to ensure service for black travelers at Howard Johnson's restaurants. 
Farmer solicited Young's advice on this campaign. He pledged to Farmer his 
"moral support and active cooperation wherever possible." In 1964 Farmer 
asked Young to address a cORE-sponsored pre-Republican Convention civil 
rights rally in San Francisco. Young could not attend, but he was confident 
that King, Wilkins, and Farmer would fairly present the League's view on the 
importance of civil rights legislation and the urgent need to remove any bar-
riers to the full participation of blacks in American society. In 1965 Young 
was an organizer of the White House Conference on Education. He requested 
an invitation for Farmer for the session on "Skills Obsolescence and Retrain-
ing: Education's New Challenge." Even Farmer's subordinates requested 
Young's assistance on various projects despite occasional conflicts between 
League affiliates and CORE chapters. Clarence D.M. Funnye of New York 
CORE, for example, headed an urban fellows project and asked the League 
to help him. Inroads by separatists within CORE beginning in 1965, how-
ever, pulled the organization away from integrationism. Separatist Floyd 
McKissick, a North Carolina lawyer, was elected in 1966 as Farmer's suc-
cessor. At a rally at the close of the Meredith March, McKissick declared 
that 1966 was "the year of the concept of Black Power" and "the year when 
black men realized their full worth in society." How much did CORE'S em-
brace of Black Power change Young's relationship to the organization and 
its leader?61 
Although McKissick and Young disagreed about Black Power, both were 
pragmatists. When the Ford Foundation in 1966 allocated major funds for 
black betterment organizations, McKissick felt slighted as the National Ur-
ban League and the NAACP received grants for $430,000 and $300,000, re-
spectively. Although the foundation's legal department had advised against 
funding a CORE request, two program officers believed that McKissick should 
not be turned away. A project of Cleveland CORE that included a youth train-
ing institute, an adult training program, and a voter registration drive seemed 
promising. A Ford program officer spoke to Dr. Kenneth B. Clark, Jack 
Greenberg, and Whitney M. Young Jr.-all of whom were "very positive 
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about a grant to CORE." These endorsements reassured Ford officials that a 
$175,000 grant to Cleveland CORE would be appropriate. 
Young praised the Ford Foundation for funding CORE. To give money 
to CORE, which recently had removed the word multi-racial from its constitu-
tion, required both intelligence and courage. Young assured McGeorge Bundy, 
the foundation's new president, that the risk was worth taking. Young argued 
that the grant would strengthen McKissick's leadership and temper the group's 
antiestablishment tendencies. Young had confidence in Floyd McKissick's 
sincerity and intentions and believed that "much of his difficulties could be 
avoided ifhe had sufficient funds for meaningful programs."62 
The strategy seemed to work. One Ford official noted that CORE "had a 
role in the reapportionment [effort] that led to the emergence of the 21st 
Congressional District, which is largely Negro." The Cleveland chapter helped 
Mayor Carl Stokes "cool the ghetto" after the assassination of Martin Luther 
King. Moreover, "it has served as a link between militant black groups, more 
moderate Negro groups, City Hall and business groups" and "it has kept out 
of trouble." The Ford Foundation gave another $300,000 in 1968 to fund 
CORE'S "Cleveland activities." Even before McKissick learned of the grant 
renewal, he applauded the foundation for "having funded a Black Power Or-
ganization dedicated to bringing about an orderly change in the power im-
balance that exists between black and white America. Because of our joint 
effort, that change is a step closer to becoming real."63 
Despite CORE'S nationalist rhetoric, Young helped to persuade its lead-
ers to sponsor pragmatic programs. At the same time Young was himself af-
fected by the Black Power perspectives and postures of CORE and other mili-
tant influences. Roy Innis, McKissick's successor, invited the League leader to 
address CORE'S 1968 convention in Columbus, Ohio, where he seemed to 
abandon his hostility to Black Power. In an allusion to the growing militancy 
of Black Power groups and grassroots residents of the inner cities Young de-
clared that America "does not respond to people who beg on moral grounds." 
The public is only moved by threats and pressure. As CORE delegates cheered 
and some chanted, "The brother has come home," Young noted that the 
change was painful, but added that an unwillingness to change was "fatal." 
While the press proclaimed that Young had moved to the side of the black 
nationalists, he finetuned his definition of Black Power to draw separatist 
support. 
Young said that blacks should develop "the power that America respects." 
When blacks took political and economic control of their neighborhoods 
and mobilized their resources for collective uplift, white Americans would 
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respect them. He supported "that interpretation of Black Power that empha-
sized self-determination, pride, self-respect and participation and control of 
one's destiny and community affairs." Because other ethnic groups had at-
tained influence in American society using these methods, Black Power could 
be understood in a similar way. Moreover, blacks, rather than seeking inte-
gration, preferred "an open society where people have a choice." The pursuit 
of black economic stability and the training of black doctors, black biolo-
gists, and black capitalists were all worthy goals and did not require extensive 
interaction with whites. At the same time blacks needed to recognize that 
"there can never be in America black capitalism, a black economy, a black 
medicine, and black biology." Group identification and group objectives were 
acceptable as long as they ultimately connected blacks to the broader Ameri-
can society. Although Young seemingly dropped the term integration from 
his vocabulary, his use of the expression open society still argued against a 
separatist strategy for black advancement. 64 
The July 7 New York Times noted in a front-page headline that "Young 
Embraces Black Power Idea," and members of CORE concluded that he had 
adopted their perspective, yet Young claimed that his speech signified no 
change in his overall philosophy. A League intern congratulated Young on his 
ability to reverse his past position. He added that in endorsing Black Power 
Young decided "to walk among your people without fear and to be a true 
leader rather than being a tool of the establishment." Young disagreed. "I 
have not reversed my position," he said, "but have simply tried to give a 
realistic and constructive interpretation to a phrase used so often." In fact, 
W.H. Wheeler Jr., chairman of the board of Pitney-Bowes, told Young, "There 
was absolutely nothing in what you said that I find myself in any disagree-
ment with." A United Parcel Service official informed the League leader, "There 
was nothing very startling about your position for I have heard you state our 
beliefs on most of these issues on previous occasions." A White House fellow 
in HUD echoed this sentiment: "Those of us who know you, know that you 
have been saying this for a long time." Price M. Cobbs, the black psychiatrist, 
was pleased by Young's "clear and forceful position on Black Power." William 
R. Hudgins, president of the black Freedom National Bank of New York, 
thought that the speech was "really great," and Floyd B. McKissick said that 
Young's position showed that there was more unity in the black movement 
than most people suspected. Additionally, Young assured a worried Millicent 
Fenwick, a New Jersey Republican leader, that most of the mail "from big 
industrialists and black people has been positive." They viewed the speech as 
a "statement of responsible leadership."65 
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Young made common cause with McKissick and his successor, Roy Innis, 
on two projects. In 1969 McKissick founded Soul City, an all-black town in 
North Carolina. Although Young doubted its feasibility, he encouraged 
McKissick to adapt his plans to "one of the dozen or more all-black towns 
that already exist."66 He also cooperated with Innis on an ambitious eco-
nomic action proposal. In June 1969 Young, McKissick, and Innis met in 
Chicago with the black National Bankers Association and the Bankers Com-
mittee on Urban Affairs of the American Bankers Association. Innis demanded 
that the nation's bankers contribute $6 billion to a new black urban coalition 
to administer development funds for inner cities. Both Young and McKissick 
backed Innis, although the League leader noted that the requested amount 
was "'chicken feed' in terms of what the banks really should do." When Innis 
failed to follow through and both bankers groups reneged on their promised 
cooperation, Young and the League "stepped into the void." 
Young authorized a survey of nearly 100 banks on their willingness to 
funnel resources through the League for a coordinated effort to address black 
urban issues. Encouraged by the response, Young with advice from Dunbar 
S. McLaurin, a founder of Freedom National Bank of New York, planned to 
raise $2 million and to form a coalition consisting of the League, CORE, the 
Black Economic Union, SCLC'S Operation Breadbasket, the National Busi-
ness League, the National Bankers Association, and other groups. He sup-
ported Innis's economic development initiative because this interpretation of 
Black Power was compatible with League objectives.67 
Young approached cooperation with ImamuAmiri Baraka with the same 
realism that marked his relationship with McKissick and Innis. Baraka, who 
had changed his name from Leroi Jones, was a well-known writer and poet. 
As a Black Power theoretician he stressed cultural nationalism as an indis-
pensable foundation for black nationhood. A native of Newark, New Jersey, 
Baraka joined with others on the Committee for Unified Newark to elect the 
city's first black mayor, Kenneth Gibson. To achieve this objective, he asked 
to meet Young to discuss League assistance on a voter education drive. Young 
advised Russell Bingham, the coordinator of Unified Newark, on where the 
committee should seek funding before the 1970 election.68 
In 1970 Baraka brought Young to Newark to speak at a press confer-
ence. He also persuaded Young to attend a Black Power conference in Atlanta 
where the Newark project was explained. The press conference aimed to 
mobilize support for black and Puerto Rican voter registration and to solicit 
contributions to fund their candidates. In support ofBaraka's initiative, Young 
said, "I am most emphatically in favor of the drive to get blacks and Puerto 
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Ricans elected to high office in Newark." He blamed the city's instability on 
the absence of blacks and Puerto Ricans from the municipal government 
despite their 65 percent majority in the population. He also endorsed the 
idea of a black mayor who "could be effective in binding up the wounds of 
racial antagonism," which the six-day riot in 1967 had stirred. For Young, 
Black Power was inextricably linked to political power. He observed, "This 
approach is a healthy and constructive alternative to violence and the chaos 
that results from violence." Although Young and Baraka disagreed about 
integrationism, they found common ground on Black Power and electoral 
politics. As a result Newark's first black mayor was elected.69 
Young worked closest with Black Power advocates in CORE and the Com-
mittee for Unified Newark. Although Percy Steele, the executive director of 
the League's affiliate in Oakland, California, cooperated with the Black Pan-
thers on various local projects, Young generally eschewed contacts with this 
well-known socialist and self-defense organization. At the same time the League 
leader strongly opposed "the undeclared war on radical groups like the Black 
Panthers by the police." Because some Panthers had been killed as a result of 
police repression, Young detected "a feeling of bitterness in the ghetto," and 
he surely believed that a gross injustice had been done to the PanthersJo 
Because some Johnson administration officials were unaware ofYoung's 
extensive interaction with Black Power advocates, they advised the president 
to broaden his contacts with militant black spokesmen. They seemed to ar-
ticulate the views of inner-city blacks better than Young. Although one aide 
preferred the "Randolph-Wilkins-Young type leadership," the rise of inner-
city rioting caused him to worry about the relevance of this triumvirate. An-
other said, "Even Whitney Young and Martin Luther King have been around 
so long that they seem 'old school' to the young militants." This presidential 
adviser regretted that "our lines of communication to the [civil rights] move-
ment run generally (and from the White House, only) to the older Negro 
establishment. We have very few contacts with younger Negro leaders. We 
MUST develop those contacts. "71 Although he eschewed contact with Stokely 
Carmichael and H. Rap Brown, a black presidential aide, Andrew Hatcher, 
suggested that the president "establish some kind of dialogue with the leaders 
of the [1967] Black Power Conference." He added that Johnson should "hear 
for himself some of the fanaticism involved in this movement, to know the 
enemy better, to listen and to warn against anarchy." However, Vice Presi-
dent Hubert H. Humphrey, Johnson's coordinator and chief adviser on civil 
rights, adopted a more pragmatic perspective about which leaders the presi-
dent should invite to the White House.72 
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Young was confident that Vice President Humphrey would protect the 
gains of the civil rights movement and rely on mainstream black leaders for 
advice. As the Johnson administration searched for ways to address racial 
unrest in the big cities, the League suggested to Humphrey, a program to 
prevent riots in twenty-one "high racial tension areas." Although he appreci-
ated Young's input, the vice president concluded that exclusive contact with 
him and other traditional black leaders would end. Instead, Humphrey, who 
in 1966 belonged to a special summer task force on the riots, wanted to 
widen the spectrum of Negro activists with whom he interacted. His aides 
defined them as "the most aggressive Negro groups who do not advocate 
rioting or violence, except in self-defense." These groups included civil rights, 
Black Power, and black nationalist organizations. Although Young did not 
lose his coveted access to the president and vice president, Johnson and 
Humphrey aides pressed for other sources of advice about blacks?3 
As the administration's ombudsman for civil rights, the vice president 
needed more information about black militants. His aides thought that "many 
young people, from college educated to dropout, have been adopting consid-
erably more militant postures." It seemed that "the entire Negro community 
has been moving in this direction." Better communication and cooperation 
between militant blacks and federal officials would reduce the "anger" of the 
activists and turn it "toward constructive channels." A vice presidential aide 
observed, "Despite their strong statements, most militants are not dedicated 
to destroying American society. Instead, they appear essentially to want a 
meaningful part of the power within our society and especially within areas 
largely inhabited by Negroes. Many government programs are available to 
help Negroes, both militants and others, to achieve their fair share of eco-
nomic and political power." It appeared to Humphrey's aides that Young and 
his mainstream colleagues lacked rapport with the activists and that the 
administration's effort to co-opt them would yield far more than what the 
League leader could deliver?4 
Ultimately, President Johnson ignored the advice of several presidential 
and vice presidential aides who recommended improved communications 
with Black Power advocates. Since LBJ saw no reason to abandon Young and 
other mainstream leaders as his principal confidants on civil rights, militant 
black spokesmen remained strangers to the president. How Johnson orches-
trated a response to the King assassination demonstrated how important Young 
and others remained to his administration. On April 4, 1968, James Earl Ray 
shot Martin Luther King Jr. in Memphis, Tennessee. News of the killing of 
this prominent practitioner of nonviolence unleashed widespread rioting in 
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cities throughout the United States. President Johnson hurriedly assembled 
those black leaders whom he believed would help him quell this unexpected 
unrest. Floyd B. McKissick of CORE was the only Black Power proponent 
invited to a White House meeting on April 5, 1968. He had gone into hiding 
for fear of his life, and Roy Innis, his colleague, called the White House for 
McKissick and asked for a list of invitees. Specifically, he wanted to know 
whether Stokely Carmichael, H. Rap Brown, Elijah Muhammad, and Adam 
Clayton Powell had been invited. He received no answers to his inquiries. At 
this point, Harry McPherson and Joseph Califano, both senior aides to the 
president, nixed any further contacts with McKissick and Innis. McKissick 
decided to attend the White House meeting, but he arrived late. When a 
security guard prevented McKissick's two companions from accompanying 
him into the White House, the CORE leader left.l5 
To reassure the nation and to implore ghetto blacks to stop the riots, 
Johnson chose Young, Roy Wilkins, Dorothy Height, Walter Fauntroy, Bayard 
Rustin, two black mayors, and others to follow him onto a White House 
podium to deliver his televised message. Whether McKissick had come or 
not, LBJ probably would have forbidden him to make remarks. But Johnson 
allowed Young and the other mainstream leaders to express their thoughts. 
These were the persons whom he could trust, and for some like Young this 
presidential endorsement seemed to validate him as a preeminent black leader.76 
Whitney M. Young Jr. derived his claim to speak for blacks from three 
principal sources. The majority of blacks who espoused integrationism and 
populated the thousands of churches, fraternal organizations, and service 
groups continuously ratified him as their spokesman. Moreover, Black Power 
advocates, although they criticized his interracialism, sought his advice and 
assistance with programs that transcended their ideological disagreement. And 
his close ties with three American presidents, especially Lyndon B. Johnson, 
validated for many blacks that Young was a man whom the White House 
regarded as a valued adviser and confidant. 
14 
Home to Africa 
T he staunch interracialism ofWhitney M. Young Jr. never precluded broad 
concerns for Africa. Although he was not a black nationalist, racial pride 
stirred his interest in the progress and prosperity of the "mother" continent. 
His cooperation with integrationist blacks and whites aimed at economic 
development, the abolition of white minority rule, and the growth of politi-
cal stability in newly independent nations. Unlike some Black Power advo-
cates who viewed the continent with romantic attachment, Young believed 
that the modernization of sub-Saharan Africa would demonstrate the capac-
ity of blacks to build productive and competitive economies in former colo-
nial areas. 
The Kennedy administration asked for Young's assistance in recruiting 
blacks for foreign policy positions. As a result of his interaction with Assis-
tant Secretary of State G. Mennen Williams, Young nominated the executive 
director of the New York Urban League, a Ph.D., for a high-level position. 
Franklin H. Williams, the director of the Division of Private Organizations 
in the Peace Corps, wanted the National Urban League to cosponsor a rural 
development project in the Camerouns. Afraid that the League might "over-
extend itself," Young rejected this proposal. Despite this setback, he main-
tained contact with Williams and later supported his appointment as U.S. 
ambassador to Ghana. 1 
Young congratulated the president when he ordered three American 
transport aircraft and crews to help the black-led Democratic Republic of the 
Congo to resist a rebellion led by white mercenaries. In Young's view Johnson 
was right "to avert serious internal conflict and chaos in this critical region." 
Johnson replied that his actions were consistent with United Nations resolu-
tions on the territorial integrity of the Congo and with his concern for the 
safety of Americans who were present in the area. Although the Congo mat-
ter only marginally impacted the African American condition, it showed how 
important African issues were to Young.2 
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He mainly dealt with Mrica through his affiliation with several insti-
tutes and committees organized to aid Mricans and to broaden the discourse 
about Mrican issues among academic, corporate, government, and civil rights 
leaders. Although Young had traveled to the continent only a few times, many 
blacks and whites interested in Mrica believed that his League experiences 
gave him special insights about developing nations, especially in the sub-
Saharan region. Young's earliest and longest association occurred with the 
American Negro Leadership Conference on Mrica. Organized in 1962 by 
the American Committee on Mrica, the ANLCA initially drew together the six 
major civil rights leaders: A. Philip Randolph, Martin Luther King Jr., Roy 
Wilkins, Dorothy Height, James Farmer, and Whitney M. Young Jr. A former 
Randolph protege in the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, Theodore E. 
Brown, became the executive director, and an interracial group of religious, 
labor, and cultural organizations, fraternities, and sororities signed on as sup-
porters. Young and the other five civil rights leaders served as a permanent 
"call committee." This position obligated them to give regularly to ANLCA. In 
1967, for example, Young's National Urban League contributed $1,500.3 
ANLCA tried to influence American government policies toward Mrica 
and to ameliorate crisis situations on the continent. After identifying crucial 
issues that demanded the immediate attention of the six civil rights leaders, 
Brown convened at least three biennial conferences and occasional meetings. 
In 1966, for example, Roy Wilkins, chairman of the call committee, asked 
Young and other supporters to meet in Washington to prepare the ANLCA 
structure for issues it needed to tackle. He cited the efforts of the white mi-
nority government of Rhodesia to thwart black majority rule and recent coups 
in several Mrican nations as matters for a strengthenedANLCA to handle. Brown 
informed Young that he and the other call committee members would host 
President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia at their 1966 biennial conference. 
Conflicting schedules, however, prevented both Kaunda and Young from going 
to the meeting.4 
More important, Brown involved Young, Wilkins, Randolph, and the 
other civil leaders in confronting South Mrica's interference in South West 
Mrica and in dealing with the civil war in Nigeria. Because the apartheid 
regime in South Mrica administered South West Mrica with the acquies-
cence of the United Nations. Brown invited Young to meet with several Mri-
can ambassadors to discuss this matter. Although Young missed the meeting, 
he agreed that this "critical issue" should be raised in a special United Nations 
session. Moreover, the six civil rights leaders endorsed a telegram sent to Presi-
dent Johnson which stated that the "apartheid policy of South Mrica dis-
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qualifies that country morally and democratically from ruling South West 
Africa." Because the territory had a black majority, South Africa's white su-
premacist government should withdraw from the region. The American Ne-
gro Leadership Conference urged LBJ to instruct the United States delega-
tion to the United Nations to ask that body to supervise South West Africa as 
it moved toward self-determination and independence. The Johnson admin-
istration agreed to review its policy on South West Africa, but Brown, after a 
White House meeting with two presidential aides, concluded that the ANLCA 
request was not viewed as an urgent matter.5 
Also in 1967 the ANLCA tried to prevent a civil war in Nigeria. Brown 
invited the six civil rights leaders to authorize a cable to Nigerian officials to 
urge a peaceful resolution of tribal conflicts. The ANLCA offered its services to 
preserve unity in the "largest, richest and ... most promising nation in Black 
Africa." Brown informed Young that this message seemed to draw "favorable 
interest and reaction" from the nation's federal and regional leaders. Ulti-
mately, with endorsements from the U.S. State Department, the Nigerian 
embassy, and the ANLCA leadership, Brown traveled to Nigeria as an emissary 
for peace. Young, Wilkins, Randolph, and King aided his efforts by agreeing 
to raise $15,000 to finance ANLCA'S peace mission. Young suggested that the 
appeals should go toward "those American concerns with investments in Ni-
geria and other parts of Africa." Although a destructive civil war still oc-
curred, ANLCA initiatives showed how the "ethnic relationship between 56 
million Nigerians and 22 million Afro-Americans" motivated Young and other 
civil rights leaders to tie together the concerns of blacks on both continents.6 
Although Young applauded ANLCA efforts on the South West Africa and 
Nigeria issues, he had doubts about the organization's effectiveness. George 
M. Houser, a founder of CORE and head of the American Committee on 
Africa, shared with Young an evaluation of ANLCA. Although Houser worried 
most about areas of overlap between the two groups, he also noted its struc-
tural weaknesses. He believed that it would be a stronger organization if policy 
positions were well developed, especially on southern Africa and American 
assistance programs. Moreover, there should have been greater contact be-
tween the ANLCA and federal officials. Young agreed with Houser's analysis 
and admitted to a certain degree of frustration about the conference. But he 
thought that the ANLCA remained an important venue for his concerns for an 
"improved and strengthened American policy in Africa." Young hoped that 
money and full-time leadership would realize this objective? 
Other groups that dealt with African affairs discovered that Young's 
involvement with their efforts enhanced their objectives. The Reverend James 
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H. Robinson, pastor of the Presbyterian Church of the Master in Harlem, 
knew that Young had traveled to Africa. Robinson's Operation Crossroads 
Africa recruited volunteers to help Africans build roads, dig wells, operate 
schools, and initiate other practical projects. In 1965 he believed that his 
contingent of 220 should hear Young speak on some aspect of race relations. 
Although Young could not fulfill his commitment, he endorsed Robinson's 
approach to African development.8 
A. Philip Randolph introduced Young to African issues far more con-
troversial than Robinson's Crossroads program. In 1966 Randolph became 
chairman of the Committee of Conscience Against Apartheid. Earlier Young 
joined Randolph and other civil rights leaders in asking President Kennedy 
to put economic pressure on South Africa. Young shared Randolph's disgust 
with the ruthless system of racial oppression that the South African govern-
ment imposed on blacks and other nonwhites. "There is no question in my 
mind," said Young, "concerning the viciousness of the South African policy 
of apartheid or the need for a change in the attitude [of] the government." 
What Randolph proposed, however, proved problematic for the League leader. 
He suggested that Young join him in persuading depositors at First National 
City and Chase Manhattan to withdraw their accounts because the two banks 
did business with the apartheid regime. Young declined because the project 
illegally would implicate the National Urban League, and he believed that 
the effort would fail. In another instance, Randolph was successful in getting 
Young's support. He invited the League leader to sign an advertisement in 
support of the state of Israel for several major newspapers. The ad affirmed 
"Israel's right to exist because it is by far the most democratic country" in the 
Middle East. Moreover, Randolph told Young, "Israel has established remark-
ably effective technical assistance programs in Black Africa." In fact, it had 
"done more in this area than any of the countries that are aligned against it," 
Randolph observed. The ad commended Israel for drawing many of its im-
migrants from Africa, and it denounced the Arab-dominated government of 
Sudan for its "brutal persecution of black Africans." Young readily signed this 
petition. 
Charles Hightower, the Washington director of the American Com-
mittee on Africa, criticized all of the signatories to the pro-Israel ad because 
they seemed to ignore the relationship between Israel and the apartheid re-
gime in South Africa. He claimed that ties were close enough that in 1968 a 
South Africa-Israel committee had been formed. Young told Hightower, "Is-
rael has never publicly supported South Africa in her oppression of black 
people, and if she trades with that country, so, too, does most of Black Af-
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rica." Concerning the alleged South Mrica-Israel committee, Young said that 
its "mere formation" was "hardly evidence of joint interest with a racist na-
tion whose leaders have been openly anti-Semitic." Young also commended 
Israel's aid to black Mrica. Its record was superior to oil-rich Arab countries, 
which contributed too few funds to sub-Saharan nations.9 
The Mrican American Institute, based at the United Nations in New 
York City, was another group that drew Young's involvement. Concerned 
with creating dialogue between American government and corporate leaders 
and their counterparts in Mrica, the Institute called on Young to speak and 
participate in its various programs. In 1968, for example, the State Depart-
ment asked Institute officials to arrange an orientation at Princeton Univer-
sity for fifty-nine Mrican students from English- and French-speaking areas 
of Mrica. Young was asked to address both groups on urban issues or civil 
rights. The Institute vice president, Frank E. Ferrari, commended Young on 
his speech and observed that "it meant a great deal to the Mricans who were 
there." In 1969 the Institute brought the League leader to Tunis, Tunisia, to 
participate in an American/ Mrican dialogue. Young noted that top officials 
from seventeen Mrican countries attended. His grasp of the issues apparently 
impressed Institute officials because they invited him to attend a future dia-
logue elsewhere on the continent. 10 
The timing of the Institute's 1971 dialogue in Lagos, Nigeria, could 
not have been worse for Young. Frank Buckner, his father-in-law, had re-
cently died in Aurora, Illinois, and Young's Lagos trip took him away from 
his grieving wife, Margaret. "I hope you are making gains in recovery from 
the terrible strain and ordeal of your father's passing," said Young in a letter 
from Lagos. "My travel I can't help, but so much," he observed, "but maybe 
you can go more with me." There was one consolation for Young in being so 
far away from home. The quality of discussion at the Lagos meeting was very 
high. 
The Institute drew from the United States several prominent politi-
cians and corporate executives, including Senator Edmund S. Muskie, former 
attorney general Ramsey Clark, WW Broom, Washington bureau chief of 
Ridder Publications, Thomas Wyman, senior vice president of Polaroid, and 
black congressmen. Young noted, "This is a far better meeting than Tunis. 
The caliber of the delegates both from Mrica and America are far superior. 
The Africans are young, intense, highly intelligent, and beautifully articulate. 
The discussion is more candid and specific." Wyman and Young sat next to 
each other in the sessions and continued their interaction during the free 
periods. Polaroid recently had been accused of collaborating with the apart-
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heid regime of South Mrica, so Wyman came to the meeting to deepen his 
company's understanding of Mrica. Moreover, Institute officials believed that 
Polaroid's experience in South Mrica would enhance discussions. Wyman 
talked with Young about how Polaroid ended its sales to the South Mrican 
government. Polaroid identification equipment was used to put together pass-
books, which nonwhites were compelled to carry and display whenever the 
police demanded to see them. Young commended company efforts to repair 
its image through full-page ads in leading American and South Mrican news-
papers that denounced apartheid. Polaroid endorsed the Sullivan principles, 
aided antiapartheid activists, and funded exchange programs. Young, who 
promoted constructive engagement, agreed that Polaroid should remain in 
South Mrica and champion Sullivan standards for responsible corporate be-
havior. Although Young applauded corporate stands against racial injustice in 
America and Mrica, he reminded Wyman and others that they still had many 
more miles to travel to aid black progress. 11 
The Institute meetings ended on March 11, 1971. Young, Wyman, 
Broom, Ramsey and Georgia Clark, and a few others decided to skip the final 
reception to go to the beach to swim. Because the sutf was choppy, everyone 
agreed to stay close together. When most in the party decided to leave the 
unclean waters, Young and two translators opted to remain. Notwithstand-
ing his swimming skills, Young apparently was caught in a heavy surf. Mis-
takenly, one of the translators commented, "He's playing fish." Ramsey Clark 
thought otherwise. He saw Young's arm go up twice as if to signal that he was 
in trouble. Both Clarks rushed into the water to rescue him. Mter Ramsey 
Clark pulled the League leader onto the beach, he and Broom tried mouth-
to-mouth resuscitation. Their efforts were in vain. A Nigerian pathologist 
performed an autopsy and concluded that Young died of a subarachnoid hem-
orrhage. A second autopsy in New York City produced no evidence of brain 
damage, and he was pronounced a victim of drowning. 12 
President Richard M. Nixon dispatched an air force transport plane to 
bring his body back from Mrica. He sent his personal emissaries, General 
Daniel "Chappie" James and William Rumsfeld. Young's funeral service at 
Riverside Church in New York City featured the Reverend Dr. Benjamin E. 
Mays, the retired president of Morehouse College, and the Reverend Dr. 
Howard Thurman, the famed mystic and Dean of Marsh Chapel at Boston 
University. Young's father and sisters arranged for his burial in the all-black 
Greenwood Cemetery in Lexington, Kentucky, not far from his boyhood 
home. President Nixon delivered a brief eulogy in which he praised Young as 
a quintessential American. Young "loved America with all its faults," Nixon 
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said, "loved it because he realized that this was a country in which we had the 
power to change what was wrong and change it peacefully."13 
New York City and Westchester County had been the center of Young's 
activities and the place where his widow planned to reside. Margaret's wishes 
had not been fully considered when the Kentucky burial site was chosen, and 
she authorized the reinterment of her husband in a Hartsdale, New York, 
cemetery. Support from various family members and consultation with Howard 
Thurman readied her to move on this matter. 14 
Epilogue 
"\Vlhitney M. Young Jr. believed that racial equality was an attainable goal 
W if powerful and influential whites joined with civil rights leaders to 
tear down social and economic barriers to black advancement. He inherited 
this perspective from his father, a black leader in Kentucky during the pre-
civil rights era. Although different racial realities shaped the leadership of the 
two Youngs, the father strongly influenced how the son interpreted to privi-
leged and monied whites the grievances of restless and disadvantaged blacks. 
To reconcile the seemingly disparate interests of whites and blacks, a diplo-
matic spokesperson was needed to mediate their differences. Whitney M. 
Young Sr. served that role in the limited setting of a private Kentucky second-
ary school to which he drew both public and private support. He developed 
Lincoln Institute into an educational venture that simultaneously addressed 
white expectations and black aspirations. As a National Urban League execu-
tive in the broader arena of local and national race relations, his son per-
suaded powerful whites to finance unprecedented social and economic pro-
grams to benefit the black population. 
Specifically, how did Young's leadership impact the black freedom 
struggle? Young's interracialism posited to influential whites in government, 
business, and the foundations that de jure and de facto equality for blacks 
were constitutional and socioeconomic necessities. Moreover, the elimina-
tion of ghettoes, Young contended, would pull blacks into mainstream par-
ticipation in every facet of American society. As a result, powerful whites gave 
the National Urban League large sums of money to achieve integrationist 
objectives. While his ambitious domestic Marshall Plan never received ample 
support, aspects of important League programs and President Johnson's Great 
Society initiatives drew from Young's blueprint and helped blacks who would 
have never benefited from federal, corporate, and philanthropic largesse. What 
ultimately disappointed Young was the realization that the billions which 
were needed to elevate the black population were not forthcoming to the 
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League and other social service organizations. 
How effective was the leadership paradigm that Young pursued? He 
sought support for black advancement from elite whites while credibly repre-
senting the interracialism that most middle- and working-class African Ameri-
cans espoused. Throughout his career, whether as head of the Omaha Urban 
League or as the NUL executive director, Young recognized that whatever favor 
he gained from influential whites also required ratification from fellow blacks. 
Moreover, he understood that whites preferred to deal with him rather than 
with moderate and militant integrationists or with impatient Black Power 
advocates. Young also knew that their seeming radicalism made him a more 
palatable negotiator than some of the other black leaders. 
At the same time Young sometimes failed to maintain the delicate bal-
ance between acceptability to powerful whites and credibility with grassroots 
blacks. Moreover, he occasionally mistook his access to elite whites for inclu-
sion as their peer. His profound disappointment at missing the presidency of 
the wealthy Rockefeller Foundation and his unusual loyalty to Lyndon B. 
Johnson despite the deepening tragedy of the Vietnam War are examples of 
Young caring more for the approval of influential whites than endorsements 
from grassroots blacks. Young was most effective when he balanced his rela-
tionship between whites and blacks. Whenever he appeared to identify with 
important whites, he exposed himself to the pejorative and unfair appella-
tion-"whitey" Young. 
What is too often overlooked about Young's leadership was the extent 
to which he cultivated the favor of blacks and their many institutions and 
organizations. While he pitched his appeal primarily to the interracialism of 
middle- and working-class African Americans, Young cooperated with sepa-
ratists on practical programs consistent with League objectives. Also, through 
New Thrust and other League initiatives Young spearheaded efforts to em-
power blacks in ghetto communities. In so doing he challenged the claims of 
Black Power proponents that they rather than Young and the League under-
stood their condition and articulated their aspirations. As much as he valued 
and pursued access to powerful whites, Young also sought the approval of 
blacks to justify his claim to be their spokesman. Ultimately, Young discov-
ered that the racial equality that he desperately desired for blacks carried for 
whites too high a price in private funds and public expenditures. 
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